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# HISTORY

OF

# ROME.

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BY

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VOL. II.

FROM THE GAULISH INVASION TO THE END OF THE FIRST  
PUNIC WAR.

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SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:

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## P R E F A C E.

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THE volume of this history now published has had throughout, like that which preceded it, the benefit of Niebuhr's assistance. I have only, therefore, to repeat what was said in the preface to the first volume, that "no acknowledgment can be too ample for the advantages which I have derived from his work."

There has lately appeared, in the second volume of Niebuhr's life and letters, a letter written by him to a young student, containing various directions and suggestions with respect to his philological studies. Amongst other things he says, "I utterly disapprove of the common practice of adopting references, after verifying them, without naming the source whence they are taken; and tedious as the double reference is, I never allow myself to dispense with it. When

I cite a passage simply, I have found it out myself. He who does otherwise, assumes the appearance of more extensive reading than belongs to him."

The perfect uprightness of Niebuhr's practice in this point is well worthy of him, and is deserving of all imitation. But I should find it difficult in all cases to say whether I had first noticed a passage myself, or had been led to it by a quotation in another writer. I have availed myself continually of Niebuhr's references, and of those made by Freinsheim in his supplement of Livy; but it has happened also that passages referred to by them had been taken by myself directly from the original source, without recollecting, or indeed without knowing, that they had been quoted previously by others. Niebuhr's reading was so vast, and his memory so retentive, that he may be presumed never to have overlooked any thing which could illustrate his subject: it is probable therefore that every quotation made in this volume may be found previously made by Niebuhr, unless it happen to relate to a matter which he has not written on. But yet some quotations were made by me with so little consciousness of their existing in Niebuhr, that in one instance I searched his volume to see whether he had noticed a passage, because I did not remember to have observed any quotation of it by him, and



yet I felt sure, as proved to be the case, that he had not overlooked it.

I have only therefore to state that many passages have been quoted by me from Pliny, Valerius Maximus, Frontinus, and other writers, for the knowledge, or at least for the recollection of which, I was indebted either to Niebuhr, or to Freinsheim, or to some other modern writer. And yet I can truly say that not a single paragraph in this volume has been written on a mere verifying of the references made by preceding writers, but that my own reading and comparison of the ancient authorities has been always the foundation of it. This is not said as laying claim to any remarkable degree of diligence or of learning, but simply to establish my right to call this history an original work, and not a mere compilation from Niebuhr or from others, who have gone over the ground previously.

But I shall be believed by all who are acquainted with Niebuhr's third volume, when I say that the composition of this volume of mine has been throughout a most irksome labour; inasmuch as I was but doing with manifest inferiority in every point what Niebuhr had done in all points admirably. In my first volume, although all the substance of it and much more was to be found in Niebuhr, yet in its form it might hope to have some advan-

tage, as putting his matter into a more popular shape. But his third volume is no less eloquent than wise; and is as superior to mine in the power of its narrative as in the profoundness of its researches. And yet this present volume was to be written, as a necessary part of my own work. I was obliged, therefore, to go through with it as well as I could, feeling most keenly all the while the infinite difference between Niebuhr's history and mine.

It may be thought by some that this volume is written at too great length; and I have heard that one, for whose judgment I have the greatest respect, has found the same fault with the preceding volume. But I am convinced, by a tolerably large experience, that most readers find it almost impossible to impress on their memory a mere abridgment of history; the number of names and events crowded into a small space is overwhelming to them, and the absence of details in the narrative makes it impossible to communicate to it much of interest; neither characters nor events can be developed with that particularity which is the best help to the memory, because it attracts and engages us, and impresses images on the mind as well as facts. At the same time I am well aware of the great difficulty of giving liveliness to a narrative which necessarily gets all its facts at second hand. And a writer who has never been engaged

in any public transactions, either of peace or war, must feel this especially. One who is himself a statesman and orator, may relate the political contests even of remote ages with something of the spirit of a contemporary; for his own experience realizes to him in great measure the scenes and the characters which he is describing. And in like manner a soldier or a seaman can enter fully into the great deeds of ancient warfare; for although in outward form ancient battles and sieges may differ from those of modern times, yet the genius of the general and the courage of the soldier, the call for so many of the highest qualities of our nature which constitutes the enduring moral interest of war, are common alike to all times, and he who has fought under Wellington has been in spirit an eye-witness of the campaigns of Hannibal. But a writer whose whole experience has been confined to private life and to peace, has no link to connect him with the actors and great deeds of ancient history, except the feelings of our common humanity. He cannot realize civil contests or battles with the vividness of a statesman and a soldier; he can but enter into them as a man; and his general knowledge of human nature, his love of great and good actions, his sympathy with virtue, his abhorrence of vice, can alone assist him in making himself as it were a wit-



ness of what he attempts to describe. But these even by themselves will do much ; and if an historian feels as a man and as a citizen, there is hope that, however humble his experience, he may inspire his readers with something of his own interest in the events of his history : he may hope at least that a full detail of these events, however feebly represented, will be worth far more than a mere brief summary of them, made the text for a long comment of his own.

*Rugby,*  
*May 28th, 1840.*

# CONTENTS

OF

## VOLUME II.

### CHAPTER XXV.

PAGE

History, foreign and domestic, from the year 365 to 378—Rome after the retreat of the Gauls—its weakness, and the great misery of the Commons—Popularity and death of M. Manlius—Wars with the neighbouring nations . . . . .	1
---	---

### CHAPTER XXVI.

The Licinian Laws.—378-384 . . . . .	32
--------------------------------------	----

### CHAPTER XXVII.

General History, domestic and foreign, from the admission of the Commons to the Consulship to the beginning of the first Samnite War—Evasion of the Licinian Laws—Wars with the Gauls, Tarquiniensians, and Volscians.—A.U.C. 389-412, Livy : 384-407, Niebuhr . . . . .	62
--	----

### CHAPTER XXVIII.

The first Samnite War—Sedition of the year 408—Genucian Laws.—A.U.C. 407-409, Niebuhr : 410-412, Fasti Capit. : 412-414, Livy . . . . .	98
---	----

## CHAPTER XXIX.

	PAGE
The great Latin War—Battle under Mount Vesuvius—The Publilian Laws—Final settlement of Latium.—A.U.C. 415-417 : 410-412, Niebuhr . . . . .	130

## CHAPTER XXX.

General History to the beginning of the second Samnite War—Privernum—Palæopolis.—A.U.C. 418-428 : 413-423, Niebuhr	163
--	-----

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Second Samnite War—L. Papirius Cursor—Affair of the Forks or Pass of Caudium—Battle of Lautulæ—Q. Fabius, and the War with Etruria.—A.U.C. 428-450 : 423-444, Niebuhr	193
---	-----

## CHAPTER XXXII.

Internal History from 428 to 454—Abolition of Personal Slavery for Debt—Dictatorship of C. Mænius—Censorship of Appius Claudius—Censorship of Q. Fabius and P. Decius—The Ogulnian Law . . . . .	267
--	-----

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

Foreign History from 450 to 464 (443 to 456, Niebuhr)—Conquest of the Æquians—Third Samnite War—Coalition of the Etruscans, Samnites, and Gauls—Great battle of Sentinum, and death of P. Decius—Final victory of Q. Fabius over the Samnites—C. Pontius is led in triumph, and put to death in cold blood . . . . .	309
--	-----

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

Internal History from the passing of the Ogulnian Law to the landing of Pyrrhus in Italy—Secession to the Janiculum—Dictatorship of Q. Hortensius—Hortensian and Mænian Laws—From A.U.C. 454 to 474 . . . . .	367
---	-----



## CHAPTER XXXV.

PAGE

- State of the East—Kingdoms of Alexander's Successors—Sicily  
—Greece—Kingdom of Epirus, and early fortunes of Pyrrhus 400

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

- Rome and the Roman People at the beginning of the War with  
the Tarentines and with Pyrrhus . . . . . 446

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

- Foreign History from 464 to 479—Wars with the Etruscans,  
Gauls, and Tarentines—Fourth Samnite War—Pyrrhus king  
of Epirus in Italy—Battles of Heraclea, Asculum, and Bene-  
ventum . . . . . 465

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

- General History from the departure of Pyrrhus from Italy to the  
beginning of the first Punic War—Final submission of Sam-  
nium—Conquest of Tarentum—Picentian and Volsinian  
Wars—Rome acquires the sovereignty of all Italy—Detached  
events and anecdotes relating to this Period.—479 to 489,  
A.U.C. 275 to 265, A.C. . . . . 521

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

- Constitution and power of Carthage . . . . . 546

## CHAPTER XL.

- First Punic War—The Romans invade Sicily—Submission of  
Hiero—The Romans create a Navy—Naval victories of  
Mylæ and Ecnomus—Expedition of M. Regulus to Africa;  
His successes, his arrogance in victory, his defeat and  
captivity—War in Sicily—Siege of Lilybæum and naval  
actions connected with it—Hamilcar Barca at Eircte and  
Eryx—Naval battle of the Ægates—Peace concluded.—  
A.U.C. 490 to 513—A.C. 264 to 241. . . . . 561



# HISTORY OF ROME.

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## CHAPTER XXV.

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HISTORY, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, FROM THE YEAR  
365 TO 378—ROME AFTER THE RETREAT OF THE  
GAULS—ITS WEAKNESS, AND THE GREAT MISERY  
OF THE COMMONS—POPULARITY AND DEATH OF  
M. MANLIUS—WARS WITH THE NEIGHBOURING  
NATIONS.

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Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ κοινόν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκ τῆς χώρας  
ἀπῆλθον, διεκομίζοντο εὐθὺς ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν  
περιοῦσαν κατασκευήν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνοικοδομεῖν παρεσκευάζοντο.—  
THUCYDIDES, I. 89.

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LIVY begins his history of the period after the  
invasion of the Gauls, by contrasting what he calls  
its greater clearness and certainty with the obscurity  
of the period which had preceded it. True it is,  
that there was no subsequent destruction of public  
records such as had been caused by the burning of  
the city: and although many invaluable monuments  
perished in the great fire of the Capitol in the times  
of Sylla, yet these might have been, and in some  
instances we know that they had been, previously  
consulted by historians, so that all knowledge of

CHAP.  
XXV.

The Roman  
history is  
still full of  
uncertainty.

CHAP.  
XXV.

their contents was not lost to the writers of the Augustan age. Yet still no period of Roman history since the first institution of the tribunes of the commons is really more obscure than the thirty years immediately following the retreat of the Gauls. And the reason of this is, that when there are no independent cotemporary historians, the mere existence of public documents affords no security for the preservation of a real knowledge of men and actions. The documents may exist, indeed, but they give no evidence: they are neglected or corrupted at pleasure by poets and panegyrists: and a fictitious story gains firm possession of the public mind, because there is no one to take the pains of promulgating the truth. And thus it has happened that the panegyrists of Camillus and of the other great patrician families, finding ready belief in many instances from national vanity, have so disguised the real course of events, that at no other period of Roman history is it more difficult to restore it.

The Romans  
proceed to  
restore their  
city. Pro-  
posal for re-  
moving to  
Veii. Camil-  
lus persuades  
the people to  
remain at  
Rome.

The Gauls were gone, and the ruins of Rome were possessed again by the Romans. The Flamen of Quirinus and the Vestal Virgins returned from Cære; and the eternal fire, unextinguished by the late calamity, was restored to its accustomed place in the temple of Vesta. But the fugitives who had fled to Veii from the rout at the Alia, and who formed a large proportion of the Roman people, were most unwilling to leave the city which for several months had been their only country: at Veii they had houses already built, and perhaps they were



not sorry to escape from the ascendancy of the patricians, and to settle themselves in a new city of which they would be the original citizens<sup>1</sup>. Thus Rome was threatened anew with the dangers of a secession, with such a division of the strength of the commonwealth as must have ensured its ruin; for some of the patricians would no doubt have removed to Veii, while others, with their clients, would as certainly have remained at Rome. At this period the name and ability of Camillus were most effectual in putting an end to the dissension, and in determining that the proposed secession to Veii should be utterly abandoned: but by what means or at what time his exile was reversed, we cannot discover. It may be true<sup>2</sup>, that while the Gauls were in possession of Rome he had encouraged the people of Ardea, where he had become a citizen, to take up arms against the Gaulish plundering parties; he may also, in such a time of necessity, have been chosen commander by some of the Romans who had fled from the city, and with them he may have done good service, both in cutting off the enemy's stragglers, and perhaps in harassing their rear after they began to retreat. And if after these exploits he had led back his party to Rome rather than to Veii, and had thus proved that even in banishment his heart was true to his old country, there is no doubt that he would have been received as joyfully as the Athe-

<sup>1</sup> That is, they would be the burghers or patricians of Veii, and around them a new plebs or commons would in process of time be formed, just as they themselves had grown up beside the patricians of Rome.

<sup>2</sup> See Livy, V. 43, 44.

nians under similar circumstances received Alcibiades<sup>3</sup>; his exile would have been speedily reversed, and his entrance into Rome, like Cicero's in after-times, would have been celebrated with general rejoicings. Still more would this have been the case, had he really during his exile repaired to Veii, and brought back to Rome after the retreat of the Gauls any considerable portion of the soldiers who had made Veii their refuge. Then may have followed the discussion whether these soldiers should return to their countrymen at Veii, or whether all should unite once more at Rome. Then Camillus and the patricians opposed to the secession would naturally appeal both in the senate<sup>4</sup> and the forum to all the local attachments and religious feelings of which Rome alone could be the object; and when the excitement was great, and the smallest thing would incline men's wavering minds either the one way or the other, it may be true<sup>5</sup> that they received as an omen from heaven the casual words of a centurion, who passing through the comitium with his century, and having occasion to halt in front of the senate-house, called aloud to the standard-bearer,

<sup>3</sup> When Alcibiades returned to Athens in the 25th year of the Peloponnesian war, after his successes in the Hellespont and in Thrace, he had never been formally recalled from exile, and doubted at first, it is said, how he should be received. But a sense of his great services, and of the necessities of the commonwealth, overpowered all other considerations, and the people did receive him with enthusiasm.—See Xeno-

phon, *Hellenic*. I. 4. How refreshing is it after the vagueness and uncertainties of the Roman traditions to turn for a moment to the narrative of a cotemporary historian, even when, like Xenophon, he is far below the highest standard of excellence!

<sup>4</sup> See the speech ascribed to Camillus in Livy, V. 51-54.

<sup>5</sup> The story is given by Livy, V. 55, and by Plutarch, *Camillus*, 32.

“Pitch<sup>6</sup> thy standard here, for this is the best place to stop at.”

CHAP.  
XXV.

The secession, in whatever manner, having been prevented, and the mass of the commons having consented to remain at Rome, although many still refused to quit Veii, the senate proceeded to reconstruct, as well as they could, the shattered fabric of the commonwealth. The sites of the temples<sup>7</sup> were retraced as well as was possible amidst the ruins, their limits were again duly fixed by the augurs, and ceremonies were performed to expiate the pollution which they had undergone by having been profaned by the barbarians. Some relics which it was impossible to replace, were said to have been miraculously preserved; the lituus<sup>8</sup> or augural crook of Romulus, with which he was supposed to have marked out the quarters of the heavens, when in answer to his augury the gods sent him the famous sign of the twelve vultures, was discovered unhurt, so ran the tradition, under a heap of ashes. Then the day<sup>9</sup> in which the rout of the Alia had taken place, the day after the ides of July, or the 16th according to our reckoning, was pronounced by the pontifices to be a day of ill-omen; and no sacrifice could acceptably be offered, nor any business prosperously done, on that day for ever. All<sup>10</sup> remaining records were sought for; the laws of the twelve tables, some laws ascribed to the kings, and some

The remaining monuments are collected, and the city begins to be rebuilt.

<sup>6</sup> Signifer, statue signum hic nysius, XIV. 5. Fragm. Mai.  
manebimus optime. <sup>9</sup> Gellius, V. 17. Livy, VI. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, V. 50.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, VI. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, Camillus, 32. Dio-

CHAP.  
XXV.

treaties with foreign nations, such as those with Carthage and with the Latins, were found to be still in existence; and parts of the laws were again fixed up in some place where they were accessible to the people at large: but the sacred or religious law, it is said, was not made public; the pontifices alone were to be acquainted with it. The city was to be rebuilt with all diligence; at present even the walls had been partially broken down, and the streets were a mere heap of ashes. There was no plan to show their old direction; men built wherever they found a spot clear of rubbish, and the first houses so erected, determined in great measure the position of the rest. Each citizen, no doubt, built upon his own hill, and generally speaking, in his own quarter, or parish, if I may use the expression, according to the division of the city marked by the *sacraria* or chapels of the *Argei*. But within these limits, the old distinctions of property were not duly observed, and there was a sort of scramble for the ground; so that the city was built irregularly, and the direction<sup>11</sup> of the *cloacæ* did not correspond with that of the streets. Meanwhile the government offered to furnish<sup>12</sup> roofing materials for the new houses at the public expense: and Niebuhr conjectures that these

<sup>11</sup> Livy, V. 55.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, V. 55. *tegula publice præbita est*. We know from Cornelius Nepos, quoted by Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* XVI. 10. § 36. that the houses in Rome were roofed with wood (shingles), down to the time of the war with Pyrrhus. Either then, *tegula* is a general

word in this passage of Livy, signifying roofing materials, whether of shingles or of tiles; or if it mean tiles strictly, we must suppose that the people did not like the labour of fetching them from Veii, and preferred to use wood, according to their former practice.



were chiefly obtained by unroofing the houses of Veii, and thus rendering the proposed seat of the secession uninhabitable, while it was made to contribute at the same time to the rebuilding of Rome. Stone and timber might also be quarried and felled by any man from any public lands, provided he gave security that he would complete his house within the year. But with all these aids the building fell heavily upon the mass of the people; it was delayed also by the attacks of foreign enemies: the securities given for completing it within the year would in many instances be forfeited; and hence began again the old system of borrowing from the patricians, speedily to be followed as before by a train of intolerable distresses and oppressions.

CHAP.  
XXV.

In the small states of Greece and ancient Italy, the loss of a great battle caused a sensible diminution of the population of free citizens. The defeat at the Alia had been bloody: many lives must have been lost in after skirmishes with the Gauls, and in their devastations of the surrounding country; and many fugitives who had taken refuge in the neighbouring cities may have preferred remaining in their new homes. On the other hand, there was a large subject<sup>13</sup> population, chiefly, it is probable, of Tyrrhenian,

Four new  
tribes added  
to the Ro-  
man people.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, VI. 4. calls the new citizens, "qui Veientium Capenatiumque ac Faliscorum per ea bella transfugerant ad Romanos." Individual deserters could not be numerous enough to form four tribes; but when the cities of Veii and Capena were hard-pressed, their territory, inhabited chiefly by

a subject population, *περίοικοι* in the political language of Greece, would be likely to revolt or submit to the Romans. The new citizens could scarcely have been Etruscans, as the difference of language would then have presented a serious barrier to their union with the Romans; but if



CHAP.  
XXV.

that is, of Pelasgian origin, in the recently conquered territories of Veii, of Capena, and, as Livy adds, of Falerii. From these it was resolved to make up the losses occasioned by the Gauls, and to convert subjects, who would infallibly have soon revolted, into citizens, who would be a most seasonable accession of strength. Accordingly, they were admitted in a body to the full rights of Roman citizens: each head of a family had his portion of seven jugera of land duly granted to him in full property, and set with landmarks, according to the rules of the agri-mensores, which constituted the legal freehold tenure of the Romans; and to show the great number of new citizens thus admitted, four new tribes<sup>14</sup> were formed out of them, and they thus constituted nearly a sixth part of the whole people in political weight, and probably a larger proportion in point of actual numbers. The tribes were thus increased from twenty-one to twenty-five.

The neighbouring people attack the Romans. Camillus repels the Volscians and Etruscans.

I have noticed these measures without regard to the exact chronological order in which they are said to have occurred. They are all placed, however, with the exception of the creation of the four new tribes, in the first year after the retreat of the Gauls: in that year the new citizens were admitted, and received their grants of land: although the creation of the new tribes, in which they might exercise their franchise politically by voting at the

they were Tyrrhenian Pelasgians, they were of the same stock as the Romans themselves, and their language and religion both bore a

considerable affinity to those of Rome.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, VI. 5.

comitia, is said to have happened two years<sup>15</sup> later. The magistrates still, as before the Gaulish invasion, came into office on the first of July<sup>16</sup>: thus the military tribunes who had commanded at the Alia and during the siege of the capitol, were still in office for some months after the retreat of the Gauls; but they were not allowed to hold the comitia<sup>17</sup> for the election of their successors, because of the supposed ill-luck of their magistracy: they resigned therefore, and the comitia were held by an interrex, a fact which of itself confutes the story of Camillus' pretended dictatorship: for had he been dictator throughout the year, according to the tales of his exploits<sup>18</sup>, the comitia would naturally have been held by him, and there would have been no need of an interregnum. But immediately after the appointment of the new tribunes, that is, about the season of harvest, the favourite season for the plundering incursions of the Peloponnesians into Attica, the Romans were alarmed by the reports of hostile attacks on every side; their forlorn condition, it is said, tempting even the smallest of the neighbouring states to assail them. If we are to believe one tradition which has accidentally been preserved to us<sup>19</sup>, the people of Ficulea, Fidenæ, and other places round about, appeared in arms under com-

<sup>15</sup> That is, it took place at the next census, which was taken in the year 368; the preceding censors having been appointed in the year 363. Livy, V. 31.

<sup>16</sup> They continued to do so, it is

said, for at least sixty years after this period. See Livy, VIII. 20.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, VI. 1.

<sup>18</sup> See Livy, VI. 1, and Plutarch, Camillus, 31.

<sup>19</sup> By Varro, Ling. Lat. VI. 18,

CHAP.  
XXV.

mand of Livius Postumius, the dictator, as he is called, of the Fidenatians, and caused such a panic that the Romans fled before them; and the anniversary of this flight, the nones or 7th of July, was celebrated ever afterwards under the name of the day of the people's flight<sup>20</sup>. This, however, is an uncertain story<sup>21</sup>, in some respects improbable, and connected at any rate with circumstances which are clearly fabulous. It is more credible that the late destructive inroad of the Gauls should have shaken all old political relations, and that the Romans could no longer rely on the aid of the Latins and Hernicans. Emboldened by their knowledge of this, the Volscians took up arms, and advanced into Latium as far as the neighbourhood of Lanuvium<sup>22</sup>, which stood on a sort of spur of high ground, running out from the very southern extremity of the Alban Hills. Here they encountered the Roman army commanded by the military tribunes, and were so superior in numbers, that they presently confined

ed. Müller, and partly by Macrobius, Saturnal. I. 11.

<sup>20</sup> Poplifugia.

<sup>21</sup> It is uncertain, because a different account of the origin of the Poplifugia is given by Macrobius, Saturnal. III. 2, and by Dionysius, II. 56, and because we know how little reliance is to be placed on stories pretending to account for the origin of old traditional usages or festivals. It is improbable, because Fidenæ had been taken and colonized by the Romans forty years earlier, and from that time forward plays no part in history, and because Ficulea is never men-

tioned at all after the times of the Roman kings. Nor can we conceive how Fidenæ should have had a dictator, which was a title peculiar to the Latin towns; unless, indeed, we suppose that it had joined some Latin confederacy since the fall of the Roman power, and was now become Latin. Further, the story of the Fidenatian dictator is mixed up with the famous legend of Tutula and the female slaves, which is evidently fabulous.

<sup>22</sup> Diodorus, XIV. 117. Livy, VI. 2.

the Romans within their camp. The tidings of their danger were carried to Rome; Camillus was named dictator, and he, taking the field with every man who could bear arms, hastened from Rome by a night-march<sup>23</sup>, and appeared at day-break on the rear of the Volscians. Then the Roman army under the military tribunes made a sally, and the Volscians, attacked both in front and rear, were totally routed. Scarcely was this danger repelled, when the dictator learnt that an Etruscan army, probably from Tarquinii, had attacked the Roman frontier on the opposite side, on the right bank of the Tiber, and was besieging Sutrium. Camillus hastened to its aid, but on his way<sup>24</sup>, said the story of his exploits, he met the citizens of Sutrium in forlorn plight, they having been obliged to surrender their city, and having saved nothing but their lives. They fell on their knees before him, told him their sad case, and craved his assistance. He bade them be of good cheer, saying that it was now the turn of the Etruscans to wail and weep. Then he advanced upon Sutrium, and found, as he had expected, that the enemy kept no watch, and were thinking of nothing but plunder: he instantly forced his way into the place, made a great slaughter, and a still greater number of prisoners; and Sutrium was thus, accord-

<sup>23</sup> The resemblance of this story to that of Cincinnatus is obvious, and is very suspicious. Livy merely describes the victory of Camillus, without saying anything of the previous danger. Plutarch makes the Latins to have joined

the Volscians, but he expressly says that Camillus marched to relieve the army of the military tribunes, which was besieged by the enemy.—Camillus, 34.

<sup>24</sup> Livy, VI. 3. Plutarch, Camillus, 35.



CHAP.  
XXV.

ing to the story, "lost and recovered in a day again<sup>25</sup>." It is impossible to tell how much of exaggeration is mixed up with these details; but there is no reason to doubt that Camillus by his genius in this memorable year did truly save his country from destruction. The enemies of Rome were checked, and time was gained for the state to recover from its disorder and distress, and to meet its rivals on more equal terms. The very existence of the Roman people in after-ages proves how well they must have defended themselves when attacked by two enemies at once in the hour of their most extreme helplessness and depression.

It were a mere wearying of the reader's patience to follow Livy through the details of the petty wars of this period, details which cannot be regarded as historical, and which, even though true, would be of little value. It will be enough to trace generally Rome's foreign relations down to the time of her great internal regeneration.

Extent of  
the Roman  
frontier. Its  
limit to-  
wards Etru-  
ria.

On the right bank of the Tiber, the Roman frontier neither advanced nor receded. Nepete and Sutrium, which had submitted to Rome three or four years before the Gaulish invasion<sup>26</sup>, and were the border towns of the Roman dominion, were twice, according to the story of Camillus, attacked

<sup>25</sup> The very passage from which this line is taken, in Shakspeare's Henry VI. Part I. shows how little reliance can be placed on a poetical version of events in themselves historical. The line refers to the capture of Rouen by the

Maid of Orleans, and its recovery by Talbot on the same day; both the capture and recapture being, as every one knows, alike purely imaginary.

<sup>26</sup> See Vol. I. chap. xviii.



by the Etruscans; once, as we have seen, in 366, and again in 369. They were both, according to the same authority, taken in 369, and immediately recovered<sup>27</sup>. It appears that the Etruscans, who were engaged in this affair, were the people of Tarquinii; and finding the strength of Rome greater than they had expected, they were probably glad to conclude a truce for a certain number of years; which was no less welcome to the Romans, as they saw that they should have enemies enough on their hands on their opposite frontier.

CHAP.  
XXV.

On the left bank of the Tiber we hear of wars with the Volscians generally, almost every year, and particularly with the people of Antium. The scene of action was commonly the neighbourhood of Satricum, a town which lay between Velitræ and Antium<sup>28</sup>. Satricum had originally been one of the thirty cities of the Latins; it had then been conquered by the Æquians and Volscians, had afterwards been taken by the Romans, and had lastly, a little while before the Gaulish invasion, revolted from them<sup>29</sup>, and was now again become Volscian. It is said to have been retaken by Camillus in 369<sup>30</sup>, and a Roman colony was sent to occupy it in the following year. Again, however, it was lost in 373<sup>31</sup>, and held for five years by the Volscians; after which

Its limits on  
the left bank  
of the Tiber.

<sup>27</sup> Livy, VI. 9, 10.

<sup>28</sup> Its position is unknown: the Italian antiquaries fix it at a little place called Conca, on the edge of the Selva di Nettuno, in the supposed line of the old road from Velitræ to Astura and Antium.

But nothing exists beyond a few shapeless ruins, which can determine nothing. Westphal. p. 40.

<sup>29</sup> Diodorus, XIV. 102.

<sup>30</sup> Livy, VI. 8. 16.

<sup>31</sup> Livy, VI. 22.

CHAP.  
XXV.

time, when the people of Antium made peace with the Romans, and Satricum was to have been restored, it was burnt, out of indignation, by the Latins<sup>32</sup>, who had been allied with the Antiatiens against Rome, and now found themselves deserted. Thus, on this side, the Roman frontier had considerably receded from the point which it had reached thirty years earlier. Then Anxur had been conquered, but now even Satricum could not be maintained, a place less than thirty miles distant from Rome. The loss of Anxur is nowhere expressly acknowledged; but it must have fallen either in the year 358, when we read of its being besieged by the Volscians<sup>33</sup>; or else it must have been lost, as well as Bola<sup>34</sup>, amidst the calamity of the Gaulish invasion; for it is not possible that it could have been retained by the Romans whilst the Volscians were fighting year after year at Satricum, nearly five-and-twenty miles nearer to Rome.

Altered re-  
lations of  
Rome with  
Latium.

But the peculiar feature of Rome's foreign relations, after the retreat of the Gauls, consisted in her altered position with respect to the Latins. Hitherto, during all the wars with the Æquians and Volscians, the alliance of the Latins and Hernicans with the Romans had remained unbroken. It is true that some of the thirty Latin cities which had concluded the original treaty with Sp. Cassius in 261, had since been conquered by the Æquians and Volscians<sup>35</sup>:

<sup>32</sup> Livy, VI. 33.

<sup>33</sup> Livy, V. 16.

<sup>34</sup> Camillus is made to recover Bola from the Æquians, in the year 366. Livy, VI. 2. It must

therefore have been previously lost.

<sup>35</sup> Of the thirty Latin cities enumerated by Dionysius, eight are mentioned by Livy or Diony-

and thus, as Niebuhr supposes, that treaty had long since been virtually at an end: and while some of the Latin states were become Æquian or Volscian, or had drawn around themselves a distinct confederacy of the small towns in their immediate neighbourhood; others, like Tusculum, were, from the equal, become no more than the dependent allies of Rome: for instance, Præneste, as Niebuhr thinks, must from its position have become Æquian, and Tibur stood aloof, and formed the centre of a small confederacy of its own. It does not, however, appear to me that we are compelled to adopt this supposition by the reason of the case; and external testimony<sup>26</sup>, such as it is, seems to be against it. The Æquians may have poured out upon the Campagna through that breach in the Apennine wall which lies open close below

sus as having been conquered by the Volscians under the command of Coriolanus; Velitræ also became Volscian in the course of the wars with the Opican nations; and others of the thirty which are not noticed again in history, were in all probability destroyed.

<sup>26</sup> Livy says that "the Latins and Hernicans, since the battle at the lake Regillus, had remained faithful to Rome for nearly a century without interruption." VI. 2. This, as a general statement, and one clearly in some respects inaccurate, may not be entitled to much weight; but a variety of incidental notices in the accounts of the several years, seem to imply that the alliance between the three nations, Romans, Latins, and Hernicans, lasted without any material change down to the

Gaulish war. Latins and Hernicans joined Camillus against Veii in 359. (Livy, V. 19.) Ferentinum, when taken from the Volscians, was given to the Hernicans as their share of the spoil in 342. (Livy, IV. 51.) The Latin and Hernican lands are ravaged by the Æquians or Volscians in 346, (Livy, IV. 55.) in 345, (id. IV. 53.) and the Hernican lands in 342. (Id. IV. 51.) The Latins and Hernicans announce the intended invasion of the Opican nations in 332 and 324, (Livy, IV. 26. 37.) and in 292 it is expressly mentioned that the lands ravaged by the Volscians were those of the Prænestines, Gabians, and Tusculans (Livy, III. 8): the three people belonging all alike at that period to the Latin confederacy.

CHAP.  
XXV.

Præneste, and may have occupied Pedum in the plain, and Lavici on the roots of the Alban Hills; nay, they may have even taken Bola within the mountain-range itself, and yet the impregnable strength of Præneste, which, at a later period, so long defied the whole power of Sylla, may have remained in perfect security; and as the Hernicans were unconquered, and yet lay quite on the rear of the Æquians when they established themselves on Algidus, so Tibur and Præneste, safe in their mountain-holds, may have continued to belong to Latium, though almost isolated from the mass of the Latin people by the conquests of the Opican nations. On the other hand, it is very likely that amid the ruin of the Latin cities around them, many small Latin communities may have gathered under their protection; and that thus the disproportion in strength between them and the other remaining states of the Latin confederacy would have become greater than it had been before. This of itself, when Rome had been so crushed by the Gauls, would lead to an altered relation between them and the Romans. By the treaty concluded with Sp. Cassius, Rome stood as one contracting party, and the whole Latin confederacy as another: of the plunder or conquest made by the allied nations, the share of Rome alone was to be equal to that of all the Latin cities together; the allied armies were to be commanded alternately by a Roman and a Latin; but each particular Latin state would enjoy the command many times less often than Rome. Thus when Rome had sunk in

power, and Præneste had risen, it would seem fair that they should stand towards each other on a different footing; that Præneste should be no longer a mere single member of the state of Latium, but should itself treat as state to state with Rome.

CHAP.  
XXV.

Be this as it may, we find that after the Gaulish invasion, the treaty of Sp. Cassius, both with the Latins and Hernicans, was either imperfectly observed, or altogether violated for a period of nearly thirty years. Latin and Hernican volunteers in great numbers are said to have joined the armies of the Volscians<sup>37</sup>; then the Latins generally, without any mention of particular states, are described as at open war with Rome<sup>38</sup>, in alliance with the Volscians; and Lanuvium<sup>39</sup>, and above all, Præneste<sup>40</sup>, are especially noticed as taking a prominent part in these hostilities. On the other hand Tusculum<sup>41</sup>, though on one occasion suspected, remained generally true to Rome: and so also did Gabii and Lavici<sup>42</sup>. It may be well conceived how greatly this altered disposition of the Latins added to the distress of the Roman commons. For some years past Latium had borne the brunt of the ravaging incursions of the Æquians and Volscians; its aid had enabled the Romans to carry the war at times into the enemy's country, while their own territory had rested in security. But now we read of the Roman territory being ravaged in all directions by the Vol-

Wars with  
the Latin  
states,—  
Præneste.

<sup>37</sup> Livy, VI. 7. 13.

<sup>38</sup> Livy, VI. 30. 32, 33.

<sup>39</sup> Livy, VI. 21.

<sup>40</sup> Livy, V. 21, 22, 27, et seq. 30.

<sup>41</sup> Livy, VI. 21. 25, 26.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.



CHAP.  
XXV.

scians<sup>43</sup>; and on one occasion<sup>44</sup> the Prænestines having laid waste the country between the Tiber and the Anio, a quarter most likely to have escaped the attacks of other enemies, at last even crossed the Anio, and advanced as far as the very walls of Rome. Under such circumstances any gleam of victory would be doubly welcome; and an inscription in the Capitol<sup>45</sup> long recorded the successful campaign of T. Quinctius Cincinnatus, who having been appointed dictator to repel this invasion of the Prænestines, marched out against them, defeated them in a battle on the very banks of the ill-omened Alia, chased them into their own country, and stormed nine of their townships in as many days. But such successes, like those with which the Saxon Kings of England sometimes relieved the disasters of the Danish invasions, were attended by no permanent fruits. The Prænestines were in the field again the very next year<sup>46</sup>; and the aspect of the Roman foreign affairs continued to be overclouded down to the very end of that period with which we are concerned in the present chapter.

Internal  
distress.

But the prospect at home was not overclouded merely; it was the very deepest darkness of misery.

<sup>43</sup> Livy, VI. 31.

<sup>44</sup> Livy, VI. 28.

<sup>45</sup> Livy, VI. 29, and Festus in "Triens." The inscription, as Niebuhr has restored it, ran thus:

Juppiter, atque Divi omnes hoc  
dederunt,  
Ut Titus Quinctius dictator  
Romanus

Oppida novem diebus novem  
caperet.

From Jove and all the gods this  
favour did befall,  
That Titus Quinctius, sometime  
Rome's captain-general,  
Nine towns did in nine days as-  
sault and take withal.

<sup>46</sup> Livy, VI. 30.

It has been well said that long periods of general suffering make far less impression on our minds, than the short sharp struggle in which a few distinguished individuals perish; not that we over-estimate the horror and the guilt of times of open bloodshedding, but we are much too patient of the greater misery and greater sin of periods of quiet legalized oppression; of that most deadly of all evils, when law, and even religion herself, are false to their divine origin and purpose, and their voice is no longer the voice of God, but of his enemy. In such cases the evil derives advantage, in a manner, from the very amount of its own enormity. No pen can record, no volume can contain, the details of the daily and hourly sufferings of a whole people, endured without intermission, through the whole life of man, from the cradle to the grave. The mind itself can scarcely comprehend the wide range of the mischief: how constant poverty and insult, long endured as the natural portion of a degraded caste, bear with them to the sufferers something yet worse than pain, whether of the body or the feelings; how they dull the understanding and poison the morals; how ignorance and ill-treatment combined are the parents of universal suspicion; how from oppression is produced habitual cowardice, breaking out when occasion offers into merciless cruelty; how slaves become naturally liars; how they, whose condition denies them all noble enjoyments, and to whom looking forward is only despair, plunge themselves, with a brute's recklessness, into the lowest sensual pleasures; how the

CHAP.  
XXV.

Sufferings of  
the Roman  
commons.

CHAP.  
XXV.

domestic circle itself, the last sanctuary of human virtue, becomes at length corrupted, and in the place of natural affection and parental care, there is to be seen only selfishness and unkindness, and no other anxiety on the part of the parents for their children, than that they may, by fraud or by violence, prey in their turn upon that society which they have found their bitterest enemy. Evils like these, long working in the heart of a nation, render their own cure impossible: a revolution may execute judgment on one generation, and that perhaps the very one which was beginning to see and to repent of its inherited sins; but it cannot restore life to the morally dead; and its ill success, as if in this line of evils no curse should be wanting, is pleaded by other oppressors as a defence of their own iniquity, and a reason for perpetuating it for ever.

Causes of  
the distress:  
severity of  
the treat-  
ment of in-  
solvent  
debtors.

But it was the blessing of Rome, that this course of evils was in her case checked in time, when it had brought suffering only on one generation, before it had entailed moral corruption on the remotest posterity. Twenty years<sup>47</sup> of poverty and oppression, could we present to ourselves each individual case of misery, would seem a fearful amount of evil; but, happily, twenty years' suffering in the life of a nation are but like an attack of fever, severe indeed while it lasts, but too short to weaken the constitution permanently. Mere poverty, moreover, is an

<sup>47</sup> The period, according to Niebuhr's chronology, was one of eighteen years, from 365 to 383: according to the common chronology it lasted twenty-three years, from 365 to 388.

evil, the sense of which varies greatly according to differences of time and place; its actual privations depend much on climate; their intolerableness arises from contrast; where none are extravagant or luxurious, poverty must almost sink to beggary before its sting is felt acutely. The actual distress endured by the Roman commons in the loss of their houses, and the destruction of their cattle and fruit-trees, few of which could have escaped the hands of the Gauls during their long occupation of the city and territory of Rome, although severe for the time, would nevertheless have been diminished by the sense of its being the common portion, and would in time have been altogether relieved. But the attacks of foreign enemies rendered the *Tributum*, as a war-tax, constant and heavy; other taxes were imposed to defray the expense of building up the rock of the Capitol with large blocks of stone<sup>48</sup>, and probably of rebuilding the temples generally; whilst the obligation of completing the houses in the city within twelve months, was a pressure on the means of the less wealthy, coming at the very time when they were least able to meet it. Thus, as we have seen, debts were unavoidably contracted; and when there

<sup>48</sup> Livy, VI. 4. "*Capitolium saxo quadrato substructum est.*" This must mean that where the cliff had been proved to be accessible, and must thus have been more or less of an inclined plane, it was so built up with large blocks of stone as to enlarge the upper surface of the hill, and make it perpendicular with the bottom of it. Similar substructions have enlarged the

surface of the hill towards the forum, where the remains of the *Tabularium* still exist.

The "*saxum quadratum*" of the Roman writers, is the "*Steintuf*" of the German geologists; the "*Tufa litoide*" of Brocchi: it is a volcanic conglomerate, found in Rome itself, and is the stone employed in the *Cloaca*.

CHAP.  
XXV.

was a general demand for money, it was not possible that any positive law could keep the rate of interest low. Whether the enactment of the twelve tables, which fixed its yearly rate at one-twelfth of the principal, was actually repealed, or only disregarded by common consent, we cannot tell; but the re-enacting that rate<sup>49</sup> a few years later is a proof that at this period it was not observed; and it is expressly mentioned that the principal<sup>50</sup> of debts was sometimes paid many times over in interest before they were of five years' standing. It is not necessary to repeat the details of the extreme severity of the law towards insolvent debtors; they have been already noticed; but as the distress was far greater now than at any former time, this severity must have been more extensively felt than ever: every patrician house was become a private gaol; but a gaol in which the prisoners were kept to hard labour for the gaoler's benefit, or were at his caprice loaded with irons and subjected to the lash.

Aggravations of their misery from particular causes.

Imprisonment for debt in its mildest form, and amidst the manifold money transactions of a great commercial country, in which the debtor must often be paying the penalty of his own imprudence, is yet beginning to shock the feelings of modern times, as being liable to the evil of confounding together misfortune and crime. How then should we regard the treatment of Roman commons, whose debts were

<sup>49</sup> Livy, VII. 16.

<sup>50</sup> Livy, VI. 14. "Multiplici jam sorte exsolutâ, mercentibus sem-

per sortem usuris." This is said of the year 370, only five years after the Gaulish invasion.



incurred by no fault of their own, but were the consequence of an overwhelming national calamity, and of the want of consideration shown by the government for their state of distress? Yet it is remarkable, that the severity of the law in itself seems even now to have excited no complaint; nor do we find that the tribunes extended their protection to the multitude of innocent debtors who were daily dragged off to labour amongst slaves in their creditor's workhouse,—what excited general discontent was, in the first place, the high rate of interest exacted by the patricians, who thus seemed to make their profit out of the general misery; and next the harshness of obliging the commons to pay heavy taxes for the public service, while the states' domain land, the natural resource in extraordinary national emergencies, was appropriated to the benefit of individuals, and whilst the taxation itself was highly arbitrary, being regulated according to an old valuation of the property of the citizens<sup>51</sup>, and making no allowance for the enormous losses which had since so greatly reduced its amount. Above all, there was the intolerable suspicion that the taxes thus hardly wrung from the people were corruptly embezzled: a tax had been imposed to replace two-fold the treasures borrowed from the temples to purchase the retreat of the Gauls; and it was whispered<sup>52</sup> that this money, instead of being restored to the gods, was secretly kept back by the patricians for their own use.

<sup>51</sup> See Niebuhr, Vol. II. p 675.<sup>52</sup> Livy, VI. 14.

CHAP.  
XXV.

M. Manlius comes forward as the protector of the poor and the insolvent debtors.

Thus the evils of the times and the public irritation were great; but before they found their true and wholesome remedy, they gave occasion to one of those false shows of relief, which only aggravate the disease. M. Manlius, the preserver of the Capitol from the Gauls, was jealous of the high reputation of Camillus<sup>53</sup>, and alienated from the patricians generally, because his share of the high offices of the commonwealth was not such as his merits claimed. Thus he was ready to feel indignant at the severities practised against the debtors; and his better feelings also, the loftiness of his nature, and his sympathy with brave men, were all shocked by the scenes which he daily witnessed. One day<sup>54</sup> he saw a centurion who had served with him, and whom he knew to be a distinguished soldier, now dragged through the forum on his way to his creditor's workhouse. He hastened up, protested against the indignity, and himself paid the debt on the spot, and redeemed the debtor. The gratitude and the popularity which this act won for him, excited him to go on in the same course: he sold by public auction the most valuable<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Livy, VI. 11. Plutarch, Camillus, 36.

<sup>54</sup> Livy, VI. 14. One is rather too much reminded here of the story of the brave old centurion, whose hard usage from his creditors excited such a tumult in the year of Rome 259.—See Livy, II. 23.

<sup>55</sup> "Fundum in Veienti," says Livy, "caput patrimonii." It could hardly, then, have been a part of the Veientian territory which had been conquered only

eleven years before. But the Ager Veiens came down to the Tiber, and portions of it may have been conquered in earlier wars, or even in the earlier years of the final war. The fundus in question was probably a "possessio," or a portion of the domain land held by occupation; but such estates were bought and sold amongst individuals as if they were property, subject always to the chance of their being reclaimed by the state.

part of his landed property, and declared that he would never see a fellow-citizen made a bondsman for debt, so long as he had the means of relieving him. So well did he fulfil this promise that he was said to have advanced money to no fewer than four hundred debtors, without requiring any interest to be paid to him; and thus to have discharged their debts, and saved them from bondage. Such generosity obtained for him the unbounded affection of the people; he was called the "Father of the Commons;" and his house in the Capitol was always beset by a multitude of citizens, to whom he spoke of the cruelty of their creditors, and of their fraud and sacrilege in appropriating to themselves the money paid by the people to replace the treasures borrowed from the gods for the ransom of the Capitol.

A dictator had been<sup>56</sup> already appointed early in the year, with the double purpose of employing him against the Volscians abroad, and, if need should be, against the attempts of Manlius at home. The office had been conferred on A. Cornelius Cossus, perhaps the same person who, in his consulship, eight-and-twenty years before, had taken cognizance of the murder of M. Postumius by his soldiers; and he was now recalled from the field to check the apprehended sedition. He summoned Manlius<sup>57</sup> before him, called upon him to prove his charge of the embezzlement of the sacred money, and on his failing to do so threw him into prison. This seems

His ambitious practices. His impeachment by the tribunes. His trial and death.

<sup>56</sup> Livy, VI. 11.

<sup>57</sup> Livy, VI. 16.

to have been merely the exercise of that power of arresting dangerous individuals, and so stopping their plans for a season, which is granted to, or assumed by, all governments in perilous times; it is remarkable, however, that the imprisonment of Manlius did not expire with the term of the dictator's office, but continued till the senate, fearing, it is said, that he would be released by force, passed a vote to restore him to his liberty. This might seem to have been an act of weakness, yet the event allows us to attribute it to a wise policy; for Manlius, when released, indulged in language more violent than ever, and at last, if we can rightly interpret<sup>58</sup> the doubtful language of the annalists, the assemblages at his house assumed a more threatening character; and the Capitol was occupied by him and his followers as a stronghold in defiance of the government, as it was many years afterwards by the tribune L. Saturninus. That his motives were not pure, and that his purposes were treasonable, seems evident from several circumstances. He did not unite with the tribunes, the natural leaders of the commons, nor concert with them any definite measure for the redress of the existing evils. This makes a wide distinction between him and the several honest popular leaders who, on other occasions, had opposed the aristocracy. Volero, Terentilius, Duillius, Icilius, Canuleius, and

<sup>58</sup> "Senatus de secessione in domum privatam plebis, . . . agitat."—Livy, VI. 19. The word "secessio" is either an exaggeration or denotes a positive act of

insurrection, or, to speak more strictly, of a withdrawal of allegiance from the existing government.

Trebonius, had each come forward with some distinct measure for the attainment of a particular end ; but of Manlius we hear nothing but that he exercised great liberality towards distressed individuals, and so acquired an immense popularity ; that he excited the passions of the people by vague charges and invectives against the aristocracy ; and that he occupied the Capitol with a multitude of his partisans. It marks also the character of his proceedings, that the tribunes, forgetting the just grievances of their order, joined the patricians against him ; and that Q. Publilius<sup>59</sup>, whose family was surpassed by none in its hereditary zeal for the true liberties of the commons, came forward to impeach him of high treason. What follows is told with some variations, and the real details cannot be recovered. According to the common account, Manlius submitted to take his trial before the centuries in the Campus Martius. I have already shown how much even the greatest criminals had to hope from the uncertainty of such a tribunal ; how much weight was given to matters foreign to the question at issue ; how a strong and eloquent appeal to the feelings of the judges might overpower the clearest evidence of the prisoner's guilt. If even the decemvir Appius had thought his acquittal by the centuries not impossible, how much more might Manlius expect from them a favourable sentence ? Nor was his hope deceived. When he appeared

<sup>59</sup> Livy, VI. 19. This Publilius was of the same family with Publilius Volero, and with the dictator Publius Philo who passed the famous popular laws which bear his name some years afterwards. —Livy, VIII. 12.



CHAP.  
XXV.

in the field of Mars, he brought forward four hundred debtors<sup>60</sup> whom he had relieved from bondage: he exhibited the spoils of thirty enemies whom he had slain in personal combat; he showed forty honorary rewards which he had at various times received from his generals in war; and amongst these, eight of those wreaths of oak, the famous civic crowns, which were given for saving the life of a fellow-citizen in battle. He produced, besides, some of the very men whom he had thus saved, living witnesses of his services, whose tears and entreaties in behalf of their preserver might strike to the hearts of all who saw them. Finally, he bared his own breast, covered with honourable scars; and, looking up to the Capitol which rose immediately above the field of Mars, he implored the aid of those gods whose temples he had saved from barbarian pollution, and bade the people to look at the Capitol and then give their judgment. The tribunes saw that the centuries thus excited would never find him guilty; and the trial was adjourned<sup>61</sup>, not to be brought forward again before the same tribunal. Yet how he was prevented from appealing to the centuries from the sentence of any other court that might have condemned him, does not appear. Nothing more is known with certainty than that Man-

<sup>60</sup> Livy, VI. 20.

<sup>61</sup> Any objection of a religious kind on the part of the augurs, or a notice "that it thundered," was sufficient to break up the comitia. C. Rabirius was saved from condemnation by a sudden adjourn-

ment produced by the act of L. Metellus, who tore down the standard hoisted on the Janiculum, and thus, according to an old custom, obliged the comitia to separate.

lius was put to death as a traitor; the very manner<sup>62</sup> of his execution, as well as the authority by which he was condemned, are variously reported. All agree, however<sup>63</sup>, that his house was levelled with the ground; that a law was passed forbidding any one from henceforth to reside within the precincts of the Capitol; and that the members of the Manlians shared so deeply in the general sense of his guilt, as to make it a rule of their house, that no Manlius should ever hereafter receive the prænomen of Marcus.

CHAP.  
XXV.

After this ill-omened opposition to the aristocracy, their power was, as usual, only the more confirmed. For four years the distress went on increasing, till the tribunes of the year 375, (we do not know their names,) ventured to make a stand<sup>64</sup> in behalf of their constituents. Censors had been appointed in this year, to take a new valuation of the property of the citizens; but one of them having died, and it being

Increased distress : the tribunes at last venture to interfere in behalf of the commons.

<sup>62</sup> Livy, and most other writers, say that he was thrown from the Tarpeian rock. Cornelius Nepos related that he was scourged to death.—See Gellius, XVII. 21. § 24. Again, some said, that he was condemned by a “concilium populi,” held in the Peteline grove without the Porta Flumentana; others said, that he was condemned by the duumviri, or two judges created, according to the old law ascribed to the times of the kings, for the purpose of trying him as a public enemy. Further, what was the “concilium populi,” and where was the “Lucus Petelinus?” for the present reading of “Porta Nomentana”

in the editions of Livy, is a mere correction of Nardini, and not to be admitted; inasmuch, as there was no Porta Nomentana before the enlargement of the walls by Aurelian. Then, there is the curious story recorded by Dion Cassius, and which Niebuhr prefers as the most authentic of all the accounts. The question is too long to be discussed here: I have thrown it, therefore, into a note at the end of the volume.

<sup>63</sup> Livy, VI. 20. Plutarch, Camillus, 36. Auctor de Viris illustr. in Manlio. Dion Cassius, Fragm. Peiresc. xxxi.

<sup>64</sup> Livy, VI. 27.

CHAP.  
XXV.

accounted unlucky to fill up the place of a deceased censor, his colleague went out of office. Two censors were then elected, but the augurs pronounced their election invalid, and they also resigned without doing any business; after which a religious objection was made to any third election, as if the gods had manifested it to be their will that there should be no censors that year. This so provoked the tribunes, that when it was proposed to call the legions into the field against the people of Præneste, they had recourse to the old method of opposition practised by the tribunes in the preceding century, and protected every citizen in refusing to enlist; nay, they went still farther, and declared that they would once for all redress the existing grievances by forbidding any debtor to be given over to his creditor's power by the sentence of the magistrate. And though they did not persevere in their purpose, for the Prænestines<sup>65</sup> by a sudden inroad up to the very gates of Rome furnished an excuse for the appointment of a dictator, and made the war seem a matter of paramount necessity, yet the tribunes withdrew their opposition only on some compromise; and at the ensuing election of military tribunes, three out of six were, for the first time since the Gaulish invasion, chosen from among the plebeians.

Their interference seems unavailing.

This apparently brought some relief for the following year: but at the end of it only one<sup>66</sup> plebeian was elected amongst the military tribunes; and the year 377 was only marked by disappoint-

<sup>65</sup> Livy, VI. 28.

<sup>66</sup> Livy, VI. 31.

ment of all the hopes of the commons, and an actual increase of their burdens. Censors were again elected, but a war with the Volscians was made a pretence for postponing the census; while, on the other hand, although the censors could not find opportunity for relieving the distress of the commons, they thought it necessary to contract for the building of a part of the city wall<sup>67</sup>; and to defray the expense of this work, additional taxes were imposed. Accordingly, in this and the following year, A.U.C. 378. the amount of debt in the state continued to increase, and the number of insolvent debtors condemned to bondage was greatly multiplied; while a sudden dissolution of the alliance between the Latins and Volscians, and the conclusion of a separate peace between the latter and Rome<sup>68</sup>, relieved the patricians from any immediate pressure of foreign warfare, and thus deprived the opposition of the tribunes of its most effectual weapon.

From this apparently hopeless condition there sprung up suddenly a prospect of deliverance. Again we have conflicting traditions, idle stories, and party exaggerations in the place of history. But the result of the great struggle is certain, whatever obscurity hangs over the details. And L. Sextius and C. Licinius, though we cannot gain a distinct knowledge of them as individuals, yet deserve to be recorded amongst the greatest benefactors to the cause of good government and equal law, inasmuch as they brought forward and carried the Licinian laws.

But deliverance is notwithstanding at hand.

<sup>67</sup> Livy, VI. 32.

<sup>68</sup> Livy, VI. 33.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### THE LICINIAN LAWS.—378-384.

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“Les mouvemens qui agitent les peuples peuvent être de deux sortes. Les uns sont produits par une cause directe, d'où résulte un effet immédiat. Une circonstance quelconque amène une nation, ou même une partie de la nation, à désirer un but déterminé; l'entreprise échoue ou réussit. . . . Ce sont là les heureuses révolutions; on sait ce qu'on veut, on marche vers un point précis, on se repose quand il est atteint.”—BARANTE, *Tableau de la Littérature Française pendant le Dixhuitième Siècle*.

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CHAP.  
XXVI.

SIX patrician military tribunes<sup>1</sup> had been elected at the comitia for the year 378, and had entered on their office on the first of July. The coalition between the Latins and Volscians, which had been so dangerous to Rome, was dissolved in this same summer, and the Volscians of Antium made a separate peace<sup>2</sup>. During the autumn the commons seemed to have utterly lost heart; the patricians were all-

<sup>1</sup> Livy, VI. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, VI. 33. But they could scarcely have made an absolute surrender, “deditio,” of their city and territory; for we hear of them again in little more than twenty years, as an independent and sovereign people; planting a colony on that very spot, Satrium, which

they had conquered in the war now before us, and which they must have retained, therefore, at the peace of 378. See Livy, VII. 27. But a state which retains even its conquests at the end of a war is not likely to make at that same time an absolute surrender of its own city and territory.



powerful at home, and fortune seemed disposed to favour them equally abroad: the cause, in short, appeared so hopeless that the more eminent men<sup>3</sup> amongst the commons were discouraged from coming forward as candidates, even for the office of tribune of the commons: the tribune's power they thought would merely expose themselves to odium, while it would be unable to effect any good. Thus the elderly men, who generally held the tribuneship, now abandoned the helm in despair, and younger men, who would have given way to their higher claims under other circumstances, now found themselves called upon to come forward, and brought with them strength and spirits better fitted for times so perilous. At the election in December, C. Licinius Stolo, a member of one of the richest<sup>4</sup> and most distinguished families amongst the commons, and a man in the full vigour of life, obtained a place amongst the ten tribunes; and L. Sextius, a young man of an active and aspiring spirit, and a personal friend of Licinius, was elected one of his colleagues.

Could we look into the private history of these times, we should find, no doubt, amongst the Roman patricians, as amongst the members of all aristocracies, a certain number of persons, who, from various motives, are opposed to the majority of their own

Some of the patricians are favourable to the cause of the commons.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, VI. 34.

<sup>4</sup> This appears from what is related of him afterwards, that the amount of public land in his occupation exceeded the measure of 500 jugera, which had been

fixed by his own law. Niebuhr observes also that this wealth of the Licinian family continued to the latest period of the republic, as is shown by the immense riches of M. Licinius Crassus.

CHAP.

XXVI.

order. By some of these, Licinius and Sextius were, we may be sure, encouraged and supported: the Licinian family had repeatedly intermarried with patricians<sup>5</sup>: the tribune himself was married to a Fabia, and others of his name had been similarly connected with the Manlii and the Cornelii. With all the advantages then of wealth and connexion that could be enjoyed by a commoner, Licinius came forward to redress the grievances of his order, and to secure their rights for the time to come.

The tribunes  
propose the  
three Lici-  
nian laws.

He proposed in the assembly of the tribes, in conjunction with L. Sextius, three separate laws<sup>6</sup>. The first provided a strong remedy for the great actual evil, the overwhelming pressure of debt. It enacted, that whatever had been already paid in interest should be deducted from the amount of the principal<sup>7</sup>; and that the debt thus reduced should be discharged in three years, in three equal instalments. The second bill was intended to save the commons, when their debts were once relieved, from the necessity of running into debt again. It proposed, therefore, to provide for the poorer citizens by giving them grants of land out of the domain, or *ager publicus*:

<sup>5</sup> The Licinius who was military tribune in the year 355 was a brother of Cn. Cornelius; and the Licinius who was master of the horsemen in 382-3 was related to the dictator of that year, P. Manlius. Livy, V. 12. VI. 39. If in the first of these two cases we suppose with Borghesi, (*Nuovi Frammenti*, Parte 2, p. 89,) that P. Licinius was a Cornelius by birth, and adopted into the family

of the Licinii, it shows no less the high eminence of the Licinii and their intimacy with the noblest patrician houses, when even a Cornelius would not scruple to become their adopted son.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, VI. 35.

<sup>7</sup> "Ut deducto eo de capite quod usuris pernumeratum esset, id quod superesset triennio æquis portionibus persolveretur." Livy, VI. 35.

and in order to have land enough available for this purpose, it restrained the right of occupation, by enacting, that no man should occupy more than five hundred jugera of the public land in tillage<sup>8</sup>, nor feed more than a hundred oxen and five hundred sheep on those portions of it which were left in pasture. The third bill was dictated by the consciousness that the enjoyment of property is neither secure in itself, nor can satisfy the wants of a noble mind, without being united with a certain portion of political power. The commons, as an order, must be raised to a level with the patricians; the honours of their country must be laid open to them; they must have an opportunity of bequeathing nobility to their children. The institution of the military tribuneship was, in itself, an affront to the commons: it was only because it was so inferior in dignity to the consulship, that it had been made nominally accessible to them. The bill of Licinius accordingly did away with the military tribuneship, and restored the consulship<sup>9</sup>. That very image of the ancient royalty, with all its sacredness and display of sovereign state, was to be open to the commons no less than to the patricians. But experience had

<sup>8</sup> "Ne quis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret." If we remember the legal definition of possessio, "quicquid apprehendimus cujus proprietas ad nos non pertinet, aut nec potest pertinere, hoc possessionem appellamus," De Verbor. Significat. 115, (Digest. Lib. L. tit. xvi.) we shall see that it was needless to add "publici" to "agri," because the only land which men

ordinarily occupied without it being their own, was the "ager publicus."

For the clause limiting the number of cattle which might be fed on the public pasture land, see Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 8.

<sup>9</sup> "Ne tribunorum militum comitia fierent, consulumque utique alter ex plebe crearetur."—Livy, VI. 35.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

shown that it was not enough to throw it open merely ; one place must be secured to the commons by law, or the influence of the patricians at the comitia would for ever exclude them from it. It was proposed therefore, that one at least of the two consuls should of necessity be elected from the commons.

Operation of  
the system  
of debtor  
and creditor.

This last law requires no explanation ; and the second, since Niebuhr has cleared up the whole subject of the agrarian laws, is equally intelligible. The first however involves in it some difficulty ; for if the rate of interest had been high, and a debt had been of long standing, the sum paid in interest would not only have equalled, but must, in some instances, have actually exceeded the amount of the principal ; so that the creditor, far from having anything more to receive, would rather have had something to refund. To explain this, Niebuhr observes, that debts were ordinarily settled at the end of one year ; and that if a debtor could not then pay, he was in the habit of borrowing money of a new creditor to discharge the principal and interest of his first account ; a proceeding which, from its frequency, had a particular name, “Versura<sup>10</sup>.” That a speedy settlement of debts was the ordinary practice, may indeed be collected from the clause in this very Licinian law itself, which required the whole debt remaining after the deduction of the already paid interest to be discharged within three years ; and if the practice of

<sup>10</sup> Festus, or rather Paulus, in “Versura.”

versura was often repeated, it will be obvious that a debtor would have paid his original debt many times over in interest, although not under that name: a part of the principal of every new debt being in fact the interest of the preceding one. Still, as the distress had now lasted for thirteen years, there must have been many who could not have gone on so long upon this system; the amount of their debt must have so exceeded all their possible means of payment, that no new creditor could have been found to advance them the money to discharge it. Under these circumstances, what could the debtor do but enter into a nexum, and at the end of a certain term, on failing to redeem himself, submit to be given over as a bondman to his creditor; or else try to procure a further respite by offering an exorbitant rate of interest? In this latter case the interest so paid would undoubtedly be deducted from the amount of the principal, and thus it would happen that there would be a very small balance left for the creditor still to receive. But such cases would be very few: in most instances, when a man's credit was so exhausted that he could no longer practise the system of borrowing from a new creditor to pay his old one, he would be obliged to enter into a nexum, and being still insolvent, would, in the common course of things, become his creditor's bondman. Then whilst the debtor was giving his creditor all the benefit of his labour, we cannot suppose that the interest of the debt went on accumulating also:



and thus, after he had remained some years in bondage, he might be redeemed by the mere payment of his original debt, from which there would be deducted only that interest which he had paid before he had been consigned to his creditor's power. But what we should most desire would be, to learn the fate of the great mass of debtors, who, in the course of the last thirteen years, had thus been reduced to slavery. Was there any limit of time beyond which they could not be redeemed? or, if the debt were never paid, did they or their posterity ever recover their freedom<sup>11</sup>? Are we, in short, to believe, that many families of the Roman commons, during this period, were finally

<sup>11</sup> There is a well-known passage in Quintilian, VII. 3. § 27. which enters into the differences between the condition of a slave and that of one who was "addictus," or given over to his creditor into bondage. But it does not specially touch the questions which I have suggested. Some parts of it, however, are remarkable. "Ad servum nulla lex pertinet: addictus legem habet. Propria liberi quæ nemo habet nisi liber, prænomen, nomen, cognomen, tribum; habet hæc addictus." "Addictus legem habet;" that is, he could not be killed by his master, nor treated by him absolutely at his discretion, but might claim the protection of the law like a freeman; again, he could inherit property and acquire property, which a slave could not do. "Tribum habet" is remarkable, because

it implies that the addictus did not undergo either the maxima or media capitis deminutio; he could not lose his rights of citizenship if he retained his tribe. But were these rights in abeyance, as the father's power over his children was suspended so long as he was a prisoner in the hands of the enemy, but returned to him as soon as he came home? or can we suppose that they continued to exist, and that a creditor might drive his addicti into the forum to give their votes as he should require, and that such votes were legal? or would this be one of the many cases in which the officer who presided at the comitia exercised his discretion in objecting to them whenever he thought proper, or receiving them if it suited the interests of his party?

lost to their country as free citizens; or was there any mitigation of the extreme rigour of their fate, and did the slave-debtor ever recover his personal liberty by consenting to become the client of his master? These are questions to which I believe it is impossible to give satisfactory answers.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

To return, however, to our narrative; the promulgation of the three Licinian bills provoked, as was natural, the most determined opposition on the part of the aristocracy. Again the battle was to be fought in the assembly of the tribes; the great object of the patricians was to prevent the bills from being passed there. Some of the tribunes were attached to the aristocratical party, and these were persuaded to interpose their negative<sup>12</sup>, to forbid the reading of the bills to the people, and thus to stop them from ever being put to the vote. Licinius and Sextius, thus baffled, and being unable to proceed with their measures directly, determined to retaliate by obstructing, in like manner, the course of their opponents. When the month of July arrived, and the military tribunes for the last year went out of office, Licinius and Sextius forbade the election of any successors to them; they would allow no curule magistrates to be appointed; and they with the ædiles of the commons remained for a time the only magistrates of the republic.

The tribunes stop the election of curule magistrates.

But that this time continued for five years, according to the common report of the Roman Fasti

But this time of anarchy did not last for five years.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, VI. 35.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

and historians, is a thing altogether incredible<sup>13</sup>. An anarchy of five years; so long a period of the most extreme political excitement, nay, of the greatest

<sup>13</sup> It is utterly impossible to ascertain the real chronology of this period. The story of the five years' anarchy arose probably from an exaggerated interpretation of some expressions in the annalists, "that for five years the tribunes went on obstructing the elections," meaning, that whilst the contest lasted, this was their weapon, which they used from time to time, and never relinquished it without stipulating for some concession in turn. Afterwards, when the date of the Gaulish invasion had been fixed to the 2d year of the 98th Olympiad, and this was assumed as certain, the existence of the five years' anarchy was no longer questioned. The *Fasti Capitolini* acknowledge them as well as Livy; so also does Dionysius, for he speaks of the ten years' tribuneship of Licinius. (XIV. 22, *Fragm. Mai.*) And Polybius implies them, where he gives the dates of the several invasions of the Gauls, II. 18. The later writers, such as Eutropius, Cassiodorus, and Rufus Festus make the anarchy to have lasted for four years. So also does Zonaras; but then these four years are with him the whole period of the struggle, for he makes them to be followed immediately by the dictatorship of Camillus, and the pretended Gaulish invasion. They are then the years which, in the common *Fasti*, follow the five pretended years of anarchy; and which are marked by four colleges of military tribunes. It is to be observed, that about forty years afterwards we still find the consular year spoken of as beginning on the 1st of July

(Livy, VIII. 20.), which requires us to suppose either that one whole year passed without military tribunes, and that the elections were not again delayed; or that in the course of the five years' struggle, the elections were each year delayed for a time, so that at the end of the period the time lost in the several years, when added together, amounted to just a year in all; or, finally, we must believe that there was no period of anarchy at all; that the tribunes every year threatened to stop the elections, but allowed them, from consideration for the public service, to be held as usual, stipulating, perhaps, for the election of certain individuals known to be either favourable to their claims, or, at least, not violently adverse to them. Borghesi thinks that one college of military tribunes has been omitted by Livy in the year preceding the beginning of the anarchy, and he has restored it, partly from Diodorus, and partly from conjecture. Thus he places the election of L. Sextius as the first plebeian consul, exactly four and twenty years after the invasion of the Gauls. Striking out the five years of pretended anarchy, the consulship of L. Sextius falls nineteen years after the invasion of the Gauls, which agrees exactly with the chronology of Diodorus, when his confusions have been corrected, and the Gaulish invasion brought to its true date, according to his system, that is to the third year of the 99th Olympiad. It agrees also with the statement of Orosius, III. 1. 4.; and this is the nearest approxima-

extremities of revolutionary violence; the water boiling, as it were, with such intensity, and yet never boiling over; a knot so perplexing, which none untied, and yet none were tempted to cut; a livelong strife, neither pacified by any compromise, nor exasperated into open violence, requires far better testimony than that of the Roman annalist removed two hundred years from the period of the struggle, to induce us to admit it as historical. What would have become of the ordinary course of business, if for five years the supreme courts of law had been closed, and the prætor's or prætorian tribune's judgment-seat so long left empty? Where was the restless enmity of the Latins, who down to the beginning of this pretended anarchy are described as so relentless in their hostilities, and who again appear in arms as soon as it is over? Unless the circumstances of the struggle were very different from all the representations of them which have reached our times, we can scarcely doubt that the Fasti followed by Diodorus and Orosius have preserved the truer account of these disputes; that one year at the most, perhaps even that not continuously, but at different intervals, was passed without curule magistrates; that the consulship of the first plebeian consul is to be placed not twenty-four but nineteen years only after the invasion of the Gauls.

The length of the struggle, even when reduced in  
 tion to the truth at which I think it is possible to arrive; namely, to fix the consulship of L. Sextius in the 2d year of the 104th Olympiad, which is the date of the battle of Mantinea, and of the death of Epaminondas, 363-2, B.C.

Military tribunes again elected.



CHAP.  
XXVI.

all from ten years to five, is sufficiently memorable. The tribunes had prevented the election of any curule magistrates; whether this state of things really lasted for a whole year, or only for a few weeks, it is not possible to determine; but it was ended by a fresh attack of the Latins on the old allies of Rome, the people of Tusculum<sup>14</sup>; the call for aid on the part of the Tusculans could not be resisted: the tribunes withdrew their veto, and the comitia for the election of military tribunes were duly held; but care was taken that only moderate men, or men friendly to the popular cause, should be chosen; there were two Valerii, the very name of whose house was an assurance to the commons, and a third tribune was Ser. Sulpicius, connected by marriage with C. Licinius, and with his patrician supporter M. Fabius. After all, they were not allowed to enlist the soldiers for the legions without much opposition, nor probably without some stipulation on the part of the senate, that the military tribunes should not, like M. Postumius, abuse their power by visiting on their soldiers in the field the political offences of the commons at Rome. When the army did at last march, Tusculum was relieved, and Velitræ, which had been foremost in the attack upon it, was besieged in its turn; but the siege was not speedily ended, and the year came to a close before the place was reduced.

Plebeians  
chosen as  
commission-  
ers of the sa-  
cred books.

Meanwhile the popular cause was gaining ground: amongst the new military tribunes was M. Fabius

<sup>14</sup> Livy, VI. 36.



Ambustus<sup>15</sup>, the father-in-law of Licinius, and the zealous supporter of his bills, an advantage which more than counterbalanced the danger threatened by the appointment of two zealous members of the aristocratical party. These were A. Cornelius Cossus, who had been named dictator some years before to oppose the designs of M. Manlius, and Q. Quinctius Cincinnatus, of the house of that Cincinnatus, who, in his consulship, had proposed to repeal the laws passed in favour of the commons at Rome, by the votes of his soldiers, in an assembly to be held in the field beyond the protection of the tribunes, and who in his dictatorship had defended the murder of Sp. Mælius. Besides, the patrician interest in the college of the tribunes of the commons was becoming weaker and weaker; not only were Licinius and Sextius continually re-elected, but three others of their colleagues, it is said, now espoused their cause, and the remaining five, who had still pledged their veto to the patricians, so felt the difficulty of their position as to be obliged to lower their tone: their veto now professed only to suspend the discussion of the bills, and not to forbid it altogether: "A large proportion of the people<sup>16</sup>," they said, "were engaged in foreign service at Velitræ: so great a question must be decided in a full assembly; till, therefore, the legions should return home, the bills must not be brought forward." In such contests as these, delay is an advantage to the resisting party when the assailants are not keen

<sup>15</sup> Livy, VI. 36.<sup>16</sup> Livy, VI. 36.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

in their attack, so that it may be possible to divert them from it by exhausting their patience: but when they are thoroughly in earnest, the flood gathers into a stronger head the longer it is opposed, and breaks in at last more overwhelmingly. So Licinius finding his three bills thus pertinaciously resisted, now proceeded to add to them a fourth<sup>17</sup>, enacting that the two keepers of the Sibylline books should be superseded for the future by a commission of ten, and that these ten should be chosen alike from the patricians and from the commons. The notion of a plebeian consul was most objected to on religious grounds; a plebeian it was said could not take the auspices, because his order could exercise no office connected with the service of the gods. Licinius resolved to destroy this objection most effectually, by attacking the religious exclusion itself. So far was he from allowing that a plebeian could not be consul because he could not be a priest, that he claimed for his order a share in the priestly offices as such; he required a distinct acknowledgment that the service of the gods might be directed, and their pleasure made known, by plebeian ministers as rightfully as by patricians. Perhaps, too, he had another and more immediate object; in seasons of extreme public danger, it was usual to consult the Sibylline books, and the keepers of them reported the answer which they found applicable to the emergency. Licinius might fear that this oracle, if left solely in the

<sup>17</sup> Livy, VI. 37.

keeping of his adversaries, might be unfairly tampered with; and its answers shaped according to their interests. It was thus especially desirable that some of the commons should be made acquainted with their contents, to prevent the possibility of any forgery.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

New military tribunes<sup>18</sup>, it is said, came into office before the army came home from Velitræ. This would be equally true whether we suppose that the soldiers came home to the harvest in July and August, or remained in the field till the close of the autumn. Amongst the new military tribunes we again find Ser. Sulpicius, and also Ser. Cornelius Maluginensis, a man so distinguished that he had already filled the same office six times before<sup>19</sup>. When the Licinian bills were again brought forward, the popular feeling in their favour was so strong as to make it apparent that the tribunes opposed to them would find it impossible to persist in interposing their negative; the patricians accordingly had recourse to their last expedient; it was pretended that the war with Velitræ required a dictator, and then Camillus, the bitterest enemy of the commons, was appointed to fill that office. It appears that he issued a proclamation<sup>20</sup> summoning the citizens within the military age to enlist and

M. Camillus  
and P. Man-  
lius dicta-  
tors.

<sup>18</sup> Livy, VI 38.

<sup>19</sup> This appears from the fragments of the Fasti Capitolini.

<sup>20</sup> Livy says, that he only threatened to issue such a proclamation, VI. 38. But Plutarch speaks of it as actually issued, προέγραψε

στρατιῶς κατάλογον.—Camillus, 39. And so the Fasti Capitolini; for the beginning of the line may be safely restored as Sigonius has supplied it. “*Ob Edictum in milites ex S. C. abdicarunt.*”

CHAP.  
XXVI.

follow him to the field ; whether his object was any thing more than delay must remain doubtful ; but his edict was utterly disregarded, and the senate, to allay the storm, called upon him to resign his dictatorship. The Fasti recorded, that P. Manlius Capitolinus was named dictator shortly after, for the avowed purpose of putting an end to the domestic disturbances<sup>21</sup> ; no record, however, remains to us of any thing that he did in his office ; but it is evident that he was disposed to take no violent steps against the commons, for one branch of the Licinian family were his relations, and from them he chose C. Licinius Calvus, though a plebeian, to be his master of the horsemen. As if to show still further that the contest was drawing to a close, the bill<sup>22</sup> relating to the keepers of the Sibylline books was passed before the end of this year ; but the other three were still delayed a little longer. Every nerve was, doubtless, strained by the patricians to preserve the exclusive possession of the consulship, and this was naturally the point to which the mass of the commons attached the least importance, while they eagerly desired to pass the other two bills, relating to the public land, and to the debts. But the tribunes, being well aware of this feeling, and being anxious, on personal as well as on public grounds, to secure the great point of an equal share of the highest magistracies, had resolved only to bring forward the three bills together, to be altogether either accepted

<sup>21</sup> "Seditionis sedandæ et rei gerendæ causâ."

<sup>22</sup> Livy, VI. 42.

or rejected. The more violent<sup>23</sup> of the aristocratical party remonstrated with hypocritical indignation against the arrogance of the tribunes, in thus dictating to the commons; and against their selfishness, in refusing to bring forward bills for the good of their whole order without stipulating at the same time for the gratification of their own ambition. But Licinius, trusting that the people would have the sense to reject the pretended sympathy of their worst enemies, persevered in his purpose; and told the commons in homely language<sup>24</sup>, “that they must be content to eat if they wished to drink.”

There is nothing viler than the spirit which actuates the vulgar of an aristocracy; we cannot sympathize with mere pride and selfishness, with the mere desire of keeping the good things of life to themselves, with the grasping monopoly of honours and power without nobleness of mind to appreciate the true value of either. All can conceive from what motives, with what temper, and in what language, the coarser spirits of the aristocratical party opposed the Licinian bills. But in all the uncorrupted aristocracies of the ancient world, there was another and a very different element also; there were men who opposed the advance of the popular party on the highest and purest principles; who regarded it as leading, in the end, to a general lawlessness, to a contempt for the institutions and moral

On what grounds the better part of the aristocracy opposed the Licinian bills.

<sup>23</sup> See the language which Livy has put into the mouth of Appius Claudius, VI. 40, 41. *φάγοιεν*. Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Peiresc.* 33, as corrected by Reimar.

<sup>24</sup> *Εἰπὼν, ὥς οὐκ ἂν πίσιεν εἰ μὴ*



CHAP.  
XXVI.

feelings of men, and to a disbelief in the providence of the gods. Such men must have existed amongst the Roman patricians; and their views are well deserving of the notice of posterity. When Ser. Cornelius Maluginensis in his seventh military tribuneship opposed Licinius and Sextius in the assembly of the tribes, he might have expressed his feelings in something like the following language, and the soberest and wisest of the commons themselves would have been touched with a foreboding fear, while they could not help acknowledging that it was partly just<sup>25</sup> :—

SPEECH OF  
SER. COR-  
NELIUS MA-  
LUGINEN-  
SIS.

“I know, Quirites, that ye account as an enemy to your order whoever will not agree to the passing of these three ordinances proposed by your tribunes, Caius Licinius and Lucius Sextius. And it may be that some who have spoken against them, are in

<sup>25</sup> I am far from wishing to introduce into history the practice of writing fictitious speeches, as a mere variety upon the narrative, or an occasion for displaying the eloquence of the historian. But when the peculiar views of any party or time require to be represented, it seems to me better to do this dramatically, by making one of the characters of the story express them in the first person, than to state as a matter of fact, that such and such views were entertained. I believe it to be perfectly true, that the better part of the opposition to the advance of popular principles in the ancient world was grounded on the view of human affairs which I have ascribed to Ser. Maluginensis. And this view is exceedingly de-

serving of notice, because it so strongly illustrates one of the great uses of the Christian revelation; namely, that it provides a fixed moral standard independently of human law, and therefore allows human law to be altered as circumstances may require, without the danger of destroying thereby the greatest sanction of human conduct. I have not, then, put modern arguments into the mouth of a Roman of the fourth century of Rome; but I have made him deliver arguments not only which might have been, but which were undoubtedly used then, and which are so characteristic of ancient times, that they could not be repeated now without absurdity.

truth, not greatly your well-wishers ; so that it is no marvel if your ill opinion of these should reach also to others who may appear to be treading in their steps. But I stand here before you as one who has been now, for the seventh time, chosen by you one of the tribunes of the soldiers;—six times have ye tried me before, in peace and in war, and if ye had ever found me to be your enemy, it had been ill done in you to have tried me yet again this seventh time. But if ye have believed me to have sought your good in times past, even believe this same thing of me now, though I may speak that which in the present disposition of your minds ye may perchance not willingly hear.

“ Now, as regarding the ordinances for the relief of poor debtors, and for restraining the occupation of the public land, I could be well content that they should pass. I know that ye have borne much, and not through any fault of yours ; and if any peaceable way can be found out whereby ye may have relief, it will be more welcome to no man than to me. I like not the taking of usury, and I think that ye may well be lightened of some part of the burden of your taxes by our turning the fruits of the public land to the service of the commonwealth. But if ye ask me, Why then dost thou oppose these ordinances ? I must truly bid you go to your tribunes, Caius and Lucius, and demand of them your answer <sup>26</sup>. They can tell you that they will not suffer

<sup>26</sup> This attack on the tribunes three bills from each other is put for their refusal to separate the by Livy into the mouth of Appius

CHAP.  
XXVI.

me to give my vote for these ordinances, nor will they suffer you to have your will. For they have said that these ordinances shall not have our votes, neither yours nor mine, unless we will vote also for a third ordinance, which they have bound to them so closely as that none, they say, shall tear them asunder. Now, as touching this third ordinance, Quirites, I will deal honestly with you: there is not the thing in all the world so precious or so terrible as shall move me, either for love or for fear, to give my vote in its behalf.

“What is there, then, ye will say to me, in this third ordinance which thou so mislikest? I will answer you in few words. I mislike the changing of the laws of our fathers, specially when these laws have respect to the worship of the gods. Many things, I know, are ordered wisely for one generation, which notwithstanding, are by another generation no less wisely ordered otherwise. There is room in human affairs for change; there is room also for unchangeableness. And where shall we seek for that which is unchangeable, but in those great laws which are the very foundation of the commonwealth; most of all in those which, having to do with the immortal gods, should be also themselves immortal. Now it belongs to these laws that the office of consul<sup>27</sup>, which is as it were the shadow

Claudius, VII. 40. It would, of course, be pressed by all the opponents of the measures; and it is too much to expect that even the best of the aristocratical party would have scrupled to avail them-

selves of it, although they would have dwelt on this point in a very different manner from their more violent associates.

<sup>27</sup> The religious argument, that a plebeian could not be created

of the majesty of Jove himself, should be held only by men of the houses of the patricians. Ye know how that none but the patricians may take any office of priesthood for the worship of the gods of Rome, nor interpret the will of the gods by augury. For the gods being themselves many, have set also upon earth many races of men and many orders; and one race may not take to itself the law of another race, nor one order the law of another order. Each has its own law, which was given to it from the beginning; and if we change these the whole world will be full of confusion. It is our boast<sup>28</sup> that we Romans have greater power over our children than the men of any other nation: with us the son is ever, so long as he lives, subject to his father's will, except his father be pleased to give him his freedom. Now, if a son were to ask why he should not, when he is come to full age, be free from his father's authority, what answer should we give than this, that the law of the Romans gave to fathers this power over their children, that to this law he had been born, as surely as to those other laws of his nature which appointed him to be neither a god nor a beast, but a man. These laws are not of

CHAP.  
XXVI.

consul without profanation, is to be found twice in Livy, in the arguments used against the Canuleian bills, IV. 2-6, and again in the speech of Appius against the Licinian bills, VI. 41. The principle implied in this argument is not to be found in Livy, but is important to be stated, because it is as characteristic of polytheism,

as the opposite principle, that all men are equal before God, except so far as their own conduct creates a difference between them, is characteristic of Christianity.

<sup>28</sup> "Fere enim nulli alii sunt homines, qui talem in filios suos habent potestatem qualem nos habemus."—Gaius, Institut. I. § 55.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

to-day, nor of yesterday; we know of no time when they have not been: may neither we nor our children ever see that time when they shall have ceased to be!

“But if the mere will of the men of this generation can set aside these laws: if, breaking through that order which the gods have given to us, we elect for consuls those whom the gods allow not; see what will be the end. Within these fifteen years four tribes of strangers have been added to the commons of this city. Ye know, also, that many enfranchised slaves, men with no race, with no law, I had well nigh said with no gods, are, from time to time, enrolled amongst our citizens. If all these are admitted into our commonwealth, to become Romans, and to live according to the laws of the Romans, it is well. But if we may alter these laws; if strangers come among us not to receive our custom, but to give us theirs, what thing is there so surely fixed in our state, that it shall not be torn up at our fancy? what law will be left for us to follow, save the law of our own fancies? Truly, if the gods had sent down one from heaven to declare to us their will; if, as our own laws were written by the decemvirs upon the twelve tables, so there were any tables to be found on which the gods had written their laws for all mankind, then we might change our own laws as we would, and the law of the gods would still be a guide for us. But as the gods speak to us, and will speak only through the laws<sup>29</sup> of our

<sup>29</sup> Τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ πείας ἡ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων, . . . ἡ Πυθία νόμφ πόλεως



fathers, if we once dare to cast these aside, there is no stay or rest for us any more; we must wander in confusion for ever.

“Nor is it a little thing that by breaking through the law of our fathers, and choosing men of the commons for consuls, we shall declare that riches<sup>30</sup> are to be honoured above that rule of order which the gods have given to us. Riches, even now, can do much for their possessor, but they cannot raise him beyond the order in which he was born, they cannot buy for him—shame were it if they could! the sovereign state of the consulship, nor the right to offer sacrifice to the gods of Rome. But once let a plebeian be consul, and riches will be the only god which we shall all worship. For then he who has money will need no other help to raise him from the lowest rank to the highest. And then we may suffer such an evil as that which is now pressing upon the cities of the Greeks in the great island of Sicily. There may arise a man from the lowest of the people with much craft and great riches, and make himself what the Greeks call a tyrant<sup>31</sup>. Ye

*ἀναρρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς αὖ ποιεῖν.*  
—Xenophon, Memorab. I. 3. § 1. Compare the language of Archidamus, and of Cleon in Thucydides, I. 84. III. 37, and the argument against any alteration in the laws, given by Aristotle in his review of the Hippias of Hippodamus. ‘Ο γὰρ νόμος ἰσχὺν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι, πλὴν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος. τοῦτο δ’ οὐ γίγνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος.—Politic. II. 6.

<sup>30</sup> Compare the sentiments of Theognis and Pindar on this point, who constantly lament the increasing honour paid to riches in comparison with the declining estimation of noble birth.

<sup>31</sup> Thucyd. I. 13. *Δυνατωτέρως δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων.*

CHAP.  
XXVI.

scarcely know what the name means ; a vile person seizing upon the state and power of a king, trampling upon all law, confounding all order, persecuting the noble and good, encouraging the evil, robbing the rich, insulting the poor, living for himself alone<sup>32</sup> and for his own desires, neither fearing the gods, nor regarding men. This is the curse with which the gods have fitly punished other people for desiring freedom more than the law of their fathers gave them. May we never commit the like folly to bring upon ourselves such a punishment !

“Therefore, Quirites, unless your tribunes can find for us another law of the gods to guide us in the place of that law which they are destroying, I cannot consent to that ordinance which they are so zealously calling upon us to pass. Not because I am proud, not because I love not the commons, but because, above all things else on earth, I love and honour law ; and if we pull down law and exalt<sup>33</sup> our own will in the place of it, truth, and modesty, and soberness, and all virtue will perish from amongst us ; and falsehood, and insolence, and licentiousness and all other wickedness will possess us wholly.

<sup>32</sup> Thucyd. I. 17. τὸ ἐφ’ ἐαυτῶν μόνον προορώμενοι ἕς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐς τὸ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν δι’ ἀσφαλείας ὅσον ἐδύναντο μάλιστα τὰς πόλεις ᾗκουν.—Compare the description of a tyrant in Herodotus, III. 80, and V. 92.

<sup>33</sup> This is what Archidamus and Cleon, striking specimens of the noblest and vilest advocates of an unchanged system, as opposed

to one of continual progress, call “the wishing to be wiser than the laws.” Archidamus boasts that the Spartans were trained ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας.—Thucyd. I. 84. Cleon describes good citizens as men who ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ ἐαυτῶν ξυνέσει, ἀμαθέστεροι τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι.—Thucyd. III. 37.

And instead of that greater freedom which ye long for, the end will be faction and civil bloodshed<sup>31</sup>, and, last of all, that which is worse than all the rest, a lawless tyranny.”

CHAP.  
XXVI.

To such language as this the tribunes might have replied by denying that its principle was applicable to the particular point at issue: they might have urged that the admission of the commons to the consulship was not against the original and unalterable laws of the Romans, inasmuch as strangers had been admitted even to be kings at Rome; and the good king Servius, whose memory was so fondly cherished by the people, was, according to one tradition, not only a stranger by birth, but a slave. And further they might have answered, that the law of intermarriage between the patricians and commons was a breaking down of the distinction of orders, and implied that there was no such difference between them as to make it profane in either to exercise the functions of the other. But as to the principle itself, there is no doubt that it did contain much truth. The ancient heathen world craved, what all men must crave, an authoritative rule of conduct; and not finding it elsewhere, they imagined it to exist in the fundamental and original laws of each particular race or people. To destroy this sanction without having any thing to substitute

What was to be said in answer to the arguments of the speech of Ser. Cornelius.

<sup>31</sup> So Theognis,  
Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε· δέδοικα δὲ  
μὴ τέκη ἄνδρα  
Εὐθυντήρα κακῆς ὕβριος ὑμετέρης.

Ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἔμφυ-  
λοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν·  
Μούναρχος δὲ πόλει μήποτε τῇδε  
ἄδου. 39-51.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

in its place was deeply perilous; and reason has been but too seldom possessed of power sufficient to recommend its truths to the mass of mankind by their own sole authority. On the other hand, good and wise men could not but see that national law was evidently in many cases directly opposed to divine law<sup>35</sup>; and that obedience and respect for it were absolutely injurious to men's moral nature; they felt sure, moreover, that the very truth was discoverable by man, and trusted that it must at last force its way if the ground were but cleared for its reception. They hoped besides, as was the case with Aristotle, that by gaining the ear of statesmen they might see a system of national education established<sup>36</sup>, which would give truth all the power of habit; and knowing too that universal law, that if man does not grow better he must grow worse,

<sup>35</sup> Hence the distinction insisted on by the philosophers between universal and municipal law, between natural and political justice. —See Aristotle, *Ethics*, V. 7, *Rhetoric*, I. 14. Hence the interest of the story of Antigone, who is represented as breaking the law of her country because it was at variance with the law of the gods: Sophocles invests her character with all the sacredness of a martyr; but Æschylus, who more entirely identified the laws of the land with the highest standard of human virtue, ends his tragedy of the “Seven Chiefs who warred on Thebes” with the expression of the opposite sentiment, which is evidently uttered from his heart. Half of the chorus go with Antigone to bury Polynices in defi-

ance of the king's decree; urging in their justification:

καὶ γὰρ γενεᾷ  
κοινὸν τόδ' ἄχος, καὶ πόλις ἄλλως  
ἄλλοτ' ἐπαινεί τὰ δίκαια.

But the other half follow the body of Eteocles, whose funeral was sanctioned by the law, exclaiming:

ἡμεῖς δ' ἅμα τῷδ', ὥσπερ τε πόλις  
καὶ τὸ εἰκαῖον ξυνεπαινεί.

μετὰ γὰρ μάκρας καὶ Διὸς ἰσχύιν  
ὅδε Καδμείων ἤρυνξε πόλιν  
μὴ 'νατραπήναι, μὴδ' ἀλλοδαπῶν  
κύματι φωτῶν

κατακλυσθῆναι τὰ μάλιστα.

<sup>36</sup> *Ethic*. Nicomach. X. 9. Ἐκ νέου δὲ ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν, μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις. . . . διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα.

and that to remain absolutely unchanged is impossible; they ventured to advance towards a higher excellence, even amidst the known dangers of the attempt, in the faith that God would, sooner or later, point out the means of overcoming them.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

The events of the last year of this long struggle are even more obscure than those of the years preceding it. P. Manlius<sup>37</sup>, the late dictator P. Valerius, who had been five times tribune before, two Cornelii, Aulus and Marcus, the one of the family of Cossus, the other of that of the Maluginenses; M. Geganius Macerinus, and L. Veturius, formed the last college of military tribunes which was to be known in Rome. Manlius and Valerius were likely to favour the bills; of Veturius we know little; but the two Cornelii<sup>38</sup> and Geganius, if they were true to the political sentiments of their families, would be strongly opposed to them. But the story of this year is again perplexed by an alleged dictatorship of M. Camillus, and a pretended inroad of the Gauls into Latium. It is said, that an alarm of an approaching invasion from the Gauls led to the appointment of Camillus; and this may be true; for the

Last college of military tribunes. End of the contest. Institution of the prætorship.

<sup>37</sup> Livy, VI. 42.

<sup>38</sup> Two Cornelii Maluginenses were amongst the most zealous supporters of the second decemvirate, one of them being actually a colleague of Appius Claudius, at a time when even the patricians themselves were generally disgusted with it; and a Cornelius Cossus had been appointed dictator to oppose the supposed designs of Manlius. The consulship of M. Geganius Macerinus, two years after the end of the decem-

virate, is marked as the period at which the reaction in favour of the patricians began; and the consuls of that year are contrasted with those of the year preceding, who are described as moderate men, not much inclined to either party. And a M. Geganius was one of those censors who treated the dictator Mam. Æmilius with such unjust severity, because he had abridged the duration of the censor's office.



CHAP.  
XXVI.

senate would gladly avail themselves of the slightest rumour as an excuse for investing him with absolute power; but that the Gauls really did invade Latium at this time, and were defeated by Camillus in a bloody battle<sup>39</sup> near Alba, seems to be merely a fabrication of the memorials of the house of the Furii, the last which occurs in the story of Camillus, and not the least scrupulous. Setting aside this pretended Gaulish war, the annalists merely related, that after most violent contests, the Licinian bills were carried<sup>40</sup>; this must have taken place before

<sup>39</sup> The *Fasti Capitolini* state that Camillus was appointed dictator this year, "*rei gerundæ causâ*," that is, "to command an army in the field," as distinguished from the other objects for which a dictator was sometimes appointed, such as, "*seditionis sedandæ causâ*," "*comitiorum habendum causâ*," or "*clavi figendi causâ*." But as the fragments of the *Fasti* are in this place very much mutilated, we cannot tell whether they contained any mention of his victory and triumph over the Gauls or no. Probably, however, they did, for the story seems to have established itself in the Roman history very generally; it is mentioned by Livy, by Plutarch, by Dionysius in the fragments of his 14th book, by Zonaras, by Appian, in a fragment which clearly refers to it, IV. 7. and it is implied, I think, in the short summary of Florus, I. 13. On the other hand, there is the notorious falsehood of the other stories of Gaulish victories gained by Camillus; there is the positive statement of Polybius, that the Gauls did not invade Latium again till thirty years after their first irruption; and that when they did

come, and advanced to Alba, the scene of Camillus' pretended victory over them, the Romans did not dare to meet them in the field. —Polyb. II. 18. There is also the statement of Aristotle, quoted by Plutarch, Camillus, 22, and agreeing so completely with Polybius, "that Rome was delivered from the Gauls by Lucius; that is, by Lucius Camillus, the son of Marcus, who repelled the Gauls in the year 406 (or more properly 401), the first time, according to Polybius, that the Romans ever did meet them with advantage. Finally, the common stories of this pretended war are at variance with one another, some placing the famous combat of T. Manlius with the Gaulish giant in this year, and making the Gauls advance as far as the Anio; while others laid the scene of Camillus' victory on the Alban Hills, and placed the combat of Manlius ten years later. I believe, therefore, that the accounts of this last dictatorship of Camillus are as little to be relied on as those of his pretended defeat of Brennus, and freeing Rome from the shame of paying a ransom.

<sup>40</sup> Livy, VI. 42.

the tribunes went out of office in December: and apparently they were not again re-elected, as if in the full confidence that the battle was won. But when the comitia for the election of consuls were held, according to the new law, and the centuries had chosen L. Sextius to be the first plebeian consul, the storm broke out again with more violence than ever, owing to the refusal of the curiæ to confirm the election and invest him with the imperium. No particulars are recorded of the following crisis; matters, it is said, came almost to a secession of the commons, and “to other terrible threats of civil contentions<sup>41</sup> ;” words which seem to mean that the secession would not have been confined to mere passive resistance, but would have led to an actual civil war. But Camillus, who was still, it is said, dictator, acted on this occasion, if we may believe any story of which he is the subject, the part of mediator; both sides made some concessions: the patricians were to confirm the election of the plebeian consul; but the ordinary judicial power was to be separated from the consul’s office, and conferred from henceforth on a new magistrate, who was always to be a patrician, and who being appointed without a colleague was not to be called consul but prætor; a title of high dignity, which had been anciently borne by the consuls, and expressed particularly their supreme power, as the captains or leaders of the commonwealth. The first person who

<sup>41</sup> “Terribilesque alias minas civilium certaminum.”—Livy, VI. 42.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

filled this new office<sup>42</sup> was Sp. Camillus, the son of the dictator; a compliment which his old father well deserved, if the last public act of his life of more than fourscore years was the reconciling of the quarrels of his countrymen, and the bringing a struggle of five years to a peaceful and happy termination.

Institution  
of the Cu-  
rule Ædile-  
ship.

This union of the two orders was acknowledged also in the religious ceremonies of the republic. A temple<sup>43</sup> was built on the Capitoline hill looking towards the forum, and dedicated to "Concord;" and a fourth day was added to the three hitherto devoted to the celebration of the great or Roman games; as if to signify that the commons were from henceforth to take their place as a part of the Roman people, by the side of the three old patrician tribes, the Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres. To preside at these games, two new magistrates were appointed under the name of Curule Ædiles; and these were to be elected in alternate years from the patricians and from the commons. Their other duties and powers it is very difficult to define; but it appears that they exercised for a time<sup>44</sup> the juris-

<sup>42</sup> Livy, VII. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Plutarch, Camillus, 42. Livy, VI. 42.

<sup>44</sup> See Niebuhr, Vol III p. 42, and seqq. To what is there said, it may be added that the title Ædilis was common amongst the magistrates of the municipia and colonies at a later period; that we meet frequently, in inscriptions, with the title "Ædilis juri dicundo," that the ædiles in the

Municipia had a "tribunal," or judgment seat, as a mark of their high dignity; and as Savigny thinks, they in the earlier period of the empire possessed even the "imperium." Savigny, *Geschichte des Rom. Rechts im Mittelalt.* Vol. I. p. 36. The two Scipios of the fifth century, whose tombs and epitaphs have been preserved to us, have their ædileships as well as their censorships and con-

diction which had formerly belonged to the Quæstores Parriidii, that they tried criminals for various offences, and if their sentence were appealed against, they appeared as prosecutors of the appellant before the comitia of the centuries.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

Thus, with no recorded instance of bloodshed committed by either party, the five years' conflict upon the Licinian bills was happily ended. From this time forward the consulship continued without interruption to the end of the republic; and with the exception of a short period to be hereafter noticed, it was duly shared by the commons. The form of the constitution, such as we find it described in those times which began to have a contemporary literature, was now in its leading points completed; but many years must yet elapse before we can do more than trace the outline of institutions and of actions; the spirit and character of the times, and still more of particular individuals, must yet, for another century, be discerned but dimly.

The completion of the form of the constitution.

sulships recorded. This seems to imply that the office then was held in higher estimation than when

Cicero could call the curule Ædile "paullo amplius quam privatus." Verr. Act. I. 13.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

GENERAL HISTORY, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN, FROM  
THE ADMISSION OF THE COMMONS TO THE CON-  
SULSHIP TO THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST SAM-  
NITE WAR—EVASION OF THE LICINIAN LAWS—  
WARS WITH THE GAULS, TARQUINIENSIANS, AND  
VOLSCIANS.—A.U.C. 389-412, LIVY; 384-407,  
NIEBUHR.

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*μυρίας ὁ μυρίος  
χρόνος τεκνοῦται νύκτας ἡμέρας τ' ἰὼν,  
ἐν αἷς τὰ νῦν ξύμφωνα δεξιώματα  
δόρει διασκεδῶσιν ἐκ σμυκοῦ λόγου.*

SOPHOCLES, *Œdip. Colon.* v. 617.

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CHAP.  
XXVII.

Chronology  
of the Lici-  
nian laws.

THE first plebeian consulship coincides, as nearly as the chronology can be ascertained, with the great battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas. At this point Xenophon ended his Grecian history; and as the writings of Theopompus and of the authors who followed him have not been preserved to us, we here lose the line of contemporary historians in Greece, after having enjoyed their guidance during a period of nearly one hundred and forty years. More than that length of time must still elapse before we can gain the assistance of a contemporary



writer, even though a foreigner, for any part of the history of Rome.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

But as I have before observed that the Greek poets, long before the time of Herodotus, have done more than any mere annalists could have done to acquaint us with the most valuable part of history, that which relates to a people's mental powers and habits of thinking, so, when we close the Hellenics of Xenophon, we find in the great orators and philosophers of the next half century more than enough to compensate for the want of regular historians. What contemporary record of mere battles and sieges, of wars and factions, could afford such fullness of knowledge as to the real state of Greece, in all points that are most instructive, as we derive from the pamphlets, as they may be called, of Isocrates, from the dialogues of Plato, the moral and political treatises of Aristotle, and the various public and private orations of Isæus, Æschines, and Demosthenes? It is when we think of the overflowing wealth of Greece, that we feel most keenly the absolute poverty of Rome. The fifth century from the foundation of the city produced neither historian, poet, orator, nor philosopher; its whole surviving literature consists of three or four lines of a monumental inscription, and a short decree of the senate, the date of which is not, however, ascertained. I cannot too often remind the reader of the total want of all materials for a lively picture of the Roman character and manners under which we unavoidably labour. Still we are as it were working our way to

Contrast between our knowledge of the Greeks and of the Romans at this period.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

light; the greatness of Rome is beginning to unfold itself; we are approaching the Samnite and the Latin wars, of which the first trained the Romans to perfection in all military virtues, by opposing to them the bravest and most unwearied of enemies; while the latter consolidated for ever the mass of their power near home, by securing to them the aid of the most faithful of allies. And the great domestic struggles are almost ended; what required direct interference has been for the most part remedied; it must be left for time to complete the union of the two orders of the commonwealth, now that they have been freed from those positive causes of irritation which kept them so long not only distinct from each other, but at enmity.

Effects of  
the Licinian  
laws.

We have seen the Licinian bills become laws of the land; we have next to endeavour to trace their results; to see how far they were fairly carried into effect, and what was their success in remedying the evils which had made them appear to be necessary.

I. Of the  
law respect-  
ing the con-  
sulship.

I. The Licinian law, which opened the consulship to the commons, was regularly observed during a period of eleven years<sup>1</sup>. After that time the patricians ventured to disregard it, so that in the fifteen following years, down to the great Latin war, it was violated six or seven several times<sup>2</sup>. But

<sup>1</sup> Livy, VII. 18.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say in the year 400, when a Sulpicius and Valerius were consuls, and in the two following years; again in 404, when a Sulpicius and a Quinctius were elected; then in 406, in 410, and

lastly, in 412. This would amount to seven instances, but in the year 401 some annals made a plebeian, M. Popillius, the colleague of M. Fabius; although most authorities give this as a year of two patrician consuls. See Livy, VII. 18.

after the Latin war it was observed regularly, and we can only find one or two doubtful instances of a violation of it. In the twenty years of plebeian consulship which occur before the Latin war, there appear however the names of only eight plebeian families; the Sextii, the Genucii, the Licinii, the Pœtelii, the Popillii, the Plautii, the Marcii, and the Decii: two of these, the Marcii<sup>3</sup> and the Popillii, enjoyed the consulship four times each; the Genucii<sup>4</sup> and Plautii obtained it three times each; the Licinii and Pœtelii twice each; and the Sextii and Decii once each. Of the individual consuls none were eminent, except M. Popillius Lænas, C. Marcius Rutilus, and P. Decius Mus; the two former were each four times elected consul, and C. Marcius obtained besides the offices of dictator<sup>5</sup> and censor, being the first commoner who attained to either of them. The fame of P. Decius has been still greater and more enduring; his self-devotion in the Latin war placed him in the fond remembrance of his countrymen on a level with the greatest names of Roman history, and from that time forward it could not be denied that commoners were to be found as worthy of the consulship as the proudest and noblest of the Fabii or the Cornelii.

Thus it appears that the Licinian law was not It was a seasonable and

<sup>3</sup> C. Marcius Rutilus was consul in 398, in 403, in 411, and in 413. And M. Popillius Lænas was consul in 396, in 399, in 405, and in 407.

<sup>4</sup> One of the Genucian family was

consul in 390, 392, and 393, and a Plautius was consul in 397, in 408, and in 414.

<sup>5</sup> He was dictator in 399, (Livy, VII. 17) and censor in 404. (Livy, VII. 22.)

CHAP.  
XXVII.  
wholesome  
measure.

passed till the state of the commonwealth was ripe for it. There were families amongst the commons fit to receive the highest nobility; whilst on the other hand, so sound was the public feeling, that we read of no mere demagogue raised to the consulship as the reward of his turbulence and faction; even the two tribunes who had conducted the long contest with the patricians were each only once elected consul, and none of the other plebeian consuls are known to have been tribunes at all. No constitutional reform could be more happy than this; nothing could be more just or more salutary than to open the honours of the state to an order sufficiently advanced to be capable of wielding political power, but retaining so much simplicity and soberness of mind as to be in no danger of abusing it.

2. Of the  
Agrarian  
law.

II. It has ever been found that social evils are far more difficult to cure than such as are merely political. It was easier to adjust the political relations of the patricians and commons, than the social relations of the great and the humble, the creditor and the debtor. We are told that the agrarian law of Licinius was carried; but what amount of public land was allotted under it to the poorer commons we have no means of discovering. Niebuhr concludes from a passage in Laurentius Lydus<sup>6</sup>, that now as in

<sup>6</sup> De Magistratibus, I. 35. Εἴτα ἐπὶ πενταετίαν ἀναρχίαν ἐδυστύχει τὸ πολίτευμα· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τρεῖς νομοθέτας καὶ δικαστὰς προβληθῆναι πρὸς βραχὺ συμβέβηκε διὰ τὰς ἐμφυλίου στάσεις. Niebuhr thinks that this is taken from Junius

Gracchanus, and that it relates to the period immediately following the anarchy. But Lydus, whose confusions and blunders make his authority very suspicious, intended I believe only to notice all the extraordinary magistrates who



the time of Ti. Gracchus a commission of three persons was appointed, with those large powers ordinarily granted to a Roman commission, for the purpose of carrying into effect the new agrarian law, and that Licinius himself was one of these commissioners, which would account for his not having been chosen rather than Sextius to be the first plebeian consul. It would be the business of this commission to take away all public land occupied by any individual above the prescribed amount of five hundred jugera, and from the land thus become disposable, to assign portions to the poorer citizens. But their task would not be easy; for attempts of every sort would be made to defeat or to evade the law: land which had passed by purchase from one occupier to another, and which had been possessed without dispute for many years, would acquire, even in the eyes of unconcerned persons, something of the character of property; while in the feeling of those who held it, to take it from them without

had at any time been appointed at Rome: and thus after mentioning the famous decemvirs, he goes on to speak of the pontifices, and ædiles, as being in some sort magistrates; and then he names the military tribunes, and the five years' anarchy, as another anomalous period; and lastly, the government of the triumvirs, by whom he means, I believe, no other persons than the famous triumviri reipublicæ constituendæ, Augustus, Antonius, and Lepidus. But although I do not think that Lydus spoke of any extraordinary

commissioners appointed after the passing of the Licinian laws, yet an agrarian law on an extensive scale necessarily implied a commission, whether of three, five, ten, or even fifteen members, to carry its provisions into effect. And the powers of such a commission, as may be seen from Cicero's speeches against the agrarian law of Rullus, were very great and very important; and it is extremely probable that Licinius would be appointed one of its members, almost as a matter of course.



CHAP.  
XXVII.

offering them any compensation was no better than robbery. Besides, the occupation of the public land had been for some time past, probably since the period of the last war with Veii, permitted to the commons as well as to the patricians; so that the occupiers were a larger and more influential body of men than they had ever been before, and the commissioners must have found it proportionably hard to compel them to observe the letter of the law.

Difficulties  
in carrying  
it into effect.

Thus, although we are told <sup>7</sup> that the patricians and commons, when the law was passed, had solemnly sworn to observe it, and though a penalty had been denounced against any violation of it, yet the commission, it seems, found it impossible to carry it into effect. The difficulties in the way of a speedy settlement were indeed manifold. In the first place, many of the occupiers emancipated their sons<sup>8</sup>, and then made over to them the land in their occupation beyond the legal amount of five hundred jugera; and in the same way probably their sheep and oxen, which were fed on the public pasture land, were also entered in the names of their emancipated sons, when they exceeded the number fixed by the law. In this manner large portions of land must have been retained in private hands, which the law had expected to make available for allotments to the commons. But farther, the occupiers urged that they had laid out money of their own on the land which they occupied; they had erected buildings on

<sup>7</sup> Appian, Bell. Civil. I. 8.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, Bell. Civil. I. 8. Livy, VII. 16.

it and planted trees; were they to lose these without receiving any equivalent? They were willing to resign what belonged to the state, but the improvements of the property had been made at their own expense, and on these the state could have no claim. Besides, it was not always easy to ascertain what was public land and what was private; for portions of both being held by the same persons, the boundary stones which, according to Roman practice, were to serve as so sure a mark of private property had been taken up, or suffered to be destroyed; and in the want of any regular surveys of the ground the uncertainty and occasions of litigation were endless. In short, we may suppose that generally speaking the occupiers retained their land, either in their sons' names or in their own, and that the agrarian law of Licinius did but little towards relieving the distress of the commons.

We are told that nine years after the first plebeian consulship, in the year 398<sup>9</sup>, C. Licinius was himself impeached by M. Popillius Lænas, one of the curule ædiles, for having violated his own law by occupying a thousand jugera of the public land, half of which he held in his son's name, having emancipated him in order to evade the law. Licinius was condemned to pay a fine of ten thousand asses; but in the meagreness of our knowledge of these times, we cannot tell in what spirit the prosecution was conducted; whether it originated in personal feelings of enmity to Licinius, or whether it was merely one

C. Licinius himself is prosecuted for evading it.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, VII. 16.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

out of a number of other prosecutions carried on with the intention of trying once more to carry the agrarian law into full effect. We know nothing of the character of M. Popillius; but from his having been chosen four times consul, and once curule ædile, it is scarcely possible to conceive that he could have been particularly obnoxious to the patricians; whereas we know that they never forgave any man who was an active supporter of an agrarian law. I am inclined to think therefore that the prosecution of Licinius<sup>10</sup> was rather instigated by a desire to lower his credit, and to punish him for his obnoxious laws, than by any wish to see those laws enforced more strictly.

3. Of the law for the relief of distressed debtors.

III. The failure of the agrarian law was of itself sufficient to prevent the success of the third of the Licinian bills, that for the relief of distressed debtors. It was something no doubt to free them from the double burden of both interest and principal, by deducting from the principal of every debt what had

<sup>10</sup> We should be glad, however, to be able to excuse the conduct of Licinius, which cannot be justified by any want of sincerity in the motives of his prosecutor. Ti. Gracchus made it a provision of his agrarian law that the commissioners for enforcing it should be a permanent magistracy, to be filled up by new elections from year to year. And it was this very clause which deprived the opponents of his law of all hope of evading it. (Appian, *Bell. Civil.* I. 10.) The commission in the present case was probably not renewed after the first year, and

then the law became powerless. It is possible that the evasion of it practised by Licinius was very generally adopted; and he may have excused himself by that common sophism, that as the evil could not be prevented, he might as well share in the benefits to be derived from it. This is not conscientious reasoning certainly, but it is too common; and Licinius may well have deceived himself by it. His enemies would naturally triumph in his violation of his own law, and would care little though they themselves had set him the example of breaking it.

been already paid in interest, and to allow a lengthened term of payment, during which they might be free from the extremest severity of the law. But to men who had nothing, and had no means of earning any thing, this lengthened term was but a respite, and their debts even when reduced by the deduction of the interest already paid, were more than they were able to discharge. Grants of public land made at such a moment might have delivered them from their difficulties; but as these were withheld, the evil after a short pause returned with all its former virulence. The Licinian law was not prospective, nor did it lay any restriction on the amount of interest which might be legally demanded. Accordingly, to pay their reduced debt within the term fixed by the law, the debtors were obliged to incur fresh obligations, and to give such interest as their creditors might choose to demand. Things grew worse and worse, till in the year 398, nine years after the passing of the Licinian laws, a bill was brought forward by two<sup>11</sup> of the tribunes, M. Duilius and L. Mænius, to restore the limitation of interest formerly fixed by the twelve tables, namely, the rate of the twelfth

<sup>11</sup> Livy, VII. 16. It is pleasant to observe the traces of an hereditary political character in so many of the Roman families. The Mænii and Duilii appear to have been remarkable for their moderation and integrity: the conduct of the tribune M. Duilius after the overthrow of the decemvirs' tyranny has already been noticed; and another Duilius was appointed one of the five commissioners in

403, for the relief of the distressed commons, and distinguished himself in that office by his impartiality and diligence. We have seen also a Mænius taking part with the patricians against the dangerous designs of M. Manlius; and C. Mænius, the upright dictator in the second Samnite war, was a worthy representative of the family character.



CHAP.  
XXVII.

part of the sum borrowed, *fœnus unciarium*. But still this did not reach the root of the evil; the very principal itself could not be paid, and the number of nexi, or persons who were pledged to their creditors, and were to become their slaves if the debt was not discharged within a certain time, went on continually increasing.

Commission  
of five ap-  
pointed. Its  
beneficial  
effects up to  
a certain  
point.

At length, in the year 403, fourteen years after the passing of the Licinian laws, the consuls, P. Valerius and C. Marcius Rutilus, the latter himself a plebeian, the former a member of that family which had always been eminent amongst the patricians for its constant zeal for the welfare of the commons, determined that the government should itself interfere to relieve a distress so great and so inveterate. Five commissioners were appointed<sup>12</sup>, three plebeians and two patricians, with the title of *mensarii*, or bankers. These established their banks or tables in the forum, like ordinary bankers, and offered in the name of the government to accommodate the debtors with ready money on the most liberal terms. It appears that one cause of the prevailing distress was the scarcity of the circulating medium<sup>13</sup>. A

<sup>12</sup> Livy, VII. 21. Their names were C. Duilius, alluded to in the preceding note; P. Decius Mus, who devoted himself in the Latin war; Q. Publilius Philo, eminent both as a general, and as the author of the famous laws which bear his name; Ti. Æmilius, one of the most moderate of the patricians, the colleague of Q. Publilius in his consulship, and the man who named him dictator; and M.

Papirius, of whom nothing, I believe, is known.

<sup>13</sup> Whether that great rise in the price of copper had yet begun, which led to the successive depreciations of the as, it is not possible to ascertain; but without taking this into the account, other and more temporary causes tended to raise the value of money at this time at Rome, as compared with that of land. A little before this



debtor, therefore, even though he possessed property in land, might yet be practically insolvent, inasmuch as he could not, except at an enormous loss, convert his land into money. Here, therefore, the five commissioners interposed: they furnished the debtor with ready money, when he had any property to offer as a security, or any friend who would be security for him: and they ordered that land and cattle should be received in payment at a certain valuation. In this manner much property which had hitherto been unavailable, was brought into circulation, land and cattle became legal tender at a certain fixed rate of value; and thus a great amount of debt was liquidated, and, as Livy adds, to the satisfaction of the creditor as well as of the debtor. If he had any authority for saying this, the fact is remarkable, for when the dictator Cæsar remedied the evils arising from a scarcity of money, during the civil wars, by nearly a similar arrangement, he was accused of making the creditors sustain a loss of 25 per cent.<sup>14</sup>; and men are so apt to regard money as the only standard of value, that this feeling is still very general; and he who should pay his creditor a less

period the Gauls had been plundering the country round Rome during four consecutive years; and the terror of such an enemy could not but depreciate the value of land exposed to their ravages, while money could be kept safely within the walls of cities which the Gauls did not attempt to besiege; and at such seasons of alarm the practice of hoarding money is always more or less prevalent, so

that the circulating medium becomes perceptibly scarcer, and, accordingly, rises in value. If, added to these causes, the demands of commerce had already begun to draw away the copper of Italy into Greece and Asia, the difficulty of selling land to pay a debt contracted when money was more plentiful, must have been proportionably greater.

<sup>14</sup> Suetonius, Julius Cæsar, c. 42.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

sum in actual money than he had borrowed, would be thought to have defrauded him of his due, although, from an increase in the value of money, what he paid might really be fully equal in its command over other commodities, to the sum which he had originally received.

Other measures attempted, but with incomplete success.

After all, however, although these proceedings of the five commissioners were well calculated to relieve the embarrassments of those debtors, who, being really solvent, were yet unable, owing to peculiar causes, to convert their property into money, yet the case of the insolvent debtors was not affected by them. Five years afterwards, in 408, the interest of money was still further reduced to the twenty-fourth part of the sum borrowed, or  $4\frac{1}{6}$  per cent.<sup>15</sup>; and, in 411, several persons were brought to trial for a breach of the law<sup>16</sup>, and condemned to pay fourfold, as in an action for *furtum manifestum*.

Thus palliatives of the existing evil had been sufficiently tried; but all were found to be inadequate. The mischief came to a head in the year 413, and could be stopped only by the most decisive remedies; but the disturbances of that year so affected the whole state of the commonwealth, and were again so much mixed up with political grievances, that an account of them will be more fitly reserved for another place, when we shall have reached that period in the course of our general narrative.

GENERAL  
INTERNAL

I propose, then, first to take a general view of the

<sup>15</sup> Livy, VII. 27.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, VII. 28. Cato de re rusticâ, ab initio.

internal state of the commonwealth, during the period which intervened between the passing of the Licinian laws and the first Samnite war, and then to trace its foreign relations within the same space of time.

CHAP.  
XXVII.  
HISTORY  
FROM 389  
TO 412.

The first part of our task has been nearly completed already, in the view which has been given of the effects of the three Licinian laws. One or two points, however, may still require to be noticed.

Between 389 and 412 we find the remarkable number of fourteen dictatorships. Four of these dictators are expressly said to have been named with a political object<sup>17</sup>, that they might preside at the election of consuls, and prevent the observance of the Licinian law. Two more<sup>18</sup>, those of 402 and 403, although nominally appointed to command against a foreign enemy, were yet really named for political purposes; and two<sup>19</sup>, those of 392 and 411, were appointed to perform a religious ceremony. Of the remaining six, three were named during the alarm of the Gaulish invasion in 394, 395, and 397<sup>20</sup>; and the other three were chosen in 393, 399, and

Frequent  
dictatorships  
and their  
object.

<sup>17</sup> M. Fabius in 404, (Livy, VII. 22.) L. Furius Camillus in 405, (Livy, VII. 24.) T. Manlius Torquatus in 406, (Livy, VII. 26) and another, whose name is unknown, in 407; the fragments of the Fasti Capitolini only containing under this year the words, "Dict.

Comit. Habend. Caus . . ."

<sup>18</sup> T. Manlius in 402, (Livy, VII. 19.) and C. Julius in 403. (Livy, VII. 21.)

<sup>19</sup> L. Manlius in 392, "clavi figendi causa" (Livy, VII. 3. and Fasti Capitol.), and P. Valerius, "feriarum constituendarum causa," in 411. (Livy, VII. 28.)

<sup>20</sup> T. Quinctius in 394, (Livy, VII. 9. Fasti Capitol.) Q. Servilius Ahala in 395, (Livy, VII. 11. Fasti Capitol.) and C. Sulpicius Peticus in 397. (Livy, VII. 12. Fasti Capitol. Appian de rebus Gall. 1.)

CHAP.  
XXVII.

410, to act against the Hernicans, the Tarquinien-sians, and the Auruncans<sup>21</sup>. But even in these last appointments there was something of a political feeling; they prevented a plebeian consul from obtaining the glory of defeating the enemy, and notwithstanding the Licinian law, kept the executive government in the hands of a patrician; and it is expressly mentioned, that App. Claudius was named dictator in 393, to conduct the Hernican war, because he had been so active in opposing the bills of Licinius.

Pœtelian  
law against  
canvassing.  
Breach of  
the Licinian  
law respect-  
ing the  
consulship.

It is thus evident that a soreness of feeling continued to exist between the patricians and commons; and that the former could not yet reconcile themselves to the inevitable change which was in progress. The attack of the Tiburtians in 396 is said to have stopped a rising quarrel between the two orders<sup>22</sup>; the inactivity of the dictator, C. Sulpicius, in the early part of the campaign of 397, was ascribed to the policy of the patricians<sup>23</sup>, who wished to keep the commons as long as possible in the field, to prevent them from passing any measures adverse to the patrician interest in the forum. The Pœtelian law passed in that same year, and brought forward by C. Pœtelius<sup>24</sup>, one of the tribunes, with the sanction of the patricians, appears also to have been intended indirectly to undermine the Licinian law with respect to

<sup>21</sup> App. Claudius in 393, (Livy, VII. 6. *Fasti Capitol.*) C. Marcius Rutilus in 399, (Livy, VII. 17. *Fasti Capitol.*) and L. Furius Camillus in 410. (Livy, VII. 28.)

<sup>22</sup> Livy, VII. 12.

<sup>23</sup> Livy, VII. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Livy, VII. 15.

the consulship. Its professed object was to put down canvassing, "ambitus," and ambitus here seems to be taken in its literal sense, not as implying any bribery, but simply the practice of going round to the several markets and meetings, held, for whatever purpose, in the country, and thus acquiring an interest among the country tribes. It is expressly said, that this law was directed against plebeian candidates: and this is natural; for men whose names did not yet command respect from their old nobility, were obliged to rely on their personal recommendations, and a simple plebeian, if unknown to the country voters, could ill compete with the influence of an old patrician family, strong, not only in its ancient fame, but in the actual votes of its own clients, and of those of the other patricians, a body of men who would be mostly resident in Rome. Besides, if he had not an opportunity of canvassing the country tribes generally, his interest might not extend beyond his own immediate neighbourhood, and thus the total number of his votes in any given tribe might not be sufficient to give him the legal vote of that tribe, and two patrician candidates might obtain a majority of suffrages, merely because no one plebeian candidate had any general interest in his favour. This seems to have been the way in which the Licinian law was set aside three years afterwards, in 400. The majority of votes was in favour of two patrician candidates; one of these was a Valerius, and his name was sure to be popular amongst the commons; whilst the plebeian candidates, debarred from general



CHAP.  
XXVII.

canvassing by the Poetelian law, had each of them probably so small a number of votes in his favour, that they would not have been duly elected according to the Roman law, even had there been no candidate standing against them. Thus the interrex<sup>25</sup>, M. Fabius, was enabled to say that the people had themselves set aside the Licinian law; inasmuch as there was a legal majority in favour of two patrician candidates, and only a small minority for any plebeian.

Law "de  
vicesimâ  
eorum qui  
manumitte-  
rentur"  
passed by  
one of the  
armies in  
the field.

An event occurred in the year 398, which very properly alarmed the tribunes, although it does not seem to have originated in any evil intention. One of the consuls, Cn. Manlius<sup>26</sup>, was in the field with a consular army, to carry on the war against the Tarquiniensians and Faliscans: his colleague C. Marcius Rutilus was engaged with the Privernatians, and enriching his army, it is said, with the plunder of the enemy's country, which had been for many years untouched by the ravages of war. It is probable that the soldiers on this occasion made prisoners of many Privernatian families, and released them again on payment of a large ransom. But prisoners taken in war, becoming, according to ancient law, the slaves of the captor, his release of a prisoner upon ransom was in fact the manumission of a slave. Accordingly Cn. Manlius called his soldiers together in the camp near Sutrium, according to their tribes,

<sup>25</sup> Livy, VII. 17. "Fabius aiebat, in duodecim tabulis legem esse, ut quodcunque postremum populus jussisset, id jus ratumque

esset; jussum populi et suffragia esse."

<sup>26</sup> Livy, VII. 16.

and, as if they were assembled in regular comitia, he proposed to them a law, that five per cent. on the value of any emancipated slave should be paid by his master into the public treasury<sup>27</sup>. It might be argued that the state ought not to lose all benefit from the plunder acquired by its soldiers; and that especially, if a soldier set an enemy at liberty for the sake of his ransom, some compensation should be made to his country, whom his act might be supposed to injure. There was some plausibility in this, and the army of Manlius might have felt also some jealousy at the better fortune of their comrades, and might have known that their own general would not, like C. Marcius, give up to them the full benefit of such plunder as they might acquire from the Etruscans. Accordingly the law was passed in the camp, and received the ready sanction of the curiæ and the senate at Rome. But the tribunes, dreading the precedent of a law passed at a distance from Rome, beyond the range of the tribunes' protection, and where every citizen was subject to the absolute power of his general, declared it to be a capital offence, if any one should for the future summon the tribes in their comitia in any other than their accus-

<sup>27</sup> "*Legem de vicesimâ eorum qui manumitterentur.*" The time and place at which the law was passed justify the explanation which I have given of its meaning; for had the object been merely to check the increase of the class of freedmen, it would scarcely have been brought forward in such an

irregular manner. Similar laws were in force in some of our West Indian islands, at once to restrain emancipation, and to prevent the slave from becoming a burden upon the public, if the state received nothing as a compensation for the contingency of being obliged to maintain him as a freeman.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

tomed place of meeting<sup>28</sup>. Their bill to this effect was sure of the support of Marcius and his army; and its principle was so clearly just, that it was passed, so far as we hear, without meeting with any opposition.

Natural  
phenomena:  
Story of  
Curtius  
leaping into  
the gulph.

The years 390, 391, and 392, were marked by a pestilence<sup>29</sup>, which is said to have been very generally fatal; and in 391, the Tiber rose to an unusual height, overflowed the Circus Maximus<sup>30</sup>, and put a stop to the games which were going on there at that very time, as a propitiation of the wrath of heaven. It is difficult to say whether it was a similar flood two years afterwards, or the shock of an earthquake, which gave occasion to the famous legend of the filling up of the Curtian lake in the forum. All know how the gulph, which had suddenly yawned wide and deep in the midst of the forum<sup>31</sup>, could be filled up by no human power, till the gods at last declared, that the best and true strength of the Roman commonwealth must be devoted as an offering to the gulph; so should the state exist and flourish for ever. While men were asking, what is the true strength of Rome? a noble youth, named M. Curtius, whose valiant deeds had made him famous, said that it were shame to think that the true strength of Rome could lie in aught else but in the arms and in the valour of her children: and he put on his armour and mounted his horse, and plunged into the gulph. All the

<sup>28</sup> "Ne quis postea populum  
*sevocaret*." Compare the well-  
known sense of *secessio*.

<sup>29</sup> Livy, VII. 1, 2.

<sup>30</sup> Livy, VII. 3.

<sup>31</sup> Livy, VII. 6. Valerius Maxi-  
mus, V. 6, § 2.

assembled multitude threw their offerings into it after him, and the gulph was closed, but the place bore his name for ever. It were vain to inquire at what period and upon what foundation this remarkable story was first originated <sup>32</sup>.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

The first year of the pestilence was marked by the death of M. Camillus <sup>33</sup>. In him we seem to lose the last relic of early Rome, the last hero whose glory belongs rather to romance than to history. But the fame of the stories connected with him proves the high estimation in which he was held when living: and it was a beautiful conclusion to his long life, that his last public action was that of a peacemaker, his last interference in political contests was that of a patriot and not of a partisan. The glory of his name was supported for one generation by his son, L. Furius, and then sank for ever.

Death of  
Camillus.

The same period of pestilence was also noted as the era at which the first and simplest form of dramatic entertainments <sup>34</sup> was introduced at Rome. Amongst the games ordered to be celebrated in the hope of propitiating the gods, one, it is said, consisting of a dance in dumb show, as an accompani-

First introduction of  
stage acting  
and dancing.

<sup>32</sup> Another story derived the name of the Curtian lake in the forum from one Curtius Mettius, a soldier of Tattius the king of the Sabines; who, in the battle between Tattius and Romulus, had been nearly lost in a piece of boggy ground between the Capitoline and Palatine hills. Livy, I. 12, 13. A spot in the centre of the forum, marked out by an altar, was known

even in the times of the emperors by the name of the Curtian lake: Galba was thrown out of his litter and murdered close to it. (Tacitus, Hist. I. 41.) But the real origin of the name being unknown, various stories, as is usual, were invented to explain it.

<sup>33</sup> Livy, VII. 1.

<sup>34</sup> Livy, VII. 2.



CHAP.  
XXVII.

ment to the music of the flute, was, for the first time, introduced from Etruria. The dumb show was afterwards succeeded by a song in which the dance was suited to the words; then came a dialogue, and, last of all, a regular acted story; but here the Romans did but translate or imitate the dramatists of Greece, and nothing in literature is less original, and, therefore, less valuable than the tragic and comic drama of Rome.

What power of imagination can complete these few isolated facts into the full picture of the life of a people during three and twenty years? who can represent to himself the senate or the forum, such as they were at this period, either as to outward forms and scenes, or as to the men who frequented them? Much less can we conceive what was passing in the interior of every family, and realize to ourselves the names of our scanty history,—the Fabii, the Valerii, the Sulpicii, or the Marcii, as they were talking and acting in the ordinary relations of life, abroad or at home. A period, of which there remains no contemporary literature, has virtually perished from the memory of after ages; some scattered bones of the skeleton may be left, but the face, figure, and mind of the living man are lost to us beyond recall.

FOREIGN  
HISTORY OF  
ROME FROM  
389 TO 412.

In times so imperfectly known as those with which we are now engaged, the geographical order of events is far more instructive than the chronological. I propose, therefore, to trace successfully the relations of Rome with the several neighbouring states, from 389 to 412, beginning with the wars with the Etrus-



cans, who were divided by the Tiber from the Latins, Volscians, and Hernicans.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

I. The people of Tarquinii, sometimes aided by the Faliscans, were engaged in wars with Rome during a period of eight years, from 396 to 404. What may have been the cause of quarrel is unknown, if it were any thing more than the ordinary enmity between two neighbouring nations, and the disputes which are for ever occurring on their common border. But the war is rendered remarkable by the specimens displayed in it of the character and influence of the Etruscan religion. The Roman consul, C. Fabius<sup>35</sup>, having been defeated in a battle in the year 397, the Tarquinians sacrificed to their gods three hundred and seven Roman soldiers, who had been taken prisoners in the action; and two years afterwards when the Faliscans had joined them, the priests of both cities, with long snake-like ribbons of various colours twisted in their hair, and brandishing burning torches in their hands<sup>36</sup>, fought in the front of their army, and struck such terror into the Roman soldiers, that they drove them back in confusion to their camp. The Etruscan priests, it should be remembered, were also the chiefs or *lucumones* of the nation, and they acted on this occasion, and with equal success, the same part which the two Decii performed for Rome in the Latin and Etruscan wars of a later period. Full of confidence in the support of the gods, the

Wars with  
Tarquinii  
and the Fa-  
liscans.

<sup>35</sup> Livy, VII. 15.

<sup>36</sup> Livy, VII. 17.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

Etruscans followed up their victory; they entered the Roman territory and spread their devastations over the whole country on the right bank of the Tiber as far as the sea. It was to meet this danger that C. Marcius Rutilus<sup>37</sup> was appointed dictator; he was named we must suppose by the plebeian consul of that year, M. Popillius Lænas, and was the first plebeian who ever obtained the dictatorship. His appointment gave great offence to the patricians, and was proportionably acceptable to his own order; all his commands were zealously obeyed; he repelled the invaders, and, like the popular consuls of the year 305, he obtained a triumph by a vote of the people when the senate refused to grant it.

Peace con-  
cluded for  
forty years.

In the year 401 the Roman annalists say, that the butchery of the Roman prisoners by the Tarquinians four years before was signally avenged; the Tarquinians were defeated in a great battle, and three hundred and fifty-eight of the noblest of the prisoners were sent to Rome, and there scourged and beheaded in the forum<sup>38</sup>. The war lingered on, however, for three years more; and was then ended by a peace concluded for forty years<sup>39</sup>. No conquests of towns or territory are recorded, and thus the Roman frontier still remained on the side of Etruria in the same position as it had been for the last forty years, since the conquest of Veii, Nepete, and Sutrium.

Wars in La-  
tium.

II. Far more complicated was the scene on the

<sup>37</sup> Livy, VII. 17.

<sup>38</sup> Livy, VII. 19.

<sup>39</sup> Livy, VII. 22.

left bank of the Tiber. There great changes took place; the relations of the several people to one another were materially altered; some nations almost vanish out of history, whilst Rome saw her territory enlarged, her population of citizens increased, her power and influence strengthened and extended beyond all former example. But the causes and circumstances of these changes are partly disguised by the dishonesty, and partly omitted through the mere meagreness of the Roman historians. Out of the confusion of Livy's narrative we must endeavour, if possible, to obtain a clear and consistent outline of the events of a period which contributed, in no small degree, to determine the future destinies of Rome and of the world.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

In the year 394, according to the common chronology, the Gauls again appeared in Latium. This inroad lasted, according to the Roman annals, for four years, and was ended, as they pretend, by the total destruction of the invaders in the year 397. Eight years afterwards, in 405, we hear of another invasion; but this new attack was completely defeated in the following year, and from that time forward we never again find the Gauls in Latium.

Gaulish invasions.

The dates of these two invasions are no doubt correctly given. They are confirmed by Polybius<sup>40</sup>,

Account of them given by Polybius.

<sup>40</sup> II. 18. It is well known, that the Roman writers claim three victories in the course of the invasion of 394—397, in which, according to Polybius, the Romans did not venture to meet the Gauls in the field. The victory of the

dictator C. Sulpicius, in 397, is described very circumstantially by Appian, who probably copied Dionysius, as well as by Livy, and the Fasti Capitolini give the day of his triumph, the nones of May. On the other hand, the

CHAP.  
XXVII.

although in all other points his account differs widely from that of the Roman writers. The Gauls penetrated into the heart of Latium thirty years after their first attack on Rome; they appeared at Alba, but the Romans, surprised by the suddenness of their inroad, and unable to collect their allies together, did not venture to meet them in the field. Twelve years afterwards, continues Polybius, they came again; but the Romans had now timely notice of their coming; their allies had joined them, and they marched out boldly to give the enemy battle. The Gauls were dismayed by this display of confidence; their chiefs quarrelled, and their whole multitude broke up under cover of night, and retreated like a beaten army to their own country. On this their last appearance in Latium, the Roman army opposed to them was commanded by Lucius Camillus; and this is the Lucius<sup>41</sup>

statement of Polybius is given simply and positively, and we know how completely the Romans corrupted the memory of many events in the Samnite war, and in other parts of their early history. We should be glad to know from what sources Polybius derived his knowledge of these events. The chronological exactness of his account seems to show, that it could not have been taken from any Greek writer who may have mentioned the Gaulish invasions of central Italy, but from some Roman annalist, and it is probable, that Fabius, who, in spite of his national prejudices, had in other instances given a true report of transactions which later annalists utterly misrepresented, was the authority whom Polybius fol-

lowed. It is not likely, on the other hand, that the pretended victories of the Roman generals are mere inventions, but that some trifling advantages gained over detached parties of the Gauls were magnified into general battles, and that the triumphs, if not altogether false, were granted by the policy of the senate, wishing to make the most of any advantage gained over an enemy so formidable as the Gauls.

<sup>41</sup> Τὸν δὲ σώσαντα Δεύκιον εἶναι φησίν. Plutarch, Camill. 22. It should be remembered, that the Romans in old times were known and called by their prænomena, or first names, as Polybius calls Scipio, "Publius," and Regulus, "Marcus." The prænomen was then much less likely to be mis-



whom Aristotle spoke of as the deliverer of his country from the Gauls. According to the Roman accounts he defeated the Gauls in a general action; yet it is not pretended that he obtained a triumph.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

These last invasions of the Gauls were marked, according to the Roman annalists, not only by many signal victories won by the Roman armies in general battles, but in particular by two brilliant single combats in which two of the noble youth of Rome gained for themselves an immortal memory. T. Manlius, the future conqueror of the Latins, fought with a gigantic Gaul<sup>42</sup> on the bridge over the Anio upon the Salarian road: he slew his enemy, and took from his neck his chain of gold (torques), which he wore on his neck in triumph, so that the soldiers called him Torquatus, and his descendants ever after bore that name. And again, before the last great victory won by Lucius Camillus, there was another single combat in the Pomptinian territory between a second giant Gaul and the young M. Valerius<sup>43</sup>, who afterwards defeated the Samnites at the great battle of Mount Gaurus. A wonderful thing happened in

Stories of  
the Gaulish  
invasions.  
T. Manlius  
Torquatus,  
and M. Va-  
lerius Cor-  
vus.

taken than in after-ages, when the nomen and cognomen were generally used instead of it, and when it was possible for a foreigner to be very familiar with the actions of Cæsar, without remembering whether his prænomen was Caius or Lucius. But Aristotle would have been no more likely to have mistaken one prænomen for another, than to have confounded two Greek brothers together, because together with their own peculiar

names they had both the same patronymic.

<sup>42</sup> There is a striking description of this combat given by Q. Claudius Quadrigarius, an annalist of the seventh century of Rome, and preserved to us by A. Gellius, IX. 13.

<sup>43</sup> This combat is also given by Gellius from some of the old annalists, IX. 11. It is described too by Dionysius, XV. 1, 2. and by Livy, VII. 26.



CHAP.  
XXVII.

this combat, said the story ; for as Marcus was going to begin the fight, all on a sudden a crow flew down and perched upon his helmet. When the two combatants closed with each other, the crow still sat on the Roman's helm, but ever and anon it soared up in the air, and then darted down upon the Gaul, and struck at his face and eyes with its beak and claws. So the Gaul, confounded and dismayed, soon fell by the sword of Marcus ; and then the crow flew up again into the air, and vanished towards the east. For this wonderful aid thus afforded him M. Valerius was known ever afterwards by the surname of Corvus, Crow, and the name remained to his posterity. These stories are the very counterpart of the combat between Sir Guy of Warwick and the Danish giant Colbrand before the walls of Winchester ; or, as Manlius and Valerius Corvus are certainly more real personages than Sir Guy, we may compare them with the ballad of Chevy Chase, and consider how far we could recognize the historical battle of Otterburne, and the real Hotspur, in the battle on the Cheviot hills, and in the Earl Percy of the poem. As in this instance the time<sup>44</sup>,

<sup>44</sup> The battle of Otterburne was fought in the reign of Richard the Second of England and Robert the Second of Scotland ; the poetical account of it places it in the reign of a King Henry in England and a King James in Scotland. Otterburne is in Redesdale near Elsdon, the scene of battle in the poem is in the Cheviot hills ; the historical battle did not arise out of any hunting excursion of Percy on the

Scottish border, but from an inroad of the Scotch into Northumberland. In the real battle, Percy was taken prisoner, and the English were defeated ; in the poetical battle, Percy is killed, but the English are victorious. And further, to show how slight actions may be magnified into great battles, the Scottish army at Otterburne, which consisted really of 2300 men, is made in another bal-

place, circumstances, and issue of the poetical battle bear no resemblance to those of the real one, so also the poetical or romance accounts of these last Gaulish invasions retain scarcely a feature of that simple and real history of them which has been preserved to us by Polybius. That the triumphal Fasti have followed the fictitious rather than the true account belongs to that peculiar blot on the Roman character which I have already noticed; that what with other people has been mere fanciful romance, has been by the Romans made to wear such an appearance of serious earnest as to be no longer romance but falsehood.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

What the Gauls did in Latium and against the Romans has been sufficiently disguised and perverted; but what they did in other parts of Italy is altogether unknown to us. We hear of them in Latium, and that they moved southwards from thence into Campania and Apulia<sup>45</sup>; but they do not seem to have touched Etruria, and their attacks on Rome were all made on the left bank of the Tiber. Perhaps the Etruscans had early concluded a peace with them, so that in their invasions of Latium and Campania they passed through Umbria and the country of the Sabines, descending upon Rome either by the Salarian road along the Tiber, or by the valley of the Anio. The Romans complained that two Latin cities, Tibur and Præneste<sup>46</sup>,

Effect of the  
Gaulish in-  
vasions on  
the relations  
of the several  
states of  
Italy.

lad of the battle to amount to 44,000, of whom there "went but eighteen away."

<sup>45</sup> Livy, VII. 11. 26.

<sup>46</sup> Livy, VII. 11. VIII. 14.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

had not scrupled in their hatred of Rome to ally themselves with these barbarians; and this was remembered afterwards against them when the issue of the great Latin war had placed them at the mercy of their old enemies. But it is not to be wondered at if they were glad to divert the torrent of the Gaulish invasion from themselves to the territory of strangers or rivals: perhaps they hired some of the Gaulish bands to enter into their service, and some advantages gained over these by the Roman generals may have been the origin of the pretended victories and triumphs recorded in the annals and in the *Fasti*. The main Gaulish army appears to have stationed itself principally on the Alban hills<sup>47</sup>, from whence, as from some island stronghold, they could attack and lay waste all the neighbouring country. Twice they are said to have approached Rome, and once they advanced as far as the very Colline gate<sup>48</sup>, by which they had entered the city in their first invasion. On one occasion we find them encamped at Pedum<sup>49</sup> in front of Præneste, an old Latin city which the Æquians had formerly conquered, but which afterwards, perhaps at this very time, got rid of its foreign masters and became again united to the Latin nation. None can tell what cities were destroyed, what people weakened, and what confederacies or dominions were broken up in the course of these Gaulish invasions. The Volscians seem to

<sup>47</sup> Polybius, II. 18. Livy, VII.  
25. Dionysius XIV. 12.

<sup>48</sup> Livy, VII. 11.

<sup>49</sup> "Gallos . . . circa Pedum consedissee auditum est." Livy, VII. 12.

have suffered more especially; for it was through their territory that the Gauls moved onwards from Latium to Campania, or returned from Campania to their quarters on the Alban hills; and it appears that their nation was from this time forward broken into fragments, each of which had from henceforth a destiny of its own. In order to understand this change fully, we must recollect that in the year of Rome 378 the Roman frontier had fallen back from Anxur to Satricum, that Satricum itself had been won by the Volscians, and afterwards burnt by the Latins<sup>50</sup>, that it might not revert to Rome, and that the Roman territory in the maritime part of the Campagna scarcely reached to the distance of twenty-five miles from Rome. But in 397 we find that the Latins<sup>51</sup> renewed their alliance with the Romans; that two new tribes of Roman citizens were created<sup>52</sup>, the Pomptine and the Publilian; and that Velitræ and Privernum<sup>53</sup>, both of them Volscian towns, but the latter unmentioned hitherto in Roman history, were engaged alone in a war with Rome. This same year witnessed also the retreat of the Gauls from Latium, after they had been overrunning it at intervals during a period of three years; and finally, it was marked by what the Romans call a conquest of the Hernicans<sup>54</sup>, who for the last four years had been at open war with Rome. That there was a connexion between all these events is manifest, although

<sup>50</sup> Livy, VI. 33.<sup>51</sup> Livy, VII. 12.<sup>52</sup> Livy, VII. 15.<sup>53</sup> Livy, VII. 15.<sup>54</sup> "Hernici devicti subactique sunt."—Livy, VII. 15.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

they appear in Livy as mere accidental coincidences. It should be remembered also that in this same year war was formally declared<sup>55</sup> between Rome and Tarquinii.

Renewal of  
the alliance  
between  
Rome and  
the Latins  
and Herni-  
cans.

The complicated negotiations and the ever changing alliances of the Greek states, between the peace of Nicias and the Athenian expedition to Sicily, cannot be comprehended readily, even though related by such an historian as Thucydides. In the last ten years of the fourth century of Rome, Latium and its neighbourhood must have presented a tissue of events equally perplexed in themselves, without any contemporary historian like Thucydides to explain them to posterity. But by considering the mere fragments of information which have been preserved to us, we may attempt to combine them into something like the following form. A war with Tarquinii in addition to one with the Hernicans, and that at a time when Tibur and Præneste were hostile, and when the Gauls might be expected to appear again in Latium as they had done regularly for the last three years, was clearly more than the strength of Rome could bear. The old alliance with the Hernicans, and with some at any rate of the Latin cities, must at whatever price be renewed. We can easily conceive that there must have been a party amongst the Latins and Hernicans equally well disposed to such a reunion. It was accordingly effected: the plebeian consul C. Plautius appears to have had the

<sup>55</sup> Livy, VII. 12. "Rebus nequicquam repetitis, novi consules jussu populi bellum indixere."



honour of restoring at this critical moment the great work of Sp. Cassius. The whole people of the Her-nicans renewed their old alliance with Rome; but of the thirty Latin cities which had concluded the league with Sp. Cassius many had perished, and some had become separated from the Latin confederacy, and were now the heads of small confederacies of their own: we may safely conclude, however, that Aricia, Bovillæ, Gabii, Lanuvium, Laurentum, Lavinium, Nomentum, and Tusculum were among the cities which returned to their old connexion, and became as heretofore the equal allies of the Romans. Thus a force was organized which might be able at last to meet the Gauls in the field, should they again venture to establish themselves on the Alban hills, or to overrun the plains of Latium.

But while Rome was thus strengthened by this reconciliation with her old allies, she also made an addition to the number of her own citizens. Two new tribes were created, making the whole number twenty-seven; and the new citizens thus received into the state appear to have been in part the inhabitants of the Ager Pomptinus, or Volscian lowlands, the country between Antium and Tarracina on the coast, and running inland as far as the roots of the Apennines which form the eastern wall of the Campagna. In the times of the later kings, the Romans, according to their own stories, had made several conquests over the Volscians in this region, which at any rate were all lost again during the subsequent advance of the Æquians and Volscians into Latium:

Two new  
Roman  
tribes cre-  
ated.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

but in the twenty years immediately preceding the Gaulish invasion, the Volscian frontier had again receded, and the Romans, as we have seen, extended their dominion for a time as far as Tarracina or Anxur. After the Gaulish invasion there followed another change of fortune; when the Latins no longer aided the Romans, but were for some time in alliance with the Volscians, the Romans again lost ground; Satricum became once more Volscian, and the intermediate country between it and Tarracina, the much contested Ager Pomptinus, must also have returned to its old masters. But whether it was that the Volscians had suffered even more than their neighbours from the Gaulish invasions, or whether the Samnites had already begun their attacks upon them in the valley of the Liris and on the side of Campania, or whether it is to be ascribed to internal divisions, and to the destruction of their old allies the Æquians, it seems at any rate that the Volscian nation was now declining, and utterly unable to withstand, as it had once done, the united forces of Rome and Latium. It is probable that much of its territory became at this period either Roman or Latin; exactly in the same manner as the Sabines of Regillus and Nomentum had lost their independence soon after the expulsion of the Tarquins. And as the Claudian and Crustumian tribes were then formed out of those Sabines who became Romans, while Nomentum and Regillus fell to the share of the Latins, so a similar division in all probability took place now, and the Pomptine and Publilian

tribes must have been formed out of the Volscians who were assigned to Rome, whilst other portions of the Volscian territory and population fell to the share of the Latins. Thus the Volscian nation having been so dismembered, those states which still survived became henceforth more individually distinguished, and also, as was natural, more resolute to defend their independence. Amongst this number were the people of Privernum; and the ravages which they and the people of Velitræ are said to have carried into the Roman territory<sup>56</sup> in this same year, were doubtless more especially directed against those whom they would consider as traitors, their own Volscian countrymen, the new Roman citizens of the Pomptine and Publilian tribes.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

This favourable aspect of the Roman affairs was still further improved four years afterwards, when in the year 401 both Tibur and Præneste<sup>57</sup> gave up their long-continued hostility, and obtained, perhaps at the price of some sacrifices of territory, a peace for a certain number of years with Rome. The peace with Tarquinii followed, as we have already seen, in the year 404.

Peace with  
Tibur and  
Præneste.

But in the year 402 we again hear of an attack made by the Volscians upon the Latins in the direction of Tusculum<sup>58</sup>. No particulars are mentioned, perhaps because the allied Romans and Latin forces

The growth  
of the Sam-  
nite power  
draws the  
Romans  
and Latins  
more closely  
together.

<sup>56</sup> Livy, VII. 15. "Accessit . . . vastatio Romani agri, quam Privernates, Veliterni deinde, incursione repentina fecerunt."

Livy, VII. 19; and for the peace or rather truce with Præneste, see Diodorus, XVI. 45.

<sup>58</sup> Livy, VII. 19.

<sup>57</sup> For the peace with Tibur, see

were in this year commanded by a Latin general; but we may suppose that Privernum and Velitræ with some of the cities of the Volscian highlands were the part of the Volscian nation engaged in these hostilities. From this time for the next five years all was quiet: but in the year 407, Satricum, which had been burnt some years ago by the Latins, and the territory of which the Latins had appropriated to themselves in their late partition of the Ager Pomptinus with Rome, was again occupied and rebuilt by the Volscians of Antium<sup>59</sup>. Jealousies were arising about this time between Rome and Latium; and it appears probable that there was a party amongst the Latins disposed to form a separate alliance with the remaining independent states of the Volscians, in order to be strengthened by them against Rome. Thus when the Auruncans or Ausonians, one of the most southern people of the Volscian stock, began to plunder the Ager Pomptinus in 410, the Romans, we are told, suspected that this inroad was actually made with the concurrence of the Latins, and expected<sup>60</sup> a war with the whole Latin confederacy. Their fears, however, were groundless for the present, and indeed the progress of the Samnite arms in Campania and on the Liris was a strong inducement both to the Romans and Latins to defer their jealousies of each other to a more convenient season. Two years afterwards, in 412, the first Samnite war broke out, in which both

<sup>59</sup> Livy, VII. 27.<sup>60</sup> Livy, VII. 28.

the Latins and Volscians to all appearance took part with Rome. CHAP.  
XXVII.

Thus in the course of three and twenty years Rome was finally delivered from the scourge of the Gaulish invasions; she had secured her northern frontier by a peace with the neighbouring states of Etruria; her old alliance with the Latins and Hernicans, however doubtful might be its duration, had been restored in time to enable her to repel the Gauls and to crush the Volscians; and it was now ready to aid her in her coming struggle with the Samnites. She had not merely extended her dominion, but by granting the full rights of citizens to the Volscians of the Ager Pomptinus, she had enlarged and strengthened her own commonwealth. She was thus prepared for the events of the next ten years, which assured to her beyond dispute the first place among the nations of Italy.

We have seen that the date of the first plebeian consulship coincided with that of the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea. The first Samnite war broke out about two years before the establishment of the Macedonian supremacy in Greece by Philip's great victory at Chæronea. Chronology.



## CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE FIRST SAMNITE WAR—SEDITION OF THE YEAR  
408—GENUCIAN LAWS.—A.U.C. 407-409 NIEBUHR:  
410-412 FASTI CAPIT.: 412-414 LIVY.

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“*Majora jam hinc bella et viribus hostium et longinquitate vel regionum vel temporum spatio quibus bellatum est dicentur; namque eo anno adversus Samnites, gentem opibus armisque validam, mota arma.*”—LIVY, VII. 29.

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CHAP.  
XXVIII.  
Legend concerning the  
origin of the  
Samnites.

THE Sabines, who dwelt amidst the highest mountains of the Apennines, where the snow lies all the year long, and which send forth the streams to run into the two seas northward and southward, were<sup>1</sup> at war for many years together with their neighbours the Umbrians. At last they made a vow that if they should conquer their enemies, all the living creatures<sup>2</sup> born in their land in that year should be devoted to the gods as sacred. They did conquer,

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, V. p. 250. Dionysius, “quod ver adtulerit ex suillo, ovillo, caprino, bovillo grege,

<sup>2</sup> The form of one of these vows quæque profana erunt, Jovi fieri.” is given by Livy, XXII. 10,

and they offered in sacrifice accordingly all the lambs and calves and kids and pigs of that year, and such animals as might not be sacrificed, they<sup>3</sup> redeemed. But still their land would not yield its fruits, and when they thought what was the cause of it they considered that their vow had not been duly performed; for all their own children<sup>4</sup> born within that year had been kept back from the gods, and had neither been sacrificed nor redeemed. So they devoted all their children to the god Mamers, and when they were grown up, they sent them away to become a new people in a new land. When the young men set out on their way, it happened that a bull went before them; and they thought that Mamers had sent him to be their guide, and they followed him. He laid himself down<sup>5</sup> to rest for the first time when he had come to the land of the Opicans; and the Sabines thought that this was a sign to them, and they fell upon the Opicans, who dwelt in scattered villages<sup>6</sup> without walls to defend them, and they drove them out, and took possession of their land. Then they offered the bull in sacrifice to Mamers, who had sent him to be their guide;

<sup>3</sup> Τὰ μὲν κατέθυσαν, τὰ δὲ καθιέρωσαν. Strabo, V. p. 250. What was not sacrificed, but yet was consecrated to the gods, must have been redeemed before it could be employed for ordinary purposes.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo as before. Festus in "Mamertini."

<sup>5</sup> This reminds us of the story of the white sow which guided Æneas to the place where he was

to build his city. A wolf was said to have done the same service to the Hirpinians, who were also of Samnite extraction.

<sup>6</sup> Ἐτύγχανον δὲ κωμηδὸν ζῶντες. Like the Ætolians in the time of the Peloponnesian war, Thucyd. III. 94; or like the Casali, which to this day contain the greatest part of the population in the valleys of the central Apennines.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

and a bull was the device <sup>7</sup> which they bore in after ages; and they themselves were no more called Sabines, but they took a new name, and were called Samnites.

What truth  
is contained  
in it.

Such is the legendary account of the origin of that great people whose history is now beginning to connect itself with that of Rome. In two points it has preserved the truth; the Samnites were a people of Sabine extraction, and had established themselves as conquerors in the country of the Opicans. But the two races were probably not very remote from each other, and thus it is less surprising that the conquerors should have adopted the language of their subjects; for the Samnites spoke Opican or Oscan, and the legends of their coins, and their remaining inscriptions are in the Oscan character. Still the two people were distinct; and the Samnites regarded neither their Opican subjects in Campania, nor their Opican neighbours, the Æquians and Volscians, as their own proper countrymen.

Notice of  
the Sam-

One single contemporary notice of the Samnites <sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Micali gives an engraving of a coin, struck by the Italian allies during their great war with the Romans in the seventh century of Rome, which represents a bull, the emblem of the Samnites, goring a wolf, the well-known type of the Romans. Two or three specimens of this coin are to be seen in the British Museum.

<sup>8</sup> Καμπανῶν δὲ ἔχονται Σαννίται· καὶ παράπλους ἐστὶ Σαννιτῶν ἡμέρας ἡμισυ, p. 3. Niebuhr reads Σαννίται instead of Δαννίται in the following page of Scylax, urging

that the description is inapplicable to the Daunians, as they neither extended across all Italy from sea to sea, nor lived to the N.W. of Mount Drium or Garganus. I think that this conjecture is highly probable, because Scylax had not mentioned the Daunians in his description of the coasts of the Lower Sea, but had mentioned the Samnites; and the only other people who stretched from sea to sea, the Etruscans or Tyrrhenians, are mentioned separately in the description of both coasts. If so,

in the days of their greatness has descended to our times; and this is contained in two short lines of the Periplus of Scylax, who describes the Samnites as living on the coast of the Lower Sea between the Campanians and Lucanians, and the length of their coast line was no more he tells us than half a day's sail. The space which they occupied reached nearly from the Sarnus to the Silarus; Neapolis, according to Scylax, is in Campania; Posidonia or Pæstum is in Lucania. But the Samnite possessions on or near the coast, even though they once included the famous cities of Herculaneum and Pompeii<sup>9</sup>, of Nola, Nuceria, and Abella, were a mere recent offshoot from the great body of the nation: the true Samnium lies wholly in the interior, and having been thus removed from the notice of the Greeks, from whom alone we derive our knowledge of the ancient world before the dominion of the Romans, it has been fated to remain in perpetual obscurity.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.  
nites in the  
Periplus of  
Scylax.

Nearly due north of Naples, there stands out from the central line of the Apennines, like one of the towers of an old castle from the lower and more

Geography  
of Sam-  
nium.—The  
Matese.

Scylax includes within the limits of the Samnites, not only the country of the Frentanians, who were notoriously of Samnite origin, but also that of their neighbours the Marrucinians and Vestinians.

<sup>9</sup> Herculaneum and Pompeii both stood, it is true, to the northward of the Sarnus; and Strabo expressly says that they were wrested by the Samnites from the Etruscans, V. p. 247. This, however, was the case also with Cuma

and Capua; but as Scylax places these towns in Campania, and distinguishes it from the country of the Samnites a little to the south of it, it is probable that at the time of the first Samnite war, which is nearly the date of Scylax's Periplus, most of this district had recovered its independence, and the Samnite possessions were reduced to the limits mentioned in the text.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

retiring line of the ordinary wall, a huge mass of mountains, known at present by the name of the Matese. On more than three-fourths of its circumference it is bounded by the Volturno and its tributary streams, the Calore<sup>10</sup> and the Tamaro, which send their waters into the Lower or Tyrrhenian Sea: but on its northern side its springs and torrents run down into the Biferno, and so make their way to the Adriatic. A very narrow isthmus or shoulder, high enough to form the watershed between the two seas, connects the Matese at its N.W. and N.E. extremities with the main Apennine line, and thus prevents it from being altogether insulated.

Its extent  
and cha-  
racter.

The circumference of the Matese as above described is between seventy<sup>11</sup> and eighty miles. Its character bears some resemblance to that of the district of Craven in Yorkshire, or more closely to that of the Jura. It is a vast mass of limestone<sup>12</sup>, rising from its base abruptly in the huge wall-like cliffs or scars, so characteristic of limestone mountains, to the height of about 3000 feet; and within this gigantic enclosure presenting a great variety of surface, sloping inwards from the edge of the cliffs

<sup>10</sup> The Calore runs along the southern side of the Matese: the Tamaro, which bounds its eastern side, runs into the Calore from the north nearly at right angles.

<sup>11</sup> Mr. Keppel Craven says, that it is reckoned to measure seventy miles.—Excursions in the Abruzzi, &c. Vol. II. p 166. Giustiniani gives it at sixty-two Neapolitan miles, which are more than seventy English ones.—See his *Dizionario*

del Regno di Napoli, Parte 2, in "Matese."

<sup>12</sup> This limestone is in some parts bituminous, and contains some fossil remains of fish. There are some volcanic or tufaceous rocks in the Matese, resembling probably the beds of tuff which are found on the slopes of the Apennines in other places, as for instance on the road from Naples to Avelino in the pass of Monteforte.



into deep valleys, and then rising again in the highest points of the centre of the range, and especially in the Monte Miletto, which is its loftiest summit, to an elevation computed at 6000 feet. Its upland valleys offer, like those of the Jura, a wide extent of pasture, and endless forests of magnificent beech-wood; it is rich in springs, gushing out of the ground with a full burst of water, and suddenly disappearing again into some of the numerous caverns in which such limestone rocks abound. In this manner the waters of a small lake in the heart of the mountain have no visible outlet<sup>13</sup>; but the people of the country say that they break out at the foot of a deep cliff or cove, about two or three miles distant, and form the full stream of the Torano.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

On the highest points of the Matese the snow lies till late<sup>14</sup> in the summer; and such is their elevation, that the view from them extends across the whole breadth of Italy from sea to sea. No heat of the summer scorches the perpetual freshness of these mountain pastures; and during the hottest months<sup>15</sup> the cattle from the surrounding country are driven up thither to feed.

This singular mountain with its subject valleys was the heart of the country of the Samnites. Of

Principal  
divisions and  
towns of  
Samnium.

<sup>13</sup> See Keppel Craven, *Excurs. in the Abruzzi*, Vol. I. p. 18. The English reader will remember Malham Tarn, and the full burst of water with which the Aire rushes out from under the rocks of Malham Cove. Similar phenomena are frequent in the limestone mountains of Peloponnesus.

<sup>14</sup> See Giustiniani, *Dizionario*. Mr. Keppel Craven found the upper half of the Matese covered with snow in May: it would remain much later on the highest summits.

<sup>15</sup> They are turned out about the end of June.—See Keppel Craven, Vol. I. p. 20.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

the two principal divisions of the Samnites, one, the Caudinians, occupied the southern side of the Matese, and the other, the Pentrians, dwelt on its northern side. To the former belonged the towns of Allifæ<sup>16</sup> on the Volturnus, of Telesia, the country of that Pontius Telesinus<sup>17</sup> who struggled so valiantly against the fortune of Sylla in the great battle at the Colline gate, and of Beneventum<sup>18</sup>. To the Pentrians belonged Æsernia<sup>19</sup> on one of the first feeders of the Volturnus, Bovianum<sup>20</sup> on the Biferno

<sup>16</sup> Alife, which still retains its ancient name, ranks even now as a city, but the bishop resides at Piedimonte, a flourishing town about three miles distant, and Alife is at present almost depopulated from malaria. See Keppel Craven, Vol. I. p. 21.

<sup>17</sup> And according to the writer of the little work, "*de viris illustribus*," it was the country also of that still greater C. Pontius who defeated the Romans at the Caudine Forks. The remains of Telesia are to be seen at the distance of about a mile to the N.W. of the modern town of Telesse, which, like Alife, has almost gone to ruin from the influence of the malaria. See Keppel Craven, Vol. II. p. 173, 174.

<sup>18</sup> This is still a well-built and flourishing town, containing a population of 18,000 souls. See Keppel Craven's Tour in the southern provinces of Naples, p. 22. 28.

<sup>19</sup> The present town, still called Isernia, stands on a narrow ridge between two torrents, running down in very deep ravines, which meet a little below, and then fall into the Vandra, about two miles above its junction with the Vol-

turno. It is a flourishing place with various manufactures, and a population of about 7000 souls. Large remains of polygonal walls are still visible, which belong probably to the days of its independence as a Samnite city. The remarkable tunnel, hewn through the rock for about a mile, and still used, according to its original purpose, for supplying the town with water, is probably a work of the Roman times. See Keppel Craven, *Abruzzi*, Vol. II. p. 81—84.

<sup>20</sup> Bovianum, or Boiano, also contains remains of polygonal walls, built of very large stones, put as closely together as possible, and the smaller interstices filled up with remarkable nicety. It is a cold place, being shaded by the Matese, which rises directly to the south of it; and the Biferno so floods the valley, that it is a constant swamp, and the air is damp and foggy: but there is no malaria, because it has no severe heats in summer. Its population, according to Giustiniani, writing in 1797, was then 3500 souls. Mr. Keppel Craven rates it at present as low as 1500. *Abruzzi*, Vol. II. p. 164.

or Tifernus, and Sepinum<sup>21</sup> on the E. of the Matese, not far from the sources of the Tamaro.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

Tribes connected with the Samnites.

Besides the Caudinians and Pentrians, there were doubtless other tribes more or less closely connected with the Samnite name, who took part in the great contest of their nation with Rome. The very names of some of these may have perished; for it is by mere accident that we hear of the Caracenians<sup>22</sup>, a tribe to the north of the Pentrians, who dwelt in the upper valley of the Sangro or Sagrus, and to whom belonged the town of Aufidena. The Frentanians, who reached down to the very shores of the Adriatic, are called a Samnite people<sup>23</sup>; yet in the accounts of the wars with Rome, they are spoken of as distinct; and they seem to have taken no part in the first war. And the Hirpinians, whose country is also included

<sup>21</sup> The actual town of Sepino stands on a hill at some distance from the remains of the ancient city, which are to be seen in the valley below. These remains are very large and remarkably perfect, but they are of Roman, as I imagine, rather than of Samnite origin. One of the famous cattle-tracks (*calles, tratturi delle pecore*), which have existed unaltered from time immemorial for the yearly migrations of the cattle from and to the coast, runs straight through the ruins of the ancient town from E. to W. See Keppel Craven, *Abruzzi*, Vol. II. p. 131. 135.

<sup>22</sup> The name is only noticed, I believe, by Zonaras and Ptolemy; unless it be the same with the Carentini of Pliny. The Italian writers, Romanelli for instance, and Micali, propose to read Sari-

ceni, as if the name were derived from the neighbouring river Sarus or Sangro. But this is exceedingly uncertain. Alfidena, or Aufidena, contains at present about 1500 souls: it stands on the Rio Torto, a torrent which just below the town plunges down into a very deep and narrow glen, about a mile above its junction with the Sangro. There exist considerable remains of polygonal walls, and an Oscan inscription on the bridge which crosses the Rio Torto. Keppel Craven, *Abruzzi*, Vol. II. p. 58, 59.

<sup>23</sup> Strabo calls them *Σαννιτικὸν ἔθνος*, V. p. 241; yet Livy represents them as suing for and obtaining peace as a distinct people, after a treaty had been concluded with the Samnites, IX. 45.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

within the limits of Samnium, and who dwelt to the S.E. of the rest of their countrymen, occupying the upper valleys of the Calore and Sabato on the south of the Apennines, and of the Ofanto or Aufidus on the northern side, are on some occasions<sup>24</sup> distinguished from the Samnites; and it is by no means certain that they took part in the beginning of the contest with Rome; nor on the other hand that when they became involved in it, the other tribes which had been first engaged continued to maintain it without interruption.

Little is known of the state of the Samnite people.

The country of the Samnites still retains its ancient features, and our own eyes can inform us sufficiently of its nature. But of the Samnite people we can gain no distinct notions whatever. Unknown and unnoticed by the early Greek writers, they had been well-nigh exterminated before the time of those Roman writers whose works have come down to us; and in the Augustan age, nothing survived of them but a miserable remnant, retaining no traceable image of the former state of the nation. Our knowledge of the Samnites is literally limited to the single fact, that they were a brave people, who clung resolutely to their national independence. We neither know what was the connexion of the several tribes of the nation with each other, nor what was the constitution of each tribe<sup>25</sup> within itself. We know

<sup>24</sup> As for instance, "Hannibal ex Hirpinis in Samnium transit." Livy, XXII. 13.

<sup>25</sup> Micali states that the Samnites were governed by a priestly aristocracy, like the Etruscans.

He gives no authority for this, and certainly it is not proved by their mere practice of enlisting their soldiers on great emergencies with certain solemn religious ceremonies.



nothing distinct of their military system and tactic, except that they did not use the order of the phalanx; the sword and large shield<sup>26</sup> were their favourite arms, and not the small shield and pike. We do not know how they governed the countries which they conquered, nor how far they adopted the Roman system of colonies<sup>27</sup>. Their wealth, manner of living, and general civilization we can but guess at: and to add to all this, the very story of their wars with Rome having been recorded by no contemporary historian, has been corrupted as usual by the Roman vanity; and neither the origin of the contest, nor its circumstances, nor the terms of the several treaties which were made before its final issue, have been related truly.

Thus destitute of direct information, we may be pardoned for endeavouring to extract some farther

Their principal articles of produce.

<sup>26</sup> Livy expressly speaks of them as scuti, and describes the form of their shield, IX. 40. The use of the scutum in itself implies that the sword, and not the spear, was the offensive weapon generally used; we are told also, that the Campanians called their gladiators Samnites, because they equipped them with arms taken from the Samnites (Livy, IX. 40); and in such combats, as the very name shows, the sword was the common weapon. Add to this the story, whether well or ill founded, as to the particular fact, that the Romans borrowed their arms offensive and defensive, "arma et tela," from the Samnites. Sallust, Bell. Catilin. 52. Athenæus VI. 106. p. 273. Diodorus, XXIII. 1. Fragm. Vatic.

<sup>27</sup> Micali says that "their society was founded on a system of agrarian laws," and he quotes as his authority for this a fragment of Varro preserved to us by Philargyrius, one of the scholiasts on Virgil, in his note on Georgic. II. 167. The fragment runs thus, "Terra culturæ causâ attributa olim particulatim hominibus, ut EtruriaTusciis, Samnium Sabellis." But I do not understand this as saying any thing of agrarian laws, but merely that the earth became the property of particular portions and races of mankind, instead of being all common to all; and that thus Etruria was given (by the gods, I think, and not by an agrarian law) to the people of the Etruscans, and Samnium to the Sabellians.



CHAP.  
XXVIII.

Winter pas-  
torage for  
their cattle  
on the sea-  
coast.

conclusions from the few facts known to us. The nature of their country makes it certain that the principal wealth of the Samnites consisted in their cattle. Wool and hides must have been the chief articles which they had to sell to their neighbours. But the high elevation of much of their country, as it preserved the pasture unscorched by the summer heats, was, on the other hand, especially exposed to the rigour of the winter; the snow lay so long on the ground that their cattle could not have found subsistence. And as in like manner the parched plains of Apulia yield no grass in the summer, the inhabitants of the centre of Italy, and of the coast of the Adriatic, must always have been dependent on each other; and the Samnites, either by treaty or by conquest, must have obtained the right of pasturing their cattle in winter in the low grounds near the sea, either on one side of the peninsula or on the other. On the shores of the Adriatic this was probably secured by their close connexion with the Frentinians, a people of their own race; and by their constant friendly intercourse<sup>28</sup> with the Marru-

<sup>28</sup> The Vestinians join the Samnites in 424, and the Marsians, Pelignians, and Marrucinians, are represented as so closely connected with the Vestinians, that an attack on these would necessarily involve the Romans in a war with all the others. Livy, VIII. 29. I think it may be concluded that the Marsians and Pelignians were on friendly terms with the Samnites from the fact that the Latins, then in alliance with Rome, attacked

the Pelignians in the first year of the Samnite war (Livy, VII. 38.); and that as soon as peace is made between Rome and Samnium, the Roman armies march through the country of the Marsians and Pelignians, in order to reach Campania. Livy, VIII. 6.

According to Livy, IX. 13, the Apulians were hostile to the Samnites, because they were oppressed by them, and their country frequently laid waste. Had Livy any

cinians and Vestinians ; while their arms, by winning possession of Campania, procured for them an access to the coast on that side, and gave them the full enjoyment of all that soft and sunny plain which extends along the shore of the Gulf of Salerno.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

It is not certain, as I have said, that the Samnites governed their Campanian conquests by means of colonies, but there is every probability that they did so. The Samnite colonists would thus constitute the ruling body in every city ; and like the early Roman patricians might be called indifferently either the burghers or the aristocracy. Niebuhr supposes that the sixteen hundred Campanian knights, who in the great Latin war are said to have stood aloof from the mass of the people, and to have remained faithful to Rome, were the colony of the Samnite conquerors. And the frequent revolts which we read of, from one alliance to another, may mark a corresponding domestic revolution, in which the colony either lost or re-established its ascendancy. Yet it may have happened that the colony in some cases had really identified itself with the old inhabitants,

Their conquests in Campania.

authority for this last expression, "*campestria et maritima loca . . . ipsi montani atque agrestes depopulabantur*," or did he put it in merely as a natural way of accounting for the ill-will of the Apulians towards their neighbour ? — But what if the injurious treatment of the Samnites consisted in compelling the Apulians to find pasture for their cattle in the winter ; exactly as the Arragonese kings of Naples obliged all tenants

holding of the crown in Apulia to let their lands during the winter to the cattle-owners of the Abruzzi ; and although the French took off these restrictions, yet the present government has in great measure re-imposed them ; and the Apulian proprietors are still obliged to reserve two-thirds of their land in pasture, and have only the cultivation of one-third left to their own disposal. See Keppel Craven, *Abruzzi*, Vol. I. p. 267—269.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

and felt with them more than with the people from whom they were themselves descended. In this manner the Samnite colonies may have become in feeling thoroughly Campanian, and have wished to make themselves independent of their own Samnite countrymen in Samnium; and thus, although the highest of the Campanian nobility were of Samnite extraction, yet Campania may have become, as it is represented, wholly independent of the Samnite nation within no long period after its first conquest.

How they  
were affected  
by the inva-  
sions of the  
Gauls.

Not the slightest notice remains of the effect produced on the Samnite dominion by the irruptions of the Gauls. Yet in the year 394-395 the Gauls had wintered<sup>29</sup> in Campania; and after their last appearance in Latium in 406 they are said to have retreated into Apulia<sup>30</sup> through the land of the Volscians and Falernians; so that they must have passed as it seems through a part of Samnium. The heart of the Samnite territory indeed they were not likely to assail; they were not expert in besieging walled cities, nor would they be tempted to invade the mountain fastnesses of the central Apennines. Thus if the Samnites did not choose to engage with them in the plains, their substantial power would be little impaired by their invasions; and they received from them perhaps no greater mischief than the ravaging of their territory in Campania, and the loss of their cattle which might have been sent down to the coast for their winter pasture. It is possible, however, that

<sup>29</sup> Livy, VII. 11.

<sup>30</sup> Livy, VII. 26.

a dread of the Gauls may have been one of the causes which led to a treaty of alliance between Rome and the Samnites<sup>31</sup> in the year 401.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

The first Samnite war, which broke out eleven years afterwards, was no doubt occasioned in part by the advance of the Samnite arms in the valley of the Liris, and by the war between Rome and the Auruncans in the year 410, which brought the Roman legions into the immediate neighbourhood of Campania<sup>32</sup>. At this time Rome and Latium were in league together, and jointly pressing upon the Volscians; their power held out hopes to the Campanians, that by their aid, they might be defended against the Samnites. This aid was in the year 412 become highly needful; the Campanians, having ventured to defend the Sidicinians<sup>33</sup> against an attack

Causes of  
the first war  
between the  
Romans and  
Samnites.

<sup>31</sup> Livy, VII. 19. Diodorus, XVI. 45. It may be observed that Diodorus agrees with Livy in placing this treaty in the consulship of M. Fabius Ambustus, and T. Quintius; but the consulship is according to him the 2nd year of the 107th Olympiad.

<sup>32</sup> Livy, VII. 28. Niebuhr supposes that by the name of Auruncans are meant the Volscians on the Liris, and that Sora was an Auruncan town. Vol. III. p. 101. Livy himself does not seem to have had this notion; for the Auruncan and Volscian wars are in his accounts carefully distinguished, and Sora is said to have been taken from the Volscians. The Auruncans, on the other hand, are mentioned again in the 8th Book, c. 15, and Suessa Aurunca is named as their chief town. Now

Suessa is Sessa, a town standing on the crater of an old volcano, just above the modern road from Naples to Rome, a few miles to the east of the Garigliano or Liris. Is there any reason for thinking that these Auruncans were more closely connected with the Volscians of Sora and Arpinum than with those of Antium, or that the name Auruncan was at this period extended to any other Opican people than to those of the neighbourhood of Sessa?

<sup>33</sup> Livy, VII. 29. The Sidicinians were close neighbours to the Auruncans, living on the same cluster of volcanic hills which form the boundary of the plain of Naples on the road towards Rome. Teanum, now Teano, was their principal town.



CHAP.  
XXVIII.

of the Samnites, had drawn the hostilities of the Samnites upon themselves, and we find that a Samnite army occupied the ridge of Tifata immediately above Capua, and from thence descended like the Æquians and Volscians from Algidus, to the plain before the walls of the city. In this state of distress, Capua implored the protection of Rome and Latium, and obtained it<sup>34</sup>. A war between Samnium on the one hand, and the connected Romans, Latins, and Campanians on the other, was the immediate consequence.

Character of  
the accounts  
of the war.

The Roman consuls in this year were M. Valerius Corvus, and A. Cornelius Cossus. Valerius is the hero of that famous legend already related, which told how he had vanquished in his early youth a gigantic Gaul by the aid of a heaven-sent crow. The acts of his consulship have been disguised by a far worse spirit; they were preserved, not by any

<sup>34</sup> Livy, VII. 31. But it is impossible to believe the statement in Livy that they applied to the Romans only, or that they purchased the Roman protection by a literal surrender, *editio*, of themselves and their city to the sovereign disposal of Rome. Every step in the Samnite and Latin wars has been so disguised by the Roman annalists, that a probable narrative of these events can only be given by a free correction of their falsifications. The case of Capua applying for aid to Rome against the Samnites was exactly that of Corcyra asking help from Athens against Corinth. The motives which induced the Athenians to receive the Corcyraeans into

their alliance were the very same which influenced the Romans: the justice of the measure was in both cases equally questionable; but it may be doubted whether the Roman legions sent into Campania were ordered only to fight in the event of an actual attack made upon their allies, which was the charge given by Pericles' government to the ten ships sent to protect Corcyra. So truly is real history a lesson of universal application, that we should understand the war between Rome and Samnium far better from reading Thucydides' account of the war between Corinth and Corcyra, than from Livy's corrupted story of the very events themselves.



regular historian, but in the mere funeral orations and traditional stories of his own family; and were at last still further corrupted by the flattery of a client of his house, the falsest of all the Roman writers, Valerius of Antium. Hence we have no real military history of the Samnite war in this first campaign, but accounts of the worthy deeds of two famous Romans, M. Valerius Corvus, and P. Decius Mus. They are the heroes of the two stories, and there is evidently no other object in either of them, but to set off their glory. It seems to me to be a great mistake<sup>35</sup> to regard such mere panegyric as history.

All that history can relate is that the Romans, we know not with what allied force to aid them, took the field with two armies; that one of these

First campaign, and battle by Mount Gaurus.

<sup>35</sup> Some of my readers may have seen a work which formed a sort of Appendix to the "Victoires, Conquêtes, &c. des Français," and was called "Tables du Temple de la Gloire." It consisted of an alphabetical catalogue raisonné of all Frenchmen, of whatever military rank, who had distinguished themselves, or thought that they had done so, in the course of the last war; and many of the articles were apparently contributed by the very individuals themselves who were the heroes of them. Now these notices had nothing of the licence of a poetical account of events; they professed to be a real matter of fact narrative; they were published when the memory of the actions to which they relate was fresh, and in the face of the jealous criticism of all the nations of

Europe, where there were thousands of witnesses both able and eager to expose any exaggeration. And yet, after all, what sort of history of any of the campaigns of the last war could be compiled from the "Tables du Temple de la Gloire?" I cannot, therefore, persuade myself that the details of the battle by Mount Gaurus, or of the wise and valiant conduct of Decius in Samnium, deserve to be transcribed in a modern History of Rome. They have not obtained such celebrity as to be worth preserving as legends; they have not in their style and substance those marks of originality which would make them valuable as a picture of the times; and least of all, have they that trustworthiness which would entitle them to be regarded as historically true.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

was to protect Campania, while the other was destined to invade Samnium. The army in Campania was commanded by M. Valerius, and his panegyric, careless of historical details, brings him, without a word as to his previous march, to Mount Gaurus<sup>36</sup>, now Monte Barbaro, in a remote corner of Campania, close upon the sea above Pozzuoli. Here, says the story, he met the Samnites, and here after a most bloody battle he defeated them.

Unsuccessful  
invasion

The army which was to invade Samnium<sup>37</sup> had

<sup>36</sup> Livy, VII. 32. "Consules . . . ab urbe profecti, Valerius in Campaniam, Cornelius in Samnium, ille ad montem Gaurum, hic ad Satriculam, castra ponunt." "What actions," says Niebuhr, "had forced the consul to fall back thither, and gave to the Samnites that assurance of victory with which they hastened to attack him, —this knowledge, as almost all else whereby the Samnite wars might have become more intelligible, is buried in everlasting night." Vol. III. p. 137.

<sup>37</sup> Livy, VII. 34—36. The account of the honours paid to Decius on this occasion by his fellow-soldiers, is characteristic of the time and people, and is worth transcribing. "After the battle, the consul called all the soldiers together, and made a speech, in which he commended all the worthy deeds which Decius had done." [Polybius especially mentions and praises this practice, VI. 39.] "He then, as was the custom, gave him divers gifts of honour, especially a crown of gold, and one hundred oxen, and one beautiful white ox over and above the number, with his horns bedecked with gold. To

the soldiers who had been with him in his post of danger, the consul gave an ox to each man, and two coats; and told them that their daily allowance of corn should for the time to come be doubled. Then, when the consul had ended, all the soldiers of the legions gave to Decius a wreath of twisted grass, which was accustomed to be given by a besieged or blockaded army to him who had delivered them; and it was put upon his head amidst the cheers of all the army. Another wreath also, of the like sort, was given to Decius by the soldiers of his own band. So Decius stood, wearing his crown of gold and his wreath of grass, and he forthwith offered in sacrifice to Mars the beautiful white ox with the gilded horns, and the other hundred oxen he gave to the soldiers who had followed him in his enterprise. And the other soldiers too gave each man to the soldiers of Decius a pound of corn from their own allowances, and a measure exceeding a pound in weight (sextarios) of wine. All the while that they were giving these honours to Decius and his soldiers, the whole army were

scarcely entered the hills which bound the plain of Naples, apparently by the pass of Maddaloni, when it became involved in a deep defile, and was nearly cut off by the enemy. It was saved by the conduct and courage of the famous P. Decius, then one of the military or legionary tribunes; and thus his panegyrist gives the whole story in great detail, and ends with saying that the Roman army was not only saved from destruction, but gained a great victory over the enemy. As it is not pretended, however, that the Romans made any progress in Samnium beyond the scene of their victory, it is likely that their success was limited to their escaping from a very imminent danger, and being enabled to retreat with safety.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.  
of Sam-  
nium.

The story of Valerius pretends that he won yet a second victory over the whole collected force of Samnium, which had been gathered to revenge their late defeat; and yet we are told that as soon as the Roman armies had returned to Rome, the Campanians<sup>38</sup> were obliged to send embassies to the senate, requesting that a force might winter in Campania for their protection, to keep off the attacks of the Samnites. This is the beginning of a totally different story, that of the sedition of the year 413, and the author of it having no concern with the

Result of  
the cam-  
paign.

shouting and cheering, for they knew not what to do for joy." Livy, VII. 37.

<sup>38</sup> Livy, VII. 38. He adds that the people of Suessa sent an embassy to the same effect. This shows, that immediately after the

retreat of the Roman armies, the Samnites were beginning, not only to overrun Campania again, but even to carry their ravages beyond the Vulturnus into the country of the Sidicinians and Auruncans.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

Samnite war, did not think of reconciling his account with the exaggerated representations given of the preceding campaign. That the Romans drove the Samnites from Campania is probable; but on the other hand, they failed in their attack upon Samnium, and the Samnites were clearly no way dispirited as to the general result of the war.

The Latins  
engaged  
against the  
Pelignians.

It would seem from a short and obscure notice in Livy<sup>39</sup>, that the Samnites were assisted in this war by some of their neighbours; whether as equal or as dependent allies we know not. For it appears that the Latins, instead of being engaged in Campania or in Samnium, moved into the heart of Italy and attacked the Pelignians; so that we must suppose that the operations of this year were carried on on a most extensive scale, and we thus see how much greater was this contest with Samnium, than any other in which Rome had been engaged before.

A Roman  
army win-  
ters in  
Campania.

The active campaign was short; for the consuls, so far as appears, still entered on their office on the 1st of July, and their triumphs took place on the 22d and 24th of September<sup>40</sup>. They themselves did not return to Campania, but parties of Roman soldiers, according to the request of the Campanians, were sent back to garrison the several cities, and a large force was thus kept on service during the

<sup>39</sup> Livy, VII. 38. "Hujus certaminis fortuna . . . Latinos, jam exercitibus comparatis, ab Romano in Pelignum vertit bellum." This can only mean that the Latins directed their main force against the north-

ern side of the Samnite confederacy, moving by the lake of Fucinus upon Sulmo, and the country of the Pelignians, and thus threatening Samnium on the rear.

<sup>40</sup> See the Fasti Capitolini.



winter. This state of things lasted through the following spring; the Romans would not commence offensive operations till the new consuls should come into office: of the movements of the Samnites we hear nothing; but it may be that their usual season of military service was the same as that of the Romans, and mere plundering parties would be deterred by the force left to keep them in check. But when the new consul, C. Marcius Rutilus, arrived after midsummer to take the command of the army, he found himself engaged in a very different duty from that of marching against the Samnites.

Had we any history of these times, events so important and so notorious as the great disturbance of the year 413 must have been related in their main points clearly and faithfully. But because we have merely a collection of stories recording the great acts of particular families and individuals, and in each of these the glory of its own hero, and not truth, was the object, even matters the most public and easy to be ascertained are so disguised, that nothing beyond the bare fact that there was a disturbance, and that it was at length appeased, is common to the various narratives<sup>41</sup>. The panegyrists

Domestic  
disturb-  
ances.

<sup>41</sup> "Adeo nihil," says Livy, "præterquam seditionem fuisse, eamque compositam, inter antiquos rerum auctores constat." VII. 42. We must not suppose that the "ancient authors" here spoken of were contemporary with these times; they were but the annalists of the sixth and seventh centuries of Rome, who followed

each the traditions and memorials of a different family. Livy himself, in another place, VIII. 40, deploras the want of all contemporary writers for the times of the Samnite wars, as one great cause of the hopeless confusion in which the story of those wars was involved.



CHAP.  
XXVIII.

of the Valerian family claimed the glory of putting an end to the contest for M. Valerius Corvus, who was, they said, specially appointed dictator; while the stories of the Marcian and Servilian families said that every thing had been done by the two consuls, C. Marcius Rutilus, and Q. Servilius. One account represented the affair as a secession of the Roman commons: another described it as a mutiny of the army in Campania. The story which most of the annalists afterwards adopted, taking only the latter view of the case, and thinking that mutinous soldiers ought not to benefit by their mutiny, told only how they were pardoned for their crime, and how they obtained<sup>42</sup> no more than one or two insignificant concessions, which in no respect compromised the dignity of the government. But other accounts<sup>43</sup> preserved the memory of a secession, headed by a tribune of the commons, and winning some of the most important constitutional points which had ever yet been agitated; nay, they told how it forced from the patricians, that which above all things they would be most loath to yield, both on public grounds and on private,—a general abolition of debts<sup>44</sup>.

The army  
in Campania  
mutinies  
and marches  
towards  
Rome.

The truth, however, in this instance, seems not difficult to disentangle. In spite of the successive lowerings of the rate of interest, there was a large amount of debt undischarged, because there had been no change for the better in the circumstances

<sup>42</sup> Livy, VII. 41.

<sup>43</sup> Livy, VII. 42.

<sup>44</sup> Auctor de Viris Illustribus, in

Valer. Corvo. Appian, Samnitic.  
Fragm. 1. § 2.

of the commons at large, to enable them to pay off even the principal of what they owed. A multitude of men thus involved, many of them perhaps actually nexi, were kept on foreign service during the winter, a thing in itself extremely galling to them, and were quartered in the towns of Campania, where they witnessed a state of luxury, such as they could never have conceived before. Nothing is more probable<sup>45</sup> than that they should have longed to appropriate these wealthy cities to themselves, to establish themselves at Capua, as their fathers, forty years before, would have fain done at Veii, and to make the Campanians their subjects, the commons of a state in which they themselves would be the burghers. Stories of their design were carried to Rome, and the commons there feeling that they too had their

<sup>45</sup> Perhaps I ought hardly to have expressed myself so strongly as to the probability of this part of the story, since Niebuhr considers it undeserving of credit. But Wachsmuth has well observed, that the eager desire of the commons to settle at Veii, proves sufficiently that they had no invincible attachment to Rome as their native country: he adds, with no less truth, "that a people whose innocence is the fruit of ignorance rather than of principle, is little able to resist the first strong temptation." How great were the excesses of the Spartans after the Peloponnesian war, when opportunities of indulgence were first offered to them! And why should we conceive that the Roman commons were men of greater simplicity of manners than the Samnites, who

had formerly seized Capua in a similar manner, when they were inhabiting it jointly with the Etruscans? Compare also the stories of the forcible occupation of Smyrna by some Colophonian exiles who had been hospitably received there (Herodotus, I. 150.); and of the seizure of Zancle by the Samians (Herodotus, VI. 23.), as showing that such acts were practised even by Greeks towards Greeks, at a period when manners had been as little corrupted by luxury and scepticism as they were at this time at Rome; whereas the Campanians were no countrymen of the Romans, and therefore, according to the too prevailing notions of the ancient world, were entitled to far less consideration.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

share of distress, proposed also to seek their remedy. Before the plans of the soldiers were yet ripe, attempts were made by their officers to break up their combinations, and detachments of those who were most suspected were ordered home, as if they were no longer wanted in Campania. But these, when they came to Lautulæ, a narrow pass between the sea and the mountains close to Tarracina, concerted their measures with the cohort which was there in garrison, and openly refused to obey their commanders. The example once set became contagious; the mass of the soldiers quartered in Campania joined the revolt, and all marched together<sup>46</sup> towards Rome, releasing on their way all the bondmen debtors whom they found working as slaves on their creditors' lands, till their number was swelled to 20,000 men.

The commons rise at Rome. M. Valerius Corvus dictator.

They halted on the slope of the Alban hills, near Bovillæ, fortified a regular camp, plundered the country as if it belonged to an enemy<sup>47</sup>, and seized upon a patrician, T. Quinctius, at his farm or country-house near Tusculum, and forced him to become their leader. The commons at Rome waited no longer;

<sup>46</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragm. I. § 1. The persons whom he speaks of as ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς δεδεμένους, must have been debtors working as slaves on the "possessiones" of their patrician creditors, on such portions of land lately conquered from the Volscians as had been occupied in the usual manner by individuals. Foreign purchased slaves must have

been too rare at Rome at this period, to have been employed in great numbers as agricultural labourers: and, in fact, the slaves who were confined to work in the workhouses of the patricians in these early times, are always described as insolvent debtors.

<sup>47</sup> "Ex prædatoribus vagis quidam compertum adtulerunt," &c. —Livy, VII. 39.

they too rose ; they too laid hold on a patrician, C. Manlius, loving the name of their old champion and martyr M. Manlius ; they marched out of the city, and established themselves in a spot four miles distant from the walls. Even now the patricians were not left helpless ; besides themselves and their clients, a numerous body, they would on this occasion be joined by all the noblest and richest of the commons, and by many perhaps of the best men even among the less wealthy, who would view with horror the disobedience of the soldiers, and the breach of their military oath. They prepared to put down the revolt ; yet, not trusting to force alone, they named as dictator M. Valerius Corvus, the most popular man in Rome, born of a house whose members had ever befriended the commons, himself in the vigour of youth<sup>48</sup>, scarcely thirty, yet already old in glory, and now in the full renown of his recent victories over the Samnites. The dictator proceeded to meet the soldiers from Campania ; the consuls were left to deal with the commons who had seceded from the city.

But when the opposing parties<sup>49</sup> approached each

Reconciliation of the

<sup>48</sup> He was three and twenty in his first consulship, (Livy, VII. 40.) and he was consul for the first time in the year 407.—See Livy, VII. 26.

<sup>49</sup> Livy, VII. 42. Appian, Samnitic. Fragm. I. § 2. This sudden burst of feeling is credible enough ; for civil war seems shocking to men who are little scrupulous in shedding the blood

of foreigners, however unjustly. In this respect it needs the hardness and coldness of a later stage of society to overcome the natural shrinking from domestic warfare. The feudal times are of course an exception to this ; for to the isolation and lawlessness of the feudal system the relations of countryman and fellow-citizen were almost unknown.



CHAP.  
XXVIII.  
contending  
parties.

other, and citizens were seen arrayed in order of battle against citizens, all shrunk alike from bringing their contests to such an issue, and with a sudden revulsion of feeling the soldiers, instead of joining battle, first welcomed each other with friendly greeting, then as they drew nearer, they grasped each other's hands, till at last amidst mutual tears and expressions of remorse they rushed into each other's arms. It may well be believed that not Valerius only but the majority of the patricians were noble enough to rejoice sincerely at this termination of the mutiny, although they foresaw that whatever were the demands of the soldiers and the commons, it would now be necessary to grant them.

Terms demanded by the soldiers, and granted.

But the insurgents were also brought to a softer temper, and asked little but what might have been given them unasked, as being in itself just and reasonable. First an act of amnesty<sup>50</sup> was passed for the mutiny and the secession, and the dictator entreated the patricians and those of the commons who had sided with them, that they would never, even in private life, in jest or in earnest, reproach any man with having been concerned in these unhappy dissensions. Then there was passed and sworn to with all religious solemnities<sup>51</sup> a law which

<sup>50</sup> Livy, VII. 41.

<sup>51</sup> "Lex sacra militaris." A lex sacra partook of the character of a treaty, and was sworn to by the two parties between whom it had been agreed to. Thus the term is applied only to such laws as settled points most

deeply affecting the interests of the two orders in the state, and were therefore a sort of treaty of peace between them. Of this sort, besides the famous laws respecting the office of tribunes of the commons, was the law of Icilius, de Aventino publicando.—See the



the soldiers regarded as their great charter, that no man's name who had been once enlisted should be struck off the list of the legions without his own consent, and that no one who had once been chosen military tribune should be afterwards<sup>52</sup> obliged to serve as a centurion. They deprecated the power of striking their names off the list of soldiers, partly because it degraded them to an inferior rank, that of the *capite censi*, who were considered unfit to bear arms; partly because whilst they were on military service they were protected from being personally attached for debts; and partly, also, because service in Campania bore an agreeable aspect, and might furnish a poor man with the means of relieving himself from his embarrassments. The law about the military tribunes had probably various objects; amongst the

first volume of this history, p. 246.

<sup>52</sup> It should be observed that Livy gives to this petition a different object. The soldiers, he says, insisted that no one who had been once tribune should afterwards be made centurion, out of dislike to one P. Saloni<sup>us</sup> who had been made almost every other year one or the other, and who was obnoxious to them, because he had especially opposed their meeting. Both Niebuhr and Wachsmuth suppose on the contrary that P. Saloni<sup>us</sup> was a popular man with the soldiers, and that the petition was made in his behalf, to save him from being obliged to go on serving in a lower rank, after having once served in a higher. Wachsmuth well compares the case of Volero Publilius, who complained of being required

to serve as a common soldier, after having been once centurion. (Livy, II. 55.) Many motives may have joined, however, in suggesting this demand of the soldiers. It was a great thing for a deserving soldier, that if once appointed military tribune, (six of whom were at this time chosen by the votes of the people themselves, Livy, VII. 5.) he should be freed from the necessity of serving again, except in the same or a higher rank. And it was a great thing for the mass of the commons, that promotion should be kept as open as possible, and that it should be necessary every year to fill up the vacancies among the centurions with new men, instead of confining them to a certain number of individuals who might pass at pleasure from one command to another.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

rest it may have been intended to advance the dignity of that office, which offered to the commons the readiest means of acquiring distinction, and thus was a natural step to the highest political magistracies.

Terms demanded and refused.

Another demand was made in a different spirit; that the pay of the horsemen or knights should be lowered, they receiving at that period three times as much as the foot-soldiers. In requiring this the soldiers not only wished to reduce the public expenditure, and so to lighten their own taxation, but there was also a feeling of enmity towards the knights, who had taken a decided part against them. But on this point the senate would not yield; and the soldiers ashamed, perhaps, of the motives which had led them to ask for it, did not press their demand<sup>53</sup>.

Demands of the commons in Rome. The Genucian laws.

While the mutiny of the legions was thus ended, the commons who had withdrawn from the city returned to their homes again; and L. Genucius<sup>54</sup>, one of their tribunes, proposed to them, in the forum, certain political measures to which it was understood the patricians would offer no opposition. These were, "that no man should be re-elected to the same magistracy within ten years, nor hold two magistracies in the same year; and that both con-

<sup>53</sup> As the commons were persuaded by Valerius and Horatius to abandon their demand for the summary execution of the decemvirs.—See Vol. I. p. 311.

<sup>54</sup> Niebuhr supposes, not unnaturally, that this Genucius belonged to the family of the tri-

bune Genucius, who was murdered by the aristocracy in the year 281.—See Vol. I. p. 171. He was also in all probability of the same family with the plebeian consuls of the years 385, 387, and 388.

suls *might* be plebeians, as the Licinian law had declared that one *must* be." The multiplication of various offices in the same hands is an evil of which we have no instances on record, because we have no lists of any of the magistrates of this period, except the consuls only. The frequent re-election of the same person to the consulship created an aristocracy within the aristocracy, and confined the highest offices to a number of great families; and now that the Licinian law was again observed, it would raise a few plebeian houses to an undue distinction, whilst the mass of the commons would be altogether excluded. It may be observed that C. Marcius, the plebeian consul of this very year, was now consul for the fourth time within a period of fifteen years.

But there was another law passed, which Livy could not endure to record, and of which we know not who was the proposer<sup>55</sup>: a law whose very name all settled societies regard with horror; a law which is, indeed, like war, an enormous evil, but which in this is most unlike war, that it has never been adopted, except when it was really necessary to prevent an evil still greater. In order to give the com-

General  
abolition of  
debts.

<sup>55</sup> It is attested by Appian, who, as Niebuhr thinks, copied this part of his work from Dionysius; and by the little work *De Viris Illustribus*. Appian's words are plain enough; ἡ βουλή—τὰς μὲν τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐψηφίστατο πᾶσι Ῥωμαίοις τοῖς δὲ τότε ἐχθροῖς (namely, the revolted soldiers,) καὶ ἄδειαν.—Samnitic. *Fragm.* I. § 2. There is no mistaking the well-known expression χρεῶν ἀποκοπή.—“Num honestum igitur,” asks

Cicero with respect to Cæsar when he had just heard of his crossing the Rubicon, “χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς, φυγάδων καθόδους, sexcenta alia scelera moliri, τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὥστ’ ἔχειν τυραννίδα?”

Ad Atticum, VII. 11. The expression in the Roman writer is no less decisive. M. Valerius, he says, “sublato ære alieno, seditionem compressit.”

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

mons an opportunity of rising to a more healthful condition, they were to be freed once for all from the shackles thrown around them by a former period of unavoidable distress: the consequences of the burning of the city by the Gauls had never yet been shaken off, nor did it appear likely that in the ordinary state of things they ever would be. It was demanded, therefore, by the commons, and M. Valerius, it is said, advised compliance with their demand, that an act of grace should be extended to all debtors, and that their creditors should not be permitted to enforce payment. In other words, all those who had pledged their personal freedom for the payment of their debts (*nexi*;) were released from their bond; nor could the prætor give over to his creditor's power, *addicere*, any debtor who had refused or might refuse to enter into such an engagement. Thus the burden of actual debts was taken away; and to prevent the pressure of an equal burden hereafter, even the lowest rate of interest was declared illegal, and any man who received more than the actual sum which he had lent was liable to restore it fourfold.

Its necessity  
and justice.

This was a sort of national bankruptcy, yet surely it wore the mildest features of that evil, and in some respects did not deserve the name. The nation itself broke no faith; but it required one portion of its citizens to sacrifice their strict legal rights in favour of another portion for the common benefit of all. It was doing on a large scale, and under the pressure of urgent necessity, what we see done every day on a smaller scale for an object not of necessity but of



expediency; when individuals are forced to sell their property at a price fixed by others in order to facilitate the execution of a canal or a railway. The patricians were in like manner obliged to part with the money which had been advanced as a loan either by themselves or by their fathers; and the compensation which they received was the continued existence of a state of society fraught to them above all their fellow-citizens with the highest means of happiness; they lost their money to preserve their country. Had such a sacrifice been made to the indolence, or carelessness, or dishonesty of their debtors, it would have been mischievous as a precedent, however urgent the necessity which led to it: but in the present case, the debts of the commons had arisen out of a common calamity, not occasioned by their fault nor to be remedied by their exertions: their distress, therefore, was fairly entitled to sympathy, and if there be any meaning in the term civil society, justice would require that its stronger members should bear the burdens of the weaker, and should submit to more than their share of the inconveniences of a common misfortune, rather than allow it to entail upon their fellow-citizens not inconvenience merely, but absolute ruin.

The domestic disturbances of this year produced important consequences abroad. The whole brunt of the Samnite war devolved on the Latins, and they sustained it so ably that their consideration amongst their allies was greatly increased, and Latium rather than Rome began to be regarded as the most power-

Growing  
power of the  
Latins.  
Peace be-  
tween Rome  
and Sam-  
nium.



CHAP.  
XXVIII.

ful member of the league. The remains of the Volscians, such as the brave people of Privernum, and the Antiatiens, together with those more distant tribes of the same stock who bordered on Campania, and were known to the Romans under the name of the Auruncans, began to gather themselves under the supremacy of Latium, and the Campanians, who had good reason to dislike the presence of Roman soldiers in their towns, may have hoped to find in a new confederacy, of which the Latins should be the head, protection at once against Rome and against the Samnites. Accordingly, the Romans felt that it was no time for them to continue their quarrel with Samnium; and in the very next year they concluded with the Samnites<sup>56</sup> a separate peace. Thus the relations of all these nations were entirely changed: Rome had connected herself with Samnium, and perhaps through the Samnites with their neighbours the Marsians and Pelignians; while on the other side stood a new confederacy, consisting of the Latins

A. U. C.  
414.  
A. C. 340.

<sup>56</sup> The Roman story is, (Livy, VIII. 1, 2.) that when L. Æmilius, the consul, entered the Samnite territory he found no enemy to oppose him; that the Samnites humbly sued for peace, and purchased an armistice to allow them to send ambassadors to Rome, by giving the consul a year's pay for his army, and three months' allowance of corn. What would have been the account of a Latin writer? Would it not have been something of this sort? "That when the confederate armies of Rome and Latium were actually in the field,

to invade the Samnite territory on different sides, the Romans suddenly and treacherously made a separate peace with the common enemy, and withdrew their army; and that not content with this, they actually entered into an alliance with the Samnites, and were ready to join them against Latium."—Compare the extreme dissatisfaction of the former allies of Lacedæmon, when she suddenly formed her separate treaty with Athens soon after the conclusion of the peace of Nicias.—Thucydides, V. 27.

and all the people of Opican extraction who lay between them and the Samnite frontier, whether known by the name of Volscians, Auruncans, Sidicinians, or Campanians. In the same manner, after the Peloponnesian war, we find Thebes and Corinth, so long the close allies of Lacedæmon, organizing a new confederacy against her; and thus at a later period Athens was at one time supporting Thebes, and shortly after, having become jealous of her growing power and ambition, joined Lacedæmon against her former ally; so that in the last campaigns of Epaminondas, the free citizens of Athens and the barbarian mercenaries of Dionysius the tyrant were fighting in the same ranks in defence of the Spartan aristocracy.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

THE GREAT LATIN WAR—BATTLE UNDER MOUNT VESUVIUS—THE PUBLILIAN LAWS—FINAL SETTLEMENT OF LATIUM.—A. U. C. 415-417 (410-412 NIEBUHR).

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“Je me refuse à croire que des peuples confédérés puissent lutter long-temps, à égalité de force, contre une nation où la puissance gouvernementale serait centralisée.”—DE TOCQUEVILLE, *De la Démocratie en Amérique* ; Tome I. p. 290.

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CHAP.  
XXIX.  
Uncertain  
relations be-  
tween Rome  
and Latium.

ALTHOUGH Rome had concluded a separate peace with Samnium, yet the old alliance with the Latins still subsisted in name unbroken. But it could not long remain so ; for the Latins continued the war against the Samnites, and might undoubtedly have called upon the Romans to aid them, according to the terms of the alliance ; while the Samnites<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Livy's whole narrative proceeds on the assumption that the Latins were the dependent allies of Rome, and that the war was on their part a revolt. Now, this is certainly false, as we know from the terms of the original alliance preserved by Dionysius, V. 61. (see Vol. I. of this history, p. 152) and from the indisputable

authority of Cincius (Vol. I. p. 153, note 4). Livy himself supplies a refutation of his own story ; for he allows expressly, VIII. 2, that the Latins had the right of making war with whom they pleased : that is, in Greek language, they were *αὐτόδικοι*, or able to give and receive satisfaction in their own name, without

called upon the Romans to procure for them peace with Latium also. In fact, the existing state of things showed clearly that the relations between Rome and Latium must undergo some change; either the two nations must become wholly separate, or more closely united; if they were to act together at all, some scheme must be devised to ensure that they should act unanimously.

The general congress of the Latin cities took upon itself to propose such a scheme; and the two prætors for the year, L. Annius of Setia, and L. Numisius of Circeii, magistrates corresponding to the Roman consuls, and retaining the name which the consuls had borne down to the time of the decemvirate, were despatched with ten of the principal deputies of the congress, to communicate their proposal to Rome<sup>2</sup>. The substance of it was that the two nations should be completely united; that they should both be governed by two consuls or prætors, one to be chosen from each nation; that there should be one senate, to consist of Romans and Latins in equal proportions; and a third similar provision must have been made for the popular branch of the government, so that a number of Latin tribes should be created, equal to that of the Roman, and the fifty-four tribes of the two nations should constitute one common sovereign assembly. In one point the

The Latins make proposals for an union between Rome and Latium.

being obliged to refer their quarrels to any superior; one of the characteristics of an equal as opposed to a dependent alliance.—

See Thucyd. V. 18. 27. I have,

therefore, tacitly corrected all Livy's false colouring in this matter, and given his facts in their true light.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, VIII. 5.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

Latins were willing to yield precedence to Rome ; none of their cities was equal to Rome in size or greatness : Rome, therefore, was to be the capital of the nation and the seat of government ; there the senate should sit, and the assembly of the tribes be held ; the Roman Jupiter of the Capitol should be equal to the Latin Jupiter of the mountain of Alba ; to both should the consuls of the united people offer their vows when they first came into office, and to the temples of both should they go up in triumph, when they returned home from war with victory<sup>3</sup>.

These proposals are rejected with indignation.

There were probably some in Rome who would have accepted this union gladly ; but the general feeling, both of the patricians and of the commons, was strongly against it. It was viewed as a sacrifice of national independence and national pride. To the Latins, used already to a federal government, it

<sup>3</sup> If the Latins really consented, as is not improbable, to acknowledge Rome as the capital of the united nation, it accounts for their subsequent acquiescence in the settlement made by the Romans after the war, so far as this, that it shows their willingness to waive the mere feeling as to the name of their country, and their consciousness that Rome was so superior to every other Latin city, as to be fairly entitled to be the head of the united nation. What I have added in the text respecting the Jupiter of the mountain of Alba, seems warranted by the actual practice of later times, even after the Latins were in a state of acknowledged inferiority to Rome. It is well known, that one of the consul's first duties

after entering upon his office, was to offer sacrifice at the great Latin festival on the mountain of Alba, as well as to sacrifice to the Roman Jupiter in the Capitol. Livy, XXI. 63. XXII. 1. And, although the instances are of more rare occurrence, yet we read of Roman generals triumphing at the Mons Albanus, and going up in solemn procession by the Via Triumphalis to the temple of the Latin Jupiter, as they went up usually by the Via Sacra to the Capitol. We cannot imagine, therefore, that the Latins, when proposing a perfectly equal union, should have consented to assign less honours to their national god, than he enjoyed even when they were become dependent.



was but taking another city into their union ; but to the Romans, whose whole political life was centred in Rome, it was admitting strangers into the forum and into the senate, and allowing the majesty of the Roman Jupiter to be profaned by the entrance of a foreigner into his temple. Accordingly, when the Latin prætors announced their proposal to the senate, which had assembled in the Capitol, it was rejected with indignation ; and T. Manlius Torquatus<sup>4</sup>, who was one of the newly-elected consuls, declared that if the senate should be so lost to itself as to receive the law from a man of Setia, he would come armed into the senate-house, and would plunge his sword into the body of the first Latin whom he saw within its walls. Then he turned to the image of the Capitoline Jupiter, and exclaimed ; “ Hear, O Jove, this wickedness ! Wilt thou endure to behold a stranger consul and a stranger senate within the sacred precinct of thy temple, as though thou wert thyself vanquished and made captive ? ” To this the Latin prætor, L. Annius of Setia, made a reply which the Romans called insulting to their god. “ But Jove,” said the Roman story<sup>5</sup>, “ taught the stranger to repent him of his scorn ; for, as soon as he had spoken his proud words, the lightning flashed and the thunder pealed, and as the Latin left the temple in haste, to go down by the hundred steps towards the forum, his foot slipped, and he fell from the top of the steps to the bottom, and his

<sup>4</sup> Livy, VIII. 5.<sup>5</sup> Livy, VIII. 6.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

head was dashed against a stone, and he died." Some of the annalists, struck perhaps by its being a notorious fact that L. Annius commanded the Latin army in the war, scrupled to say that he had been killed before its commencement; they said, therefore, that he had been only stunned by his fall: and they said nothing of the sudden burst of the lightning and thunder. No doubt, if the traditions of the family of L. Annius had been preserved, they would have given a different picture of his mission. But, whatever were the particulars of it, its result is certain; the proposal for an equal union was rejected, and the sword was to decide whether Latium should from henceforth be subject to Rome, or Rome to Latium.

The Romans  
prepare for  
war. T.  
Manlius and  
P. Decius  
are appointed  
consuls.

The Romans, however, had made up their minds to this issue before they heard the proposals of the Latin ambassadors. They were anxious to engage in the war at a moment when they might be assisted by the whole force of the Samnites: the Latins, on the other hand, would gladly have reduced Samnium to submission before they came to an open breach with Rome. Resolved, therefore, on the struggle, and well aware of its importance, the Romans wished to anticipate the election of the new consuls<sup>6</sup>, that they might have more time for their preparations before the usual season for military operations arrived, which, as we have seen, was not till after the harvest. Accordingly, the consuls of the year 409

<sup>6</sup> Livy, VIII. 2.

were required by a decree of the senate to resign their office before the end of their year, the middle of the summer, and two men of the highest military reputation were appointed to succeed them. One of these was T. Manlius Torquatus, renowned in his youth, like Valerius Corvus, for having slain a gigantic Gaul in single combat, and no less remarkable for a force of character, such as is best fitted for the control of great emergencies, when what in ordinary life is savageness becomes often raised and sobered into heroism. He had been consul only four years before ; but a special act, we must suppose, dispensed in his case with the recent provisions of the Genucian law. His colleague was the deliverer of the Roman army from its imminent peril in Samnium in the first campaign of the late war, and a man no less distinguished nine years earlier for his moderation and equity as one of the five commissioners appointed to relieve the commons from the burden of their debts<sup>7</sup>, the famous P. Decius Mus.

The Romans had good reason to prepare earnestly for the coming contest ; for never had they been engaged in one so perilous. With two or three exceptions all the Latin cities were united against them ; not all indeed with equal determination, but still all were their enemies. Tusculum<sup>8</sup>, whose true friendship they had so long

Importance  
of the con-  
test.

<sup>7</sup> "Quinqueviri mensarii." See Livy, VII. 21.

<sup>8</sup> Geminus Metius, who was slain by the young T. Manlius, commanded the horsemen of Tusculum.—Livy, VIII. 7. Lavinium

according to Livy took no part in the first campaign, but the Fasti Capitolini say that the consul Mænius in the year 417 triumphed over the Lavinians ; and their disposition is evident from Livy's

CHAP.  
XXIX.

experienced; Lavinium, the sacred city, which contained the holy things reported to have been brought by Æneas from Troy; Setia, Circeii, and Signia, Roman colonies, were now joined with the mass of the Latin nation, with Tibur and Præneste, with Pedum, Nomentum, and Aricia. The Latin nobles were personally known to those of Rome, and in many instances connected with them by mutual marriages; the two nations speaking the same language, with the same manners, institutions, and religious rites, trained with the same discipline to the use of the same arms, were bound moreover to each other by the closeness of their long alliance; their soldiers had constantly served in the same camp, and almost in the same tents: the several parts of their armies<sup>9</sup> had constantly been blended together; legions, cohorts, and maniples had been made up of Romans and Latins in equal proportions; the soldiers, centurions, and tribunes of both nations were thus familiar with each other's faces: and each man would encounter and recognise in his enemy an old and tried comrade.

The Latin  
military cha-  
racter not  
inferior to  
the Roman.

“The Romans and Latins,” says Livy<sup>10</sup>, “were alike in every thing, except in their courage.” This is an unworthy slander. Even nations of different race and climate and institutions, when long trained together under a common system of military disci-

own story, VIII. 11. The prætors of the whole nation for the first year of the war came from Setia and Circeii, and they are especially said to have induced Signia to

join the confederacy.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, VIII. 7, 8.

<sup>10</sup> “Adeo nihil apud Latinos dissonum ab Romanâ re præter animos erat.”—VIII. 8.

pline, and accustomed to fight side by side in the same army, lose all traces of their original disparity. But what the Latins were, we know from the rank which they held amongst the nations of Italy, and from the families which they afterwards furnished to Rome, when it became their common country. The Latins were able to contend on equal terms with the Samnites and Volscians, with the countrymen of C. Pontius and C. Marius. From Latium Rome received the Fulvii<sup>11</sup>, a family marked at once with all the great and all the bad qualities of the Roman aristocracy; and what Roman house could ever boast of brighter specimens of every Roman virtue than the Latin house of the Catos of Tusculum? The issue of the contest was not owing to the superior courage of the Romans, but to the inherent advantages possessed by a single powerful state when contending against a confederacy whose united strength she can all but balance alone, while to each of its separate members she is far superior.

With the Latins were joined, as we have seen, the Campanians, the Sidicinians, the Auruncans, and the Volscians, including under this name the various remnants of that people, the Antiatiens on the coast, and the several tribes or cities in the valley of the Liris. Laurentum, Ardea, and perhaps Lanuvium<sup>12</sup>,

The Latin confederacy, and its weaknesses.

<sup>11</sup> L. Fulvius, who was consul in the year 427, had been chief magistrate of Tusculum only the very year before he was consul at Rome.—Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* VII. 43. Ed. Venet. 1559.

<sup>12</sup> I agree with Niebuhr and

with Sigonius, that in Livy's narrative, VIII. 12, 13, Lavinio and Lavinii should be restored instead of Lanuvio and Lanuvinis. It is not only that the *Fasti Capitolini* name the people of Lavinium and not of Lanuvium as those over



CHAP.  
XXIX.

alone of all the Latin cities took part with Rome: Fundi and Formiæ stood aloof from the rest of their Volscian countrymen and remained neutral, allowing a free passage to the Roman armies through their territory<sup>13</sup>. It was a more remarkable circumstance, and one of ill omen for the unanimity and perseverance of the Latin confederacy, that the knights<sup>14</sup> or aristocracy of Capua, whether of Samnite extraction, or of mixed blood, Samnite, Etruscan, and Opican, protested as a body against the war with Rome, although for the present the influence of the Latin party overbore their opposition. But it was evident that on the first reverses they would regain their ascendancy, and hasten to withdraw their countrymen from the league. We have also indications<sup>15</sup>

whom the consul Mænius triumphed, or that several MSS. of Livy support the correction; but in the settlement of Latium the Lanuvians are named apart, as if they had been treated with singular favour, which is scarcely to be conceived if they had been among the last of the Latins to remain in arms. And that they were favourably treated appears also from the famous article "Municipium" in Festus, where they are classed along with the people of Fundi, Formiæ, and others, who we know were thought worthy of reward rather than punishment. Besides, Livy himself tells us that the Antiatians in the year 415 ravaged the district called Solonius (VIII. 12), and we know from Cicero, de Divinatione, I. 36, that this district was a part of the territory of Lanuvium. It is certain, therefore, that Lanuvium must have been friendly to Rome at that time, and if so, it

is not conceivable that she could afterwards have joined the Latins, when their cause was almost desperate. But I am not sure that the mistake is not to be ascribed to Livy himself rather than to his copyists: for it seems a just remark of Drakenborch's that Livy calls the people of Lavinium not Lavinii but Laurentes, as if he had confused the two towns together. Yet "Laurentes," in VIII. 11. must mean the people of Laurentum, not of Lavinium, from a comparison with Livy's own statement about Lavinium in the beginning of the same chapter; and that the two names really belong to two distinct places is proved by their being both found in the list of the thirty Latin towns given by Dionysius, V. 61.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, VIII. 14.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, VIII. 11.

<sup>15</sup> The Romans received information of the hostile designs of

of a Roman party in some of the cities of the Latins; and it is impossible to suppose that Tusculum in particular should not have contained many zealous supporters of the old alliance with Rome. Probably the Roman and anti-Roman parties were in most places more or less identical with the aristocracy and the party of the commons; and already, as in the second Punic war, Rome was regarded by the Italian aristocracies as the greatest bulwark of their ascendancy.

With Rome were united some few Latin towns<sup>16</sup>, some of her own colonies<sup>17</sup>, her old allies the Hernicans, and above all the Samnites and their confederacy, including, it is probable, the warlike nations of the Marsians and the Pelignians.

Allies of  
Rome.

When the Latins sent the two prætors as ambassadors to Rome, it is evident that no active warfare could be going on in Campania. Latin garrisons had probably wintered there to repel plundering parties of the Samnites; and the Latin army would march thither as soon as the season for military operations arrived, to renew their invasion of Samnium. No expectation seems to have been entertained that their proposal of an equal union would be answered by an immediate declaration of war. Certain it is

The Romans  
commence  
the war un-  
expectedly,  
and both  
consuls  
march  
through  
Samnium  
into Cam-  
pania.

the Latins, says Livy, “per quosdam privatis hospitibus necessitudinibusque conjunctos.” These, like the *πρόξενοι* in Greece, would undoubtedly form a party disposed to Rome, whose influence would be felt as soon as the fortune of the war turned against the Latins.

<sup>16</sup> The lands of the Ardeatians were ravaged by the Antiatians in 415; (Livy, VIII. 12). Ardea, therefore, must have been at that time in alliance with Rome.

<sup>17</sup> Such as Ostia, whose lands were also ravaged by the Antiatians in 415. (Livy, *ibid.*)

CHAP.  
XXIX.

that the breach of the old alliance was far more to be charged on the Romans than on them; for the Romans had deserted them in the midst of a war jointly undertaken by the two nations, and had made peace with the common enemy; and the Campanians, who had originally joined the alliance to obtain protection against the Samnites, had no choice but to follow the Latins, as from them alone was that protection now to be hoped for. But the opportunity was tempting, and the Romans, taking advantage<sup>18</sup> of the earliness of the season, when the Latins might scarcely be prepared for active operations, hastily declared war, and despatched both consuls with two consular armies, not by the direct road into Campania by Tarracina or by the Liris, but by a circuitous route at the back of their enemies' country, through the territory of the Marsians and Pelignians<sup>19</sup> into Samnium. There the consuls were joined by the Samnite army; and their combined forces then descended from the mountains of Samnium, and encamped in presence of the enemy in the plain of Capua, with a retreat open into the

<sup>18</sup> When we consider that the usual season for hostilities at this period was the autumn, it may be doubted whether the Latin army which fought under Vesuvius was more than that force which had wintered in Campania to garrison the several towns, and as such very inferior in numbers to the two consular armies of the Romans. The rapid march of the consuls through the central countries of Italy may have been unknown to the Latins, and their

sudden appearance in Campania in conjunction with the Samnites may have been as startling a surprise to the enemy, as that of Claudius Nero to Hasdrubal after his admirable march from Bruttium to join his colleague on the Motaurs; or as that of Napoleon to the Austrians when the army of reserve broke out from the Val d' Aosta on the plains of Lombardy in the campaign of 1800.

<sup>19</sup> Livy, VIII. 6.

country of the Samnites on their rear, but with the whole army and territory of the hostile confederacy interposed between them and Rome.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

While the Romans and Latins lay here over against each other, the consuls issued an order <sup>20</sup> strictly forbidding all irregular skirmishing, or single encounters with the enemy. They wished to prevent the confusion which might arise in chance combats between two parties alike in arms and in language: perhaps also they wished to stop all intercourse with the Latins, lest the enemy should discover their real strength, or lest old feelings of kindness should revive in the soldiers' minds, and they should begin to ask whether they had any sufficient grounds of quarrel. It was on this occasion that T. Manlius the consul's son was challenged by Geminus Metius, of Tusculum <sup>21</sup>; and, heedless of the order of the generals, he accepted the challenge and slew his antagonist. The young man returned in triumph to the camp, and laid his spoils at his

The son of T. Manlius engages the enemy contrary to his father's orders and is executed.

<sup>20</sup> Livy, VIII. 6.

<sup>21</sup> Livy, VIII. 7. The same story may be told again with effect, even after it has been often told before, if we have received it from an original and independent source; because if twenty eye-witnesses give an account of the same event, the impression which it has made on each of them will have been different, and, therefore, each will tell the story in his own way, and it will contain something new and original. But when we derive all our knowledge from one single account, and that account

has been once perfectly given, there is nothing to be done by later writers but to copy it, or simply to state its substance. Thus it is with Livy's famous description of the condemnation of T. Manlius by his father; the story cannot be better told than he has told it, and we have no means of adding to it or varying it from other original sources. I have therefore followed Niebuhr in simply stating its outline; for the finished picture the reader must consult Livy himself.



CHAP.  
XXIX.

father's feet ; but the consul, turning away from him, immediately summoned the soldiers to the prætorium, and ordered his son to be beheaded before them. All were struck with horror at the sight, and the younger soldiers, from a natural sympathy with youth and courage, regarded the consul with abhorrence to the latest hour of his life ; but fear and respect were mingled with their abhorrence, and strict obedience, enforced by so dreadful an example, was felt by all to be indispensable.

The two armies meet near Mount Vesuvius. Resolution of the Roman generals to devote themselves to death for the victory of their country.

The stories which we are obliged to follow, shifting their scene as rapidly and unconnectedly as our old drama, transport the two armies without a word of explanation from the neighbourhood of Capua to the foot of Mount Vesuvius, where, on the road which led to Vesperis, according to their own way of expressing it, the decisive battle was fought. What Vesperis was<sup>22</sup>, or where it was situated, on which side of Vesuvius the action took place, or what had brought the two armies thither, are questions to which we can give no answers. But he who had been present at the last council held by the Roman generals before they parted to take their respective stations in the line, might have seen that having planned for the coming battle all that skill and ability could devise, they were ready to dare all

<sup>22</sup> "Apud Vesperim fluvium," is the expression of the author "de Viris Illustribus" twice over, in his notices of P. Decius and of T. Manlius. Cicero twice mentions the name, but simply says "ad Vesperim." There is no stream at

present on either side of Vesuvius, which will answer the description ; but it is scarcely possible to calculate the changes effected in the geography of a country by volcanic action during a period of so many centuries.



that the most heroic courage could do or suffer: the aruspices had been consulted<sup>23</sup> as to the import of the signs given by the entrails of the sacrifice: their answer had been made known to the principal officers of the army; and with it the determination of the consuls, that, on whichever side of the battle the Romans should first begin to give ground, the consul who commanded in that quarter should forthwith devote himself, and the hosts of the enemy with himself, to the gods of death and to the grave: "for fate," said they, "requires the sacrifice of a general from one party, and of an army from the other: one of us, therefore, will be the general that shall perish, that the army which is to perish also may be not ours, but the army of the Latins."

CHAP.  
XXIX.

We have seen that the arms and tactic of both armies were precisely similar. In each there were two grand divisions, the first forming the ordinary line of battle, and the second the reserve; the latter being, in point of numbers, considerably the strongest<sup>24</sup>. The first division, however, was subdivided into two equal parts, the first of which, known by

Similar dispositions of both armies.

<sup>23</sup> Livy, VIII. 6. Both consuls, said the story, had seen in the night the same vision; a figure of more than human stature and majesty appeared to them, and told them that the gods of the dead, and earth, the mother of all, claimed as their victims the general of one party, and the army of the other: the consuls then sacrificed, to see whether the signs observed in the entrails of the victim would speak the same language as their vision.

<sup>24</sup> See the famous description of the legion at this period in Livy, VIII. 8, and Niebuhr's comments upon it, Vol. I. p. 497, &c. Ed. 2, 1827, and Vol. III. p. 110, &c. The first line, comprising the hastati and principes, contained in each legion only 1890 men; the reserve, consisting of the triarii, rorarii, and accensi, amounted to 2790.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

the name of the *Hastati*, consisted of light and heavy armed soldiers, in the proportion of one-third of the former to two-thirds of the latter; the second part, called the *Principes*, contained the flower of the whole army, all heavy-armed men, in the vigour of their age, and most perfectly and splendidly accoutred. The reserve, forming in itself a complete army, contained a threefold subdivision; one-third of it was composed of veteran heavy-armed soldiers, the *Triarii*; another third of light-armed, *Rorarii*; and the remainder were mere supernumeraries, *Accensi*, who were destined to supply the places of those who should have fallen in the first line, or to act with the reserve in cases of the last extremity. These divisions being the same in both armies, the generals on either side knew precisely the force and nature of the enemy's reserve, and could calculate the movements of their own accordingly.

Tactic of the  
Roman le-  
gion at this  
period.

The tactic of the Romans was at this period in an intermediate state, between the use of the order of the phalanx, with the round shield and pike, and the loose array of the later legion, with the large oblong shield, sword, and pilum, such as it is described by Polybius. But the want of all contemporary accounts of this middle period, makes it exceedingly difficult to comprehend it clearly. Reserving, therefore, for another place, all minute inquiries into the subject, I shall here only take for granted some of the principal points, so far as they are essential to a description of the battle.

Order of  
battle of  
both armies.

The Roman and Latin legions were, as we have

seen, opposed to each other. The Samnites and Hernicans, who formed one wing of the Roman army, must in like manner have been opposed to the nations of their own or of a kindred stock, the Campanians, Sidicinians, and Volscians.

Of the Roman line itself, the legions on the right were commanded by Titus Manlius<sup>25</sup>, those on the left by Publius Decius.

The battle began with the encounter of the hastati, who formed on each side, as we have seen, the first division of the first line. Consisting both of light and heavy-armed soldiers, they closed with each other with levelled pikes, amidst showers of darts from their light-armed men, who either skirmished in the intervals between the maniples of the pikemen, or, sheltered behind them, threw their missiles over the heads of their comrades into the line of the enemy.

In this conflict the right wing of the Latins prevailed, and the Roman hastati of the left wing fell back in disorder upon the principes, who formed what may be called the main battle.

Decius then called aloud for M. Valerius<sup>26</sup>, the pontifex maximus. "The gods," he said, "must help us now," and he bade the pontifex dictate to him the form of words in which he was to devote

Battle under Mount Vesuvius.

Roman first line in disorder.

P. Decius devotes himself.

<sup>25</sup> Livy, VII. 9.

<sup>26</sup> Who this M. Valerius was we know not; whether it was the M. Valerius Poplicola, who was consul in 400 and 402, or M. Valerius Corvus, who had been already three times consul and once

dictator, and of whom Pliny relates, that in the course of his long life, he was appointed to curule offices no fewer than one and twenty times. Hist. Natur. VII. 48.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

himself and the legions of the enemy to the gods of death. It should be remembered, that to Decius, as one of the commons, all the ceremonies of the Roman religion were an unknown mystery. The pontifex bade him take his consular toga<sup>27</sup>, and wrap

<sup>27</sup> "Togam prætextam sumere jussit;" "sumere," because it was not commonly worn in battle. The form of words in which Decius devoted himself, ran as follows. "Thou, Janus, thou, Jupiter, thou, Mars, our father, thou, Quirinus, thou, Bellona, ye, Lares, ye, the nine gods, ye, the gods of our fathers' land, ye, the gods whose power disposes both of us and of our enemies, and ye also gods of the dead, I pray you, I humbly beseech you, I crave, and doubt not to receive this grace from you, that ye would prosper the people of Rome and the Quirites with all might and victory; and that ye would visit the enemies of the people of Rome and of the Quirites with terror, with dismay, and with death. And, according to these words which I have spoken, so do I now, on the behalf of the commonwealth of the Roman people and the Quirites, on the behalf of the army, both the legions and the foreign aids, of the Roman people and the Quirites, devote the legions and the foreign aids of our enemies, along with myself, to the gods of the dead, and to the grave." No one can doubt the genuineness of this prayer, which, together with the rules to be observed in these solemn devotions, Livy has copied, he tells us, "verbis ipsis, ut tradita nuncupaque sunt:" VIII. 11; where "tradita," I may observe, does not refer to any oral tradition, but to the pontifical books: just as

Cyprian, where he appeals to "traditio apostolica," means to refer to the apostolical writings in the New Testament. Livy himself may have copied the prayer immediately from one of the older annalists, either from Fabius Pictor, from whom Gellius quotes one or two similar notices of ancient religious observances, or from L. Cincius, whose treatise "de Re Militari" contained the form used by the Fetiales in declaring war, and that, of the military oath. See Gellius XVI. 4. Varro also was fond of recording ancient forms, carmina, in their own words; of which we have several instances in that almost solitary remnant of his voluminous works which has reached our times, his work on the Latin language. Forms of all sorts, and laws, may be relied on as perfectly genuine, even when ascribed to a period the history of which is good for nothing.

To notice more particularly the prayer of Decius, it may be seen that it addresses Janus before all other gods, even before Jupiter himself; in evident agreement with that ancient rite of opening the gates of Janus at the beginning of a war, which implied that he was in an especial manner the god whom the Romans wished to go out with them to battle. See Vol. I. p. 9. Mars *Pater*, like the Ζεὺς and Ἀπόλλων πατῆρ, has a manifest reference to the legend of the birth of Romulus. As a god of war, Mars, I should imagine,



it round his head, putting out his hand from under it to hold it to his face, and to set his feet upon a javelin, and so to utter the set words which he should

was of a later date in Italy than Janus; or at any rate that the two gods came to the Romans from different quarters. Virgil speaks of the opening of the gates of Janus as a Latin rite, older than the origin of Rome. The "lares" here spoken of, would be, I suppose, "lares militares," (see Orelli's Inscriptions, No. 1665,) "lares," as is well known, being a general title, and denoting powers, or mighty ones; their particular character and office being expressed by a particular title, or implied by the nature of the case. Thus L. Æmilius, in the war with Antiochus, when engaged in a sea-fight with the enemy, vowed to build a temple to the lares permarini, or "the powers or genii of the deep." Livy, XL. 52. Macrobius, Saturnalia, I. 10. Müller, Etrusker, Vol. II. p. 129, conf. p. 91. The war lares, to whom Decius prayed, are apparently the same powers that are represented on two Etruscan tombs, engravings of which are given by Micali in the plates accompanying his history, Pl. 105, 106. They are winged figures, male and female, who are present in a battle, taking part with the several combatants.

The "nine gods," "dii novensiles," are probably the nine gods of the Etruscan religion, who alone had the power of launching lightning and thunderbolts. See Müller, Etrusker, Vol. II. p. 84, note 10. According to another definition, Servius, Æn. VIII. 187, the dii novensiles were gods who had been deified for their good

deeds; "quibus merita virtutis dederint numinis dignitatem."

By "the gods whose power disposes both of us and of our enemies," "divi quorum est potestas nostrorum hostiumque," may be meant either the especial tutelar powers of each nation, the "lares urbium et civitatum;" (see Orelli, Inscription. Collect. 1668, 1670, and Müller, Etrusker, Vol. II. p. 91. 93;) or the peculiar national gods of each, such as the Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva of the Capitol for Rome, and the Jupiter of the mountain of Alba for Latium. The gods of Latium might be addressed in the prayer, to show that the Romans did not treat them with that irreverence which the Latin ambassador had manifested towards the Jupiter of the Capitol.

Lastly, to end this long note, it has been doubted what is the meaning of the expression, "*veniam peto feroque*," which occurs in the prayer of Decius. I think the true interpretation of "*fero*" is "*nanciscor*;" and that, as some have understood it, (see the note on the words in Bekker's Livy,) the words are added as of good omen, "the grace which I crave I feel sure that I shall also obtain;" in the well-known future sense of the present tense, in which "*fero*" signifies, "I am going to obtain." It may, perhaps, signify no more than an earnest wish, "I am ready to obtain," "I would fain obtain;" but at any rate "*ferre veniam*" must signify "to receive favour," as, "*petere*" signifies "to sue for it."



CHAP.  
XXIX.

dictate. When they had been duly spoken, the consul sent his lictors to his colleague, to say that he had devoted himself to death for the deliverance of the Roman army. Then, with his toga wrapped around his body, after the fashion adopted in sacrifices to the gods, he sprung upon his horse, armed at all points<sup>28</sup>, plunged amidst the ranks of the enemy, and was slain. Such an example of self-devotion in a general is in all cases inspiring; but the Romans beheld in this not only the heroic valour of Decius, but the certain devotion of their enemies to the vengeance of the gods: what was due from themselves to the powers of death Decius had paid for them; so, like men freed from a burden, they rushed on with light and cheerful hearts, as if appointed to certain victory.

The main  
battles on  
both sides  
engage.

The Latins too understood the meaning of Decius' death, when they saw his dress and heard his words of devotion; and no doubt it produced on their minds something of dismay. But soon recovering, the main battles on both sides closed in fierce onset; and though the light troops of the Roman reserve were also brought into action, and skirmished amongst the maniples of the hastati and principes, yet victory seemed disposed to favour the Latins.

<sup>28</sup> "Armatus in equum insilivit," says Livy. Zonaras says, τὰ ὅπλα ἐκδύς. (VII. 26.) But this must refer only to the moments while he was uttering the prayer: when that was ended, he resumed the full arms of a Roman general; only his sacred character,

as one devoted to the gods, was marked by the peculiar manner in which his toga was wrapped around him, the "cinctus Gabinus."

With respect to the nature and origin of the cinctus Gabinus, see Müller, Etrusker, Vol. II. p. 266.

In this extremity Manlius, well knowing that in a contest so equal the last reserve brought into the field on either side would inevitably decide the day, still kept back the veterans of his second line, and called forward only his accensi or supernumeraries, whom for this very purpose he had, contrary to the usual custom, furnished with complete arms. The Latins mistook these for the veterans, or triarii, and thinking that the last reserve of the Romans was now engaged, they instantly brought up their own. The Romans struggled valiantly, but at last were beginning to give way, when, at a signal given, the real reserve of the Roman veterans started forwards, advanced through the intervals of the wavering line in front of them, and with loud cheers charged upon the enemy. Such a shock at such a moment was irresistible; they broke through the whole army of the Latins almost without loss; the battle became a butchery, and according to the usual result of engagements fought hand to hand, where a broken army can neither fight nor fly, nearly three-fourths of the Latins were killed or taken.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

The Roman  
reserve de-  
cides the  
fate of the  
day.

How far the Samnites contributed to this victory; whether they, after having beaten the Volscians and Campanians, threatened the flank of the Latins at the moment of the last charge of the Roman veterans, there was no Samnite historian to tell, and no Roman annalist would tell truly. Nor need we wonder at this; for if we had only certain English accounts of the battle of Waterloo, who would

Share of the  
Samnites in  
the battle.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

know that the Prussians had any effectual share in that day's victory?

If the importance of a battle be a just reason for dwelling upon it in detail, then I may be excused for having described minutely this great action between the Romans and Latins under Mount Vesuvius; for to their victory on that day, securing to them for ever the alliance of Latium, the Romans owed their conquest of the world.

The Latins  
are again  
defeated,  
and many  
cities sub-  
mit.

The wreck of the Latin army retreated by different roads out of Campania; and the conquerors had suffered so severely that they were in no condition to pursue them. The fugitives first halted at Minturnæ<sup>29</sup>; then finding themselves not molested, they advanced again to Vescia, a town described as in the country of the Ausonians, one of the Greek forms of the name of the Opicans or Oscans, and situated apparently on the eastern or Campanian side of the Massican hills, where the streams run towards the Savone. Here they rallied, and L. Numisius, the Latin prætor, used every effort to revive their courage, and to procure reinforcements both from Latium, and from the Volscians; Campania having been wholly lost by the late battle. A large

<sup>29</sup> Livy, VIII. 10, 11. It is plain from this that Samnium was altogether the base of the Roman army's operations, and that whatever was the exact scene of the great battle, the Romans fought with the enemy's army interposed between them and Rome. This sufficiently marks the grand scale of these operations, and also the enlarged military views of the

Roman consuls. They ventured to abandon altogether the line of their own territory, and to carry the war directly into Campania, resting on the territory of their allies, and communicating with Rome by a route circuitous indeed, but secure from interruption, through the country of the Marsians and Pelignians.

force was thus again assembled, and the Romans and Samnites, who had been themselves also reinforced, we may suppose, in the interval, from Samnium at any rate if not from Rome, hastened a second time to encounter them. But the victory was easy and decisive; and as no third army could immediately be raised, the consul entered Latium without opposition, plundered the open country, and received the submission of several cities. The Latin confederacy was, in fact, broken up for ever.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

According to the Fasti, the consuls of the preceding year must have resigned so long before the regular expiration of their office, that Manlius and Decius must have been appointed to succeed them almost before the end of the winter, and their great campaign was carried on in the early spring. Manlius made all haste no doubt to return home to his triumph; but as he triumphed on the 18th of May<sup>30</sup> it is clear that he had greatly anticipated the usual season for military operations, and by so doing had perhaps taken the enemy by surprise. Great as had been his services, his triumph was regarded with no joy; such rejoicings seemed unbecoming<sup>31</sup> in one who had lost both his colleague and his own son in the course of the contest; and the younger Romans looked on him less as the conqueror of the Latins, than as the murderer of his son.

T. Manlius  
returns to  
Rome and  
triumphs.

<sup>30</sup> The notice in the fragments of the Fasti runs as follows:—

[T. M]anlius L. F. A. N. Imperiossus Torquatus [C]os III. De Latineis . Campaneis . Sidici-

neis . Aurunceis . A. CDXIII. xv. K. Junias.

<sup>31</sup> Dion Cassius, Fragg. XXIX. Mai.



CHAP.  
XXIX.

The Campanian aristocracy rewarded for their attachment to Rome.

The Latin towns which had already submitted were deprived of all their public or domain land, and a like penalty was imposed on the Campanians<sup>32</sup>. But as the Campanian aristocracy had been wholly opposed to the war with Rome, they were rather entitled to reward than punishment. They therefore received the franchise of Roman citizens, which enabled them to intermarry with Romans, and to inherit property, while their ascendancy in their own country was abundantly secured; and as a compensation for the loss of their domain land they were each to receive from the Campanian people 450<sup>33</sup> denarii a year.

Whilst the consuls were absent in Campania, L. Papirius Crassus, the prætor, had been left at home

<sup>32</sup> Livy, VIII. 11. Niebuhr thinks that the settlement of Latium was attended by many executions, which history, from a desire to soften the picture, has omitted, Vol. III. p. 159. The Romans, however, far from being ashamed of such executions, rather gloried in them; and even Livy himself relates with entire approbation the cruel vengeance taken upon Capua in the second Punic war. The moment that the war was at an end with any of the Latin states, it was the policy of Rome to avoid driving them again to despair by any bloody executions; and as the deportation of the senators of Velitræ is mentioned as an instance of remarkable severity, it seems reasonable to believe that no blood was shed except on the field of battle.

<sup>33</sup> Livy, VIII. 11. Mr. Twiss supposes that thirty talents were

fixed upon as the annual payment to be made to each century of the Campanian equites, which would make one hundred and twenty talents for the whole four centuries; and as there were four hundred knights in each century, it allows just four hundred and fifty denarii or drachmæ to each individual. Niebuhr well observes that the yearly payment of so large a sum as one hundred and twenty talents gives us a high idea of the wealth of Capua. The coin paid is called by Livy "denarios nummos;" and although silver denarii were not coined at Rome till a later period, yet this proves nothing against their earlier use in Campania; and although Eckkel and Mionnet acknowledge only a copper coinage of ancient Capua, yet Micali gives an engraving of a silver coin, with an Oscan inscription, which must un-



with the command of the forces usually appointed to protect the city. He had watched the Antiatiens, and checked their plundering inroads, but had been able to do nothing of importance. After the return of Manlius he was appointed dictator, as Manlius himself fell sick. It seems probable that he was appointed dictator for the purpose of holding the comitia, and that Manlius having been left sole consul, and afterwards being himself disabled by illness, was required, like the consuls who had preceded him, to resign his office before the end of his year<sup>34</sup>. He was succeeded by Ti. Æmilius and Q. Publilius Philo.

The history of their consulship is obscure. The Latins are said to have renewed the war again<sup>35</sup>, to recover their forfeited domain; it is more likely that only some of their cities had submitted to Manlius, and that the treatment which these met with drove the rest to try the fortune of arms once again. They were defeated by the consul Publilius<sup>36</sup>, and more of their towns then submitted; some, however, still

The new  
consuls de-  
feat the  
Latins  
again.

doubtedly have belonged to Capua in the days of its independence. See plate 115 of Micali's Atlas.

<sup>34</sup> Something of this sort must be supposed, if Livy had any authority for his statement that the consuls in the year 420, only ten years after this period, still came into office on the 1st of July. (Livy, VIII. 20.) For as Manlius entered on his consulship before the winter was well ended, and triumphed as early as May, the consular year must have begun from that time forwards not in

July, but in the early spring, unless it had again been altered by some subsequent change. But the whole chronology of this period is still so uncertain in its details, that it is impossible to arrive at any certain conclusion.

<sup>35</sup> Livy, VIII. 12.

<sup>36</sup> The dates for these years furnished by the Fasti are as follow:

T. Manlius triumphed on the 18th of May, 413. Q. Publilius Philo triumphed on the 13th of January, 414; and L. Camillus and C. Mænius triumphed on the

CHAP.  
XXIX.

continued to resist, and amongst these Pedum, Tibur, and Præneste, are particularly named. The consul Ti. Æmilius laid siege to Pedum, but the defence was obstinate; and whatever was the true cause, Pedum remained to the end of his consulship unconquered.

Q. Publius Philo dictator. He brings forward and passes the Publilian laws.

This was probably owing to the state of affairs in Rome. Out of the large tracts of domain land won in the last campaign, the assignations of land to the commons had in no case exceeded the amount of three jugera to each man; all the rest was occupied as usual by the great families of the aristocracy. Great discontent was excited at this, and other circumstances occurred, in all probability showing a design on the part of the patricians to take advantage of their successes abroad in order to recover their old ascendancy. Niebuhr supposes that the majority of the senate was opposed to these projects, and cordially joined with the consuls in repressing them. Both the consuls were wise and moderate men; both had been amongst<sup>37</sup> the five commissioners for the relief of the general distress in the year 403, whose merits were so universally acknow-

28th and 30th of September, 415. Now, as the Fasti reckon the years of Rome from the 21st of April, (the Palilia,) the traditionary date of the foundation of the city, it is obvious that between May, 413, and January, 414, there intervened twenty months, whilst between January, 414, and September, 415, there would be no more than eight. But whether these dates are correct is quite another ques-

tion. I believe that it is impossible to fix the chronology of much of the fifth century of Rome with precision, because it is impossible to fix the history; and again we cannot attempt to fix the history by the chronology, because that is in itself uncertain.

<sup>37</sup> Livy, VII. 21. "Meriti æquitate curâque sunt ut per omnium annalium monumenta celebres nominibus essent."

ledged by all parties. There is no likelihood that such men should have indulged a spirit of faction or personal pique at such a moment, or should have proposed and carried laws of the greatest importance without any especial call for them, and yet without encountering any formidable opposition. Nor is it consistent that the senate, after having had some months' experience, according to the common story, of the factious character of the two consuls, should have required them to name a dictator in order to get rid of them, when the very result which did take place might have been so easily foreseen, that Æmilius would name his own colleague. It is far more probable that the senate foresaw, and had in fact arranged that it should be so, in order that the reforms which were judged necessary might be supported and carried with the authority of the greatest magistracy in the commonwealth. The reforms now effected were purely constitutional, and consisted mainly, as far as appears, in destroying the power of the aristocratical assembly of the *curiæ*, a body necessarily of a very different character from the senate, and in which the most one-sided party spirit was likely to be predominant. General assemblies of the members of a privileged or separate order<sup>38</sup> are of all things the most mis-

<sup>38</sup> It scarcely needs to be observed that our house of lords resembles the Roman senate, and not the *comitia* of the *curiæ*. If our nobility were like that of the continent, so that all a peer's sons were noble, or like the patrician

order at Rome, so that all his descendants in the male line were noble, a representative body chosen out of and by so large a privileged class, without any mixture of new creations, would be a very different thing from our

CHAP.  
XXIX.

chievous; as they combine with the turbulence and violence of a popular assembly all the narrowmindedness and exclusiveness of a particular caste. It seems that no greater benefit could have been conferred on Rome than the extinction of the power of the *curiæ*; and accordingly one of Publilius' laws deprived<sup>39</sup> them of their power as a branch of the legislature with regard to all laws passed by the *comitia* of tribes; and another reduced it to a mere formality with respect to all laws submitted to the *comitia* of the centuries<sup>40</sup>: whatever law was pro-

house of peers, and would give a tolerable idea of the nature of the Roman *comitia* of *curiæ*. Compare also the spirit, at once factious and intolerant, which has marked the convocations of the clergy, and particularly the lower house of convocation as opposed to the upper; that is, again, the *curiæ* as opposed to the senate. Consider also that worst of all possible assemblies, the diet of the nobles of Poland.

<sup>39</sup> I have followed Niebuhr in his explanation of the Publilian laws. Vol. III. p. 169, et seqq. Livy says the purport of the first law was, "*ut plebiscita omnes Quirites tenerent*:" evidently understanding it to have had the same purport with the Valerian and Horatian law of the year 306, which enacted, "*ut quod tributim plebes jussisset populum teneret*," III. 55. It is certainly possible that the same law having fallen into disuse, or rather being obstructed by the power of a party, should be again solemnly re-enacted; but Niebuhr's explanation is so consistent and so probable that I have been induced to adopt it.

<sup>40</sup> "*Ut legum quæ comitiis centuriatis ferrentur ante initum suffragium patres auctores fierent.*" I need not say that "*patres*" here was generally supposed to mean the senate, and I have no doubt that Livy so understood it; but I think Niebuhr is right in understanding it of the patrician *curiæ*, who had before possessed a distinct voice as a branch of the legislature. The power of the *curiæ* was likely to be disputed earlier than that of the senate; the senate was now a mixed body composed of the most eminent men of both orders; it was a true national council; and that such a body should exercise the power of deciding what questions should be submitted to the *comitia* of the people at large, was nothing more than what was common in Greece even at this very period; and it was held not to be incompatible with a democracy, provided that the body in which this power was vested was not of too narrow and exclusive a character. Δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί τι τοιοῦτον ᾧ ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται τοῦ δήμου προβουλευέιν . . . τοῦτο δέ, ἂν ὀλίγοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὦσιν,



posed by the senate to the centuries, and no measure could originate with the latter, was to be considered as having the sanction of the *curiæ* also; so that if the centuries passed it, it should have at once the force of a law. A third Publilian law enacted that one of the two censors should necessarily be elected from the commons; a fourth, as Niebuhr thinks, provided that the prætorship also should be thrown open, and that in each alternate year the prætor also should be a plebeian.

“The *patres*,” says Livy, “thought that the two consuls had done the commonwealth more mischief by their domestic measures than service by their conduct of the war abroad.” If the term *patres* be understood of the majority of the patrician order, Livy is probably right; but if he meant to speak of the senate, he must have judged them over harshly. That assembly contained the best and wisest of the aristocracy, but it did not represent the passions and

The Publilian laws approved by a majority of the senate.

ὀλιγαρχικόν. — Aristotle, *Politica* IV. 15. See also the institution of the *νομοφύλακες* at Athens: *προγράφουσι πρὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ὑπὲρ ὧν δεῖ χρηματίζειν*. Pollux, from Aristotle, VIII. § 95. It is not probable then that the senate at Rome should have thus early lost a power which still existed generally in Greece; but that the *curiæ* should be deprived of it was perfectly natural. And as Niebuhr observes, that the principal members of the senate, headed by the dictator and supported by the mass of the people, should have triumphed over the ultra aristocra-

tical spirit of the *curiæ* is easily conceivable: but the senate would not so readily have yielded an important prerogative of its own; and it is not possible to believe that had the senate joined the body of the patricians in resisting the dictator's measures, they could have been carried without some violent convulsions. Whereas the Publilian laws, very unlike the Hortensian, the Genucian, the Canuleian, or any other of the great measures carried by the commons against the inclination of the senate as well as of the patricians, were passed peaceably, and, so far as we hear, without a struggle.



CHAP.  
XXIX.

exclusiveness of the patrician vulgar. The majority of the senate, whether patricians or commoners, saw the necessity of the Publilian laws, and had the rare wisdom to pass them in time. Accordingly, they were followed by no demands for farther concessions; but by a period of such unbroken peace and order, that for many years the internal dissensions of the Romans are heard of no more; and the old contests between the patrician order and the rest of the people may be said to have been ended for ever. The Hortensian laws about fifty years later were occasioned by contests of another sort, such as marked the latter period of the commonwealth; contests of a nature far more dangerous—where the object sought for is not so much political power for its own sake, but as the means of obtaining bread.

Final sub-  
mission of  
Latium.

In the following year the war with the Latins was brought to a conclusion. The new consuls were L. Furius Camillus, perhaps a grandson<sup>41</sup> of the great Camillus, and C. Mænius. Camillus marched against Pedom, while his colleague attacked the Antiatians, who were supported by the people of Velitræ, Aricia, and Lavinium. Both were completely successful; Pedom was taken by Camillus<sup>42</sup>, and the people of Tibur and Præneste, who endeavoured to relieve it,

<sup>41</sup> He is called in the Fasti, "Spurii filius, Marci nepos." The great M. Camillus is known to have had a son named Spurius, who was the first prætor. Livy, VII. 1. The other consul, C. Mænius, must have belonged to one of the most distinguished fa-

milies of the commons, for although we have no yearly lists of tribunes preserved, yet three tribunes of the name of Mænius are incidentally mentioned at different times by Livy, IV. 53. VI. 19. and VII. 16.

<sup>42</sup> Livy, VIII. 13.

were defeated; while Mænius gained a victory over the Antiatiens and their allies near the river or rather stream of Astura. Then all the cities of Latium severally submitted, as did also the people of Antium: garrisons were placed in them, and the future settlement of Latium was submitted by the consul, Camillus, to the decision of the senate. It appears that the case of each city was considered separately, and its fate was settled as justice or expediency might seem to dictate. Unluckily, Livy either could not find, or grew impatient of repeating, what was the particular sentence passed upon each state; he has only noticed the fate of a few, and we are left to conjecture what was determined with respect to the rest.

First of all it was ordered as a general law, that there should be from henceforth no common meetings, assemblies, or councils for any two or more of the cities of Latium<sup>43</sup>; and that they should be made as foreigners to one another, with no liberty of intermarriage, or of purchasing or inheriting lands in each others' territories. All notion of a Latin state or union was to be utterly done away; and each city was to be isolated from its neighbours, that all community of interests and feelings between them might as much as possible be destroyed. This was the system on which the Romans settled the kingdom of Macedon after their final victory over Per-

Settlement  
of Latium.  
Dissolution  
of the Latin  
confederacy.

<sup>43</sup> "Ceteris Latinis populis con- inter se ademerunt." Livy, VIII.  
nubia commerciaque et concilia 14.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

seus: it was split up into four distinct portions<sup>44</sup>, and each of these was debarred from any interchange of the rights of citizenship with the other three.

Condition  
of the several Latin  
states.  
Tibur and  
Præneste;

Tibur and Præneste, the two most powerful cities of Latium, were deprived of their domain land<sup>45</sup>, and probably of any dominion which they may have exercised over the decayed towns or districts in their immediate neighbourhood. They retained their own laws and municipal independence, and there was still to exist between them and the Romans the old mutual right of assuming at pleasure each others' citizenship, so far as regarded the concerns of private life. But in war they were bound to follow where Rome should lead, and to furnish soldiers as auxiliaries or allies to the Roman legions.

Lanuvium,  
&c.

Lanuvium obtained the full rights of Roman citizenship, and its people formed the whole or a part

<sup>44</sup> Livy, XLV. 29.

<sup>45</sup> Livy, VIII. 14. That Tibur remained a distinct state is proved by the language of Livy, IX. 30, where he speaks of the Romans sending ambassadors to the people of Tibur; and still more by the fact that Roman citizens might choose Tibur as a place of exile, as was also the case with Præneste. Late in the sixth century of Rome, we have instances on record of this, Livy, XLIII. 2; and Polybius, writing early in the seventh century, speaks of the same right as still existing, adding, as the reason of it, that the Romans were bound by solemn treaties to the people of these cities. These treaties, ὀρκια, are rightly understood by Niebuhr

to have been the old terms of the Latin league, including the interchange of all the private rights of citizenship between the citizens of the two countries; *ισοπολιτεία*. On the other hand, the political dependence of Tibur and Præneste upon Rome is evident: Papius Cursor, when consul, had a summary power of life and death over the general of the Prænestine auxiliary troops serving in his army, Livy, IX. 16, so that the alliance probably contained the famous clause which distinguished a dependent from an equal ally; "Majestatem populi Romani comiter conservato." See Cicero, pro Balbo, 16. Compare Livy, XXXVIII. 11.

of one of the new tribes which were created at the next census<sup>46</sup>. It is probable that several other districts of Latium obtained the same privilege: perhaps such as had been hitherto dependent on some of the larger towns, since the decay or destruction of their own cities. In this manner the inhabitants of Scaptia and Gabii, which once were among the thirty cities of Latium, but had since fallen to decay, may have become latterly subjects of the Tiburtians, and now in all likelihood received the full citizenship of Rome, and composed the Scaptian tribe, which was created five years afterwards.

Aricia<sup>47</sup>, Pedom, Nomentum, and perhaps Tusculum, obtained the Roman citizenship without political rights; in other words, they were placed in the condition of provincial towns, without any municipal or corporate privileges, and justice was administered

Aricia, Pedom, &c.

<sup>46</sup> The Mæcian tribe was created in 422 by the censors, Q. Publius and Sp. Postumius. It derived its name, according to Paulus the epitomator of Festus, "a quodam castro." And Livy, VI. 2, speaks of a place near Lanuvium, which he calls "ad Mæcium." The probability is, therefore, that the Mæcian tribe contained in it the people of Lanuvium.

<sup>47</sup> This may seem at variance with Livy's statement, who says that they were admitted to the rights of Roman citizens on the same footing as the people of Lanuvium. But it is true that Lanuvium, immediately after the war, did receive no more than the civitas sine suffragio; it could not enjoy the full franchise till its people

were admitted into some tribe; and this did not take place till the next census. But that, from the time of the next census, Lanuvium was in a different condition from Aricia, and, probably, also from Pedom and Nomentum, appears from the famous article "Municipium" in Festus; Niebuhr's commentary on which, (Vol. II. chap. 4. pp. 55—60. Eng. Transl.) is one of the best specimens of his unrivalled power in discerning the true political relations of the ancient world. I would refer the reader continually to this passage in Niebuhr, for a full explanation of the various rights included sometimes under the common term "municipium."



CHAP.  
XXIX.

amongst them by a præfect sent from Rome. Their law was altogether that of Rome; their citizens were enlisted in the legions, and their taxation was in all respects the same as that of the Romans.

Velitræ.

In Velitræ, from some reason to us unknown, the aristocracy appear to have been zealous supporters of the late war, while the people were well disposed to the Romans. Accordingly the walls of the town were destroyed<sup>48</sup>, and all the senators deported beyond the Tiber, with a heavy penalty upon their return to Latium. All their lands, whether domain or private property, were taken from them and given to some Roman colonists who were sent to supply their place. Yet the people of Velitræ appear to have received the full Roman citizenship five years afterwards, and to have been included at that time in the new Scaptian tribe<sup>49</sup>.

Laurentum.

Laurentum, which had taken no part in the war, remained as before municipally independent<sup>50</sup>, enjoying an interchange of all the private rights of citizenship with Rome, but bound to aid, or in other words to serve, the Romans as an ally: and this, probably, was the condition also of Ardea.

Relations of  
Volscian  
and Campa-  
nian towns.

The relations of some Volscian and Campanian

<sup>48</sup> Livy, VIII. 14.

<sup>49</sup> The Octavii belonged to the Scaptian tribe, (Suetonius in Augusto, 40,) and their original country was Velitræ. The tale which Suetonius adds, of their having come to Rome in the time of Targuinus Priscus, and having been made patricians by Servius Tul-

lius, but afterwards having chosen to become plebeians, is merely one of the ordinary embellishments of a great man's pedigree, invented after he has risen to eminence.

<sup>50</sup> "Cum Laurentibus renovari fœdus jussum, renovaturque ex eo quotannis post diem decimum Latinarum." Livy, VIII. 11.



towns, which had taken part in the late contest, were also fixed at this time.

Antium.

The people of Antium<sup>51</sup> were obliged to surrender all their ships of war, and forbidden to send any more to sea for the time to come. A colony was to be sent thither, but the Antiatiens might themselves, if they chose, be enrolled amongst the colonists; that is to say, their territory was to be divided into lots, according to the Roman method of assignation, and all former limits or titles of property were to be done away; but every Antiatian might receive a portion of land in the new allotment, as a member of the Roman colony of Antium. The municipal independence of Antium ceased, as a matter of course; the Roman laws superseded the old laws of the city; and the Antiatiens became Roman citizens in all their private relations, but with no political rights.

Fundi and Formiæ<sup>52</sup>, which had remained neutral, Fundi, Formiæ, &c.

<sup>51</sup> Livy, VIII. 14. Antium became a maritime colony, and as such was exempted from furnishing soldiers to the legions (Livy, XXVII. 38); it was obliged, however, to furnish seamen for the naval service. (Livy, XXXVI. 3.) With regard to the prohibition to send ships to sea, it must be understood only of triremes and quinqueremes; for that the Antiatiens after this period not only had many smaller vessels, but were accustomed to sail even as far as the Greek seas, appears from the complaints of their piracies addressed to the Romans successively by Alexander and by Demetrius Poliorcetes. Strabo, V. p. 232.

<sup>52</sup> Livy, VIII. 14, compared with Festus in "Municipium." Acerræ is mentioned by Livy, VIII. 17, and by Festus in "Municipium," and in "Municeps." Atella is mentioned by Festus in "Municeps." Festus says expressly of Fundi, Formiæ, Cumæ, and Acerræ, that after a certain number of years they became Roman citizens, that is, in the full sense of the term, being enrolled in a tribe, and being made eligible to all public offices. But the "certain number of years" was about a century and a half; for the date of the admission of Fundi and Formiæ to the full citizenship happens to be known, and it did

CHAP.  
XXIX.

Capua, for whose fidelity its own aristocracy would be a sufficient guarantee, and several other Campanian towns, such as Cumæ, Suessula, Atella, and Acerræ, were either now, or shortly afterwards, made capable of enjoying the private rights of Roman citizens, but retained their own laws and government. Their soldiers in war formed distinct legions<sup>53</sup>, and were not numbered amongst the auxiliaries; a distinction which perhaps entitled them to a larger share of the plunder,—possibly also these states may have even received portions of conquered land to add to their domain.

Honours  
paid to the  
consuls. The  
rostra.

Equestrian statues of the two consuls by whom this great war had been brought to a conclusion, were set up in the forum<sup>54</sup>: and the beaks of the Antia-

not take place till the year 564. (Livy, XXXVIII. 36.) What can be meant by the expression that the people of Cumæ and Acerræ after some years became Roman citizens, it is not easy to decide; but it may be that they received the full franchise later than the period included in the last remaining book of Livy; and for that subsequent period we have no detailed information.

<sup>53</sup> "In legione merebant," says Festus, in "Municeps." The Campanian soldiers who made themselves masters of Rhegium a little before the first Punic war, are called by Livy, *Legio Campana*; and the name of their leader, Decius Jubellius, is clearly Campanian. Yet these same soldiers are called by Polybius, (I. 6, 7,) and by Appian, (Samnitic. Fragm. 9,) "Romans," and Orosius calls them the "eighth legion," (IV. 3;)

nor should it be forgotten, that Polybius in his list of the forces at the disposal of the Romans in the great Gaulish war of 529, reckons the Latins and the other Italian nations separately, but classes the Romans and Campanians together, and names the amount of their joint force. This seems to show that the connexion between Rome and Campania from the great Latin war to the invasion of Hannibal was unusually intimate; and we know also that a mutual rite of intermarriage prevailed between the inhabitants of both countries. Livy, XXIII. 4.

<sup>54</sup> Livy, VIII. 13, 14. For the description of the rostra given in the text, see Niebuhr, Vol. III. note 268; and particularly Bunsen, "Les Forum de Rome," p. 41. Bunsen, judging from the views of the rostra given on two coins in his possession, supposes that it was a

tian ships were affixed to the front of the circular stand or gallery, between the comitium and the forum from which the tribunes were accustomed to address the people. From this circumstance it derived its well-known name of *rostra*, or the beaks.

CHAP.  
XXIX.

Three years were sufficient to finish for ever the most important war in which Rome was at any time engaged; whilst with the Samnites the contest was often renewed, and lasted altogether for more than seventy years. It was not that the Samnites were a braver people than the Latins, but that the Latin war found immediately its natural termination in a closer union, which it was hopeless and not desirable to disturb; whereas, in the Samnite contest, such a termination was impossible; and the struggle could end in nothing short of absolute dominion on one side, and subjection on the other. The Samnites were complete foreigners, remote in point of distance, with a different language, and different institutions; they and the Romans were not likely to form one people, and neither were willing to be

The war with Latium was ended naturally and beneficially for both parties.

circular building, raised on arches, with a stand or platform on the top bordered by a parapet; the access to it being by two flights of steps, one on each side. It fronted towards the comitium, and the *rostra* were affixed to the front of it, just under the arches. Its form has been in all the main points preserved in the ambones, or circular pulpits, of the most ancient churches, which also had two flights of steps leading up to them, one on the east side, by

which the preacher ascended, and another on the west side, for his descent. See Ducange, Glossar. Med. et Infim. Latinit. in "*Ambono*." Specimens of these old pulpits are still to be seen at Rome in the churches of St. Clement, and S. Lorenzo fuori le mure. Bunsen aptly compares the platform of the *rostra*, on which the speaker moved to and fro, as he wished to address different parts of his audience, to the hustings of an English election.

the others' mere subjects. But between Rome and Latium nature had given all the elements of union; and the peculiar circumstances of the Latins precluded that mischievous national pride which has sometimes kept two nations apart, when nature, or rather God speaking in nature, designed them to be one. Had Latium been a single state like Rome, neither party<sup>55</sup> would willingly have seen its distinct nationality merged in that of the other; but the people of Tusculum or Lanuvium felt no patriotic affection for the names of Tibur or Præneste; they were as ready to become Romans as Tiburtians; and one or the other they must be, for a mass of little states, all independent of each other, could not be kept together; the first reverses, appealing to the sense of separate interest in each, inevitably shattered it to pieces. Those states that received the full Roman franchise became Romans, yet did not cease to be Latins; the language and the manners of their new country were their own. They were satisfied with their lot, and the hope of arriving in time at the same privileges was a prospect more tempting even to the other states than any thing which they were likely to gain by renewed hostilities. Tibur and Præneste, thus severed from their

<sup>55</sup> The rights of succession in an hereditary monarchy may effect an union between two countries, by the crown of each devolving on the same person, which would have been utterly impracticable had either of them been a republic. As it was, the union of the

crowns of England and Scotland preceded the union of the kingdoms by more than a century; and had not the crowns been united, what human power could ever have effected an union of the two parliaments?

old confederates, could not expect to become sovereign states; they must, according to the universal practice of the ancient world, be the allies of some stronger power; and if so, their alliance with Rome was at once the most natural and the most desirable. Thus the fidelity of the Latins was so secured that neither the victories of Hannibal, nor the universal revolt of all Italy in the social war, tempted it to waver: one strong proof amongst a thousand, that nations like individuals cheerfully acquiesce in their actual condition, when it appears to be in any degree natural, or even endurable; and that their desire of change, whenever they do feel it, is less the wish of advancing from good to better, or a fond craving after novelty, than an irresistible instinct to escape from what is clearly and intolerably bad, even though they have no definite prospect of arriving at good.



## CHAPTER XXX.

GENERAL HISTORY TO THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND SAMNITE WAR—PRIVERNUM—PALÆPOLIS.—  
A.U.C. 418-428—413-423, NIEBUHR.

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Τὴν διὰ μέσου ξύμβασιν εἴ τις μὴ ἀξιώσει πόλεμον νομίζειν οὐκ ὀρθῶς  
δικαιώσει.—Τοῖς γὰρ ἔργοις ὥς διήρηται ἀθρεῖτω, καὶ εὐρήσει οὐκ εἰκὸς  
ὄν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι.—THUCYDIDES, V. 26.

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### CHAP. XXX.

Alexan-  
der's con-  
quests in  
Asia con-  
temporary  
with the pe-  
riod imme-  
diately fol-  
lowing the  
Latin war.

ACCORDING to the synchronism of Diodorus, the same year which witnessed the final settlement of Latium, was marked also by the first military enterprises of Alexander, by his expedition against the Illyrians and his conquest of Thebes. During the twelve following years, the period nearly which I propose to comprise within the present chapter, Asia beheld with astonishment and awe the uninterrupted progress of a hero, the sweep of whose conquests was as wide and as rapid as that of her own barbaric kings, or of the Scythian or Chaldæan hordes; but far unlike the transient whirlwinds of Asiatic warfare, the advance of the Macedonian leader was no less deliberate than rapid: at every step the Greek power took root, and the language and the civilization of Greece were planted from the shores of the

Ægæan to the banks of the Indus, from the Caspian and the great Hyrcanian plain to the cataracts of the Nile; to exist actually for nearly a thousand years, and in their effects to endure for ever<sup>1</sup>. In the tenth year after he had crossed the Hellespont, Alexander, having won his vast dominion, entered Babylon; and resting from his career in that oldest seat of earthly empire, he steadily surveyed the mass of various nations which owned his sovereignty, and revolved in his mind the great work of breathing into this huge but inert body the living spirit of Greek civilization. In the bloom of youthful manhood, at the age of thirty-two, he paused from the fiery speed of his earlier course; and for the first time gave the nations an opportunity of offering their homage before his throne. They came from all the extremities of the earth, to propitiate his anger, to celebrate his greatness, or to solicit his protection. African tribes<sup>2</sup> came to congratulate and bring presents to him as the sovereign of Asia. Not only would the people bordering on Egypt upon the west look with respect on the founder of Alexandria and the son of Jupiter Ammon, but those who dwelt on the east of the Nile, and on the shores of the Arabian gulph, would hasten to pay court to the great king whose fleets navigated the

<sup>1</sup> I leave out of sight the question as to the greater or less influence exercised upon the civilization of India by the Greek or semi-Greek kingdoms of the extreme eastern part of Alexander's

empire, and refer merely to the facilities afforded by the diffusion of the Greek language and civilization in Asia and Egypt to the early growth of Christianity.

<sup>2</sup> See Arrian, VII. 15.

CHAP.  
XXX.

Erythræan sea, and whose power was likely to effect so largely their traffic with India. Motives of a different sort influenced the barbarians of Europe. Greek enterprise had penetrated to the remotest parts of the Mediterranean; Greek traders might carry complaints of wrongs done to them by the petty princes on shore or by pirates at sea to the prince who had so fully avenged the old injuries of his nation upon the great king himself. The conqueror was in the prime of life; in ten years he had utterly overthrown the greatest empire in the world;—what, if having destroyed the enemies of Greece in the east, he should exact an account for wrongs committed against his nation in the west? for Carthaginian conquests, for Lucanian devastations, for Etruscan piracies? And he would come, not only having at his command all the forces of Asia, whose multitude and impetuous onset would be supported in time of need by his veteran and invincible Macedonians, but already the bravest of the barbarians of Europe were eager to offer him their aid; and the Kelts and Iberians, who had become acquainted with Grecian service when they fought under Dionysius and Agesilaus, sent embassies to the great conqueror at Babylon, allured alike by the fame of his boundless treasures and his unrivalled valour. It was no wonder then that the Carthaginians<sup>3</sup>, who had dreaded a century earlier the far inferior power of the Athenians, and on

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, VII. 15.

whose minds Timoleon's recent victories had left a deep impression of the military genius of Greece, despatched their ambassadors to secure if possible the friendship of Alexander. But some of the Italian nations, the Lucanians and the Bruttians, had a more particular cause of alarm. They had been engaged in war for some years with Alexander, king of Epirus, the uncle by marriage of the conqueror of Asia. Alexander of Epirus had crossed over into Italy as the defender of the Italian Greeks against the injuries of their barbarian neighbours: in this cause he had fallen, after having long and valiantly maintained it, and his great kinsman could not have heard without indignation of the impious cruelty with which his enemies had outraged his lifeless body<sup>4</sup>. Thus the Lucanians and Bruttians are

<sup>4</sup> Livy, VIII. 24. Livy sets the death of Alexander of Epirus in the consulship of Q. Publilius and L. Cornelius. This consulship, according to Diodorus, synchronizes with Olymp. 113-3, and he places the embassies to Babylon and the death of Alexander two years later, in Olymp. 114-1. But his reckoning in this place is confused, and his Fasti differ from those of Livy; for with him there is a year between the consulships of Publilius and Cornelius and Pœtelius and Papirius, which according to Livy were next to one another. Again, Livy places the death of Alexander of Epirus in the same year with the foundation of Alexandria. But Alexandria according to Arrian was founded in Olymp. 112-1, and according to Diodorus, one year later, in Olymp. 112-2, which

would bring the death of Alexander of Epirus to the consulships either of M. Valerius and M. Atilius in 420 (415), or of T. Veturius and Sp. Postumius in the year following. Yet the treaty of Alexander of Epirus with Rome is placed in the consulship of A. Cornelius and Cn. Domitius, that is, in 422 (417); and this is likely to be a sure synchronism, because the treaty would naturally contain the names of the Roman magistrates who concluded it. It seems impossible to fix exactly the date of the death of Alexander of Epirus, but it seems from every calculation that we may safely place it so early as to make it certain that his nephew must have heard of it at the time when he received the Italian ambassadors at Babylon.

CHAP.  
XXX.

especially mentioned as having sent embassies to Alexander at Babylon: it is not unlikely that their kinsmen, the Samnites, who had been their allies in the war, joined with them also in their endeavours to escape the dreaded vengeance, although their name was either not particularly known or not thought worthy of especial record by the great Macedonian officers who were their king's earliest and best historians.

Embassies  
from Italy  
to Alexander  
in Babylon.

"The Tyrrhenians also," said Aristobulus and Ptolemæus, "sent an embassy to the king to congratulate him upon his conquests." The ports of the western coast of Italy swarmed at this time with piratical vessels, which constantly annoyed the Greek traders in those seas, and sometimes ventured as far as the eastern side of the Ionian gulph. This reproach was not confined to the Etruscans, it was shared certainly by the people of Antium; it may be doubted whether Ostia, Circeii, and Tarracina were wholly free from it. These piracies had been reported to Alexander<sup>5</sup>, and he sent remonstrances to the Romans on the subject. Perhaps his name was used by his kinsman Alexander of Epirus, with whom, in the course of his campaigns in Italy, the Romans concluded a treaty. But having on the one hand to justify themselves from the charge of supporting pirates to the injury of the Greek commerce,

<sup>5</sup> Strabo, V. p. 232. Διόπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος πρότερον ἐγκαλῶν ἐπέστειλε, καὶ Δημήτριος ὕστερον. Some writers have understood this Alexander to be Alexander of Epirus; but it is quite clear from

Strabo's language that he meant the most eminent man of the name of Alexander as well as the most eminent Demetrius; that is to say, Alexander the Great and Demetrius Poliorcetes.



and being able on the other hand to plead the merit of their alliance with the king of Epirus, there is every reason to believe that among the Tyrrhenian ambassadors mentioned by Alexander's historians there were included ambassadors from Rome. Later writers<sup>6</sup>, yielding to that natural feeling which longs to bring together the great characters of remote ages and countries, and delights to fancy how they would have regarded one another, asserted expressly that a Roman embassy did appear before Alexander in Babylon: that the king, like Cineas afterwards, was struck with the dignity and manly bearing of the Roman patricians, that he informed himself concerning their constitution, and prophesied that the Romans would one day become a great power. This story Arrian justly disbelieves: but history may allow us to think that Alexander and a Roman ambassador did meet at Babylon; that the greatest man of the ancient world saw and spoke with a citizen of that great nation, which was destined to succeed him in his appointed work, and to found a wider and still more enduring empire. They met too in Babylon, almost beneath the shadow of the temple of Bel, perhaps the earliest monument ever raised by human pride and power, in a city stricken as it were by the word of God's heaviest judgment, as the symbol of greatness apart from and opposed to goodness. But I am wandering from the limits of history into a higher region; whither indeed his-

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, VII. 15.

CHAP.  
XXX.

Progress of  
the Sam-  
nites on the  
upper Liris.

tory ought for ever to point the way, but within which she is not permitted herself to enter.

During the period of Alexander's conquests, no other events of importance happened in any part of the civilized world, as if a career so brilliant had claimed the undivided attention of mankind. The issue of the Latin war at once changed the friendship between the Romans and Samnites into a hollow truce, which either party was ready to break at the first favourable moment: neither was any longer needed by the other as a friend, to bring aid against a common danger; the two nations from this time forward were only rivals. The Samnites had made conquests from the Volscians, as the Romans had enlarged their dominion in Latium and Campania; they had won a portion of the upper valley of the Liris, and, as it seems, were still carrying on the war on their own behalf in this quarter, after the Romans on the one side, and the Latins and Campanians on the other, had retired from the contest. They even crossed the Liris<sup>7</sup>, had taken and destroyed Fregellæ upon the right bank, and had thus acquired a position of no small importance; for Fregellæ stood on the Latin road, the direct line of communication between Rome and Samnium, on the frontier of the Hernicans, at the point where the valley of the Trerus or Sacco joins that of the Liris<sup>8</sup>. This was

<sup>7</sup> Livy, VIII. 23. Dionysius, XV. 12, Fragm.

<sup>8</sup> Westphal places Fregellæ at Ceprano, a small frontier town of the pope's dominions, just on the

right bank of the Liris; but says that there is no vestige of the ancient city in existence. Mr. Kappel Craven is disposed to identify Fregellæ with some remains about

not unnoticed by the Romans, and they kept their eyes steadily on the advance of the Samnite dominion in a quarter so alarming.

War with the Sidicinians. Colony planted at Cales.

Meantime the embers of the great Latin war continued to burn for a time on the frontiers of Campania. The Sidicinians still remained in arms<sup>9</sup>, with what hopes or from what despair, we know not; they attacked the Auruncans, who had submitted to Rome, and destroyed their principal city; and the Romans were so slow or so unsuccessful in opposing them, that they were in the next year joined by the Opicans of Cales<sup>10</sup>, whom Livy calls Ausonians. A.U.C. 419. Cales stood on the edge of the plain of Capua, not more than ten miles from the city<sup>11</sup>; its example might become contagious, and therefore the Romans now roused themselves in earnest, sent both consuls to act against this new enemy; and having driven both the Sidicinians and the Ausonians within their walls, they chose M. Valerius Corvus as consul for the succeeding year, and committed the war especially to his charge. He laid regular siege to Cales, and took the place; but although both he and his colleague, M. Atilius Regulus, proceeded afterwards to attack the Sidicinians, yet on them they could make no impression. And although Cales was imme-

four miles lower down, below the junction of the Trerus, near to the present village of S. Giovanni in Carico.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, VIII. 15.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, VIII. 16.

<sup>11</sup> Cales is the modern Calvi, six Neapolitan miles from the mo-

dern Capua, and therefore about eight Neapolitan miles from the ancient Capua, which stood on the site of the modern village of S. Maria di Capua. But eight Neapolitan miles are about ten English ones, the Neapolitan mile being nearly  $1\frac{1}{4}$  English miles.

CHAP.  
XXX.

diately made a colony, and garrisoned with 2500 colonists<sup>12</sup>, yet the Sidicinians held out during the two following years; their lands were wasted, but their principal city, Teanum, was not taken, and as neither victories nor triumphs over them appear in the annals or in the Fasti, and the termination of the war is never noticed, we may suppose that they after a time obtained favourable terms, and preserved at least their municipal independence.

League between the Romans and Alexander of Epirus.

A.U.C. 422.

Before the close of this contest it was noted in the annals<sup>13</sup> that Samnium was become suspected by the Romans. This was in 421, and the same thing is remarked of the year following; so that the Romans heard with pleasure in that year, that Alexander, king of Epirus, brother of Olympias, and thus uncle to Alexander the Great, had landed in Lucania<sup>14</sup>, near Pæstum, and had defeated the united armies of the Lucanians and Samnites. Immediately after this battle, the Romans concluded a treaty of peace with the conqueror; a treaty which could have no other object than to assure him of the neutrality of the Romans, and that the alliance, which had so lately subsisted between them and the Samnites in the Latin war, was now virtually at an end. Whether there were any stipulations for a division of the spoil, in the event of his making territorial conquests in Italy, must be merely matter of conjecture; but the Romans, at any rate, took advantage of Alex-

<sup>12</sup> Livy, VIII. 16.

<sup>13</sup> In 422 it is said that "Samnium jam alterum annum turbari

novis consiliis suspectum erat."—Livy, VIII. 17.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, VIII. 17.



ander's invasion; and when, in 424<sup>15</sup>, the Volscians of Fabrateria sent an embassy to solicit their protection against the Samnites, they received it favourably, and threatened the Samnites with war if they did not leave Fabrateria unmolested. And yet the Samnites in attacking it were but putting down the last remains of the Latin confederacy on the upper Liris, exactly as the Romans had done in Campania; the Volscians of Fabrateria and the Sidicinians had been alike allied with the Latins against Rome and Samnium, and as Rome was now engaged with the latter for her own separate advantage, so it was just that Samnium should gain her own share of the spoil by conquering the former. But the Romans treated the Samnites now, as they treated the Ætolians after the battle of Cynocephalæ, or the Achæans after the defeat of Perseus: as soon as the common enemy was beaten down, the allies who had aided Rome in his conquest, became her next victims. Two years afterwards, in 426<sup>16</sup>, the Romans went a step farther, and actually planted a colony of their own at Fregellæ, a Volscian city, which, as we have seen, had been taken and destroyed by the Samnites, so that its territory was now lawfully, so far as the Romans were concerned, a part of Samnium. But fortune had now turned against Alexander of Epirus, and his power was no longer to be dreaded; the Samnites, therefore, were in a condition to turn

<sup>15</sup> Livy, VIII. 19. Fabrateria is the modern Falvaterra, standing on a hill on the right bank of the

Trerus or Tolero, a little above its junction with the Liris.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, VIII. 22.



CHAP.  
XXX.

their attention to other enemies; the war between Rome and the Greeks of Palæpolis and Neapolis immediately followed, as we shall see presently, and this led directly to an open renewal of the contest between Rome and Samnium.

War with  
Privernum.

A.U.C. 424.

In the mean time the Romans had gained a fresh accession of strength nearer home. The unconnected notices of these events recorded<sup>17</sup> that in 424 a war broke out with the people of Privernum, in which the people of Fundi took a part, notwithstanding the favourable terms of their late treaty with Rome. Not a word of explanation is given as to the causes of this war, but the name of its leader has been recorded; Vitruvius Vaccus, a citizen of Fundi, who, availing himself of the interchange of all private rights of citizenship between the inhabitants of the two countries, had acquired property at Rome, and actually possessed a house on the Palatine hill. His influence at Privernum, as well as the fact of his having a house at Rome in such a situation, prove him to have been a man of great distinction; and probably he was ambitious of being admitted to the full rights of a Roman citizen<sup>18</sup>, and like Attus Clausus of Regillus in old times, of becoming a member of the senate, and obtaining the consulship.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, VIII. 19.

<sup>18</sup> The case of L. Fulvius of Tusculum, a very few years later, seems to throw light upon the views of Vitruvius Vaccus. It is mentioned of Fulvius, that in one year he commanded a Tusculan army against Rome, and in the

next was himself elected Roman consul, having in the interval obtained the full citizenship of Rome. Circumstances favoured him, and were adverse to Vitruvius; but the object in view was in both cases probably the same.

Disappointed in this hope, he would feel himself slighted, and seek the means of revenging himself. Privernum had been deprived of a portion of its domain after the late war, and had seen this land occupied by Roman settlers; motives, therefore, for hostility against Rome were not wanting, and hopes of aid from Samnium might encourage to an attempt which otherwise would seem desperate. But either these hopes were disappointed, or Vitruvius had rashly ventured on an enterprise which he could not guide. He was defeated in the field, and fled to Privernum after the battle: his own countrymen, the people of Fundi, disclaimed him, and made their submission; but the Privernatians held out resolutely against two consular armies till the end of the Roman civil year; and the new consuls, who continued to beset Privernum with the whole force of Rome, did not finish the war for some months afterwards. At length Privernum submitted<sup>19</sup>; Vitruvius Vaccus was taken alive, kept in the dungeon at Rome till the consuls' triumph, and then was scourged and beheaded; some others were put to death with him; the senators of Privernum, like those of Velitræ, were deported beyond the Tiber: the consuls L. Æmilius and C. Plautius, triumphed<sup>20</sup>,

<sup>19</sup> Livy, VIII. 20.

<sup>20</sup> See the Fasti Capitolini, which also give the consul Æmilius his title of Privernas.

The coins of the Plautian family, struck at the very end of the seventh century of Rome, still record the triumph over Privernum; in the legend, C. HVPSAE. COS.

PREIVER. CAPT. Hypsæus was one of the cognomina of the Plautian family, and in later times the prevailing one; but the conqueror of Privernum, according to the Fasti, was C. Plautius *Decianus*. That is, apparently, he was a Decius adopted into the Plautian family, so that his name at full

CHAP.  
XXX.

Story of the bold language used by a Privernatian deputy before the Roman senate.

and Æmilius obtained the surname of Privernas, in honour of his conquest over so obstinate an enemy.

What follows is almost without example in Roman history, and though like every other remarkable story of these times, its details are in some respects uncertain, yet its truth in the main may be allowed<sup>21</sup>, and it is well worthy of mention, as a solitary instance of that virtue, so little known to the Romans, respect for the valour of a brave enemy. After their triumph, the consuls brought the case of the people of Privernum before the senate, and urging their neighbourhood to Samnium, and the likelihood of a speedy war with the Samnites, recommended that they should be gently dealt with, to secure their fidelity for the future. Some of the senators were disposed to adopt a less merciful course; and one of these called to the Privernatian deputies who had been sent to Rome to sue for mercy, and asked them, "Of what penalty, even in

length would have run, C. Plautius Hypsæus Decianus. — See Eckhel, *Doctr. Num.* Vol. V. p. 275.

<sup>21</sup> The details are uncertain, because Dionysius places its date in the year 398, and ascribes the questions put to the Privernatians, not to a Plautius or Æmilius, but to a Marcius; that is to say, to C. Marcius Rutilus, the first plebeian dictator and censor. There are also some variations in the circumstances of the story. It appears to me that the story itself was of Privernatian origin, and that when the Privernatians became Roman citizens, they used to relate with pride this instance

of the unflattering nobleness of their fathers. When it became famous at Rome, the Romans, as it reflected credit on them also, were glad to adopt it into their history, and then the several great families which had conducted wars at different periods against Privernum, were each anxious to appropriate it to themselves. Thus the Marcii wanted to fix it to the earlier war with Privernum, which had been carried on by an ancestor of theirs; while the Æmilii and Plautii claimed it for the last war, in which their ancestors had been the consuls. The Privernatian story in all probability mentioned no Roman general by name.

their own judgment, were their countrymen deserving?" A Privernatian boldly answered, "Of the penalty due to those who assert their liberty." The consul, dreading the effect of this reply, tried to obtain another of a humbler strain, and he asked the deputy, "But if we spare you now, what peace may we expect to have with you for the time to come?" "Peace true and lasting," was the answer, "if its terms be good; if otherwise, a peace that will soon be broken." Some senators cried out that this was the language of downright rebellion: but the majority were moved with a nobler feeling, and the consul, turning to the senators of highest rank who sat near him, said aloud, "These men, whose whole hearts are set upon liberty, deserve to become Romans." Accordingly it was proposed to the people, and carried, that the Privernatians should be admitted to the rights of Roman citizenship: in the first instance, probably, they were admitted to the private rights only, but ten years afterwards two new tribes were formed, and one of these, the Ufentine, included among its members the inhabitants of Privernum<sup>22</sup>.

The year 425 is farther marked by an alarm of a new Gaulish invasion, which was thought so serious, that the workmen in the several trades, and even those whose business was altogether sedentary<sup>23</sup>, are said to have been enlisted as soldiers; and a large army, composed in part of such materials, marched

Alarm of a  
new Gaulish  
invasion.

<sup>22</sup> Festus, in "Oufentina."

<sup>23</sup> "Sellularii." Livy, VIII. 20.



CHAP.  
XXX.

out as far as Veii to look out for and oppose the expected enemy. A similar alarm<sup>24</sup> had led to the appointment of a dictator, and to an unusual strictness in the enlistment of soldiers, three years before ; but in neither instance did any invasion actually take place. Polybius says<sup>25</sup>, that at this period "the Gauls, seeing the growing power of the Romans, concluded a treaty with them : " he does not mention what were the terms of this treaty, and Livy seems to have known nothing of its existence. Probably the Gauls found that their arms might be turned against other nations with more advantage and less risk than against Rome ; while the Romans, looking forward to a war with Samnium, would be glad to purchase peace on their northern frontier by some honorary presents to the Gaulish chiefs, and by engaging not to interfere with them, so long as they abstained from attacking the Roman territory.

The Romans  
found a  
colony at  
Anxur or  
Tarracina.

On their southern frontier the Romans, still with a view to the expected war with the Samnites, secured their direct communications with Campania, by sending a small colony or garrison of three hundred settlers to occupy the important post of Anxur<sup>26</sup>, or Tarracina. Each man received as his allotment of land no more than two jugera, so that the whole extent of ground divided on this occasion did not exceed 400 English acres. We are not to suppose that these three hundred colonists composed the whole population of the town ; many of

<sup>24</sup> Livy, VIII. 17.

<sup>25</sup> Livy, II. 18.

<sup>26</sup> Livy, VIII. 21.



the old inhabitants doubtless still resided there<sup>27</sup>, and had continued to do so ever since the place had become subject to the Romans; but they had ceased to form a state or even a corporate society; all their domain was become the property of the Roman people, and they were governed by a magistrate or præfect sent from Rome. The Roman colonists, on the other hand, governed themselves and the old inhabitants also; they chose their own magistrates and made their own laws: and over and above the grant of two jugera to each man, a portion too small by itself to maintain a family, they had probably a considerable extent of common pasture on the mountains, the former domain of the city of Anxur, and of which the colonists would have not indeed the sovereignty but the beneficial enjoyment. It should be remembered too, that as they retained their Roman franchise, they could still purchase or inherit property in Rome, and intermarry with their old countrymen; and thus, if any of them returned to Rome at a future period, they would easily enrol their names again amongst the members of their old tribe, and so resume the exercise of all their political rights, which had been suspended during their residence in the colony, but not actually forfeited.

Two years after the war with Privernum, there

War with  
the Greeks  
of Parthe-  
nope.

<sup>27</sup> It is a part of the well-known definition of a Roman colony given by Servius, *Æn.* I. 12. that “*ducti sunt in locum certum ædificiis munitum.*” The colonists were sent to inhabit a town already in existence, not to build a new

one for themselves; and thus by the very nature of the case, they would generally form a part only of the whole population of such a town, as the old inhabitants would rarely be altogether extirpated.

began that course of events which finally involved the Romans in open hostilities with the Samnites. When the Latin confederacy was broken up by the victory of Manlius and Decius, Capua, as we have seen, was punished for her accession to it by the loss of her domain land; and the territory thus ceded to Rome had been partly divided out by the government to the commons in small portions of three jugera to each settler, and partly had been occupied, after the usual manner, by families of the aristocracy. Thus a large body of strangers had been introduced into Campania; and disputes soon arose between them and the inhabitants of the Greek towns of the sea-coast<sup>28</sup>. Of these, Palæpolis and Neapolis, the old and new towns of Parthenope, were at this period almost the sole survivors. They were both Cumæan colonies; but Cumæ itself had, about eighty years before, been taken by the Samnite conquerors of Capua; and since that period it had ceased to be a purely Greek city: a foreign race, language, and manners were intermixed with those of Greece, and lately Cumæ, like the neighbouring towns of Capua and Acerræ, had become intimately connected with Rome. The two Parthenopean towns, on the contrary, had retained their Greek character uncorrupted; when their mother city had been conquered, they opened their gates to the

<sup>28</sup> Livy, VIII. 22. Dionysius' statement represents the wrong as offered to the Campanians themselves; and that the Romans took up the cause of their dependent

allies, or, in the well-known Greek term, of those who were *ὑπήκοοι τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας*. See Dionys. XV. 4. Fragm. Mai.

fugitives<sup>29</sup> who had escaped from the ruin, and received them as citizens of Parthenope; and although a short time afterwards they formed an alliance with the Samnites, perhaps from dread of the ambition of Dionysius of Syracuse, yet this connexion had not interfered with their perfect independence. They kept up also friendly relations with the people of Nola, whose admiration and imitation of the Greeks was so great as to give them in some respects the appearance of a Greek people<sup>30</sup>. Now, for the first time, they were brought into contact with the Romans, who accused them of molesting the Roman settlers in Campania, and demanded satisfaction for the injury. Certainly the Greeks had no scruples to restrain them from making spoil of the persons and property of barbarians; but the hostility was generally mutual; the Greek cities in southern Italy had suffered greatly from the attacks of their Lucanian neighbours; and the Roman settlers and occupiers of land in Campania might sometimes relieve their own wants by encroaching on the pastures or plundering the crops of the Greeks of Parthenope.

What account the Neapolitans gave of the origin of their quarrel with Rome, we know not; but the Roman story was, that when their *feciales* were sent to Palæopolis<sup>31</sup> to demand satisfaction, the Greeks,

It involves the Romans in a war with the Samnites.

<sup>29</sup> Dionysius, XV. 6. Fragm. Mai.

<sup>30</sup> Νωλανῶν σφόδρα τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀσπαζομένων. Dionys. XV. 5. The coins of Nola closely resemble those of Neapolis, and the le-

gend is in the Greek, not in the Oscan character.

<sup>31</sup> Dionysius, in all his account of these affairs, makes mention only of Neapolis; the name of Palæopolis does not once occur in

CHAP.  
XXX.

being a tongue-valiant people, returned an insulting refusal. Upon this the senate submitted to the centuries the resolution that war should be declared with the people of Palæpolis; and the centuries having approved of it, war was declared accordingly. Both consuls were sent into Campania; Q. Publilius Philo to attack the Greeks, L. Cornelius Lentulus to watch the Samnites, who were expected to aid them. It is said that a Samnite garrison of 4000 men<sup>32</sup>, together with 2000 men from Nola, were received into Palæpolis; and L. Cornelius reported to the senate that enlistments of men were ordered all over Samnium, and that attempts were making to excite the people of Privernum, Fundi, and Formiæ to rise in arms again against Rome. Upon this, ambassadors were sent by the Roman government to the Samnites, to obtain redress for their alleged grievances. The Samnites wholly denied their having tampered with Privernum<sup>33</sup>, Fundi, and Formiæ; and the soldiers who had gone to Palæpolis were, they said, an independent body, who had volunteered into the Greek service, and had not been sent by any public authority. This was probable enough, at a period when Campanian, or Opican, or Samnite mercenaries,—for the same men were

his narrative. In the Roman story, Palæpolis holds the more prominent place; for no other reason apparently, than because Palæpolis was conquered by force, and enabled Publilius to obtain the honour of a triumph, while Neapolis entered into a friendly treaty with Rome. But Palæpolis must

really have been a very insignificant place; for it followed almost as an infallible rule, that whenever a new town, Neapolis, was founded in a more advantageous situation, the old town, or Palæpolis, went to decay.

<sup>32</sup> Livy, VIII. 23.

<sup>33</sup> Livy, VIII. 23.

called indifferently by all these names,—bore such a high renown for valour, and were enlisted into the service of so many different nations. But the Samnites farther charged the Romans with a breach of the treaty on their part, in having planted a Roman colony at Fregellæ; a place which, having been conquered by the Samnites from the Volscians in the late war with the Latin confederacy, belonged rightfully to them as their share of the spoil. The Roman annalists seem to have known of no adequate answer that was made to this charge: the Romans proposed, it is said, to refer the question to the decision of some third power, keeping possession however of Fregellæ in the mean time. But the Samnites thought their right so clear, that it was idle to refer the matter to any arbitration<sup>34</sup>, and to allow the Romans in the mean while to exclude them from entering upon their own land. They replied, that no negotiations, and no mediation of any third party could decide their differences; the sword alone must determine them. “Let us meet at once in Campania,” they said, “and there put our quarrel to issue.” The answer was characteristic of the Romans: “Our legions march whither their own generals order them, and not at the bidding of an enemy.” Then the Roman *fecialis*, or herald<sup>35</sup>, stepped forward: “The gods of war,” he said, “will judge between us.” And then he raised his hands to

<sup>34</sup> See the answer of the Corinthians when the Coreyræans, like the Romans, first besieged Epidamnus, and then offered to refer the

dispute to the arbitration of some third party. Thucyd. I. 39.

<sup>35</sup> Dionysius, XV. 13. Fragm. Mai.



CHAP.  
XXX.

heaven and prayed, "If the Roman commonwealth has received wrong from the Samnites, and shall proceed to take up arms because she could obtain no justice by treaty, then may all the gods inspire her with wise counsels, and prosper her arms in battle! but if Rome has been false to her oaths, and declares war without just cause, then may the gods prosper neither her counsels nor her arms!" Having said thus much, the ambassadors departed; and L. Cornelius, it is said, crossed the frontier immediately, and invaded Samnium.

Q. Publilius  
Philo is  
made pro-  
consul.

But the year passed away unmarked by any decisive actions. Q. Publilius established himself between Palæpolis and Neapolis, so as to intercept all land communication between them, and to be enabled to lay waste their territory. He did not venture, however, to besiege either city, and as the sea was open to their ships, they were not likely to be soon reduced by famine. Thus when the consular year was about to close, Q. Publilius was empowered to retain his command as proconsul<sup>36</sup>, till he should have brought the war to a conclusion; and this is the first instance on record of the name and office of proconsul, and proves the great interest which Publilius must have had both in the senate and with the people at large; for certainly no urgent public necessity required that he should receive such an extraordinary distinction. It might have seemed of much greater consequence to leave the same gene-

<sup>36</sup> Livy, VIII. 23.

ral in the command of the army in Samnium; but Cornelius<sup>37</sup> was only excused from returning to Rome to hold the comitia, and was required to nominate a dictator for that purpose: as soon as the new consuls came into office, the conduct of the war was committed to them.

CHAP.  
XXX.

The consul named as dictator M. Claudius Marcellus, a man who had been himself consul four years before, but was of a plebeian family. And here we may observe a confirmation of Niebuhr's opinion, that the spirit of the senate at this period was very different from that of the more violent patricians, or probably of the majority of the order. The senate had just conferred an unprecedented honour on the man whom the patricians most hated, on the author of the Publilian laws. This probably excited much bitterness; and although M. Claudius Marcellus seems to have given no personal cause of offence, yet as he was a plebeian, the more violent patrician party determined to vent their anger upon him. They could not stop the proconsulship of Publius, for that was solely within the cognizance of the senate and people; but the dictatorship of Marcellus might be set aside by a power which was still exclusively patrician, and for that very reason was likely to be animated by a strong patrician spirit, the college of augurs. Reports were spread abroad that the dictator had not been duly appointed, that

Patrician  
jealousies  
against a  
plebeian  
dictator.

<sup>37</sup> Livy, VIII. 23.

CHAP.  
XXX.

some religious impediment had occurred; and of this question the augurs alone were judges. It was referred to them, and they pronounced that in the appointment<sup>38</sup> the auspices had not been properly taken, and that it was therefore void. The dictator accordingly resigned his office; but the decision of the augurs, although not legally questionable, was openly taxed with unfairness. The consul, it was said, was in the midst of his camp in Samnium; he had arisen, as was the custom, at the dead of night, and had named the dictator when no human eye beheld him. He had mentioned nothing of evil omen to vitiate his act; there was no witness who could report any, and how could the augurs, whilst living quietly at Rome, pretend to know what signs of unlucky import had occurred at a given time and place in Samnium. It was plain to see that the real impediment to the dictator's appointment consisted in his being a plebeian.

Attempts to  
set aside the  
Licinian  
law.

The patricians appear to have been so encouraged by this victory, as to venture upon another attempt of a far more desperate nature; they seem to have tried to set aside the Licinian law, and to procure the election of two patrician consuls. This at least is the most likely explanation of the fact that after the dictator's resignation, when the comitia were to be held by an interrex, the election was so delayed<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Livy, VIII. 23. "Vitiosum videri dictatorem pronuntiaverunt."

<sup>39</sup> Livy, VIII. 23.

that thirteen interregna, a period of more than sixty-five days, were suffered to elapse before the new consuls were appointed. The fourteenth interrex was L. Æmilius Mamercinus, a man whose family since the days of the good dictator Mamercus Æmilius had always been opposed to the high patrician party, who was himself a friend<sup>40</sup> of Publilius Philo, and whose brother had been Publilius' colleague and associate in the year in which he had passed his famous laws. He brought on the election without delay, and took care that it should be conducted according to law; and thus the efforts of the patricians were baffled, and a plebeian consul, C. Pœteli<sup>41</sup>, was elected along with the patrician L. Papi<sup>42</sup>rius Mugillanus.

It was an untimely moment for the renewal of party quarrels, when Rome was entering upon her second and decisive war with Samnium. In the first contests the two nations had met without animosity, and the war was ended between them soon and easily. But in the fourteen years which had since elapsed their feelings had become greatly changed. They were now well aware of each other's power and ambition; their dominions were brought into immediate contact; neither could advance but by driving back the other. The Latin states were now closely united with Rome, and it was become a question which of the two races, the Latin or the Sabellian,

Feelings of both nations at the beginning of the second Samnite war.

<sup>40</sup> He had named Publilius his master of the horse a few years earlier, when he was himself dic-

tator, Livy, VIII. 16.

<sup>41</sup> Livy, VIII. 25.

CHAP.  
XXX.

should be the sovereign of central and southern Italy.

The second Samnite war therefore was carried on with feelings of bitter hostility; and instead of ending like the first within three years, it lasted amidst striking vicissitudes of fortune for more than twenty.



## CHAPTER XXXI.

SECOND SAMNITE WAR—L. PAPIRIUS CURSOR—AFFAIR OF THE FORKS OR PASS OF CAUDIUM—BATTLE OF LAUTULÆ—Q. FABIUS, AND THE WAR WITH ETRURIA.—A.U.C. 428-450 : 423-444, NIEBUHR.

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“Samnites quinquaginta annis per Fabios et Papirios patres, eorumque liberos, ita subegit ac domuit (populus Romanus), ita ruinas ipsas urbium diruit, ut hodie Samnium in ipso Samnio requiratur; nec facile appareat materia quatuor et viginti triumphorum.”—FLORUS, I. 16.

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THE second Samnite war brings us to the middle of the fifth century of Rome, and within little more than three hundred years of the Christian æra. Alexander died almost before it had begun; and neither Aristotle nor Demosthenes were living when the Romans, in the fifth year of the contest, were sent under the yoke at the memorable pass of Caudium. At its conclusion, sixteen years later, we are arrived at the second generation of Alexander's successors; Eumenes and Antipater were dead, Demetrius Poliorcetes was in the height of his renown; and Seleucus and Ptolemy had already assumed the kingly diadem, and founded the Greek kingdoms of

CHAP.  
XXXI.

Chronology  
of the second Sam-  
nite war.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

Syria and of Egypt. So completely had Greece arrived at the season of autumn, while at Rome it was yet the early spring.

General nature and objects of the war.

The war on which we are going to enter lasted on the lowest computation above twenty years. It was full of action, but its events present so complicated a tissue, that it is not easy to comprehend its general principle. Here, however, as in the Peloponnesian war, it was a great object with either party to tempt the allies of the other to revolt; and thus the Roman armies were so often employed in Apulia, and in the valley of the upper Liris, while the Samnites were eager at every favourable opportunity to pour down into Campania. At first the fidelity even of the Latin states to Rome seemed doubtful; but that was secured by timely concessions, and Rome and Latium firmly united were enabled to send out armies so superior in number to those of the Samnites, that while revolt from the Romans was an attempt of the greatest danger, revolt to them was prompted both by hope and fear. The Etruscan war, like all the other military attempts of that divided people, offered no effectual diversion; and at last Samnium saw her allies stripped as it were from around her, and was obliged herself to support the havoc of repeated invasions. She then yielded from mere exhaustion; but was so unsubdued in spirit that she only made peace till she could organize a new force of allies to assist her in renewing the struggle.

Q. Publilius Philo<sup>1</sup> in his new office of proconsul was continuing his land blockade of the Greeks of Parthenope; while the new consuls of the year 428 with their united armies were ordered to invade Samnium. But the Romans, according to the policy which they invariably pursued in their later wars, did not choose to carry on a systematic war in their enemy's country till they had secured the alliance of some state in his immediate neighbourhood. Thus, before they commenced their operations, they concluded treaties of alliance<sup>2</sup> with the Lucanians and Apulians, or, at any rate, with some particular states or tribes of these two nations. The Lucanians, although a kindred people to the Samnites, were politically distinct from them; and they had moreover their own internal factions<sup>3</sup>, each of which would gladly apply for foreign aid to enable it to triumph over its rival. Besides, they were the old enemies of the Greek cities on their coasts; and as

CHAP.  
XXXI.

The Lucanians and Apulians become the allies of Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, VIII. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, VIII. 25.

<sup>3</sup> This, Niebuhr observes, appears from the statement that Alexander of Epirus during his wars in Italy was attended by about two hundred Lucanian exiles; and that these exiles treated with the opposite party and purchased their return to their several states by betraying him and murdering him.—Livy, VIII. 24. It is vexatious that Diodorus, or rather his work as it now remains to us, makes no mention of the affairs of Italy during this period. He notices the war between the Lucanians

and Tarentum in the 110th Olympiad, in which Archidamus, the king of Sparta, fought on the side of the Tarentines and was killed; and which was exactly contemporary with the battle of Chæroneia, and the beginning of the great Latin war. (Diodorus XVI. 62-88.) But of the subsequent relations between Tarentum and the Lucanians we have not a word; the whole of the 17th and 18th books in their present state being devoted exclusively to the affairs of Greece and Asia; and the portion of the history which treated of the contemporary events in Sicily and the west, having been entirely lost.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

Rome was now in open war with Neapolis, and on the brink of a quarrel with Tarentum, this very circumstance would dispose the Lucanians to seek her alliance. As for the Apulians, they were treated by the Samnites, it is said, almost as a subject people<sup>4</sup>; and they might, therefore, as naturally look to Rome for deliverance, as the allies of Athens in the Peloponnesian war were ready to revolt to Lacedæmon. But the Samnite government had not the active energy of the Athenian: and the Romans were still more widely distant from the pusillanimity and utter unskilfulness which marked the military plans of Sparta.

End of the war with the Greeks of Parthenope. Neapolis becomes the ally of the Romans.

We know nothing but the mere outside of all these transactions; the internal parties whose alternate triumph or defeat influenced each state's external relations, are mostly lost in the distant view presented by the annalists of Rome. But it is recorded<sup>5</sup> that the war with the Greeks of Parthenope was ended by the act of a citizen of Palæopolis, who preferring the Roman to the Samnite connexion, found means to admit the Romans into his city. Publilius obtained a triumph for his conquest, and Palæopolis is no more heard of in history; but Neapolis, warned in time by the fate of her sister city, did not allow one of her own citizens to place her at the enemy's mercy, but at once concluded peace for herself and was admitted into the Roman alliance<sup>6</sup>. From that day forward the political his-

<sup>4</sup> Livy, IX, 13. See chap. XXVIII. of this history, note 28.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, VIII. 25.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, VIII. 26, speaks of a

tory of Neapolis is a blank to us, till in the revolutions of ages, the Chalcidian colony became the seat of an independent duchy, and afterwards of a Norman kingdom.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

The people of Tarentum<sup>7</sup>, it is said, were greatly concerned at the issue of this war; and were anxious by every means to stop the alarming growth of the Roman power. A strange story is told of their deceiving the Lucanians by false representations of outrages offered by the Roman generals to some Lucanian citizens; and the effect of their trick, it is said, was so great, that the whole Lucanian nation, in the very same year in which they had concluded their alliance with Rome, revolted and joined the Samnites. But the Samnites, mistrusting this sudden change, obliged them to give hostages for their fidelity, and to receive Samnite garrisons into their principal towns.

The Lucanians revolt from Rome, and again join the Samnites.

It is quite evident that we have not here the whole explanation of the conduct of the Lucanians. Some internal revolution must have prepared the way for it, and then any stories, whether true or false, of the insolence of the Roman generals might be successfully employed to excite the popular indignation. But how the Roman party was so suddenly and completely overthrown, and why neither of the consular armies made any attempt to restore it, it is impossible to conjecture. The whole account of the

Obscurity of these accounts. Operations of the first campaign.

"*fœdus Neapolitanum*," not "*Palæopolitanum*," which he accounts for by saying, "*Eo enim*, (scil. Neapolin) *deinde summa rei Græ-*

*corum venit*." But see chap. XXX. note 31.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, VIII. 27.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

operations of the two consuls is confined to the statement<sup>8</sup>, that they penetrated some way from Capua up the valley of the Volturnus, and took the three towns of Allifæ, Callifæ and Rufrium. But no success was obtained of sufficient importance to deserve a triumph, and the conquered towns were in all probability immediately abandoned, for the Romans could not as yet hope to maintain their ground permanently on the upper Volturnus; and it appears that fifteen years afterwards Allifæ was still held by the Samnites. Thus, at the end of the first campaign, the aspect of the war was not favourable to Rome.

A.U.C. 429.  
Second campaign. War  
with the  
Vestinians.

The next year opened still more unpromisingly; for the Vestinians<sup>9</sup> joined the Samnite confederacy; and if the Romans attacked them, it was likely that the Marsians, Marrucinians, and Pelignians, would all take up arms in their defence. These four nations lay on the north and northwest of Samnium, and their territory reached from the coast of the Adriatic to the central chain of the Apennines, and to the shores of the lake Fucinus. If they were hostile, all communication between Rome and Apulia was rendered extremely precarious; and Samnium was secured from invasion except on the side of the valley of the Liris, or from Campania. The Romans, therefore, boldly resolved to declare war at once against the Vestinians, and by a sudden attack to detach them from the Samnite alliance. One of

<sup>8</sup> Livy, VIII. 25.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, VIII. 29.

the new consuls, Dec. Junius Brutus, marched immediately into their country; the neighbouring nations remained quiet, and the Vestinians, overpowered by a superior force, saw their whole country laid waste; and when they were provoked to risk a battle they were totally defeated, and were reduced for the rest of the season to disperse their army, and endeavour only to defend their several cities. Two of these<sup>10</sup>, however, were taken, and although it is not mentioned that the Vestinians sued for peace, yet the communication between Rome and Apulia seems for the future to have been carried on through their country without interruption.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

Meanwhile the other consul, L. Furius Camillus, who was to have invaded Samnium<sup>11</sup>, was taken ill, and became unable to retain his command. Being then ordered to name a dictator, he fixed upon L. Papirius Cursor, who accordingly appointed Q. Fabius Rullianus his master of the horse, and marched out to attack the Samnites. Livy's carelessness, and the extreme obscurity of the small towns and villages in Samnium, make it impossible to ascertain the seat of this campaign exactly. We cannot even tell whether the Romans invaded Samnium<sup>12</sup>, or

L. Papirius  
Cursor dic-  
tator.

<sup>10</sup> Cutina and Cingilia.—Livy, VIII. 29. Both names are entirely unknown, and both, therefore, as usual, are given with great variations in the MSS. The country of the Vestinians lay on the left bank of the river Aturnus, and it included that highest part of the whole range of the Apennines, known by the name of “Il gran

Sasso d' Italia.” But the sites of the several small towns in it, which in all probability had perished long before the Augustan age, it is impossible to ascertain now.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, VIII. 29.

<sup>12</sup> Livy fixes the scene of action in Samnium, and calls the place at which the action was fought

CHAP.  
XXXI.

were obliged themselves to act on the defensive, and to meet the Samnite army in the valley of the upper Anio, under the Imbrivian or Simbrivian hills, about half way between Tibur and Sublaqueum.

Story of his severity towards Q. Fabius his master of the horse.

The faint and obscure outline of the military transactions of this campaign affords a strong contrast to the lively and full picture of the dispute between the Roman dictator and his master of the horse, which the annals have given amongst the events of this year. As the story would be considered honourable to both the actors in it, the traditions and memoirs of both their families would vie with each other in recording it; and the historian, Fabius Pictor, in honour of his own name and race, was likely to give it a place in his history. It is told by Livy with his usual power and feeling; but here, as in the story of T. Manlius and his son, it will be best merely to repeat the outline of it, as we have no other knowledge of it than what we derive from Livy himself, and to give it again in detail would be either to translate him, or to describe with less effect, what in him is related almost perfectly.

Q. Fabius appeals to

When the auspices were taken<sup>13</sup>, as usual, by the

“Imbrinium.” VIII. 30. But Niebuhr observes, that the circumstances of the story which follows, imply that the Roman army could have been at no great distance from Rome: and the Imbrivian or Simbrivian hills of the upper valley of the Anio are well known. In this Samnite war, wherever we have any details of a battle, the geography of the cam-

paign is generally more perplexed than ever; because such details always come from stories preserved by the several families of the aristocracy, whether in writing or traditionally; and these, caring nothing for the military history of the previous operations, only sought to describe the deeds of their hero in the battle.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, VIII. 30.

dictator at Rome, previously to his marching out to war, the signs of the will of the gods were not sufficiently intelligible. It was necessary, therefore, to take them over again; and as they were auspices<sup>14</sup> which could only be taken lawfully within the precinct of the old Ager Romanus, the dictator was obliged for this purpose to return to Rome. He charged his master of the horse to remain strictly on the defensive during his absence; but Fabius disobeyed his orders, and gained some slight advantage over the enemy; an advantage which the annalists magnified into a decisive victory, with a loss to the Samnites<sup>15</sup> of 20,000 men. However Papirius, as soon as he heard of this breach of his orders, hastened back to the camp, and would have executed

CHAP.  
XXXI.

the tribunes; and the people by their entreaties prevail on the dictator to spare his life.

<sup>14</sup> This appears from that well-known passage in Varro, in which he gives the augurs' division of all countries, according to the rules of their art; that is, according to the several kinds of auspices which were peculiar to each of them. The ager Romanus and the ager Gabinus are classed apart, because in these two districts the auspices might be taken in the same way. All other countries were either ager peregrinus, or ager hosticus, or ager incertus; and these required different auspices.—See Varro, V. § 33. Ed. Müller.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, VIII. 30. Some writers, not content with this, asserted that two pitched battles had been fought during the dictator's absence, and that Fabius had been twice signally victorious. "In quibusdam annalibus tota res præ-

termissa est," says Livy; that is, the action was of no importance in itself, and therefore was omitted in those annals which did not enter into the details of the story of Papirius and Fabius. But as it made a necessary part of that story, it was mentioned of course in every version of it; and both the Papirian and the Fabian traditions would be disposed to exaggerate its importance: the latter from an obvious reason; but the former would be disposed to do it equally, for the glory of the character of Papirius was placed in his unyielding assertion of the sacredness of discipline; and this would be rendered the more striking, in proportion to the brilliancy of the action, which he, notwithstanding, treated as a crime, because it had been fought contrary to his orders.



Fabius immediately, had not the violent and almost mutinous opposition of the soldiers obliged him to pause. During the night Fabius fled from the camp to Rome, and immediately summoned the senate to implore their protection; but ere the senators were well assembled, the dictator arrived, and again gave orders to arrest him. M. Fabius, the father of the prisoner, then appealed to the tribunes for their protection, and declared his intention of carrying his son's cause before the assembly of the people. Papirius warned the tribunes not to sanction so fatal a breach of military discipline, nor to lessen the majesty of the dictator's office, by allowing his judgments to be reversed by any other power. The tribunes hesitated; they were unwilling to establish a precedent of setting any limits to the absolute power of the dictator, a power which was held essential to the office; and yet they could not bear to permit an exercise of this power so extravagantly severe as to shock the sense and feelings of the whole Roman people. They were relieved from this difficulty by the people themselves<sup>16</sup>; for the whole assembly with one voice implored the dictator to show mercy, and to forgive Fabius for their sakes. Then Papirius yielded; the absolute power of the dictator, he said, was now acknowledged: the people did not interfere to rescind his sentence<sup>17</sup>, but to entreat his

<sup>16</sup> Livy, VIII. 35.

<sup>17</sup> "Non noxa eximitur Q. Fabius, sed noxæ damnatus donatur populo Romano, donatur tribuni-

ciæ potestati, precarium non justum auxilium ferenti." — Livy, VIII. 35.



mercy. Accordingly he declared that he pardoned the master of the horse; "and the authority of the Roman generals was established," says Livy, "no less firmly by the peril of Q. Fabius than by the actual death of the young T. Manlius." This is true, if by peril we understand not only that he was in danger, but also that he was no more than in danger, and that he did not actually perish; for the execution of Fabius would, perhaps, have been more ruinous to discipline than any other possible result of the transaction, as the reaction of feeling produced by laws of extreme severity has a direct tendency to utter lawlessness. It may be observed also, that according to this story the tribunes possessed the power within the city, of staying the execution even of a dictator's sentence: and there is no doubt that in him, no less than in an inferior magistrate, it would have been a breach of the solemn covenant of the sacred hill, to have touched the person of a tribune. And, in the same manner, the people in their centuries could undoubtedly have taken cognizance of the offence of Fabius themselves, and removed it out of the jurisdiction of the dictator. But neither the tribunes nor the people wished so to interfere, because it was held to be expedient that the dictator's power should be, in practice, unrestrained; and, therefore, it was judged better to save Fabius by an appeal to the clemency of Papirius, rather than by an authoritative reversal of his sentence.

From this story we return again to the meagre-  
Successes of  
Papirius.

CHAP.  
XXXI.Truce for a  
year.

ness of the accounts of the war. It is said, that whilst Papirius<sup>18</sup> was absent in Rome, one of his foraging parties was cut off by the Samnites; and that after his return to the army, the soldiers were so unwilling to conquer under his auspices, that in a bloody battle, fought under his immediate command, with the enemy, the fortune of the day was left doubtful. Then, said the story<sup>19</sup>, Papirius saw how needful it was to win the love of his soldiers; he was assiduous in his attentions to the wounded; he commended them by name to the care of their respective officers; and he himself with his lieutenants went round the camp, looking personally into the tents, and asking the men how they were. The affections of the army were thus completely regained; another battle followed, and the victory of the Romans was so decisive, that the Samnites were forced to abandon the open country to the ravages of their enemies, and were even driven, so said the stories of the Papirian family, to solicit peace. The dictator granted an armistice, and ambassadors from the Samnites followed him to Rome, when he returned thither, about the end of February<sup>20</sup>, to celebrate his triumph. But as the terms of a lasting peace could not be agreed upon, nothing more was concluded than a truce for a single year; a breathing time which both parties might find convenient.

Third campaign. Confusion of the history of this year.

The new consuls, however, were engaged in hostilities with the Samnites in the course of their magi-

<sup>18</sup> Livy, VIII. 35.<sup>19</sup> Livy, VIII. 36.<sup>20</sup> See the *Fasti Capitolini*.

stracy, so that the Roman annalists accused the Samnites of having broken the truce as soon as Papirius went out of office<sup>21</sup>. In the utter confusion of the chronology of this period, and the obscurity of its history, we cannot tell whether the charge was well founded or no. But the events of this year, 431, according to the common chronology, have been more than ordinarily disguised and suppressed, for the annalists represent it as a year marked by no memorable action; whereas, in fact, it witnessed a coalition against Rome, which was indeed quickly dissolved, but in the mean time had exposed the republic to the most imminent jeopardy. We must attempt to restore the outline at least of the real but lost picture.

CHAP.  
XXXI.  
A.U.C. 431.

The Samnites had employed the year of the truce in endeavouring to procure assistance for themselves amongst the allies and subjects of Rome. They succeeded, either wholly or in part, with the Apulians: some of whose cities<sup>22</sup> revolted from the Romans, and called in the Samnites to assist in reducing those who refused to join them. Thus when the truce was either ended, or broken, Q. Aulius Cerretanus<sup>23</sup>, one of the consuls, was obliged to march with one consular army into Apulia; whilst the other consul, C. Sulpicius Longus, was sent into Samnium.

The consuls  
march into  
Apulia and  
Samnium.

<sup>21</sup> Livy, VIII. 37. "Nec earum ipsarum (induciarum) sancta fides fuit: adeo, postquam Papirium abisse magistratu nuntiatum est, arrecti ad bellandum animi sunt."

<sup>22</sup> Livy, VIII. 37.

<sup>23</sup> Livy calls him Q. Æmilius

Cerretanus, but says "Aulium quidam annales habent." He himself calls him Aulius, however, when he mentions his second consulship in the year 429.—Livy, IX. 15.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

Whether he made his attack on the side of Campania, or from the country of the Pelignians and Marsians, we know not; but it appears at any rate that both consuls were engaged at a distance from Rome, and their communications with it would, therefore, be liable to great interruption.

Great rising  
of the cities  
near Rome  
to claim the  
full rights of  
citizenship.  
L. Fulvius  
consul of the  
Tusculans.

Five years had now elapsed since the rights of Roman citizenship had been bestowed on the people of Privernum; thirteen years had passed since the same privileges had been given to the Tusculans. But as this citizenship extended only to private rights, and conferred no political power; (for neither the Privernatians nor the Tusculans were as yet included in any Roman tribe, and consequently they enjoyed no rights of voting;) so it was felt to be a degradation rather than a benefit; or at any rate it was fitted only for a temporary measure, which ought to pave the way for a more perfect union. We may conjecture also from what has taken place in other countries, that hopes had been held out, or even promises made, by the Romans, of which the fulfilment was afterwards indefinitely delayed; and the nobility of Privernum and Tusculum, connected with those of Rome in their private relations, and aspiring to share with them also their political distinctions, were especially impatient of their actual condition. The Samnite war, and above all, the absence of both the consular armies in remote parts of Italy, seemed to afford them an opportunity of enforcing their claims, and obliging the Romans to grant them a full equality of rights. Suddenly,



therefore, like the Irish volunteers of 1782, the people of Tusculum and Privernum flew to arms; and the spirit which actuated them must indeed have been general, if it be true that the people of Velitræ<sup>24</sup>, although already included in a Roman tribe, were yet persuaded to join them. One of their leaders was L. Fulvius Curvus, of Tusculum, and like the leaders of the Italian allies in the great war of the seventh century, he was invested with the title of consul<sup>25</sup>. A Privernatian leader was probably associated with him in this dignity, in intimation that Tusculum and Privernum were resolved to form a distinct Roman commonwealth of their own,

<sup>24</sup> In the bill proposed afterwards by M. Flavius for the punishment of the Tusculans, it was proposed to punish all those "quorum ope ac consilio Veliterni Privernatesque populo Romano bellum fecissent." This can only allude to the short war of this year; but the account of these events in Livy is so meagre that if we only followed his narrative the allusion would be unintelligible; for not a word had been said of Privernum since the war of 425, nor of Velitræ since the great Latin war. Drakenborch, therefore, is naturally at a loss to understand the meaning of the passage; but as the statement of the language of the bill is likely to be authentic, we might venture even from that alone to supply the defects of the other part of Livy's narrative, even if we had not Pliny's remarkable notice of L. Fulvius, which throws a light upon the whole transaction.

<sup>25</sup> "Est et L. Fulvius inter in-

signia exempla, Tusculanorum rebellantium consul; eodemque honore quum transisset exornatus confertim a populo Romano: qui solus eodem anno quo fuerat hostis Romæ triumphavit ex iis quorum consul fuerat." Pliny, *Histor. Natur.* VII. 44. Now the title of consul was Roman exclusively and not Latin; the Latins had prætors and dictators, but no consuls; which would naturally be the case, if the origin of the name at Rome were as accidental, and as connected with the peculiar circumstances of the time, as I have supposed it to have been. See Vol. I. chap. xv. p. 312. If then Fulvius was really called consul and not prætor, the title must have been chosen with the same feeling as in the Italian war; when the Italian allies, claiming to be the true representatives of the Roman nation, elected their two consuls and twelve prætors in opposition to the consuls and prætors of the city of Rome.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

they too being Roman citizens, if the inhabitants of the capital persisted in excluding them from the government and honours of their common country.

Night march  
of L. Ful-  
vius upon  
Rome.  
The de-  
mands of the  
insurgents  
are granted.

Their measures seem to have been taken with the most careful secrecy, and the execution of them fell upon the Romans like a thunderbolt. In the dead of the night an alarm was given that an enemy was before the walls of Rome<sup>26</sup>; the citizens arose in haste, each man seized his arms, and ran to the Capitol, or to defend the walls and secure the gates of the city. The attempt of L. Fulvius to surprise Rome, not less bold than the march of C. Pontius Telesinus upon the Colline gate, was timely baffled; and finding the city secured against a surprise, he retreated as rapidly as he had advanced. But although this single blow had failed, it still revealed the magnitude of the actual danger. If Velitræ had joined in the revolt, what hope was there that the other cities of Latium would remain faithful? and if the whole storm of the Latin war should

<sup>26</sup> Livy, VIII. 37. "*Romæ nocturnus terror ita ex somno trepidam repente civitatem excivit, ut capitolium atque arx moeniaque et portæ plena armatorum fuerint, et cum concursatum conclamatumque ad arma omnibus locis esset, primâ luce nec auctor nec causa terroris comparuit.*"—The story thus given is a mere absurdity; but it is probable enough, if explained as in the text. We read of a similar night attack made by the Æquians upon Tusculum towards the close of the third century of Rome, Livy, III. 23; and in the same

manner Appius Herdonius had actually surprised the Capitol at Rome in the year 294. It may be that Fulvius expected to be joined by a party within Rome itself, and the failure of this co-operation may have ruined his design. That he should have retreated instantly, as soon as he found that he was discovered, was of course necessary; and thus there would have been no enemy to be seen from the walls of Rome when the day broke; and yet the alarm in the night was any thing but imaginary.

again gather, when the Samnites were no longer allies of Rome, as in the last war, but her deadly enemies, what prospect was left of victory? The pride of the Roman aristocracy was obliged to yield; and the self-same conduct which in Vitruvius Vaccus five years before they had punished with death, they were now obliged in the case of L. Fulvius Curvus to reward with the consulship. What security they could give, that they would keep their plighted faith, we know not; but L. Fulvius was so satisfied that he went over to the Romans, and his countrymen and their allies, assured that their demands would be granted, laid down their arms. A mad if not a treacherous attempt to disturb this understanding was made by M. Flavius<sup>27</sup>, one of the tribunes; he proposed a law for visiting with condign punishment those citizens of Tusculum who had been the instigators of the late insurrection. This must undoubtedly have included L. Fulvius himself; and had the law passed, the Latins in indignation and despair would have risen as one man; and the quarrel would have become utterly irreconcilable. One tribe, the Pollian, voted in favour of it, and even expressed its wish for a still bloodier vengeance on the whole people of Tusculum, such as the Athenians had taken upon the revolted Melians and Scionæans. But all the other tribes, to the number of eight and twenty, had the wisdom to reject the bill. In the very next census the Tescu-

<sup>27</sup> Livy, VII. 37.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

lans<sup>28</sup> and Privernatians received the full rights of citizenship; but L. Fulvius obtained the object of his ambition even without this short delay; he was elected at once Roman consul; and the man who in one year had led a hostile army to assail the very walls of Rome, was in the next year invested with the highest civil and military power in the Roman commonwealth.

Fourth cam-  
paign of the  
war. Victo-  
ries of the  
Romans.

What became of the consular armies in Samnium and Apulia, while these important events were passing in the neighbourhood of Rome, we have no means of discovering. It is certain that they gained no victories; it is possible that they may have sustained some defeats, and that their ill fortune may have helped to break the spirit of the Roman government, and to enforce a compliance with the demands of the Tusculans. But when the seeds of dissension near home were destroyed, and Tusculum and the other neighbouring cities were cordially united with Rome, the war in Samnium assumed a different aspect. The Roman annals represent the year 432 as one marked by most brilliant victories; although some accounts<sup>29</sup> ascribed the merit of them

<sup>28</sup> This is known with regard to the Privernatians, because they were included in the tribe Ufentina or Oufentina, which was created in 436. See Livy, IX. 20. Diodorus, XIX. 10. With regard to the Tusculans it is only a conjecture, but we never hear of them afterwards, except as full citizens; and their being enrolled in the

Papirian tribe, (which is known from Livy, VIII. 37,) seems to suit with the supposition that they were admitted to the full franchise by L. Papirius Cursor, who, as appears from the Fasti Capitolini, was one of the censors of the year 436, when the Falerian and Ufentine tribes were created.

<sup>29</sup> Livy, VIII. 38, 39.

to the consuls, Q. Fabius and L. Fulvius, while others gave it to a dictator, A. Cornelius Arvina. All agreed, however, in saying that the Samnites sustained a bloody defeat, insomuch that the party in Samnium which was favourable to peace obtained for the moment an ascendancy. This party resolved to purchase the friendship of Rome by the humblest concessions; all prisoners<sup>30</sup> and all plunder taken from the Romans were to be restored; all the demands of the Romans before the war were to be fully satisfied; and Brutulus Papius, the leader of the war party, was to be given up to the Romans as the man who had broken the peace between the two nations. Brutulus Papius, it is said, would not be given up alive; he killed himself, and only his lifeless body was offered to the vengeance of his enemies. But the Romans, thinking that a party which could yield so much would not dare to refuse any thing, rejected even these terms, and would be contented with nothing less than that the Samnites should acknowledge their supremacy, and become their dependent allies<sup>31</sup>. One unsuccessful campaign was not enough to reduce so brave a people to such an humiliation; the whole nation resolved to try the chance of war once more; and their choice of an emperor or captain-general for the approaching campaign fell on a man who has deserved to be called the Samnite Hannibal, on Caius Pontius of Telesia<sup>32</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> Livy, VIII. 39. Dion Cassius, *Fragm.* Ursin. 143.

<sup>31</sup> Appian, III. *Fragm.* 4.

<sup>32</sup> He is called Pontius Telesi-



CHAP.  
XXXI.

Fifth campaign. The Romans invade Samnium from Campania.

The military history of the ensuing year is more than ordinarily obscure, because the annals were filled with nothing but the stories about the disaster of Caudium, and, as usual, these stories never think of connecting the event to which they relate with the circumstances which led to it, but plunge into the midst of it at once. The two new consuls, it is said, T. Veturius and Sp. Postumius, at the head of two consular armies, consisting each of two Roman legions, and a considerable force of auxiliaries, marched from Rome into Campania; as if it was intended to strike a blow at the great Samnite cities on the southern side of the Matese at Caudium, and Telesia, and Beneventum, or, as it was then called, Maleventum. The last campaign in Apulia had, probably, recovered the revolted cities in that country, and the Roman party amongst the Apulians was supposed to be strong enough to retain their countrymen in their alliance with Rome. Thus the seat of war was removed entirely to the southern frontier of Samnium; and C. Pontius, the Samnite general, was prepared to defend the passes which lead from the plain of Naples to Beneventum and the higher valleys within the line of the Apennines.

They enter the pass of Caudium.

But, in order to tempt the Romans to plunge blindly into these defiles, Pontius contrived to mislead them by a false report that the whole Samnite

nus by the author of the little work "de Viris Illustribus," in the notice of Sp. Postumius. The great Samnite leader who fought so obstinately against Sylla was

also Pontius Telesinus, and possibly a descendant of the Pontius who defeated the Romans at the pass of Caudium.



army was gone off into Apulia<sup>33</sup>, and was there busily engaged in besieging Luceria; as if trusting to the natural strength of their own country to withstand the invasion of the Roman consuls. The consuls believed this story, and thinking on the one hand, that the danger of their allies made it necessary to choose the shortest route into Apulia, while the absence of the Samnite army would enable them to force their way through Samnium without difficulty, they entered the fatal pass of Caudium. This was a cut or valley in the outer line or wall of the Apennines, leading from the plain of Campania under the foot of Tiburnus to Maleventum. The modern road from Naples to Benevento still runs through it, and it is now called the valley of Arpaia<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> Livy, IX. 2. At what period in this campaign, or by what forces, Luceria was really won over to the Samnite alliance, it is not possible to say. A part of the Samnite forces may have been in Apulia when the Romans entered Samnium; and C. Pontius may have won his victory with an army much inferior in numbers to that of the Romans. But the history of this campaign cannot be completely restored.

<sup>34</sup> The situation of the pass of Caudium has been a matter of dispute. Mr. Gandy, in a memoir published by Mr. Keppel Craven, in his tour through the southern provinces of Naples, p. 12—20, places it in a narrow gorge on the little stream of the Isclero, above Sant' Agata de' Goti. But Niebuhr adheres to the common opinion that it was the valley between Arienzo and Arpaia, through which

the present road from Naples to Benevento runs. A village in the midst of this defile is still called Forchia, and Niebuhr says that the defile itself was even in the middle ages distinguished by the name of *la Furcula Caudina*. The dispute has been only occasioned by the supposition that Livy's description of the scene was topographically correct, and by the difficulty of reconciling it with the actual character of the valley of Arpaia. But Livy's descriptions, unless we can be sure that they are taken from some writer who was careful about such matters, deserve no credit; and the picture which he gives of the pass of Caudium is but a representation of almost all mountain valleys, which contract at intervals into mere gorges, and expand between these gorges into something almost deserving the name of a plain. It is said that

CHAP.  
XXXI.

They are defeated and their retreat is cut off.

In this valley the Roman army found itself on a sudden surrounded by the enemy, who showed themselves on both flanks and on the rear, as soon as the heads of the columns were stopped by the obstacles with which the Samnites had blocked up the road in front of them. Thus entangled in a situation nearly similar to that of Flaminius at Thrasymenus, the Romans were completely defeated<sup>35</sup>. Night, however, saved them from total destruction; but to retreat to the plains was impossible: the pass in their rear, by which they had entered the valley, was secured by the enemy; so that they had no other resource but to encamp in the valley, not far from the scene of their defeat, and there hopelessly to abide the issue. The Samnites, having thus got them in their power, waited quietly till famine should do their work for them. Occupying the road both in front and on the rear of the Romans, and guarding every possible track by which the enemy might try to escape over the hills on either side of

the valley of Arpaia is too open to suit such a description. Both Niebuhr and Mr. Keppel Craven call it, however, a narrow valley, and the Romans, as they have disguised every other part of the story, were likely also to exaggerate the natural difficulties of the ground, in order to lessen the shame of their defeat.

<sup>35</sup> Livy, as is well known, makes the Romans surrender without a blow, overcome by the insuperable difficulties of the ground where they had been entrapped. But Appian, when he enumerates the officers who signed the capitula-

tion afterwards, names only twelve military tribunes, and says, that those who signed were all who were surviving; *σύμπαντες ὅσοι μετὰ τοὺς διεφθαρμένους ἦρχον*.—III. Fragm. 4, § 6. Now two consular armies consisted of four legions, and had twenty-four military tribunes: so that half of the full number must have been either killed or disabled by their wounds. And Cicero in two places, quoted by Niebuhr, (*De Officiis*, III. 30, and *De Senectute*, 12) expressly says that there was a battle of Caudium, in which the Romans were defeated.

the valley, they easily repulsed some desperate attempts made by the Romans to break out; and a large army surprised on its march, with all its communications cut off, and hemmed in within a single narrow valley, could not possibly have the means of subsistence beyond a very short period. Accordingly the Romans soon threw themselves on the mercy of the conqueror: "Put us to the sword<sup>36</sup>," they said, "sell us as slaves, or keep us as prisoners till we are ransomed; only save our bodies, whether living or dead, from all unworthy insults." They might have remembered how their own countrymen were accustomed to lead their captive enemies in triumph, and to execute them in cold blood in the common prison; nay, how they had lately demanded even the lifeless body of a noble Samnite, Brutulus Papius, to be given up to them, and had deprived it of the rites of burial. But now they could understand that it became a noble nature to show mercy, and that an unfortunate enemy deserved to be treated with compassion.

They spoke to one who could feel this in the hour of triumph, and not merely when fortune had turned against him. The father of C. Pontius had been no stranger to the philosophy of Greece; his intercourse with the Tarentines had made him acquainted, it was said, with Archytas<sup>37</sup>: nay, he had even taken part

C. Pontius  
of Telesia.  
He offers  
terms to the  
Romans.

<sup>36</sup> Appian, III. Fragm. 4, § 2. this story on the authority of Compare Dionysius, XVI. 4. Nearchus of Tarentum, whom he had himself personally known, Fragm. Mai.

<sup>37</sup> Cicero, de Senectute, XII. and who had repeated it to him § 41. Cicero makes Cato relate on the authority of some old men,

in a philosophical conversation, respecting pleasure, so went the story, not with Archytas only, but with Plato. These particulars may not be historical; but the connexion with Tarentum was likely to have an influence on the most eminent Samnites; and C. Pontius was probably far more advanced in cultivation of mind than any Roman general of that age. He resolved to use his victory generously, and to make it, if possible, the occasion of an equal, and therefore of a lasting peace<sup>38</sup>. "Restore to us," he said to the consuls, "the towns and the territory which you have taken from us; call home your colonists whom you have unjustly settled upon our soil; and conclude with us a treaty which shall acknowledge each nation to be alike independent of the other. If ye will swear to do this, I will spare your lives, and let you go without ransom; each man of you giving up his arms merely, and keeping his clothes untouched: and you shall pass in sight of

as a Tarentine tradition. Cato is made to add, that according to his own calculation, Plato's visit to Tarentum had taken place in the consulship of L. Camillus and App. Claudius; that is, in the year of Rome 406 according to the common reckoning. Niebuhr thinks that Nearchus' story only means that Nearchus had himself written a dialogue *περὶ ἡδονῆς*, in which Archytas, Pontius, and Plato were made the speakers. (Vol. III. note 373.) But Aristoxenus, a scholar of Aristotle, and therefore removed from the time of Archytas only by one generation, in his life of Archytas, speaks of a discussion on bodily pleasures

between him and Polyarchus, and he seems to give a reality to the conversation, by stating that Polyarchus came to Tarentum on an embassy, which had been sent thither by the younger Dionysius. (Athenæus, XII. 64.) At any rate, as Niebuhr himself allows, the very introduction of the name of C. Pontius into a philosophical dialogue with Archytas and Plato, would show that the eminent Samnites had acquired, through their intercourse with Tarentum, an interest in and an acquaintance with the Greek philosophy.

<sup>38</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragm. IV. § 5. Livy, IX. 4.



our army as prisoners whom we had in our power, and whom we set free of our own will, when we might have killed them, or sold them, or held them to ransom."

CHAP.  
XXXI.

When Pontius had announced these terms, he called for the Roman *fecialis*, whose office it was to conclude all treaties and to take the oaths in behalf of the Roman people<sup>39</sup>. But there was no *fecialis* with the army; for the Romans had resolved to make no peace with the Samnites, and to receive no proposals from them but their absolute submission. So the consuls and all the surviving officers took the oaths; and six hundred Roman knights were to be delivered as hostages to the Samnites, to ensure the ratification of the peace by the Roman people.

The consuls  
accept them.

When the Spartans were hopelessly cut off from all aid in the island of Sphacteria, the Athenian commanders agreed to a truce<sup>40</sup>, in order to allow time to the Spartan government to send an embassy to Athens, and to purchase, if they could, the deliverance of their soldiers by consenting to reasonable terms of peace. Why Pontius did not act in a similar manner, and insist upon treating, not with the generals of the blockaded army, but with the senate and people of Rome, whose consent was obviously essential to the validity of any treaty of peace, the suspicious and imperfect accounts of the Roman writers will not enable us to explain. Did he know so little of the Romans as to expect that

But the Ro-  
man govern-  
ment was  
not likely to  
observe  
them.

<sup>39</sup> Appian, Samnit. Fragm. IV.  
§ 5.

<sup>40</sup> Thucydides, IV. 15, 16.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

they would ratify the treaty because its terms were so moderate, and because he had spared the lives of so many thousands of their citizens? But, according to Roman notions, no peace was endurable unless they themselves dictated its conditions; and the mercy of an enemy was a deadly insult, because it reminded them that they had been vanquished. Or did he trust to the force of natural affection; that the six hundred knights whom he had demanded as hostages, and who were probably the sons or near relations of the most influential members of the senate, would be so far regarded by their fathers, as to tempt them for their sakes to impair the majesty of Rome? But those fathers were the countrymen and contemporaries of T. Manlius, who had ordered his son to be put to death, even when victorious, rather than allow of any example which might be injurious to military discipline; how, then, could the lives of sons who had degraded themselves by becoming prisoners to the Samnites be purchased at the price of national humiliation? Or was Pontius really guilty of no such imprudence; and was it his only fault that he relied on the solemn faith of a people whose care was not to observe their treaties honestly, but to devise some pretext by which whilst they broke the spirit they might still save the letter? It is expressly mentioned<sup>41</sup> that not only the officers

<sup>41</sup> Cicero, de Officiis, III. 30. § 109. Cicero's words are, "Eodemque tempore, Ti. Numicius, Q. Mælius, qui tum tribuni plebis erant, quod eorum auctoritate pax

erat facta, dediti sunt, ut pax Samnitium repudiaretur." The expression, "quod eorum auctoritate pax erat facta," shows, I think, that they were tribunes of the

of the army, but two of the tribunes of the commons, gave their sanction to the treaty: and it seems certain that they gave it as tribunes, and that they were not merely elected tribunes after the surrender, having been at the time no more than tribunes of the soldiers. But if two tribunes of the commons, as such, signed the treaty, how came they to do so, or how was it that during the term of their sacred office they were abroad with the army, and not within the walls of Rome? Were they sent to the camp for the very purpose of deceiving the Samnite general, by accepting the treaty, and assuring him that it would be ratified; and did he, knowing their sacred character, and that they were the leaders and representatives of the Roman commons, rely too confidently on their word, without requiring that formal authority for it, which alone, according to the casuistry of the Romans, could make the nation responsible?

When the consuls, quæstors, tribunes of the soldiers, and the two tribunes of the commons, had taken the oaths, the first fulfilment of the treaty immediately followed. The Romans gave up their arms, and marched out of their camp wearing or carrying with them nothing but one single article of clothing<sup>42</sup>, the campestre or kilt, reaching from

The Romans give up their arms and march out under the yoke.

commons when they signed the treaty, and that the "auctoritas" here spoken of was the sanction of their sacred office. Livy also mentions the fact, that two men who were tribunes of the commons in that year were amongst

those who signed the treaty, IX. 8.

<sup>42</sup> "Ἐκαστον ἱμῶν σὺν ἱματίῳ.—Appian. Samnit. Fr. IV. § 5. "cum singulis vestimentis inermes." Livy, IX. 5. In this state Livy calls them "seminudi," IX. 6, because all the upper part of their bodies

CHAP.  
XXXI.

the waist to the knees, and leaving the upper part of the body naked now that the soldiers had been obliged to give up their coats of mail. Even the consuls were obliged to appear in this humble plight, for their war cloaks, *paludamenta*, were taken from them, and their lictors ordered to leave them the instant they came out of the camp. The six hundred knights were then delivered up to the Samnites, and the rest of the Roman army, stripped of their arms and baggage, passed in order through an opening purposely made for them in the Samnite lines of blockade<sup>43</sup>. Two spears were set upright in this opening, and a third was fastened across them at the top; and through this gateway the vanquished army marched out, as a token that they had been conquered in war, and owed their lives to the enemy's mercy. It was no peculiar insult devised for this occasion, but a common usage so far as appears in all similar cases<sup>44</sup>; like the modern cere-

was naked: Dion Cassius less correctly calls them *γυμνούς*.—*Ἐκέλευον αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ζυγὸν γυμνοὺς εἰσελθεῖν ὅππῃ ἐλεθέντες ἀφείθησαν*. Frag. Mai, XXXVII. It may be observed that this condition of allowing each soldier to march out with a single article of clothing was granted by the Athenian commanders to the Potidæans, when Potidæa was taken in the second year of the Peloponnesian war; and that the Athenian government complained of the treaty as too favourable to the vanquished.—See Thucydides, II. 70.

<sup>43</sup> Ὁ μὲν Πόντιος παραλύσας τι

τοῦ διατείχισματος. Appian, Frag. IV. § 6. *Διατείχισμα*, "a cross or dividing wall," because the Samnite blockade would be effected merely by carrying two lines across the valley, one above the Roman camp and the other below it. The nature of the ground rendered a circumvallation, or *περιτείχισμα*, unnecessary.

<sup>44</sup> This is shown by the story of Cincinnatus, which represents the Æquians as made to pass under the yoke by Cincinnatus under similar circumstances. And Dionysius expressly calls it a Roman custom to make an enemy who had surrendered pass under the yoke,

mony of piling arms when a garrison or army surrender themselves as prisoners of war. So far, indeed, was Pontius from behaving with any unusual insolence, that he ordered carriages to be provided for the sick and wounded of the Roman army; and furnished<sup>45</sup> them with provisions sufficient to support them till they should reach Rome.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

In far different plight, and with far other feelings than they had entered the pass of Caudium, did the Roman army issue out from it again upon the plain of Campania. Defeated and disarmed, they knew not what reception they might meet with from their Campanian allies; it was possible that Capua might shut her gates against them, and go over to the victorious enemy. But the Campanians behaved faithfully and generously<sup>46</sup>; they sent supplies of arms, of clothing, and of provisions to meet the Romans even before they arrived at Capua; they sent new cloaks, and the lictors and fasces of their own magistrates, to enable the consuls to resume their fitting state; and when the army approached their city the senate and people went out to meet them, and welcomed them both individually and publicly with the greatest kindness. No attentions, however, could soothe the wounded pride of the Romans: they could not bear to raise their eyes from the ground, nor to speak to any one; full of shame they continued their march to Rome: when they came near

They retreat  
to Capua,  
and from  
thence re-  
turn to  
Rome.

III. 22, p. 469, Reiske. The same thing is implied in the definition of the terms "jugum," and "sub jugum mitti," in Festus.

<sup>45</sup> Appian, Fragm. IV. § 6.

<sup>46</sup> Livy, IX. 6. Dion Cassius, Fragm. Mai, XXXVI.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

to it, all those soldiers who had a home in the country<sup>47</sup> dispersed and escaped to their several houses singly and silently; whilst those who lived in Rome lingered without the walls till the sun was set, and stole to their homes under cover of the darkness. The consuls were obliged to enter the city publicly and in the light of day, but they looked upon themselves as no longer worthy to be the chief magistrates of Rome, and they shut themselves up at home in privacy.

Grief and  
humiliation  
of the senate  
and people.

Nor was the blow less deeply felt by the senate and by the whole people. The actual loss in the battle, and the captivity of six hundred of the flower of the youth of Rome, were enough of themselves to throw the nation into mourning; how much more grievous were they when accompanied by such utter defeat and humiliation<sup>48</sup>! All business was suspended; all orders put on mourning; the knights and senators laid aside their gold rings, and took off the well-known red border of their dress which marked their rank: in every house there was weeping and wailing for those who had returned home dishonoured, no less than for those who were dead or captive: and all ceremonies of rejoicing, all festivals, and all private marriages, were suspended, till they could be celebrated in a year of better omen. A dictator<sup>49</sup> was named to hold the comitia for the election of new consuls; but the augurs declared

<sup>47</sup> Appian, *Fragm.* IV. § 7. Livy, IX. 7.

<sup>48</sup> Appian and Livy, *ubi supra*.

<sup>49</sup> Zonaras says, that the con-

suls were obliged to resign their office immediately; *παπαντίκα ἔπαισαν*, VII. 26.



that the appointment was null and void; another dictator was then chosen, but the same objection was repeated; till at last, as if the gods abhorred every magistrate of this fatal year, the elections were held by an interrex. This interrex was M. Valerius Corvinus, and the consuls chosen<sup>50</sup> were two of the most eminent citizens in the commonwealth, Q. Publilius Philo, the author of the Publilian laws, and L. Papirius Cursor, who had so sternly upheld military discipline in his late dictatorship.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

We cannot suppose that the Samnites would have allowed their victory to remain long unimproved, without assuring themselves whether it was the intention of the Roman government to ratify the treaty or no. But the chronology and history of these events are alike so meagre or so wilfully falsified, that it is scarcely possible to ascertain either the dates or the real character of the transactions which followed. As soon as the new consuls came into office, the question of the ratification of the treaty<sup>51</sup> was brought before the senate. Sp. Postumius, one of the consuls of the last year, being called upon to deliver his opinion, declared at once that the treaty ought not to be accepted, but that himself and his late colleague, T. Veturius, with every officer who had taken the oaths to the Samnites, should be given up to them, as having promised what they were unable to perform. The senate em-

It is resolved to break the treaty and to give up to the enemy the generals and officers who signed it.

<sup>50</sup> Livy, IX. 7.

<sup>51</sup> Livy, IX. 8.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

braced his proposal; and to many of the senators it involved a personal sacrifice scarcely less than that which he was making himself, inasmuch as they were exposing their sons, who were amongst the six hundred hostages, to the vengeance of the enemy. But the Romans were as regardless of their own individual feelings as of the laws of justice and good faith, when either were set in the balance against national pride and ambition. The consuls and all the other officers who had sworn with them to the Samnites, were committed to the charge of the *feciales*, and were by them conducted into Samnium. They were then half stripped, as when they passed under the yoke, their hands were bound behind their backs, and the *feciales* solemnly delivered them over to the Samnites, as men whose persons were justly forfeited to them in atonement for their breach of faith. No sooner was this surrender completed, than Sp. Postumius struck the Roman *fecialis*<sup>52</sup> violently

<sup>52</sup> Livy, IX. 10. Niebuhr supposes that there must have existed between Rome and Samnium at this period a relation of isopolity; that is, that the citizens of either country, on losing or relinquishing their own franchise, might take up at pleasure that of the other; and that in this sense Sp. Postumius, when given up by the Romans, and so having ceased to be a Roman citizen, immediately took up his franchise as a citizen of Samnium. But this supposition appears to me unnecessary and improbable. Sp. Postumius could have no choice of becoming a citizen of Samnium, for he was given

up to the Samnites, *deditus*, and therefore had no rights whatever in relation to them, but became their absolute property. See the language held with respect to the Campanians when they surrendered themselves to Rome, according to the Roman story, to obtain protection against the Samnites. Livy, VII. 31. The meaning of Postumius' action and words was this; that he now belonged to the Samnites, and that they were responsible for his actions, as for those of their slaves. If Samnite slaves had plundered the Roman territory, the Romans would have called upon the Samnites to give

with his knee, his hands and feet being fettered; and cried out, "I now belong to the Samnites, and I have done violence to the sacred person of a Roman *fecialis* and ambassador. Ye will rightfully wage war with us, Romans, to avenge this outrage." It is hard to say whether this trickery, at once so base and so foolish, should be ascribed to mere hypocrisy or to fanaticism; for the fanatic is as prone to falsehood as to cruelty, and justifies to himself the one no less than the other, by holding that the end sanctifies the means.

Yet it is a fanaticism, less wicked indeed, but even more extraordinary, when a man like Livy can describe such a scene, and can represent, as he has done, the conduct of Pontius in such strong contrast with that of the Romans, without appearing to feel any admiration of the one, or any shame for the other. Pontius refused the offered victims: "They were not the guilty persons<sup>53</sup>," he said, "nor would he, by transferring the punishment to them, acquit their country. The Roman government had reaped

Pontius refuses to accept them.

them satisfaction for the wrong; and in this sense a Samnite slave had now insulted a Roman *fecialis*, and Rome had thus received a wrong, for which she might either demand satisfaction, or seek it herself by arms. The latter course might lawfully be taken, unless there was a special treaty by which the contracting parties had bound themselves to appeal to negotiation in case of any dispute between them, before they had recourse to arms. And accordingly we find such a clause in the truce con-

cluded between Athens and Lacedæmon, in the ninth year of the Peloponnesian war, Thucyd. IV. 118. where the parties mutually engage *τὰ ἀμφίλογα δίκη διαλύειν ἄνευ πολέμου*. But the Spartans at the beginning of the war had chosen to follow a different course, and to seek redress for their alleged grievances by a direct appeal to arms, without any negotiation. —See Thucyd. I. 86.

<sup>53</sup> Dion Cassius. *Fragm. Mai*, XXXVII. Livy, IX. 11.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

all the advantages of the treaty of Caudium, but refused to fulfil its conditions. Either the legions should be replaced in their desperate position, from which nothing but that treaty could have delivered them, or the stipulated price of their deliverance should be paid. The gods would not be mocked with the trickery of a childish superstition, which endeavoured to abuse their holy names for the support of perfidy and injustice." So Sp. Postumius and his companions were given back to the Roman *feciales*, and returned unhurt to their own army.

Exaggerated  
stories of the  
victories of  
L. Papirius  
Cursor.

Such is the account which the Roman annalists have given of the famous defeat and treaty of the pass of Caudium. It differs in many respects probably from the truth; yet it is accurate and trustworthy, when compared with the stories of the transactions which followed. L. Papirius Cursor was one of the favourite heroes of Roman tradition; his remarkable swiftness of foot, his gigantic strength, his enormous capacities for food, and the iron strictness of his discipline, accompanied as it was by occasional touches of rough humour<sup>54</sup>, all contributed to make his memory popular, somewhat in the same way as Richard Cœur de Lion has been admired amongst us; and his countrymen boasted that he would have been a worthy champion to have fought against Alexander the Great, if Alexander had ever invaded Italy. This favourite leader was consul in the year immediately following the affair of the pass

<sup>54</sup> See the character given him related there, and by Dion Cassius, by Livy, IX. 16, and the anecdotes Fr. Mai, XXXIX.



of Caudium; so great a warrior must have signally avenged that disgrace; and accordingly, he was made to realize the most sanguine wishes of the national vanity; he retook Luceria<sup>55</sup>, the fatal town which had tempted the consuls of the last year to rush blindly into the defile of Caudium; and in it he recovered all the arms and all the standards which had been taken from the Romans, and above all he there found the six hundred Roman knights who had been given up as hostages, and delivered them all safe and sound. Thus every stain of the late disaster was wiped away; but the pride of the Samnites must also be humbled: seven thousand Samnite soldiers were taken in Luceria, and were sent away unhurt, after having been made to pass half naked under the yoke, and C. Pontius himself, by the especial favour of the gods, was their commander, so that the ignominy which he had inflicted on the Romans was now worthily returned upon his own head. No wonder that after such a marvellous victory L. Papirius should have entered Rome in triumph; and never, since M. Camillus had triumphed over the Gauls, had there been seen, it was said, so glorious a spectacle. The two triumphs, indeed, may well be compared with one another; both are equally glorious, and both also are either wholly or in part the inventions of national vanity.

The Fasti Capitolini for this year are, unluckily,

But the Romans were really very successful.

<sup>55</sup> Papirius' campaign is given at length by Livy, IX. 13—15. Traces of the same story are to be found in Dion Cassius, Fragg.

Mai, XXXVIII, in Dionysius, Fragg. Vaticana, XXXVI. and in Florus, I. 16.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

only partially legible ; but it is remarkable that they contain the names of three dictators, of only one of whom there is the slightest notice in Livy, and that they place the triumph of L. Papirius not in this year but in the following, when, according to them, he was for the third time elected consul. One of the three dictators was L. Cornelius Lentulus, and as the Cornelian house was very numerous and powerful, there were not wanting writers who claimed for him the glory of all the supposed victories<sup>56</sup> of this year, which others had given to L. Papirius. Victories as unreal as the pretended conquest of Luceria might well be ascribed to different persons ; that town had only been just taken by the Samnites, and it is impossible to believe that they would have kept their most precious trophies and the whole number of their hostages, in a foreign and conquered city, rather than in the cities of Samnium itself. Besides, there is reason to doubt whether Luceria was recovered at all before the year 440, at which time Livy places what according to him was its second recapture, as it had just before revolted to the enemy. The real events of this year cannot be ascertained ; but there is every probability that the Romans were, in truth, successful ; that they did much to remove the feeling of discouragement from the minds of their own soldiers, and to lower the confidence of the Samnites. It appears that the victory of the pass of Caudium had not been a solitary advantage

<sup>56</sup> Livy, IX. 15.

to the enemy; for they had also taken Luceria in Apulia, and driven the Roman colonists out of Fregellæ<sup>57</sup>, the occupation of which place had been one of the immediate causes of the war. The people of Satricum<sup>58</sup> also, in the heart of Latium, are said to have revolted to the Samnites; a fact which is thus barely noticed, with the remarkable addition, that the Satricans took an active part in the recovery of Fregellæ. Thus the consuls, Publilius and Papirius, had an arduous task to accomplish; and they well justified the confidence of their countrymen, who had selected them above all other citizens to retrieve the honour and the fortune of Rome.

Fregellæ on the upper Liris, and Satricum in the heart of Latium, the one on the upper road, the Via Latina, from Rome to Capua, the other nearly on the lower road, by Anxur and Fundi, were now fallen into the power of the enemy; and the war might at any moment, by the revolt of the Hernicans, or of a greater number of the Latin or old Volscian cities, be brought under the very walls of Rome. Yet the Romans resolved at once to fix the seat of war in Apulia, in the same spirit of courage and wisdom which made them send troops to Spain, even when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy. Luceria had fallen, and unless the Romans could effectually support their party in Apulia, that whole country would soon be lost to them and strengthen the power of their enemy. Accordingly, L. Papirius

CHAP.  
XXXI.

The Roman  
consuls in  
Apulia.

<sup>57</sup> Livy, IX. 12.

<sup>58</sup> Livy, IX. 12. 16.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

Cursor marched<sup>59</sup> into Apulia by the longer but uninterrupted route through the country of the Vestinians and along the coast of the Adriatic; while Q. Publilius was to force his way through Samnium and so effect a junction with his colleague. If the main force of the Samnites was employed in Apulia, it is possible that a Roman consular army, consisting of two Roman legions and an equal number of allied troops, might have found no army in Samnium strong enough to obstruct its march; and it would of itself avoid engaging in the siege of any of the Samnite cities. But the account of Publilius' exploits is so extravagant, and at the same time so vague<sup>60</sup>, that we cannot tell by what line he reached Apulia: it is only certain that both consuls were engaged on the other side of Italy during the whole campaign, and that whether they retook Luceria or not, the progress of revolt in Apulia was effectually checked.

Meanwhile the neighbourhood of Rome could not be left defenceless; and the dictators of this year

Successive  
dictatorships  
at Rome for  
the protec-  
tion of the  
city.

<sup>59</sup> Livy, IX. 14. "Locis maritimis pervenerat Arpos."

<sup>60</sup> The account is vague, for it names no scene of action more definite than Samnium. "Publilius in Samnio substitit adversus Caudinas legiones." Livy, IX. 12. "Adversus Caudinas legiones" is also a vague expression, for it may signify either the troops that had lately been engaged at Caudium under C. Pontius, or the forces of the city of Caudium, or of the whole tribe or district of the Caudinians, one of the great divisions of the Samnite nation. And it is extravagant, because it represents

the Samnites as flying from the field of battle in Samnium directly into Apulia, when they were in such a state of total rout that they did not venture to defend their own camp. Had this been the case, they would rather have fled for shelter to their own cities, than have gone to a foreign country which was at that very time the seat of active warfare; to say nothing of the absurdity of an army accomplishing a march of such a distance in a disorderly and scattered flight. "Apuliam dissipati petière."

were probably appointed to provide for the safety of the capital, and to prevent the example of Satricum from spreading amongst the other cities of Latium. But traces of the old patrician party spirit may here be again observed, as in the dictatorship of M. Marcellus six years before. Q. Publilius had named C. Mænius<sup>61</sup> as dictator, a man of a plebeian family like himself, and who together with himself was made the subject of a more violent attack from the patricians in his second dictatorship six years afterwards. The augurs no doubt declared his appointment to have been invalid, as they had done in the case of Marcellus; and accordingly he resigned, and

<sup>61</sup> Only fragments of the Fasti Capitolini are here legible, so that the names of the three dictators of this year, and of their masters of the horse, are mutilated, and stand thus,

C. MA . . .  
 M. FOS . . .  
 L. CORN . . .  
 L. PAPIRIU . .  
 T. MANLI . . .  
 L. PAPIRIU . . .

That the first dictator and master of the horse were C. Mænius, spelt Mainius in the Fasti, and M. Fostius, admits of no doubt, as the Fasti in noticing the dictatorship of C. Mænius six years later, call him then dictator for the second time. [II. DICT.] The second dictator is clearly L. Cornelius Lentulus, who is mentioned by Livy, and the third is as certainly T. Manlius; but the two L. Papirii, who are named successively as masters of the horse, are very uncertain. Sigonius makes

the latter of them to have been L. Papirius Crassus, who was censor two years afterwards, and the former, he thinks, was L. Papirius Cursor, the son of the consul, who was himself afterwards so distinguished in the third Samnite war. But the annals which Livy notices as having made L. Papirius Cursor master of the horse to L. Cornelius, meant undoubtedly L. Papirius the father, and not the son. This, however, could not have been the meaning of the Fasti Capitolini; for it is plain that they made L. Papirius consul in this year, although the names of the consuls do not exist on our present fragments, inasmuch as in the next year they call him "Cos: III."—I imagine, therefore, that the second L. Papirius who was master of the horse in this year must have been L. Papirius Mugillanus; the same man whom some annals, according to Livy, made consul instead of L. Papirius Cursor in the year following.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

a patrician was appointed to succeed him, P. Cornelius Lentulus. Thus far the accounts are intelligible; but why Lentulus also should have resigned, and the consuls have been required to make a third choice, it is not so easy to discover. This third dictator was T. Manlius, apparently the same Manlius who eighteen years before had gained the great victory over the Latins by Mount Vesuvius; and it is probable that by him were held the comitia for the following year, at which L. Papirius Cursor was again elected consul, together with Q. Aulius Cerretanus. It may be that the patrician party were anxious to secure the re-election of Papirius; and that P. Lentulus had been opposed to it. Manlius, on the contrary, so much resembled Papirius in the sterner points of his character, that he was likely to agree with those who thought his re-election desirable.

Recovery of  
Satricum.

Papirius in his military conduct justified the confidence of his countrymen. He recovered Satricum<sup>62</sup>, while his colleague carried on the war with continued success in Apulia. The authors of the revolt of Satricum were executed; the people were disarmed, and the town secured by a strong garrison. Thus again the sparks of a Latin insurrection, the greatest of all dangers, were put out before they could burst into a flame.

Truce for  
two years.

In the next year the Samnites<sup>63</sup> are said to have concluded a truce with the Romans for two years; but it may be that this truce only restrained the two

<sup>62</sup> Livy, IX. 16.

<sup>63</sup> Livy, IX. 20.



parties from directly invading each other's territories, while it left them at liberty to support their respective allies in Apulia. At any rate the war continued in that country without intermission, but with uniform success on the side of the Romans. Teanum, Canusium, and Forentum <sup>64</sup>, submitted to Rome and became her dependent allies; and Apulia was so far reduced that the consuls, towards the end of the second year of the truce, 437-8, proceeded to carry the war into Lucania, and took a place called Nerulum <sup>65</sup>. But no farther progress was made at present in that quarter.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

During these two years of truce the Romans were engaged in consolidating their power in their own immediate neighbourhood. The censors, L. Papirius Crassus and C. Mænius, created two new tribes <sup>66</sup> in the years 436-7, the Ufentine and the Falerian, and enrolled in some of the old tribes an accession of citizens. The Roman settlers in Campania, who had received grants of land there after the Latin war, were put under the government of a præfect, who was yearly sent to Capua to administer justice amongst them and amongst the Roman citizens residing in Capua itself, according to the Roman law <sup>67</sup>; and a new constitution was given to the colony of Antium, probably improving the condition of the

Two new  
Roman  
tribes cre-  
ated.

<sup>64</sup> Livy, IX. 20.

<sup>65</sup> Livy, IX. 20. If this place was the Nerulum of the Itineraries, the consuls must have penetrated deeply into Lucania; for the Nerulum of the Itineraries lay far to the south, nearly between the

Greek cities of Laos on one sea, and Sybaris on the other.

<sup>66</sup> Livy, IX. 20, Diodorus, XIX. 10.

<sup>67</sup> Livy, IX. 20, and compare Niebuhr, Vol. III. 339.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

old Volscian population. The importance of Antium as a naval station made it desirable to leave there no seeds of disaffection; the more so, if the Tarentines, as is not improbable, furnished the Samnites with some naval assistance at this period, and made occasional descents on the coast of Latium.

Unsettled  
state of  
men's minds  
in Campa-  
nia.

Whether there had been any interference of the Romans in the domestic affairs of the Campanian cities which excited jealousy; or whether the increasing success of Rome in the war with Samnium created a general alarm amongst her allies lest they should be left without any power capable of checking her absolute ascendancy, we find at any rate that about this time there was a general restlessness amongst the Campanians, and that the Samnites were encouraged to adopt the wiser policy of carrying the war into the territory of their enemies' allies, rather than abide the storm passively at home. The Falerian tribe which had been recently created at Rome included that part of Campania known by the name of the Falernian territory; the Roman settlers there would certainly be enrolled in it, while it did not comprise the inhabitants of Cales, Fundi, or Formiæ. Privileges granted to some are a source of discontent if denied to others; and the creation of a Roman tribe so near to them, into which they were not admitted, might make the Campanian towns more impatient of their relation of mere alliance. Thus Nuceria<sup>68</sup> had revolted in the pre-

<sup>68</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 65. Compare Livy, IX. 38. 41.

ceding year, and other towns were ready on the first opportunity to follow its example.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

But here again the chronology and history are both involved in inextricable confusion. Livy's account is so imperfect and so unreasonable that it is clearly impossible to rely on it; that of Diodorus is far more sensible, yet it also has omissions which it is difficult to supply. As soon as the truce was over, the Samnites resolved to act on the offensive, and turned their attention to the valley of the Liris, where, as we have seen, they had recovered and still held Fregellæ. They attacked and stormed the town of Plistia<sup>69</sup>, an unknown place, but apparently situated somewhere in that neighbourhood; they then prevailed on the Volscian population of Sora to massacre the Roman colonists who held their town, and to join the Samnite confederacy. It is impossible to believe that while these events were taking place, the Roman consuls were sitting idle at Rome; it is much more likely that one consular army was, as usual, in Apulia, and the other either watching the Samnites in the valley of the Liris, or invading Samnium from the side of Campania. But when the news arrived of the fall of Plistia and the revolt of Sora, it was judged necessary to appoint a dictator; and L. Æmilius<sup>70</sup>, who was the dictator

The Samnites are successful on the upper Liris.

<sup>69</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 72.

<sup>70</sup> Fasti Capitolini, and Livy, IX. 21. But Livy makes the appointment of L. Æmilius precede the fall of Plistia and the revolt of Sora. I have followed the order

of Diodorus, who without naming Æmilius places the siege of Saticula, which he conducted, after the other two events.

Saticula stood within the first line of hills which rise imme-

CHAP.  
XXXI.

fixed upon, immediately began to act on the offensive, and laid siege to Saticula. Whether this town belonged to the Samnites, or was only in alliance with them, and was still possessed by the old Opican population of Campania, is not easy to determine. The Samnites made a desperate effort to relieve the place, but they were defeated by the besieging army with considerable loss, and Saticula was obliged to surrender<sup>71</sup>.

They defeat  
the Romans  
at Lautulæ.

After the fall of Saticula the consuls of the new year, if these events really belong to two distinct years, proceeded on the one hand to invade Samnium on the side of Saticula, and on the other to march as usual into Apulia. The army which invaded Samnium overran the country in the neighborhood of Saticula, and then either forced its way into Apulia, or turned aside to the left up the valley

diately from the plain of Naples, in a small valley which divides these first hills from the higher and bolder mountains of Taburnus.

<sup>71</sup> The *Fasti Capitolini* and *Diodorus* agree in stating, that in the following year, which, according to the *Fasti*, was the year of Rome 438, or 439 according to the common reckoning, and 434 according to Niebuhr, L. Papirius Cursor and Q. Publilius Philo were again elected consuls together; and *Diodorus* places the battle of Lautulæ expressly in their consulship. Niebuhr's latest criticism (*Vol. II. p. 627, 2nd edit.*) seems to have rejected this consulship as an interpolation; and it is remarkable that *Livy*, although he certainly

makes a year intervene between the consulship of Sp. Nantius and M. Popillius, and that of M. Pætelius and C. Sulpicius, does not give the consuls' names. He says, moreover, that they, like the consuls of the preceding year, stayed at Rome and did nothing, which in a time of such danger as this year must have been, even according to his own account, is an absolute impossibility. *Diodorus* places the revolt of Sora, the siege of Saticula, and the battle of Lautulæ, all in the same year, which according to him was the year of the consulship of Papirius and Publilius. Amidst all this confusion it is impossible to determine the order of events with certainty.

of the Volturnus, and from thence crossed over by the line of the Latin road to the valley of the Liris, and advanced upon Sora in the hope of punishing it for its revolt. A movement was made at any rate, which left Campania open; and the Samnites, seizing the opportunity, called out, it is said<sup>72</sup>, their whole population within the military age, and without withdrawing their armies from Apulia and Sora, they burst down into Campania with this third army, which, though hastily raised, was strong in its numbers and in its determined courage. All Campania was at once in a ferment, and the Romans were obliged to name Q. Fabius Maximus dictator, and to send him out with all speed with such a force as could be found or raised in and near Rome, in order to check the spirit of revolt. Fabius advanced beyond Anxur, and occupied the pass of Lautulæ between Anxur and Fundi, already noticed as a post of importance on the coast road from Rome to Campania. Here the Samnites attacked him, and notwithstanding his high military reputation, they defeated him with great slaughter. Q. Aulus Cerretanus, the master of the horse, sacrificed his life nobly in covering the retreat, but the Samnites remained masters of the country, and it is stated in general terms that every place in the neighbourhood revolted to them<sup>73</sup>, and that all through Campania<sup>74</sup>,

<sup>72</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 72.

<sup>73</sup> "Circa omnia defecerunt," are the words which Livy puts into the mouth of Fabius, when he is

urging his soldiers to venture a second battle after the defeat at Lautulæ.—IX. 23.

<sup>74</sup> Livy, IX. 25, 26.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

Conse-  
quences of  
this defeat.

and even at Capua itself, the party opposed to the Roman alliance began to obtain the ascendancy.

How the consuls effected their retreat from Apulia and from Samnium we know not, nor how far the Samnites either improved or neglected their present opportunity. The Roman citizens of the new Falerian tribe must have been exposed to the greatest dangers; for the open country of Campania was now in the power of the enemy, and as the Roman settlers had no strong towns of their own, they must have either taken shelter in the several cities of their allies, or have made their escape within the pass of Tarracina into the old Volscian country, now the Ufentine tribe, or even to Rome itself. But within the limits of the Campagna we hear of no disposition to revolt; there the timely gift of the full Roman franchise had converted Volscians and Latins into Romans, and neither Privernum nor Tusculum gave any cause of suspicion in this emergency. The new consuls were C. Sulpicius Longus and M. Pœtelius Libo; the latter had not till now commanded an army; the former had indeed been already twice consul, and must now have been advanced in years; but we do not know that he had acquired any remarkable distinction.

Revolt of  
Capua and  
the other  
towns of  
Campania.

The principal seat of the war in the next campaign appears to have been the country between Tarracina and the Samnite frontier; and both of the consuls were employed in this quarter. Their business was to watch the Samnites, and to protect the allies of Rome, but they did not for some time ven-

ture to encounter the enemy in the field. In spite of all their endeavours, however, Suessa Aurunca and Calatia<sup>75</sup> either revolted or were taken; and Capua itself, as if judging that the battle of Lautulæ was now proved to have decided the fate of the war, broke off its alliance with Rome, and declared for the Samnites<sup>76</sup>. This last misfortune obliged the Romans to name a dictator; and C. Mænius, who had once before filled that office, was now again invested with it, and was sent out with a third army to act especially against Capua. An obscure report, barely noticed by Livy<sup>77</sup>, has acquainted us with the existence of another danger which beset Rome at this time, and which must have been more alarming than all the rest. Cabals, and even conspiracies, were formed amongst some of the Roman aristocracy, to turn the perilous crisis of their country to their own personal advantage. Who were the individuals concerned in these plots, or what was their special object, we know not; we can scarcely be mistaken, however, in supposing that Appius Claudius, who was censor two years afterwards, was one of them; and his subsequent conduct makes it probable that he wished to make a party amongst the lowest of the people, and by their help, com-

<sup>75</sup> This appears, because Calatia is mentioned as retaken by the Romans in the following year; and a Roman colony was sent to Suessa, which, it is said, "Aurun-corum fuerat." That a colony was sent there implies that the place must have been conquered by the Romans, which could not have

happened, unless it had previously revolted from them, or been otherwise in the enemy's power.

<sup>76</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 76.

<sup>77</sup> IX. 26. "Nec Capua ipsa crimine caruit: quin Roman quoque et ad principum quosdam inquir-  
rendos ventum est."

CHAP.  
XXXI.

bined with the strength of the more violent patri-  
cians, to overthrow the actual constitution, and re-  
store the exclusive ascendancy of the old burgher  
aristocracy. Disasters in war excite discontent, and  
discontent readily attacks the existing order of  
things, however unconnected it may be with the  
immediate evil; and in this manner the defeat of  
Lautulæ might be made instrumental to a patrician  
revolution.

The Auso-  
nian cities  
are betrayed  
to the Ro-  
mans.

But the domestic and foreign danger was alike  
dispelled by the military success of the consuls.  
While an aristocratical conspiracy at Rome was  
threatening the most extreme evils, a similar con-  
spiracy in the Ausonian cities of Ausona, Minturnæ,  
and Vescia occurred most critically to revive the  
cause of Rome in the neighbourhood of Campania.  
Twelve of the young nobility<sup>78</sup> of those towns,  
dreading nothing so much as the ascendancy of their  
political adversaries through Samnite assistance,  
offered to the Roman consuls to betray their respec-  
tive countries into their hands. By their means  
Roman soldiers were put in possession of the gates  
of the three cities, and the mass of the people in  
each were put to the sword. Thus the Romans  
gained three places of considerable importance from  
their position; and the bloody execution done upon  
the inhabitants would spread the impression among  
the neighbouring states, that to revolt from Rome  
might even yet be attended with danger.

<sup>78</sup> Livy, IX. 25.

Still the Samnite force was yet unbroken, and availing themselves of the effect produced by their victory at Lautulæ, the Samnite armies were still acting on the offensive. Where the great battle was fought which effectually turned the tide, it is not possible to ascertain. Livy places<sup>79</sup> the scene at the edge of the plain of Naples, where the road from Capua to Beneventum first ascends the hills of Samnium, apparently not far from the pass of Maddaloni. Diodorus fixes it at a place which he calls Cinna<sup>80</sup>, a name wholly unknown, nor will his account enable us so much as to guess its situation. But whatever was the scene of the action, the victory of the Romans was complete, and the threatening consequences of the defeat at Lautulæ were entirely prevented. The news of the battle instantly struck terror into the Campanians, and they at once<sup>81</sup> made their submission to the dictator, and agreed to give up to him the principal instigators of their revolt. Amongst these are particularly named two men of one of the noblest families in Capua, Ovius and Novius Calavius. They, like Vibius Virrius and his associates in the war of Hannibal, chose to perish by their own hands, rather than by the axe of the dictator's lictors, and the principal offenders having thus atoned for their revolt, the state of Capua was pardoned, and readmitted to its former alliance with Rome.

CHAP.  
XXXI.  
Great victory of the Romans at Cinna.  
Submission of Capua.

The strength of the two parties in the Samnite war was so essentially unequal that the loss of a

Continued successes of the Romans.

<sup>79</sup> Livy, IX. 27.

<sup>80</sup> Livy, XIX. 76.

<sup>81</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 76.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

Colonies  
planted at  
Luceria,  
Suessa, In-  
teramna, and  
Casinum.

battle pressed far more severely on the one than on the other. Accordingly, after the defeat which rendered their victory at Lautulæ fruitless, the Samnites were again reduced to the defensive, and saw the towns which they had won successively wrested from them. In the two next years<sup>82</sup> Fregellæ, one of the original causes of the war, Sora<sup>83</sup> which had revolted just before the battle of Lautulæ, and Atina<sup>84</sup>, another Volscian city situated among the mountains which look down on the valley of the Melfa, one of the early feeders of the Liris, were all taken by the Romans; while in Campania and its neighbourhood they made themselves masters of Suessa Aurunca, of Nola, and Calatia<sup>85</sup>; and in Apulia they finally obtained possession of Luceria<sup>86</sup>. They resolved too to secure these conquests by permanent occupation; and thus 2500<sup>87</sup> colonists were sent to Luceria; another colony was planted at Suessa Aurunca; a third in the island of Pontia<sup>88</sup>; and two more to consist of 2000 colonists each were ordered to be founded at Interamna on the Liris, and at Casinum on one of the feeders of the Liris.

<sup>82</sup> Livy, IX. 28. Diodorus, XIX. 101.

<sup>83</sup> Livy, IX. 24.

<sup>84</sup> Livy, IX. 28.

<sup>85</sup> Livy, IX. 28. Diodorus, XIX. 101.

<sup>86</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 72. Livy, IX. 26.

<sup>87</sup> Livy, IX. 26.

<sup>88</sup> Livy, IX. 28. Diodorus, XIX. 101-105. Niebuhr observes, that the plural form, "Pontiæ," belongs only to the group of islands, or

rather of rocks, in the largest of which, now Ponza, the Roman colony was founded. Ponza has a good harbour, and was taken possession of by the British in 1813. It is volcanic, and is about 14 Neapolitan miles in circumference, (nearly  $17\frac{1}{2}$  British,) and exhibits several remains of ancient buildings. See Giustiniani, *Dizionario del Regno di Napoli*, in Ponza.



These three last colonies were settled on ground which had formerly belonged to the Volscians: Interamna and Casinum were an advance of the Roman frontier on the upper road into Campania; but Pontia must have been colonized with a different object. Two years afterwards we find that two commissioners<sup>89</sup> for naval affairs were for the first time created by the Romans; and this appointment, coupled with the occupation of Pontia, make it probable that during the war with Samnium the Roman coasts were exposed to continual plundering descents, and the Roman merchant-vessels often intercepted on their voyages. Whether this annoyance proceeded from the Lucanians, or whether the Tarentines had really lent to the Samnites the aid of their maritime power in this long struggle, are amongst the many points in the history of these events of which we must content to be ignorant.

The Samnite war lasted eight years longer; nor was even this latter period of the contest unchequered by some changes of fortune; still Rome was continually becoming more powerful, and the various attempts made by several of the Italian nations to check her growing supremacy served only to set in a clearer light the greatness of her resources. Etruria, which had remained at peace for nearly forty years, now, as if alarmed by the danger of the Samnites, exerted her whole strength against Rome, but in vain. The Umbrians, a people whose name we have scarcely hitherto had occasion to

Superiority  
of the Ro-  
man power  
over that of  
all the na-  
tions opposed  
to it.

<sup>89</sup> Livy, IX. 30.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

mention, attacked the Romans in entire ignorance of their own and their enemy's power, and were defeated and struck down in an instant. The Hernicans, so long united with Rome in a close alliance, revolted only to become more completely subjected; the hardy nations of the Marsians, Pelignians, and Marrucinians, after having from jealousy stood aloof hitherto from their Samnite kinsmen, now at last endeavoured to aid them when it was too late, and did but involve themselves in their humiliation. Northwards, and southwards, in the central Apennines, and on the coast of the Adriatic, the Roman power was alike irresistible, and Rome towered above the nations who were jointly or severally assailing her, like one of the heroes of the Homeric poems when beset by a multitude of common men.

Its causes;  
the greater  
population  
of Rome and  
Latium: the  
central po-  
sition of  
Rome, and  
the unity of  
its govern-  
ment.

To those who estimate the power of a nation by its geographical extent, this constant superiority of Rome may appear extraordinary; for undoubtedly the portions of Italy possessed by the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Samnites, were many times larger than the territory of Rome and her allies. But their superiority in population was by no means equally great; nor is it likely that either Etruria or Samnium were peopled as densely as Latium and Campania. Livy does not give the returns of the several census taken at this period, but he states generally, that the number of Roman citizens averaged about 250,000<sup>90</sup>; to which the Latin and Campanian allies

<sup>90</sup> Livy, IX. 19. "Censebantur ejus ætatis lustris ducena quinquagena millia capitum."

are to be added. Now we do not know what was the population of Samnium or Etruria at this time; but if we may at all be guided by the famous return of the military force of the several nations of Italy in the great Gaulish war of 529<sup>91</sup>, we may conclude that it fell far short of that of the Romans and their confederates. To this must be added the still greater advantages on the side of Rome, of a central position, an unity of counsels, and a national spirit, as systematic as it was resolute. A single great nation is incomparably superior to a coalition; and still more so when that coalition is made up not of single states but of federal leagues; so that a real unity of counsels and of public spirit is only to be found in the individual cities of each league; which must each be feeble, because each taken sepa-

CHAP.  
XXXI.

<sup>91</sup> The return of free citizens within the military age, gave for the Samnites, Lucanians, Marsians, Marrucinians, Frentanians, and Vestinians, the number of 120,000 foot soldiers, and 14,000 horse. Polybius, II. 24. The Umbrians were 20,000; the Etruscans and Sabines together, (the number of the Etruscans separately is not given,) were 50,000 foot and 4000 horse. Here we have a total of 190,000 foot and 18,000 horse. But the same return reckons the Romans, Latins, and Campanians at 330,000 foot and 23,000 horse, besides the forces actually at that time in the field, which amounted to 50,000 Romans and Campanians more, and probably too at least 20,000 Latins, with not more than 40,000 of the Samnites, Lucanians, &c. on the very highest calculation, and probably much

less. Thus the Romans, Latins, and Campanians, at the time of the great Gaulish war, were more numerous than the Etruscans, Umbrians, Samnites, and Lucanians, nearly in the proportion of two to one. And although, in the course of the eighty or ninety years which elapsed between the second Samnite war and the Gaulish invasion, the population of Etruria and Samnium may be supposed to have decreased, while that of Rome undoubtedly had increased by the accession of the Hernicans, Æquians, and a large part of the Sabines, to the rolls of Roman citizens, yet still, with every possible allowance that can be made, we must believe that the Romans and their allies in the second Samnite war, considerably surpassed their enemies even in mere numbers.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

ately is small in extent and weak in population. The German empire alone, setting aside the Spanish, Italian, and Hungarian dominions of the house of Austria, could never, even with the addition of the Netherlands, have contended on equal terms with France.

ETRUSCAN  
WAR. A  
great Etrus-  
can army  
besieges Su-  
trium.  
Campaign of  
Q. Æmilius  
on the  
Etruscan  
frontier, and  
of C. Junius  
in Samnium.

The sudden breaking out of the Etruscan war at this period, was determined no doubt by the expiration of the forty years' peace which had been concluded with the Tarquinians in the year 404. As usual, when the term of peace was drawing to a close, there would be some negotiation between the two countries<sup>92</sup>, to ascertain whether the treaty would be renewed, or whether its close was to be followed by immediate war; and this explains Livy's statement<sup>93</sup>, that in the consulship of M. Valerius and P. Decius there arose rumours of hostilities with Etruria; and that great preparations were made by both nations, although no actual attack was begun by either till the year following. But if we may trust the Roman accounts<sup>94</sup>, not Tarquinii only, but all the Etruscan cities except Arretium took part in the renewed quarrel. This probably was owing to a jealousy of the Roman power on the one hand, and to the cessation of the Gaulish inroads into northern Etruria on the other, so that Clusium and Perugia and Cortona were no longer prevented by a nearer danger, as in the last war with Veii, from giving their aid to the cities on the southern frontier.

<sup>92</sup> See Vol. I. of this history, chap. xvii. note 48, and chap. xviii. p. 386.

<sup>93</sup> IX. 29.

<sup>94</sup> Livy, IX. 32.

Accordingly a great Etruscan army laid siege to Sutrium<sup>95</sup>, which was still, as it had been nearly eighty years before, the most advanced point of the Roman dominion on the side of Etruria. Q. Æmilius Barbula, one of the consuls, marched with a single consular army to protect the Sutrians, and a battle was fought with no decisive result; but it was most obstinately contested, and the loss on both sides was immense. The Etruscans, however, continued to besiege Sutrium, and they apparently constructed lines around it, as the Romans had done at Veii, in which they proposed to keep a part of their army through the winter, that the blockade might not be interrupted. Meantime the campaign of this year in Samnium had been decidedly favourable to the Romans, although the details are utterly uncertain; for if we compare Livy's account with that of Diodorus, no one would suspect that both writers were describing the events of the same war and the same period. According to Livy<sup>96</sup>, the scene of action lay in Samnium, and one consular army only, that of C. Junius Bubulcus, was engaged. By this army, Bovianum, the chief city of the Pentrian Samnites, on the north side of the Matese, is said to have been taken; and afterwards, when the Samnites had nearly surprised the consul by an ambuscade, the practised valour of the soldiers repelled the danger, and even obtained a complete victory. According to Diodorus<sup>97</sup>, both consuls were employed, and the seat of

CHAP.  
XXXI.  
A.U.C. 443.  
B.C. 311.

<sup>95</sup> Livy, IX. 32.

<sup>96</sup> IX. 31.

<sup>97</sup> XIX. 26.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

war was Apulia. Here the Romans, after a battle which lasted for two days, gained a complete victory, and from that time forwards they remained masters of the field, overran the open country without opposition, and took by storm or by the terror of their arms several of the enemy's cities. In order to reconcile these apparent contradictions, we must suppose that Diodorus describes the winter campaign, and Livy that of the summer following: that both consuls, after entering upon their office in September or October, were employed in Apulia during the winter, which, as Niebuhr has observed, is the best season for military operations in that country; that in the summer of the following year the Etruscan war broke out, and that then Q. Æmilius was sent to relieve Sutrium, while C. Junius carried on the war in the centre of Samnium. The siege of Bovianum, where the climate is so cold, that the snow must render military operations impracticable till very late in the spring, and the ambuscade formed by the Samnites to surprise the Romans while pursuing the cattle into the high mountain pastures, clearly imply a summer campaign. And when C. Junius marched home with his army to celebrate his triumph on the 5th of August, he probably found his colleague still engaged with the Etruscans on the side of Sutrium.

A.U.C. 444.  
Campaign of  
Q. Fabius  
Maximus in  
Etruria.

Q. Fabius Maximus was elected one of the consuls for the new year; the same person who, when master of the horse fourteen years before, had so nearly forfeited his life for his disobedience to the orders of the dictator, L. Papirius Cursor. As the

Fabian house was both powerful and popular, he was a favourite hero in the stories of these times; and his exploits in this campaign have been disguised by such exaggerations, that it is difficult to appreciate his real merit justly. We can hardly believe that he defeated the whole united force of the Etruscan nation in a great battle under the walls of Perugia, with such slaughter that sixty thousand Etruscans were killed or taken; nor were the Ciminian mountains so impassable a barrier as to justify the statement, that, before the daring expedition of Fabius, they had not even been crossed by any Roman traders, and that the country beyond was as unknown as the wilds of Germany before the conquests of Drusus. Yet the campaign of Fabius was doubtless, in a very high degree, able, enterprising and successful, and the triumph which he obtained in the following year for his victories over the Etruscans was assuredly well deserved.

According to Diodorus<sup>98</sup>, both the consuls, Q. Fabius and his colleague C. Marcius Rutulus, marched together to relieve Sutrium; and it was by their joint force that the Etruscan besieging army, which had ventured to attack them, was beaten and obliged to take refuge within its lines. But the employment of both the consular armies in Etruria was not unobserved by the indefatigable Samnites. They poured down into Apulia, and ravaged the territory of the allies of Rome in that country without meeting with any opposition. This obliged the Ro-

He resolves to penetrate into the heart of the enemy's country.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

mans to recal C. Marcius from Sutrium, and to send him with his army against the Samnites. Fabius was thus left alone, and the Etruscan lines before Sutrium were too strong to be attacked with success. But it struck him that a sudden and rapid invasion of central Etruria might oblige the enemy to recal their army from Sutrium, and would at the same time enrich his soldiers with the plunder of a wealthy and untouched country. It was thus that Hannibal hoped to relieve Capua by his unexpected march upon Rome; and the same policy led Scipio into Africa, as the surest method of obliging Hannibal to evacuate Italy. Fabius sent to Rome to acquaint the senate with his purpose, that an army of reserve<sup>99</sup> might be raised to cover the Roman territory during his absence: he had also previously sent his brother<sup>100</sup> across the Ciminian mountains to col-

<sup>99</sup> That such an army was raised, appears from Livy, IX. 39, and Niebuhr well observes, that the mission of five senators, accompanied by two of the tribunes of the commons, who arrived in the camp before Sutrium too late to stop the expedition into Etruria (Livy, IX. 36), seems to imply that some earlier communications had passed upon the subject, and that Fabius having shown a disposition to disobey the prohibition of the senate, the two tribunes were sent to arrest him, which they alone, by virtue of their inviolable character, could do with safety.

<sup>100</sup> Livy, IX. 36. That the Camertians, who concluded the treaty with the Romans on this occasion, were the people of Camerinum,

the modern Camerino, and not, as Dr. Cramer supposes, of the obscure place Camerata, on the left bank of the Tiber, between Todi and Amelia, is proved decisively, if indeed it could ever have been reasonably doubted, by an inscription found at Camerino, in which the Camertians express their gratitude to the emperor Severus, for having confirmed to them "the equal rights of their treaty," "jure æquo fœderis sibi confirmato:" an allusion to their well-known fœdus æquum, concluded at this very time of the first Roman invasion of Etruria, and which existed to the end of the commonwealth, and nominally at least, as the inscription above quoted shows, to the third century of the Christian era. It was in

lect information, and to persuade, if possible, some of the Umbrian states to ally themselves with Rome. His brother could speak the Etruscan language, and in the disguise of a shepherd, accompanied only by a single slave who had been brought up with him from a child and was also acquainted with Etruscan, he penetrated through Etruria as far as Camerte or Camerinum in Umbria, a town on the northern side of the Apennines, near the modern road from Foligno to Ancona. The Camertians received him in the most friendly manner, and desired him to assure the consul, that if he came into their neighbourhood their entire force should join his army, and that they would supply him with provisions during a whole month. With this encouraging message the Roman officer returned to his brother, and Q. Fabius resolved to lose no time in carrying his plan into execution, suspecting perhaps that if he delayed he might receive a peremptory order from the senate, not to risk his army in so hazardous an enterprise.

The Ciminian hills, for we should scarcely call them mountains, are the ridge which divides the valley of the Tiber from the basin of the lake of Bolsena, and from the valley which runs from the foot of the lake down to the sea. Where the road from Viterbo to Rome crosses them they are still covered with copse-wood, and the small crater of the lake of Vico, which lies high up in their bosom, is

The Ciminian hills. Fabius crosses them, and carries the war into Etruria. His victories there.

the territory of Camerinum also, that L. Scipio was defeated by the Gauls and Samnites in the third Samnite war. The above inscription is given by Orelli, No. 920.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

surrounded by the remains of the old forest. In the fifth century of Rome the woods were far more extensive; and the hills having now become the boundary between the Roman and Etruscan nations, were perhaps studiously kept in their wild state in order to prevent collisions between the borderers of both frontiers. They are a remarkable point, because, as they run up to a crest with no extent of table land on their summits, they command a wide view on either side, reaching far away to the south-east over the valley of the Tiber, even to the Alban hills, whilst on the north and west they look down on the plain of Viterbo; and the lake of Bolsena is distinctly visible, shut in at the farthest distance by the wild mountains of Radicofani. Fabius, having sent on his baggage and infantry during the night, followed himself with his cavalry about the middle of the day following: and on the next morning the whole army crossed the summit of the Ciminian ridge, and poured down into the plains beyond. Some of the Etruscan chiefs<sup>101</sup> assembled their peasantry, and attempted to stop the plunder of their lands; but they were defeated with great loss; and the invaders overran the country far and wide, and carried off cattle and prisoners in great numbers. How far they penetrated into Etruria is

<sup>101</sup> The character of the Etruscan government is well given in Livy's short statement, "tumultuariæ agrestium Etruscorum cohortes repente a principibus regionis ejus concitatæ," IX. 36. These

"principes" were the Lucumones or nobles of Etruria, and the "agrestium cohortes" were their serfs, who, as in Russia and Poland, formed the bulk of the national armies.



uncertain. According to Livy it was a mere plundering inroad, and could not have extended beyond the territory of Vulsinii; but according to Diodorus<sup>102</sup>, the Roman army advanced into the very heart of Etruria, fought a great battle, and won a decided victory, in the neighbourhood of Perugia; insomuch that the siege of Sutrium was raised, and three of the greatest of the Etruscan cities, Perugia, Arretium, and Cortona, sued for peace, and concluded a truce for thirty years. Livy<sup>103</sup> represents the decisive victory as having been won near Sutrium after the return of the Romans from their expedition; an immense army of Etruscans, joined by the forces of some of the states of Umbria, hastened to pursue and take vengeance on the invaders, but did not overtake them within the Etruscan territory, and thus followed them to their old position in the neighbourhood of Sutrium. Both accounts agree in describing the victory as signal, and in stating that it was followed by a peace with three of the principal cities of Etruria.

Meanwhile, the war was raging with no less fury in Samnium. C. Marcius after having been recalled from Sutrium had marched with his army into Apulia<sup>104</sup>, and there at first relieved the allies of Rome from the plundering incursions of the enemy. But the Samnites had no intention to act merely on the defensive; they were eager to crush the army of Marcius, while Fabius was engaged in Etruria; and

Samnium.  
The Romans  
are defeated,  
and L. Papi-  
rius Cursor  
is appointed  
dictator.

<sup>102</sup> Livy, XX. 35.<sup>103</sup> IX. 37.<sup>104</sup> Diodorus, XX. 35.

they attacked him with such vigour<sup>105</sup> that the Roman annals themselves acknowledge that the issue of the battle was doubtful, and that it seemed to be even unfavourable, owing to the loss of several superior officers, and especially as the consul himself was wounded. The truth is sufficiently evident that the Romans were in fact defeated. When the news of this battle reached Rome, the senate resolved immediately that L. Papirius Cursor should be again appointed dictator; but it was necessary that one of the consuls should name him, and as nothing certain was known of the fate of C. Marcius, a deputation was sent to Fabius in Etruria, to request that he would perform this office. Fabius and Papirius were personal enemies; the consul had not forgotten how nearly he had once fallen a sacrifice to Papirius's inexorable temper; and political difference had since perhaps contributed to keep alive the personal quarrel. The deputation sent to Fabius consisted therefore of senators<sup>106</sup> of consular rank, whose private influence with him might be supposed likely to aid the expressed wish of the senate, and to induce him to sacrifice his own personal feelings. He heard the senate's decree read, and listened to the arguments with which the deputies urged him to obey it; but he gave them no answer, either by look or word, and retired abruptly from the interview. In the dead of the night, however, according to the usual form, he pronounced the nomination of Papirius; but when the deputies ven-

<sup>105</sup> Livy, IX. 38.<sup>106</sup> Livy, IX. 38.

tured to thank him for his noble conquest over his feelings, he again heard them in silence, and finally dismissed them without any answer.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

The dictator found an army at once disposable in the troops which had been raised to cover Rome when Fabius began his march across the Ciminian hills. With this force he marched into Samnium; there he was joined by the wreck of the consul's army, and by the contingent of the Campanian allies of Rome; but he did not immediately venture upon a battle. Again all the previous movements of both armies are unknown, nor is even the scene of the battle mentioned, but we are told<sup>107</sup> that after a short time a general action took place, in which the dictator Papirius, his master of the horse, C. Junius Bubulcus, and his two lieutenants, M. Valerius and P. Decius, both men of consular rank, all alike distinguished themselves; and which ended in a complete victory on the side of the Romans. Papirius triumphed on the 15th of October<sup>108</sup>; and his triumph was distinguished by the splendour of the captured arms which were carried in the procession. There were a number of gilded and silvered shields<sup>109</sup> which had been borne by two different bands of Samnites in the late battle; the silvered shields had belonged to a band, each man of which had been pledged by solemn oaths, accompanied by a ceremonial of the most mysterious and appalling character, to return victorious or to die. As sacred soldiers these men had worn in the

His great  
victory and  
splendid  
triumph.

<sup>107</sup> Livy, IX. 40.

<sup>108</sup> Fasti Capitolini.

<sup>109</sup> Livy, IX. 40.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

field coats of white linen, and silvered arms; and had their station on the right wing, which was the post of honour. The band with gilded shields had worn coats of various colours, like a plaid; and both bands had plumes of an imposing height waving on their helmets. All these particulars of the Samnite arms are mentioned for the first time at the triumph of Papirius; which proves that on no former occasion had the Samnites sustained so great a defeat, or had attached such great importance to the issue of the contest, as to adopt the unwonted expedient of a sacred or devoted band. It is added that these gay shields were divided out amongst the several silversmiths in the forum<sup>110</sup>, that they might hang them up to decorate their shops on those great festivals when the forum was dressed up as a part of the pageant.

Confusions  
again in the  
chronology.  
Submission  
of Etruria.

The chronology is here again involved in confusion. According to the *Fasti Capitolini*, L. Papirius held his dictatorship for a whole year, during which there were no consuls; and Q. Fabius commanded in Etruria as proconsul, and triumphed in that office

<sup>110</sup> These shops of the silversmiths lined the *Via Sacra*, which on its course from the *Velia* to the foot of the Capitol ran along the northern side of the forum. They were like cells open in front, built of peperino, and with a row of square massy supports or piers in front of them, supporting the first story of the houses above; exactly like the covered passages in which the shops are ranged in so many of the towns of Italy at

this day. The shields were hung up on the outside front of the square piers, or *pilæ*, looking towards the forum. The butchers' shops, which in the time of the *decemvirs* had occupied this side of the forum, had lately disappeared with the growing magnificence of the city, and had been succeeded by the shops of goldsmiths and silversmiths. See *Beschreibung der Stadt Rom*, Vol. III. 2nd part, p. 25.

on the 13th of November. To this version of the story belongs apparently the account of a second Etruscan campaign of Q. Fabius, of a great victory gained by him over the Umbrians, and of a second gained over the Etruscans at the lake of Vadimon; then of the revolt and subsequent submission of Perusia, of the occupation of that strong city by a Roman garrison, and of embassies sent from the other cities of Etruria to sue for peace. It would be difficult indeed to find room for all these great achievements in the single year of Fabius' consulship; but, on the other hand, this second Etruscan campaign is unknown to Diodorus, and both he and Livy agree in making the second consulship of Q. Fabius follow immediately after his first, without any such interval as that mentioned in the *Fasti*. It is remarkable also, that the little lake of Vadimon should have been the scene of two victories over the Etruscans, within a period of about thirty years; and we are tempted to ask whether the first of these battles has not been greatly exaggerated. Yet the Etruscans must have been signally humbled by Fabius; for in the next year, when P. Decius invaded Etruria, he met with little opposition; the people of Tarquinii obtained a peace for forty years<sup>111</sup>: and the other Etruscan cities were glad to obtain a truce for a single year; and even this they purchased at the price of giving a year's pay to the consul's army, and two coats to each soldier.

<sup>111</sup> Livy, IX. 41. Diodorus, XX. 44.



CHAP.  
XXXI.

Continued  
successes of  
the Romans.  
Short war  
with the  
Umbrians.

Q. Fabius, who had been chosen consul for the third time as the colleague of P. Decius, had this year the conduct of the war in Samnium. But the Samnites were so weakened, that their speedy subjugation seemed inevitable; and this, we may suppose, filled the neighbouring nations with a sense of their own danger if Samnium should fall, and induced not only the Marsians and Pelignians<sup>112</sup> to take part with the Samnites, but even shook the long-trying friendship of the Hernicans with Rome, and aroused the Sallentines, at the southern extremity of Italy, to look on the Samnite cause as their own. But all was of no avail, and the success of the Romans was uninterrupted. Nuceria Alfaterna in Campania, which had revolted seven years before, was now recovered, the Marsians and Pelignians were defeated, and Fabius was enabled to leave his province without danger, and to hasten into Umbria<sup>113</sup>; the Umbrians, it is said, having raised so formidable an army as to threaten to march straight upon Rome, and P. Decius having thought it necessary to retreat from Etruria, in order to watch over the safety of the capital. Here again we cannot but suspect some exaggeration; for Fabius is said to have won an easy victory over the Umbrians, and the Umbrian towns immediately submitted. This may be doubtful; but it is certain that the people of Oriculum concluded an alliance with Rome, and that Fabius obtained no triumph either for his vic-

<sup>112</sup> Livy, IX. 41.<sup>113</sup> Livy, IX. 41.

tory over the Umbrians, or for those which he is said to have won in Samnium. Yet his command in Samnium was continued to him for another year with the title of proconsul: the new consuls were Appius Claudius and L. Volumnius.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

As the Etruscan war was now over, and Q. Fabius continued to command the army in Samnium, only one of the consuls for this year was required to take the field. This was L. Volumnius, and he was sent against the Salientines<sup>114</sup>, an Apulian or Iapygian people, who dwelt, as we have seen, at the extreme heel of Italy, and who were now attacked by the Romans, under pretence, we may suppose, of their having annoyed some of the Apulian allies of Rome. But Volumnius did nothing worthy of notice, although, according to Livy, he gained some victories, took several towns, and made himself very popular with his soldiers by his liberality in the disposal of the plunder. The Fasti Capitolini, however, show that he obtained no triumph; and one of the annalists, Piso<sup>115</sup>, omitted his consulship altogether, as if he doubted its reality.

War with  
the Sal-  
lentines.

Fabius<sup>116</sup> on his part defeated the Samnites near Allifæ, and obliged their army to surrender. The Samnites themselves he disarmed, and then dismissed them unhurt; but all the other prisoners, to whatever nation they belonged, were sold for slaves. Amongst this number, there were several who declared themselves to be Hernicans, and these were

The Herni-  
cans become  
suspected by  
the Romans.

<sup>114</sup> Livy, IX. 42.

<sup>115</sup> Livy, IX. 44.

<sup>116</sup> Livy, IX. 42.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

immediately sent off to Rome, and by order of the senate were committed to the custody of the several allied cities of the Latins. Q. Fabius then led his army home; but either his victory has been exaggerated, or it was balanced by some defeats, which the Roman writers did not choose to mention, for he obtained no triumph.

The Herni-  
cans revolt.

The new consuls were Q. Marcius Tremulus, and P. Cornelius Arvina. They brought the case of the Hernican prisoners before the senate, which, says Livy<sup>117</sup>, so exasperated the whole nation, that the people of Anagnia summoned a general council of deputies from every Hernican city, and all with three exceptions voted for war with Rome. It is manifest that something is omitted in this narrative, the decision of the senate upon the case which was brought before them. This it was, no doubt, which so exasperated the Hernicans; and no wonder, if, as there is every reason to believe, it ordered the prisoners to be scourged and beheaded. Such a bloody execution would naturally excite a deep and general indignation, and the common feeling of the Hernican people would call aloud for vengeance.

Combined  
operations of  
the Herni-  
can and  
Samnite  
armies.

Meanwhile the indomitable spirit of the Samnites kindled at the prospect of this accession to their league against Rome; and they thought that if they could clear the valley of the Liris, and thus open their communications with the country of the Hernicans, their combined forces might possibly again

<sup>117</sup> Livy, IX. 42.

carry the war into the heart of Latium, through the great mountain-portal by Præneste. Accordingly they attacked and carried the two posts of Calatia on the Volturnus, and Sora on the upper Liris, and sold the prisoners as slaves<sup>118</sup>. Thus the communication with the Hernicans was opened, and a Samnite army must have taken up its position in the valley of the upper Liris on the edge of the Hernican country. The Romans then hoped by a combined operation of both the consular armies to penetrate into the heart of the enemy's seat of war in two different directions; and Q. Marcius proceeded to invade the Hernican territory from the side of Latium, while P. Cornelius was to ascend the valley of the Liris from Campania, and to dislodge the Samnites from Sora. But the enemy held their ground so well<sup>119</sup>, and availed themselves so effectually of their central position, that the consuls could make no progress; and being kept in total ignorance of each other's movements, it is likely that each successively sustained a severe check from a concentration of the enemy's force against his particular army. This state of affairs excited great alarm at Rome; all citizens within the military age were enlisted, and two regular armies of two legions each were raised, to be ready for any emergency.

Thus supported, Q. Marcius soon overbore the resistance of the Hernicans, and obliged them to purchase a truce for thirty days by furnishing the

The Hernicans solicit and obtain a truce. Samnium ravaged for five months by two consular armies.

<sup>118</sup> Livy, IX. 43. Diodorus, XX. 80.

<sup>119</sup> Livy, IX. 43.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

Roman army with two months' pay and rations of corn, and with clothing for each soldier. They then sued for peace, and were referred by the senate to the consul, who received accordingly their entire submission. He hastened to effect his junction with his colleague, and the Samnite army, oppressed by their united forces, was defeated with great slaughter<sup>120</sup>. Marcius returned to Rome and triumphed on the 30th of June<sup>121</sup>, and his services were accounted so eminent that an equestrian statue was set up in honour of him in the forum<sup>122</sup>, in front of the temple of Castor, or rather of the twin heroes, Castor and Pollux. After his triumph, he rejoined his colleague in Samnium, and their two armies being completely masters of the field ravaged the whole country with the utmost perseverance for the space of nearly five months<sup>123</sup>; cutting down the fruit trees, burning the houses that were not secured within the fortified towns, and doing all the mischief in their power in the hope of forcing the enemy into submission. The consuls were thus detained so long in the field, that a dictator was named to hold the comitia; and L. Postumius and Ti. Minucius were elected consuls for the year following.

Final submission and settlement of the Hernicans.

Before the close of this year the senate had decided the fate of the Hernicans<sup>124</sup>. Three cities which had taken no part in the late war were left in

<sup>120</sup> Livy, IX. 43.

<sup>121</sup> Fasti Capitolini.

<sup>122</sup> Livy, IX. 43. Pliny, Hist. Nat. XXXIV. 6. The temple of Castor was on the southern side of

the forum, opposite to the line of the Via Sacra.

<sup>123</sup> Diodorus, XX. 80.

<sup>124</sup> Livy, IX. 43.



the enjoyment of their municipal independence; but Anagnia and the other towns were obliged to receive the Roman franchise without the right of voting; or, in other words, to become the subjects of Rome, without any share either in the general government or in their own municipal administration. They were forbidden to hold any common meetings or to intermarry with one another, and their magistrates were prohibited from exercising any other function than that of superintending the performance of the rites of religion.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

The long contest with the Samnites was now drawing to a conclusion. Before the new consuls took the field, and after Marcius and Cornelius had returned home, the Samnites revenged in some degree the devastation of their own country by making several plundering inroads into the plain of Campania<sup>125</sup>. But when the legions opened the campaign, the power of the Romans was again irresistible. The seat of the war was now in the very heart of Samnium, on the north side of the Matese, in the country of the Pentrians; and the two consuls attacked the two cities of Tifernum and Bovianum. One last desperate effort was made by the Samnite imperator or captain-general, Statius Gellius, to relieve Bovianum: but it was vain, although the battle was so stoutly contested that the Roman consul Ti. Minucius was mortally wounded, and did not live to reap the fruits of his victory. But Gellius

Decisive  
campaign in  
the heart of  
Samnium.  
Bovianum  
taken.

<sup>125</sup> Livy, IX. 44. Diodorus, XX. 90.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

was himself taken prisoner, and the greater part of his army destroyed. Bovianum then surrendered, and the consuls on their return home recovered the towns which had been lately lost in the valley of the Liris, Sora, Arpinum, and an unknown place, Ceren<sup>n</sup>ia<sup>126</sup>, or Censennia.

The Samnites and their allies submit to the Romans.

This campaign was decisive. The new consuls were P. Sulpicius and P. Sempronius, and Sulpicius immediately took the field in Samnium<sup>127</sup>. He gained some advantages, small perhaps in themselves, but important, as the last drop poured into the brimming vessel and causing the water to overflow. The Samnites at last sued for peace, and the Marrucinians, Marsians, Pelignians, and Frentanians followed the example. They were all obliged to become the allies of Rome, but the alliance was no longer on equal terms<sup>121</sup>; they became, in fact, poli-

<sup>126</sup> Diodorus calls it Serennia. Is not this place the "Cisauna" in Samnium, mentioned in the inscription on the tomb of L. Scipio Barbatus?

<sup>127</sup> This appears from the Fasti Capitolini, which state that Sulpicius obtained a triumph for his victories over the Samnites in this year.

<sup>128</sup> Dionysius, Excerpt. de Legation. p. 2331. Reiske. His words are, speaking of the Samnites, τοὺς ὑπηκόους ὁμολογήσαντας ἔσεσθαι. Livy says, "Fœdus antiquum Samnitibus redditum." This is because he never seems to have conceived that any nation could ever have been the equal ally of Rome, but that from the very beginning it must have acknowledged the Roman supremacy.

Thus, when he speaks of the first treaty between Rome and Samnium in the year 401, he says that the Samnites solicited the friendship of Rome; that "Legatis eorum comiter ab senatu responsum; fœdere in societatem accepti." VII. 19. In the same manner he misrepresents the early relations between Rome and Latium. But the negotiations had broken off in the year 432 on this very point, because the Samnites would not become the dependent allies of Rome; and as the Romans never receded from the conditions on which they had once insisted, we may be sure that they would have granted no peace to the Samnites which did not include their complete submission; nor can we suppose that the Sam-

tically subject, and consented to acknowledge and respect the majesty, or, in other words, the supremacy of Rome. CHAP.  
XXXI.

In comparison with such a full confession of the superior strength of the Romans, any partial acquisitions of territory were of slight importance. But the Romans had obtained in the course of the war the important position of Luceria in Apulia, which secured their ascendancy in that part of Italy; and they had also won the whole line of the Liris, all those Volscian towns which had been the Samnite share of the spoil at the conclusion of the great Latin war. Campania had been retained, and its connexion with Rome was rendered closer than ever; and above all, the timely extension of the full Roman franchise to so many of the Latin and Volscian cities in the neighbourhood of Rome, had made the Roman power sound at the heart, and had consolidated that mass of citizens, and of allies scarcely less true than citizens, within the confines of Latium, of which neither the arms nor the arts of Hannibal could tempt a single individual to join his standard.

The conquest of the Hernicans gave the Romans, it is probable, a considerable accession of territory in the forfeited domain land of the several cities; and it put an end to the old equal alliance which entitled the Hernicans to a share of all plunder taken by the armies of the allied nations. The vic-

nites would have persevered so long in carrying on the war amidst such repeated disasters, if they could have ended it on any terms less intolerable.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

tories over the Etruscans and Umbrians had revealed the secret of the comparative weakness of those once dreaded nations; and had taught the Romans that their frontier might be extended as soon they chose beyond the Ciminian hills.

Rome was  
now the first  
power in  
Italy.

Thus in the twenty years of the second Samnite war Rome had risen to the first place beyond dispute amongst the nations of Italy. And amidst the divisions and corruption of the several kingdoms which had grown up out of the fragments of Alexander's empire, there was scarcely a power in the civilized world, except Carthage, which could have contended successfully with Rome single-handed.

Half a century was yet to elapse before Carthage entered upon the contest. Meanwhile the Roman power was yet to be sharply tried; what Etruria and Samnium could neither singly nor by their joint efforts effect, they were to try again with the help of the Gauls; what they had failed to accomplish through barbarian aid, they were to attempt in their last struggle with the assistance of the arms and discipline of the Macedonian phalanx, and guided by the genius of Alexander's genuine successor, the hero-king of the race of Achilles.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

INTERNAL HISTORY FROM 428 TO 454—ABOLITION OF  
PERSONAL SLAVERY FOR DEBT—DICTATORSHIP OF  
C. MÆNIUS—CENSORSHIP OF APPIUS CLAUDIUS—  
CENSORSHIP OF Q. FABIUS AND P. DECIUS—THE  
OGULNIAN LAW.

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“Nothing has contributed more than this lenity to raise the character of public men. Ambition is of itself a game sufficiently hazardous and sufficiently deep to inflame the passions, without adding property, life, and liberty to the stake.”—EDINBURGH REVIEW, No. XCV. p. 161.

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WE have seen, that in the year immediately preceding the first campaign of the Samnite war, several symptoms had been manifested by a strong party amongst the patricians of the old jealousy towards the commons; M. Marcellus, a plebeian, had been forced to resign his dictatorship by the augurs, on the alleged reason that his appointment was invalid from some religious objection; and the most obstinate attempts were made to set aside the Licinian law, and to procure the election of two patrician consuls. In the course of the Samnite war occasional traces of the same feeling are discernible. But its shape was no longer what it had been in the earlier

CHAP.  
XXXII.

Altered position of parties at Rome. The new or lower popular party.



CHAP.  
XXXII.

days of the commonwealth. It was no longer a struggle between an aristocracy in the exclusive possession of the government, and a people impatient of their own exclusion from it. It was no longer a struggle between the whole patrician order on the one side, and the whole body of the commons on the other. A considerable portion of the patricians and a majority of the senate were well reconciled to the altered state of things, and cordially received the distinguished commoners who had made their way to the highest offices in the commonwealth, and composed a new nobility fully worthy to stand on equal terms by the side of the old. Thus the moderate patricians, the new nobility of the commons, and the mass of the old plebeians were now closely linked together; and their union gave that energy to the Roman councils and arms, which marks in so eminent a manner the middle of the fifth century. But as these elements had tended more and more towards each other, so they parted off on either side from other elements with which, at an earlier period, they had been respectively connected. The moderate patricians stood aloof from the high or more violent party, who still dreamt of recovering the old ascendancy of their order: whilst a new popular party, though as yet very inconsiderable in power or influence, was growing up distinct from the old plebeians, regarding them with envy<sup>1</sup>, and regarded by

<sup>1</sup> This is the progress of all popular parties, from the necessity of the case. As the ruling body in the earliest state of society is extremely exclusive, the popular party then comprises what Sieyès

them in turn with feelings of dislike and suspicion. This new party consisted of freedmen, and of citizens engaged in the various trades and occupations of a city life, who were despised by the old agricultural plebeians as a low and unwarlike populace, and who, by a strong public opinion, were excluded from all prospect of political distinctions. Many of these persons indeed, had not even the right of voting, as they were not included in any tribe; and they bore this exclusion as impatiently as the old

CHAP.  
XXXII.

would call the nation minus a privileged individual or a very small privileged class. Each success of this party satisfies the wishes of a portion of its members, and thus makes them for the future its enemies. And a repetition of this process would at last place the anti-popular party in that same position which was at first occupied by their adversaries; they would, in their turn, become the nation, minus a very small excluded class, a class, in fact, excluded by nothing but their own ignorance or profligacy. This would be the natural perfection of a state, but, unhappily, this as yet has never been attained to; the process has gone on healthfully in its first stages, satisfying successively all those whose exclusion was wholly unnatural, that is, who were excluded by distinctions purely arbitrary, or overbalanced by many more points of resemblance and fitness for political power. But when it reaches those who differ really from the governing body, as in the case of the rich and the poor, then convulsion and decline have mostly followed. The work of smoothing down these real differences is so difficult,

that it has rarely or never been attempted; the excluding party, strengthened by all those who were once excluded, is now extremely powerful, and its power is moral as well as physical; the excluded or popular party, no longer a nation contending against a caste, but yet much more than a worthless faction contending against a nation, are conscious of a wrong done to them, and are embittered by this feeling; but being unable to carry their point, and, from their very inability to obtain a share of the benefits of society, becoming more and more morally unfit to enjoy them, their triumph and their continued exclusion are alike deplorable. Their triumph is but the triumph of slaves broken loose, full of brute ignorance and wickedness; their continued exclusion is a perpetual cancer, wasting away the nation's life; and it is a moral evil moreover, because it involves injustice. The great and hardest problem of political wisdom is to prevent any part of society from becoming so socially degraded by poverty, that their political enfranchisement becomes dangerous, or even mischievous.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

plebeians had borne their exclusion from the highest curule offices. This was a class which was daily becoming more numerous, in proportion as Rome grew in wealth and population, and it formed the origin of the popular party of the later period of the commonwealth; a party very different, both in its character and feelings, from the commons of its earlier history.

Coalition of  
the two ex-  
treme par-  
ties against  
the mode-  
rate party.

These extremes of civil society, the highest aristocrats and the lowest populace, have often made common cause with each other against that middle class which both hate equally. And when the malcontent aristocratical families are few in number, but of the highest nobility, any ambitious individual among them is tempted to court the populace for objects more directly personal; he tries to make them the instrument, not of the greatness of his order, but of his own. Thus it was commonly remarked of the tyrants of the ancient world, that they began by playing the demagogue. In such an union between the highest and the lowest classes of society, the gain is mostly for the former; the latter derived little advantage from the alliance, except the pleasure of the horse in the fable, when he saw his old enemy the stag effectually humbled. But the coalition is not solely one of political expediency; it arises partly out of certain moral affinities existing between those whose social and political conditions are the extremest opposites. The moral bond between them is their common impatience of law and good government; that anarchical and selfish rest-

lessness, which sees in the existing order of society an equal restraint upon the pride and passion of the highest and on the needy cupidity of the lowest<sup>2</sup>. This is the feeling which has so often brought together the proudest despot or the most insolent aristocrat and the lowest and most profligate populace; and it was this, though in a far milder degree, which associated in one common party at Rome, in the period now before us, the humblest of the city populace and the representative of the proudest family in the commonwealth, Appius Claudius.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

But in these coalitions, which are for ever recurring in history, the two coalescing parties are far from deserving the same judgment. Historians have justly pronounced their full condemnation on the selfish hypocrisy of the tyrant, who talks of liberty in order to establish his own despotism. And for those who, despising all the honours and benefits of society which are fully open to them, aspire to a rank and greatness of a higher and more exclusive sort than the nature of society allows, no condemnation can be too severe, for no wickedness can be greater. But the lowest class, when they are misled into such alliances, deserve even in their worst excesses a milder sentence. Not only are they entitled to all the excuse which may be claimed by ignorance, and an ignorance arising rather from their condition than from their choice; but in their quar-

Character  
of such coa-  
litions.

<sup>2</sup> ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν πόλμαν ἐξάγουσιν εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους.—Thucydides, III. 45.  
παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία ὑβρεῖ τὴν  
πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι.



CHAP.  
XXXII.

rel against the existing order of things, there is, and ever will be, amidst much of envy and cupidity and revenge, a certain mixture also of justice. Nothing is more horrible than the rebellions of slaves; yet it is impossible to regard even these with unmixed abhorrence. Nor can we ever place on the same level, those who, being excluded from the benefits of society, do but seek a share of them, and those who, enjoying all these benefits in ample measure, cannot rest without something more. Neither are the middle classes apt to be wholly guiltless in their treatment of those below them; when they have established their own rights against the aristocracy, they become a new aristocracy themselves, and having themselves passed through the door, they shut it against those who would fain follow. But here, as in their own earlier contest with the old aristocracy, the fault does not consist in denying political rights to those who are not yet fit for them, for this may be often necessary and just; but in preventing them from ever becoming fit, by retaining institutions which have an inevitable tendency to keep the lowest classes morally degraded, or, at the best, by taking no pains to introduce such as may improve them.

EMINENT  
MEN OF  
THIS  
PERIOD.  
1. Of the  
high aristocratical  
party, L.  
Papirius  
Cursor and  
Appius  
Claudius.

In the high aristocratical party at Rome during the period now before us, two individuals are eminent; L. Papirius Cursor, and Appius Claudius. But their objects seem to have been different. Papirius appears to have been sincerely attached to the old aristocratical constitution, and to



have honestly wished to restore what in his eyes was the uncorrupted discipline of the Roman commonwealth. Appius, like his ancestor the decemvir, or Dionysius of Syracuse, wished to overthrow the existing order of things, not in favour of the old patrician ascendancy, but of his own personal dominion.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

The moderate or middle party, composed as it was of the majority of the senate and of the whole body of the old commons, numbered amongst its members most of the distinguished men of the time. To this party belonged Q. Fabius Maximus, eminent alike in peace and in war, and who enjoyed the love<sup>3</sup> of his countrymen no less than he commanded their admiration and esteem. With him stood his friend P. Decius Mus, thrice his colleague in the consulship when Rome needed the services of her bravest and ablest generals against her foreign enemies; and his colleague also in that memorable censorship, which required and found in them all the statesman's wisdom. P. Decius might have disputed the palm of happiness in Solon's judgment with Tellus the Athenian. Born to the truest nobility, the son of that P. Decius, who, when consul, had devoted himself to death for his country in the great battle with the Latins, he, like his father, obtained the highest

2. Of the  
middle or  
moderate  
party.

Q. Fabius  
Maximus.

P. Decius  
Mus.

<sup>3</sup> When he died the people contributed by subscription a large sum for the expenses of his funeral, which seems to have been a method of expressing the public feeling towards the dead, even when his family was too wealthy to require it as an actual assistance. On this occasion, Q. Fabius

Gurges, the son of the old Q. Fabius, employed the money in giving a public entertainment to one part of the people, epulum, and in sending portions of meat to the rest, visceratio. See the writer "de Viris Illustribus," in his life of Q. Fabius.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

honours with the purest fame ; and after having performed the greatest services in peace and in war, and having been rewarded in the fullest measure with the respect and affection of his fellow-citizens, he too, like his father, devoted himself to death to save Rome from defeat, and so consigned the glory of his life<sup>4</sup>, safe from all stain, and crowned with the yet higher glory of his death, to his countrymen's grateful memory for ever. Of the same band, yet rather to be ranked first than third, was M. Valerius Corvus, to whom no less than to Decius, Solon might have allowed the name of happy. His youth had caught the last rays of the romantic glory of earlier times ; and his single combat with the giant Gaul, and the wonderful aid which the gods had then vouchsafed him, was sung in the same strains as the valiant acts of the heroes of old, of Camillus, or Cincinnatus, or Cornelius Cossus. His manhood was no less rich in glory of another sort, which if less brilliant was more real. Elected consul for the first time at three and twenty, five years afterwards in his third consulship he won the famous battle of Mount Gaurus against the Samnites, and gave in the victorious issue of this first encounter a happy omen of the final result of the long contest between the two nations. He was elected consul three times afterwards, and twice dictator ; and in his political

M. Valerius  
Corvus.

<sup>4</sup> Δοκεῖ δέ μοι δηλοῦν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν πρώτην τε μνημόσυνα καὶ τελευταία βεβαιόσυνα ἢ νῦν τῶνδε καταστροφῇ. Thucyd. II. 42. In Decius' case his death was not the

"first indication" of his worth, but the "last confirmation" of it ; it was the worthy close of a noble life.

course, true to the character of his family, he finally relieved the long distress of the poorer commons, and appeased the most dangerous commotion which had ever yet threatened Rome; and he re-enacted the famous Valerian law in his fifth consulship, that great law of appeal from the sentence of the magistrate which the Romans regarded as the main bulwark of their freedom. In his sixth consulship he was nearly seventy years old, but he lived thirty years longer, and died at the full age of a hundred years<sup>5</sup>, after having witnessed the triumphant end of the long contest with the Samnites, which three generations earlier had been under his own auspices so successfully begun. Next to these three great men we may rank Q. Publilius Philo, the author of the Publilian laws, prætor<sup>6</sup>, dictator, censor, and four times consul, who was chosen consul with L. Papius Cursor after the disaster of Caudium, as being with him the man most able to retrieve the honour

Q. Publilius  
Philo.

<sup>5</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* VII. 48. Pliny says that forty-six years intervened between his first consulship and his sixth. His sixth consulship was in the year 453, according to Pliny's own chronology, [446 Niebuhr,] if we place it four years after the consulship of P. Sempronius and P. Sulpicius, which with Pliny is the year 449. (*Hist. Natur.* XXXIII. § 20.) His first consulship accordingly would fall in 406, but according to the *Fasti Capitolini*, which place his second consulship two years afterwards, in 407, it would fall in 405. His third according to the same chronology

was in 410; and his fourth in 418. The *Fasti* are wanting at the period of his two last consulships, and they cannot be fixed positively. In his first consulship he was only three and twenty (*Livy*, VII. 26.); which, following the chronology of the *Fasti*, would give 382 for the year of his birth. He lived, therefore, to the year 482 [475, Niebuhr]; that is, to the year after the capture of Tarentum, and the end of the fourth Samnite war.

<sup>6</sup> *Livy*, VIII. 15. VIII. 12. VIII. 17. For his four consulships see *Livy*, VIII. 12-22. IX. 7, and *Diodorus*, XIX. 66, and the *Fasti Capitolini*.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

C. Mænius.

of Rome. Nor should we omit C. Mænius<sup>7</sup>, twice dictator, a man odious to the high patrician party for the firmness with which he opposed their projects, but repelling their attacks by the spotless innocence of his public life. To the same party belonged also, in all probability, Q. Aulus Cerretanus<sup>8</sup>, twice consul, chosen master of the horse by Q. Fabius in his first dictatorship, who sacrificed his life in covering the retreat of the Romans in the rout of Lautulæ, and M. Foslius, master of the horse to C. Mænius in his second dictatorship, like him obnoxious to the high patrician party<sup>9</sup>, and like him protected by his integrity.

3. Of the  
new popular  
party.  
Cn. Flavius.

The third or new popular party could not be expected from its very nature to produce as yet any men of high distinction. Yet one individual belonging to it made himself remarkable, and will claim a place in this history, Cn. Flavius, the scribe or clerk, who divulged the secrets of the pontifical calendar, and of the technicalities of actions at law, and was rewarded with the curule ædileship in spite of his humble origin and occupation.

That we are able to notice so many individual characters at this period, shows that we are arrived at the dawn of what may be called real history. And this previous sketch of the parties of the commonwealth, and of their most eminent members, may

<sup>7</sup> For his second dictatorship, see Livy, IX. 26; for his first, see the fragments of the Fasti Capitolini, and note 61 of Chap. XXXI. of this volume.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, VIII. 37. IX. 15, and for his death see the Fasti Capitolini, and Diodorus, XIX. 72. Livy, IX. 23.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, IX. 26.

perhaps make the account of the transactions in which they were engaged, not only clearer but more interesting.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

During the first half of the Samnite war, but in what year<sup>10</sup> is uncertain, there was passed that famous law which prohibited personal slavery for debt; no creditor might for the future attach the person of his debtor, but he might only seize his property; and all those whose personal freedom was pledged for their debts, (*nexi*), were released from their liability, if they could swear that they had property enough to meet their creditor's demands. It does not appear that this great alteration in the law was the work of any tribune, or that it arose out of any general or deliberate desire to soften the severity of the ancient practice. It was occasioned, we are told, by one scandalous instance of abuse of power on the part of a creditor towards his debtor, who, according to the old law, had been given over to him as a slave, (*addictus*), because he had pledged his person for his

Abolition of  
personal  
slavery for  
debt.

<sup>10</sup> Livy places the story in the consulship of C. Pœtelius, in the very first year of the war; VIII. 28. But as Dionysius (*Fragm.* Vol. IV. p. 2338, Reiske), and Valerius Maximus (VI. 1, § 9), relate it as having happened after the affair of the pass of Caudium, Niebuhr refers it to the dictatorship of C. Pœtelius, in the 12th year of the war. (Livy, IX. 28.) A passage in Varro, *de Ling. Lat.*, (VII. 105, ed. Müller,) relates to this subject, but is so corrupt in the MSS. that its testimony cannot be appealed to with certainty.

It runs "*Hoc C. Popilio vocare Sillo dictatore sublatum ne fieret, ut omnes, qui bonam copiam jurarunt, ne essent nexi, sed soluti.*" Müller has corrected this into, "*Hoc C. Popililio auctore Visolo dictatore sublatum.*" "*Visolo*" having been a conjecture of Anton. Augustino, and approved by Scaliger, because the cognomen of C. Pœtelius was Visolus, as we learn from the *Fasti Capitolini*. But I would rather read "*C. Popililio provocante*" in the former part of the sentence, than "*C. Popililio auctore.*"



CHAP.  
XXXII.

debts, and had been unable to redeem his pledge. The outrage excited so general a feeling, that the senate immediately passed a bill for the effectual prevention of such atrocities for the future; and the consuls, or rather, as it should seem, the dictator, C. Poetelius, was desired to propose it to the people, that it might become a law. But although personal slavery for debt was thus done away, yet the consequences of insolvency were much more serious at Rome than they are in modern Europe. He whose property had been once made over to his creditors by the prætor's sentence, became, *ipso facto*, infamous<sup>11</sup>; he lost his tribe, and with it all his political rights; and the forfeiture was irrevocable, even though he might afterwards pay his debts to the full; nor was it even in the power of the censors to replace him on the roll of citizens. So sacred a thing did credit appear in the eyes of the Romans; and so just did they consider it that a failure in the discharge of one of the most important social obligations should be visited with a forfeiture of social and political rights.

State of  
parties with  
respect to  
the rising of  
the Tuscu-  
lans and  
Privernatians.

As the internal history of Rome during this period can only be collected from a few detached notices, we are compelled to pass over in silence those memorable years which were marked by the rising of the Tusculans and Privernatians, and by the defeat at the pass of Caudium. This last disaster,

<sup>11</sup> "In pudoris notam capitis pœna conversa, honorum adhibitâ proscriptione, suffundere maluit hominis sanguinem quam effun-

dere."—Tertullian, *Apologet.* 4.

See also the strong language of Cicero pro Quintio, 15, 16.

indeed, was such as to still for a time all domestic disputes, and to make every Roman feel alike for the national calamity; and the election of L. Papius Cursor and Q. Publilius as consuls for the following year, seems to show a common desire to appoint the two ablest generals of the commonwealth, without any reference to party distinctions. But the war with Tusculum, Privernum, and Velitrae was of another character; and the claims of these cities and the treatment which should be shown to them, must have been judged of very variously. Are we mistaken in supposing that the moderate or middle party supported the liberal policy which was actually pursued, while the new popular party, the party of the populace, called aloud for severity and vengeance? We know that L. Fulvius Curvus, who had so lately led the Tuscans to assail the city of Rome, was elected consul<sup>12</sup> together with Q. Fabius; and that six or seven years afterwards he was appointed master of the horse<sup>13</sup> by L. Æmilius Mamercinus; and both Fabius and Æmilius were eminent amongst the leaders of the moderate party. We know also that M. Flavius the tribune, who brought forward the bill for the punishment of the Tuscans, was a man of doubtful private character<sup>14</sup>, and that he was said to have owed his first tribuneship to a largess which he had given to the poorer citizens, in gratitude for having been acquitted by them when indicted by the ædiles on a criminal charge.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, VIII. 38.<sup>13</sup> Livy, IX. 21.<sup>14</sup> Livy, VIII. 22.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

It appears also, that he must have been elected tribune twice at least within four years<sup>15</sup>; which, in a man of such a character seems to argue that he continued to practise the arts of a demagogue. If this be so, his bill for the punishment of the Tusculans exactly resembled, both in himself and in the personal and political character of its author, the famous bill of Cleon for the execution of the Mytileneans: and we have here another instance that a low popular party has as little claim as that of the high aristocracy, to the title of high-principled and liberal.

Intrigues of  
the aristo-  
cratical  
party at the  
time of the  
revolt of  
Capua.  
C. Mænius  
dictator.

The six years which followed the affair of Caudium are to us, as far as regards domestic affairs, a blank; but in the year 439, (Niebuhr 434,) the defeat of Lautulæ and its consequences led to the second dictatorship of C. Mænius, an event, of which the notices preserved to us are unusually full. Capua had revolted<sup>16</sup>, and as the consuls, M. Pœtelius and C. Sulpicius, were fully engaged with the Samnites, a dictator with a third army was appointed to reduce the Campanians. The battle of Cinna, as we have seen, terrified the Campanians into submission; and the principal leaders of the revolt perished by their own hands. But the dictator, C. Mænius<sup>17</sup>, during his inquiry into the origin of the revolt at Capua,

<sup>15</sup> Compare Livy, VIII. 22, and 37. Huschké, in his work on the Constitution of Ser. Tullius, p. 730, refers to this M. Flavius the anecdote related by Valerius Maximus, VIII. 1, § 7. He ingeniously observes, that the anecdote must refer to a period when the

number of the tribes was twenty-nine, which exactly tallies with the date of the story as given by Livy. According to Valerius Maximus, the curule ædile by whom Flavius was impeached was C. Valerius.

<sup>16</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 76.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, IX. 26.

gained some startling information, which showed that it had received encouragement from a powerful party in Rome itself; the spirit<sup>18</sup> of his commission, he argued, called upon him to follow up this investigation; and when he returned to Rome, he pursued it with vigour. No proof it seems could be obtained of any direct act of treason; but there existed what were in Greece the well-known preparations for a revolution, a number of organized societies<sup>19</sup> for the purpose of influencing the elections, and procuring the appointment of particular candidates. These societies, it is implied, consisted partly of the highest members of the aristocracy, and partly of the lowest classes of citizens, both at present being combined in one common cause. The dictator, therefore, encountered a formidable opposition; the high patrician party recriminated upon him and upon his master of the horse, M. Foslius Flaccinator: "Men of the commons<sup>20</sup>, such as they were, needed undue means to secure their way to public offices, rather than the patricians, who derived from their noble birth a sufficient and an honourable title to the votes of their countrymen." Immediately the dictator and his master of the horse courted and called for the

<sup>18</sup> "Versa Romam interpretando res, non nominatim qui Capuæ, sed in universum qui usquam coissent conjurassent adversus rempublicam, quæri senatum jussisse." —Livy, IX. 26.

<sup>19</sup> "Coitiones honorum adipiscendorum causâ factas." Livy, IX. 26. These words are almost a translation of the description

given by Thucydides of the aristocratical clubs of Athens, τὰς ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγγανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς. VIII. 54.

<sup>20</sup> "Negare nobilium id crimen esse, quibus si nullâ obstat fraude, pateat via ad honorem, sed hominum novorum." Livy, IX. 26.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

fullest inquiry into their conduct; they resigned their offices, were put upon their trial before the consuls, and in spite of the efforts of the aristocratical party to prove them guilty, they were most honourably acquitted<sup>21</sup>. Q. Publilius Philo, the most distinguished commoner of his time, was accused by the same party on the same charge, and was acquitted no less completely. But by thus dexterously assailing their assailants, the high nobility gained a considerable advantage; it seemed as if both parties were open to accusation, and that an inquiry into an offence so universal must needs be fruitless. Besides, the most serious danger had been removed by the favourable turn of the events of the war; and when men's minds were no longer under the influence of alarm, the inquiry would cease to be supported by that strong public feeling which alone could enable it to proceed with effect. Accordingly, the societies triumphed; and the coalition between the high aristocracy and the populace, thus ineffectually attacked, began to manifest itself more freely and more decidedly.

Censorship  
of App.  
Claudius.

Accordingly, two years afterwards, Appius Claudius was elected censor, together with C. Plautius. The censorship it should be remembered was in point of rank the highest office in the commonwealth; its power was almost unbounded; its command over the public money, and the opportunities

<sup>21</sup> "Publilius etiam Philo, multiplicatis summis honoribus post res tot domi belloque gestas, ceterum invisus nobilitati, causam dixit."—Livy, IX. 26.



of distinction and of influence which it afforded as originating and conducting all public works, made it an especial object of ambition to a man like Appius, who was less fitted to signalize himself as a general. Besides, he probably had from the first formed the design of prolonging his term of office for the full period of five years, in defiance of the Æmilian law; and so vast a power, enjoyed during so long a period, might be made to serve the wildest purposes of ambition.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

One of his earliest acts as censor was to revise the list of senators. It was usual on these occasions to add to the list the names of such citizens as seemed best to deserve that honour; and the selection would commonly be made from those who within the last five years had been elected for the first time to any curule magistracy, and who, therefore, had not been in the senate at the last census. But in addition to the deaths caused by the Samnite war, (and the master of the horse could not have been the only senator who fell in the rout of Lautulæ,) the year immediately preceding Appius' censorship had been marked by a visitation of pestilence, so that the names which he would have to add to the roll of the senate would be more than usually numerous. To the utter scandal of the old plebeians no less than of the patricians, Appius passed over many names which other censors would have inserted, and filled up the vacancies with numbers of the low popular party, many of whom were the sons

His revision  
of the list  
of senators.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

of freedmen<sup>22</sup>, and therefore, according to Roman law, the grandsons of nobody. The persons thus chosen were probably wealthy men, and many of them may have already filled the offices of tribune or plebeian ædile; but the time when the senate had been a purely patrician assembly was too recent to allow of its being thrown open not merely to commoners, but to men whose grandfathers had been slaves; and the attempt of Appius to fill the senate with those who would have been no better than his creatures, like some of his ancestor's colleagues in the decemvirate, was too violent a measure to be endured. Accordingly, the consuls of the next year, C. Junius Bubulcus and Q. Æmilius Barbula, set his list aside without hesitation, and summoned those only as senators whose names had been on the roll of the last previous censors, L. Papirius Crassus and C. Mænius.

He admits  
many freed-  
men into the  
tribes.

Not discouraged, however, by this ill success, Appius acted on the same system when he proceeded to revise the rolls of the several tribes. His colleague, C. Plautius, unable to bear the shame of seeing his list of the senate utterly disregarded, had resigned his office at the end of the year<sup>23</sup>. If a censor died or resigned before the completion of the eighteen months fixed by the Æmilian law as the term of his authority, it was accounted unlucky to elect another in his place; and his colleague on such

<sup>22</sup> Diodorus, XX. 35, 36. Livy, IX. 29, 30.

<sup>23</sup> Livy, IX. 29.

occasions usually resigned immediately, rather than incur the odium of wielding such vast powers alone. Appius, however, had no such scruples, and continued to act as sole censor. In his revision of the tribes, he admitted a great number<sup>24</sup> of freedmen and citizens of low condition to the enjoyment of the full franchise; and he entered them purposely in all the tribes, that the influence of his party might extend to all. It will readily be understood that a large proportion of the members of the more remote tribes especially, would attend but seldom at the comitia; whilst the city populace and the tradesmen and artisans were always on the spot, and would be frequently the majority of voters in their respective tribes. Thus the old agricultural commons saw themselves overwhelmed by their new tribesmen, and that share in the government which they had so hardly won was on the point of being wrested from them by men whom, according to the general feeling of the ancient world, they despised as little better than slaves.

Thus far the conduct of Appius was not inconsistent with a mere desire to restore the old ascendancy of the patricians; for the lowest classes being as yet quite incapable of exercising dominion, might safely be used as auxiliaries for humbling the classes next above them; just as the feudal kings occasionally courted the commons, and were enabled through their aid to weaken the power of the nobles,

CHAP.  
XXXII.

He encourages Cn. Flavius to publish his calendar and his account of the forms to be observed in actions at law.

<sup>24</sup> Diodorus, XX. 35, 36. Livy, IX. 46.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

without any danger of seeing their own authority subjected to the control of a representative assembly. But if it be true that Appius encouraged Cn. Flavius<sup>25</sup> in the acts which gave such offence to the aristocracy, we cannot conceive his objects to have been other than personal; for it was against the old patrician influence much more than against the new plebeian nobility, that the proceedings of Flavius were directed. This man was the son of a freedman, a clerk or writer by his occupation, and at this time employed in the business of the censor's office under Appius. It was by Appius' instigation that he published his famous calendar or almanack; that is, he stuck up whitened boards round the forum, on which were marked down the days and parts of days in every month on which law business might lawfully be done; a knowledge which the people had hitherto been obliged to gain from the pontifices, or a few of the patricians who understood the pontifical law; and as the days did not recur regularly, and the principle which determined them was carefully kept a secret, the people were wholly at their instructors' mercy<sup>26</sup>. At the same time Flavius also published an account<sup>27</sup> of the forms to be observed in the several ways of proceeding at law; a work which in after-times must have been

<sup>25</sup> "Appii Cæci scriba, cujus hortatu exceperat eos dies consulando assidue sagaci ingenio promulgaveratque."—Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* XXXIII. 6. Ed. Sillig.

<sup>26</sup> "Publicatis diebus fastis,

quos populus a paucis principum *quotidie* petebat." Pliny, XXXIII. 6.

<sup>27</sup> "Actiones composuit." See Cicero, *de Orat.* I. 41. Epp. ad Attic. VI. 1.

exceedingly curious; but which must have utterly failed in practice, if its object was to enable a common man to conduct his own suit, without consulting some one learned in the law. Accordingly it was to the publication of his calendar that Flavius owed his great popularity; he was elected soon after tribune<sup>28</sup>, he was appointed to one or two other important public offices, and six years later, as we shall see presently, he obtained the rank of curule ædile.

Thus making it his pleasure to lessen all dignity and to diminish all influence but his own, offending in his pride the old aristocracy no less than the new, and the middle classes, Appius now, as sole censor, feeling himself in possession of almost kingly power, resolved to distinguish his name by public works on a most magnificent scale, such as the greatest king might emulate. Without any authority from the senate<sup>29</sup>, he applied the large sums of public money which were paid into his hands by that multitude of persons who farmed the state property in all its manifold kinds, to the execution of two great works; one, the construction of a military road from Rome to Capua; the other, the bringing a constant supply of good water into the city from a distance of about eight miles from the Esquiline gate, partly by pipes under ground, and partly by an aqueduct.

The great road from Rome to Capua, which was afterwards continued to Brundisium, has indeed

His public  
works.

The Appian  
road to  
Capua.

<sup>28</sup> Livy, IX. 46.

<sup>29</sup> Diodorus, XX. 35, 36.



immortalized the name of its author; nor will the mightiest works of modern engineers ever rival the fame of the Appian Way. This has been owing to accidental causes; yet the road was a magnificent undertaking, and even without noticing the excellence of its pavement, which was added at a later period, we may justly admire the labour bestowed in order to keep its line generally on a level, the deep cuttings through hills, and the vast substructions of massy stones on which it was carried across valleys. The whole line from Rome to Capua was about 120 English miles; the road left the city at the Porta Capena, the gate of Capua; it passed in a straight line over the Campagna till it reached the foot of the Alban hills at Bovillæ; there it ascended to the higher grounds, and passing through Aricia, and leaving Velitræ and the modern road to Naples on the left, it descended again into the plain nearly in the same straight line, and ran on to the Pontine marshes. At this point, as Niebuhr thinks, the road stopped; and the communication through the Pontine marshes was carried on by a canal almost as far as Tarracina. But the very excavation of the canal would of itself supply materials in part for an embankment by the side of it; and it is more likely that both it and the road were carried through the marshes together. Afterwards the road ascended the mountains behind Tarracina, thus avoiding the ill omened pass of Lautulæ, and soon after descended again into the plain of Fundi, crossed the Liris at Minturnæ, and the Volturnus at Casilinum, and three

miles farther it arrived at the termination of its course, the city of Capua<sup>30</sup>.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

The other work of Appius was less remarkable in itself, than as being the earliest of those famous aqueducts which still, amid their ruins, are such striking and characteristic monuments of Roman greatness. In fact, it can scarcely be called an aqueduct, for the water<sup>31</sup> was carried under ground throughout the whole of its course, with the exception of sixty Roman paces, or about an hundred yards, in the low ground by the Porta Capena, where it was conveyed partly on arches, and partly on a solid substruction of massy stones. Its termination was at the salt works by the river side, close by the Porta Trigemina, and immediately under the north-west corner of the Aventine; and it seems to have been especially intended to supply water to the inhabitants of the low district about the Circus, who had hitherto been obliged to use the water of the river, or the rain water collected in tanks or cisterns. When we remember that this part of Rome was particularly inhabited by the poorest citizens, we may suspect that Appius wished to repay the support which he had already received from them, or to purchase its continuance for the time to come; but we shall feel unmixed pleasure in observing that the first

The Ap-  
pian aque-  
duct.

<sup>30</sup> It is well known that the ancient Capua did not stand on the Vulturnus, but about three miles to the south of it, on the site of the present S. Maria di Capua. The modern Capua corresponds with the ancient Casilinum.

<sup>31</sup> The whole account of this aqueduct is taken from the work of Frontinus. He was superintendent of the aqueducts in the reign of Nerva, and his account of them is exceedingly full and accurate.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

How money  
and labour-  
ers were  
found for  
these works.

Roman aqueduct was constructed for the benefit of the poor, and of those who most needed it.

“These two works exhausted,” says Diodorus, “the whole revenue of Rome.” But considering the unavoidable expenses of the war, to which the tributum was wholly appropriated, the disposable revenue from the vectigalia, or rents received by the commonwealth, must have been insufficient; and Niebuhr reasonably conjectures that Appius must have sold large portions of the state’s domain, in order to raise the money which he required. The workmen employed consisted doubtless, in great measure, of the prisoners taken from the Samnites, either in battle or in the repeated invasions of their territory; the rest were the public or government slaves, or those furnished by the several contractors for the work: for such labours were held to be degrading to free citizens, and Appius would have acquired no popularity amongst the poorest classes, by offering to provide them with employment in making his road, or digging his water-course.

Appius re-  
tains his  
censorship  
beyond the  
legal term.

The regular term of the censor’s office, eighteen months, was far too short for the completion of these works; and had they been finished by another censor, the glory of them would have been lost to Appius. Setting, therefore, all law and all opposition at defiance, Appius persisted in retaining his censorship when the eighteen months were expired; and although the tribune P. Sempronius Sophus<sup>32</sup>,

<sup>32</sup> Livy, IX. 33.

one of the most eminent commoners of this period, threatened to send him to prison if he persisted in disobeying the law, and although six of the other tribunes supported their colleague, yet the remaining three promised Appius their protection; and as their negative was all-powerful, Appius was secured from any molestation so long as they continued in office. He found some tribunes equally devoted to him in the next year, for he retained his censorship four years, and in the fifth he endeavoured to add to it the power and dignity of consul, and whilst he still continued to be censor, he declared himself a candidate for the consulship. Here, however, that negative power of the tribunes which had hitherto been his support was employed against him: L. Furius<sup>33</sup> forbade the business of the comitia to proceed, until Appius had resigned his censorship. Then, however, he was elected consul, and perhaps in this capacity finished and dedicated the two works of which he so greatly coveted the glory.

The extreme moderation of the party opposed to Appius deserves in all these transactions the highest praise. They composed probably the majority in the senate, and if they had exerted their whole strength they must have been also the majority in the comitia. Yet they suffered Appius to defy the laws for a period of two years and a half, and afterwards they allowed him to be elected consul without opposition, nor when he became a private citizen did

CHAP.  
XXXII.

Wise moderation of the party opposed to him.

<sup>33</sup> Livy, IX. 42.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

they ever impeach him for the violence of his conduct. We cannot, in our ignorance of the details of all these times, appreciate fully the wisdom of this conduct; but as violence begets violence, so unquestionably does moderation in political contests lead to moderation in return. The personal ambition of Appius had been gratified even beyond the law; and this his political opponents had endured at the time, nor did they seek to punish it afterwards. Nothing was attempted against him which could either irritate his own passions, or invest him in the eyes of the multitude with the character of a martyr in their cause. If he had ever carried his views still higher than to a five years' censorship, if the hope of regal dominion had ever floated before his eyes, the forbearance shown towards him deprived him not only of every pretext for further violence, but appealing to the nobler part of his nature restrained him for very shame from endeavouring to wrest more, where so much had been already yielded to him; it would not suffer him to assail that constitution which had shown itself towards him at once so confident and so placable. Ten years after his first consulship he was elected consul again in the midst of the third Samnite war, and he obtained the prætorship in the year following. He bore his part not without honour, amongst the greatest generals of his day, in that most arduous contest when the Gauls again fought against Rome with the Etruscans and the Samnites to aid them; and in his old age he had the glory of determining the senate by the last effort of his



eloquence not to treat with the ambassador of Pyrrhus. CHAP.  
XXXII.

The example which Appius had set in his public works was followed by the succeeding censors, M. Valerius Maximus and C. Junius Bubulcus. They also made some roads<sup>34</sup> through the country in the neighbourhood of Rome; that is, they either improved the line of the existing local roads, or widened them, and constructed them of better materials. One of the roads, thus in a manner made anew, led from Rome to Tibur; and this being afterwards continued through the country of the Æquians by Carseoli and Alba, as far as Sulmo and Corfinium, and thus having become one of the greatest lines of communication in Italy, was known throughout its whole length by the name of the Valerian Way, because the first twenty miles of it from Rome to Tibur were made by the censor M. Valerius.

In this same year, 447-8 (Nieb. 441), we may place the trial of A. Atilius Calatinus, on a charge of having betrayed the garrison of Sora to the Samnites. He had married a daughter of Q. Fabius, and had been left by his father-in-law in the command of the place, when he himself left his province of Samnium to return to Rome. Sora and Calatia were at this period<sup>35</sup> both surprised by the Samnites, and the troops who garrisoned them were sold for slaves. Atilius either made his escape, or was taken

<sup>34</sup> Livy, IX. 43. Cassiodorus. <sup>35</sup> Diodorus, XX. 80. Livy, IX. 43.

prisoner and allowed to be ransomed; but on his return to Rome he was accused of treason, a charge often made against unsuccessful officers, and listened to the more readily, because while the soldiers had been led away into slavery, their commander had met with a fate so different. Perhaps in this accusation we may trace the influence possessed at this time in the comitia by the city populace, who were not commonly enlisted in the legions, and who were apt to judge the conduct of military men unfairly and severely, in proportion to their own total ignorance of war. It might have fared hardly with Atilius, had his father-in-law been any less distinguished man than Q. Fabius. But Fabius<sup>36</sup> came forward and declared to the people that the charge was groundless; "Had it been otherwise," said he, "I should not have allowed my daughter to remain the wife of a traitor<sup>37</sup>." The people, suspicious because they were ignorant, but meaning honestly, listened at once to the testimony of so great a general, and so upright a man, and Atilius was acquitted. His son, the grandson of Q. Fabius, became one of the most distinguished citizens in the first Punic war; he was twice consul, dictator, and censor<sup>38</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> Valerius Maximus, VIII. I. § 9.

<sup>37</sup> By which it appears, as Niebuhr well observes, that the practice of marrying without *conventio in manum* was common even amongst distinguished families. Thus the daughter still remained in her father's power, if to bar her husband's right to her by

prescription she absented herself from him for three nights in the year. See vol. I. p. 263.

<sup>38</sup> His epitaph said of him, in language resembling the epitaphs of the Scipios,

"*Plurimæ consentiunt gentes Populi primarium fuisse virum.*"

See Cicero, de Senect. 17.

Two years afterwards the influence of the new popular party in the comitia reached its highest point, when Cn. Flavius, the clerk of Appius, and the man who had published the calendar and the forms of actions at law, was elected curule ædile.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

Ædileship  
of Cn. Fla-  
vius, the  
clerk of Ap-  
pius Clau-  
dus.

When the first votes were given in his favour, the ædile who presided at the comitia refused to receive them, saying that a clerk was not fit to hold a curule magistracy. It so happened<sup>9</sup> that Flavius himself was attending on the curule ædile at that very time in the way of his occupation; he had his tablets and his style in his hands, to record the votes. As soon as he heard the objection he stepped forwards; he laid down his tablets, and declared upon oath that from that day forwards he would follow the business of a clerk no more. The ædile then received the votes that were given for him, and Cn. Flavius was duly elected. His colleague was Q. Anicius<sup>10</sup> of Præneste, who had only within the last few years became a Roman citizen; while two commoners of consular families, C. Poetelius and Cn. Domitius, were unsuccessful candidates. The indignation of the patricians and of the old commons on this occasion was so great, that the senators laid aside their gold rings, and the young patricians, and wealthy commoners who formed the equestrian order, put off their chains of honour (phaleræ), as if so great a dishonour to the commonwealth required a general mourning. It should be remembered that the curule

<sup>9</sup> L. Piso, Annal. III. quoted by Gellius, VI. 9.

<sup>10</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. XXXIII. 6.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

ædileship was at this time an office of high distinction, and that every curule magistracy was supposed to convey something of kingly and therefore of sacred dignity; so that it was a profanation if it were bestowed on a freedman's son, although he might have held the tribuneship of the commons without offence. Flavius, however, was a man of spirit, and was not abashed by these signs of displeasure; nay, he even enjoyed the mortification of the nobility; and a story<sup>41</sup> was told how on a time, when his colleague Q. Anicius was sick, Flavius went to visit him; and when he entered his room he found several noble youths who were sitting there with him. They, scorning the freedman's son, remained in their places, and would not rise as they were bound to do to the curule ædile. Upon which Flavius sent for his curule chair, and placed it in the doorway so that no one could pass, and then taking his seat in it, obliged them to see him in the enjoyment of his dignity. Yet, although he would not allow himself to be overborne by insolence, he could not bear to be the occasion of divisions between his countrymen; and he vowed to build a temple to Concord<sup>42</sup>, if he could succeed in effecting a recon-

<sup>41</sup> Piso, apud Gell. VI. 9. Livy, IX. 46.

<sup>42</sup> "Flavius vovit ædem Concordiæ, si populo reconciliasset ordines." Niebuhr understands by *populus* the old patricians, and by *ordines* the plebs and the freedmen. But surely the old sense of *populus* is inapplicable here; and

we must either understand "*ordines*" of the senate and the equestrian order, which is undoubtedly the meaning, if the words are Pliny's own; or if he copied them from an older writer, "*ordines*" may signify the clerks, *scribæ*, and the other trades or inferior callings, and *populus*

ciliation between the higher and lower classes of the commonwealth.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

We must suppose, therefore, that he witnessed without opposition the decree of the senate that two censors should be immediately appointed, although not a year had elapsed since the last censors had resigned their office. Still less could he find fault with the choice of the comitia, which fell upon two of the most popular men in Rome, Q. Fabius and P. Decius.

Q. Fabius  
and P. Decius censors.

This censorship, according to Niebuhr, effected little less than a remodelling of the whole constitution : in particular, he supposes that the perplexing combination of tribes and centuries, which is known to have existed in the later periods of the commonwealth, was the work of Fabius and Decius ; and that they adjusted, in a manner satisfactory to all parties, the ever-contending claims of nobility and wealth on the one hand and of numbers on the other. I cannot assert this, even on Niebuhr's authority, not only from the total want of all direct evidence, but because I am inclined to think that the mixture of tribes and centuries in the later form of the comitia centuriata was the work of the fourth century of Rome rather than of the fifth. Nor do I quite believe the story<sup>43</sup> that it was to his eminent

Measures  
supposed to  
have been  
taken in  
their cen-  
sorship.

means what Livy calls "integer populus," that is, the patricians and the old commons, as opposed to the "forensis factio."

<sup>43</sup> The story is told by Livy, IX. 46, and by several other writers. But Polybius asserts

that the surname of Maximus was given to the dictator Q. Fabius in the second Punic war, on account of his great services at that period. III. 87. This is undoubtedly a mistake, but I believe the other story is no less so ; and that the



CHAP.  
XXXII.

services in this censorship that Q. Fabius owed his surname of Maximus.

What was  
certainly  
effected was  
wise and  
beneficial.

What is actually recorded of the censors of this year is sufficiently probable ; and that it should have been accomplished not only without a contest, but as far as appears without exciting any thing but satisfaction, is one of the most extraordinary proofs of the political wisdom and moderation of the Roman people. The lower classes of the city, and those whose blood was not yet clear from the taint of slavery, had gained a political power much more than in proportion to their social importance ; and there is in this something so unnatural, that it shocks even those who may be supposed to benefit by it, unless they have been previously corrupted by intolerable distress, no less fatal to wisdom and goodness than excessive enjoyment, or have been exasperated by previous insolence and oppression. Had there been now such a state of misery amongst the poorer classes as that which followed the Gaulish invasion, or had the old law of debtor and creditor existed still and been rigorously exercised, the lower people would have eagerly retained the power which fortune had thrown into their hands ; they would have valued it as ensuring them at once protection and vengeance. But when all was prospering, when the state was victorious abroad and daily growing

surname Maximus in the Fabian family, no less than in the Valerian and Carvilian, had reference originally to personal size rather than to greatness of mind or exploits ;

that it answered to the surname of Philip le Long, or of Edward the First, rather than to that of Alexander or Charlemagne.

in wealth and magnificence at home; when the citizens of highest rank were also the worthiest; and the commonwealth seemed to enjoy a real aristocracy, which is as natural and excellent as its counterfeits are hateful; above all, when there was prevailing a general spirit of moderation, which dispelled all fears of tyranny,—why should men endure such an unfitness as that the lower should take the place of the higher, and that those who were of least account in society should exercise politically the greatest power? So Flavius, resigning all prospect of rising to higher honours, allowed that he had already risen too high for one of his class, and that more than one generation should elapse between the slave and the curule magistrate. Fabius and Decius removed all freedmen<sup>44</sup>, all artisans, and all other citizens of the lowest class, into four tribes only out of the one and thirty which then existed; so that they could influence at most but a little more than an eighth part of the whole comitia; and these four tribes were the old tribes of the city, as distinguished from those of the country, the Palatine, the Colline, the Esquiline, and the Suburran. Then Flavius, seeing the conditions of his vow fulfilled, built his temple to Concord<sup>45</sup>, a small chapel of which the

<sup>44</sup> Livy, IX. 46.

<sup>45</sup> Pliny, Hist. XXXIII. 6. In this notice of the founding of the temple by Cn. Flavius, Pliny adds, “inciditque in tabellâ æreâ eam ædem cciv. annis post Capitolinam dedicatam.” This is a very important passage for the chronology of Rome; for it declares that the

consulship of P. Sempronius and P. Sulpicius, the last year of the second Samnite war, was believed by those who were then living, and by one who had an access to all existing monuments, to have been the 204th year from the beginning of the commonwealth.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

walls were plated with bronze, and which stood within the precinct of the temple of Vulcan, on the north side of the comitium. It was built with the money arising from the penalties paid by some wealthy men for having lent money at a rate of interest higher than was allowed by law; and Flavius by virtue of his office of ædile had prosecuted them before the comitia. When it was completed, the pontifex maximus, L. Cornelius Scipio<sup>46</sup>, refused to dictate the solemn form of dedication, which Flavius, according to custom, was to repeat after him; but the comitia, indignant at the spirit which dictated this refusal, passed a resolution which obliged the pontifex to retract it. Yet, afterwards, to complete the picture of moderation displayed by the people on this occasion, the comitia passed a bill proposed to them by the senate, enacting that for the time to come no man should be allowed to dedicate a temple without the sanction of the senate or of the majority of the tribunes of the commons. The aristocratical pride of the pontifex required to be restrained; yet it was not fit that he should be called to perform the solemnities of the national religion at the pleasure of an individual, or that a temple should be consecrated without the sanction of some public authority. Happy is that people which delivers itself from the evils of an aristocratical or priestly dominion, not by running wild into individual licentiousness, but by submitting to the wholesome sovereignty of law!

<sup>46</sup> Livy, IX. 46.

“The Carthaginians,” says Aristotle<sup>47</sup>, “provide for the stability of their constitution, by continually sending out a portion of their commons to their settlements in the surrounding country.” This policy was no less familiar to the Romans, and as some of the poorer citizens must have been discontented with the recent proceedings of the censors, so we find that three colonies were founded in the next two years, and that no fewer than fourteen thousand citizens were sent out as colonists<sup>48</sup>. The three places thus colonized were Sora, Alba, and Carseoli. Sora had been taken and retaken repeatedly in the late Samnite war, and its important position, just at the point where the Liris issues out from the mountains which confine its earlier course upon the high plain of Arpinum and the Fibrenus, made it desirable to secure its permanent possession; Carseoli and Alba had been conquered in the late war with the Æquians. Carseoli was in the upper valley of the Anio, about thirty-eight miles from Rome. Alba stood on an isolated hill at a little distance from the lake Fucinus; and the strength of its fortifications was even at this time remarkable, for the walls which still exist are built of enormous polygonal blocks of the limestone of the Apennines, and belong to a period much more ancient than the fifth century of Rome.

CHAP.  
XXXII.  
Colonies  
founded at  
this time.

Places so recently conquered, and so exposed to fresh attacks whenever a war should break out again,

Who were  
sent as set-  
tlers.

<sup>47</sup> Politic. II. 11.

<sup>48</sup> Six thousand were sent to Alba, four thousand to Sora, and as many to Carseoli. Livy, X. 1. 3.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

must have been colonized by men who understood war, and might be able to maintain their own ground, as a sort of frontier garrison. The settlers sent thither could not, therefore, have consisted wholly of the unwarlike populace of the city, but of the poorer citizens of the old commons, who had been accustomed to serve in the legions, and who had the skill and courage of veteran soldiers. It is very probable, however, that a certain portion of the freedmen and of the city populace may have been mixed up with them.

The Ogul-  
nian bill for  
throwing  
open all  
sacred of-  
fices to the  
commons.

In appointing and supporting the censorship of Fabius and Decius, the patricians and the nobility of the commons must have acted in concert with each other. But three years afterwards, there was a feeble return of the old quarrel between the two orders, when two of the tribunes<sup>49</sup>, Q. and Cn. Ogulnius, proposed a bill for increasing the number of the pontifices and augurs by the addition of new members to be chosen from the commons. In Rome, as elsewhere, the civil equality of the two great orders of the state had been established, whilst the old religious distinctions between them still subsisted; a commoner might be consul, dictator, or censor, but he could not as yet be pontifex or augur. But this exclusion, although it related to religious offices, was maintained for political purposes, and could not indeed be justified on religious grounds. For, according to the old principle, that

<sup>49</sup> Livy. X. 6, et seqq.



the priests of the gods must be of a certain race or caste, carefully preserved from any profane mixture, the Roman patricians had long since forfeited the purity of their blood by their frequent intermarriages with the commons. But politically, their exclusive possession of the offices of pontifex and augur might secure them some advantages. Twice within twenty-five years we have seen the appointment of a plebeian dictator annulled by the augurs, on the ground of certain religious objections of which they were the sole judges. All questions of augury depended on their decision; and this in a state where nothing either political or military was done without consulting the auspices, conferred, necessarily, an immense power. The pontifices, in like manner, had the absolute control over every part of the ritual of religion, and, as connected with it, over the calendar. What festivals were to be observed, and at what times; what public sacrifices should be performed, and with what ceremonies; and what was an interference on the part of any individual with sacred places, persons, or things, were all points of their jurisdiction, against which it is doubtful whether even the tribunes would have ventured to interpose. It seemed but reasonable, therefore, that as the patricians and commons were now become one people, and as both alike were admitted to those high and sacred dignities of consul and dictator, which involved the practice of augury, and the offering sacrifice to the peculiar gods of Rome, in the name of the Roman people, so the knowledge as

CHAP.  
XXXII.

well as the practice of the national religious system should be committed to both equally; that where no religious objection really existed, political ambition might no longer be able to shelter itself beneath its semblance.

P. Decius  
supports it,  
and it be-  
comes a law.

Still, however, a party amongst the patricians, headed, as we are told, by Appius Claudius<sup>50</sup>, vehemently opposed the Ogulnian bill. It was supported by P. Decius; and no man could have pleaded for it with greater effect, when he appealed to his father's memorable death, and recalled him to the memory of some of his hearers, as they had seen him in the great battle with the Latins, with his toga wrapped around his head, and his feet on a javelin, devoting himself to the powers of death in behalf of the Roman people. "If my father," said he, "was no less fit than his patrician colleague to offer himself to the gods, as an accepted expiation for the whole people, how could he be unfit to direct their worship?" The question, in fact, could not but be carried; some of the tribunes were at first engaged to interpose their negative, but the general feeling obliged them to forbear, and the Ogulnian bill became a law. The pontifices, who were then four in number, elected accordingly four commoners to complete their college to eight, or, including their head, the pontifex maximus, to nine. And the augurs, who were also four, elected five commoners to raise their college to the same number of nine, on the

<sup>50</sup> Livy, X. 7.

notion that each of the original tribes of Rome, the Ramnenses, the Titienses, and the Luceres, was to be represented by an equal number of the public ministers of religion. It seems that the new appointments were fairly and wisely made; P. Decius himself<sup>51</sup>, and P. Sempronius Sophus, who had been both consuls and censors, were two of the new pontifices; and amongst the augurs, besides T. Publius, C. Genucius, and C. Marcius, all of them members of the most eminent families of the commons, we find the name of P. Ælius Pætus, a man of no great political or military distinction, but who probably showed a remarkable fondness for the study of the pontifical and augural discipline, inasmuch as we find an unusual number of his descendants<sup>52</sup> filling the offices of pontifex and augur, as if those sacred duties were almost the hereditary calling of their race and name.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

In the same year<sup>53</sup> M. Valerius, one of the consuls, re-enacted for the third time the famous law which bore the name of his family, and which was, in fact, the Roman law of trial by jury, as it permitted every citizen to appeal from the sentence of a magistrate in capital cases to the judgment of his country. It is not certain whether the consul who brought forward this law was M. Valerius Maximus, or M.

The Valerian law  
re-enacted.

<sup>51</sup> Livy, X. 9.

<sup>52</sup> Q. Ælius Pætus, who fell at Cannæ, was pontifex, Livy, XXI. 21. P. Ælius Pætus was appointed augur in the place of Marcellus, Livy, XXVII. 36; and on his

death he was succeeded by Q. Ælius Pætus. Livy, XLI. 21. Nor must we forget the Ælius whom Ennius honoured with the title of "egregiè cordatus homo."

<sup>53</sup> Livy, X. 9.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

Valerius Corvus: it must have been the latter, however, if the common statement be true that he was six times elected consul; and we should be glad to ascribe the measure to a man so worthy of it. The law denounced the violation of its provisions as a crime, but named no fixed penalty; leaving it open to the accuser to demand, and to the judges to award, a milder or a heavier sentence, according to the nature of the particular case, as was so generally the practice at Athens. But why this law should have been re-enacted at this particular time we know not. No recent instances of arbitrary power are mentioned, nor do we hear of any consul of this period who is charged with a disposition to cruelty. Perhaps the object of Valerius was simply to satisfy the humbler citizens that the government was not unmindful of their personal security, although it had diminished their political power; and that whilst the more distinguished commoners were completing their own equality with the patricians, they did not mean to allow the poorer members of their order to be oppressed with impunity. Thus the re-enactment of the Valerian law, taken in conjunction with the passing of the Ogulnian, seems to form an æra in the constitutional history of Rome; when the commons obtained a confirmation of their great charter of personal freedom for the mass of their order, and for those of their members who might rise to eminence, a perfectly equal share in all the honours of the commonwealth, religious no less than civil.

This period  
is followed

In some of the transactions recorded in this

chapter, we seem almost to have emerged into the light of day, and to be able to trace events and their actors with much of the clearness of real history. But even in those which are in themselves most vivid, we find a darkness on either side, concealing from our view their causes and their consequences; as in dreams, single scenes and feelings present themselves with wonderful distinctness: but what brought us to them, or what is to follow after them, is left altogether a mystery. Some of the many difficult questions which belong to this period, I propose to lay before the reader in the appendix to this volume, as I feel that I can offer no explanation of them so satisfactory as to claim the name of history. In this number I would place especially the famous question as to the later constitution of the comitia of centuries, a problem which not even Niebuhr could fully solve, and which has equally baffled other writers who have more recently attempted it. But in the following period of about fourteen years, which elapsed between the passing of the Ogulnian law and the dictatorship of Q. Hortensius, there is scarcely a single fact in the domestic history of Rome which can be discerned clearly, and we are left to ask what circumstances could have produced so great a change; and how, after a state of things so peaceable and so prosperous, and a settlement of the constitution apparently so final, we are brought back again so suddenly to the circumstances of a long past period, to

CHAP.  
XXXII.

by one very  
obscurely  
known.



CHAP.  
XXXII.



a heavy burden of debt, to quarrels between the different orders in the state from this cause, and to a new secession of the commons to the Janiculum.

In the meantime we must carry on for a while the foreign history of Rome, and describe that short but decisive war, in which the Romans triumphed over the triple coalition of the Etruscans, the Samnites, and the Gauls.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

FOREIGN HISTORY FROM 450 TO 464 (443 TO 456, NIEBUHR) — CONQUEST OF THE ÆQUIANS — THIRD SAMNITE WAR — COALITION OF THE ETRUSCANS, SAMNITES, AND GAULS — GREAT BATTLE OF SENTINUM, AND DEATH OF P. DECIUS — FINAL VICTORY OF Q. FABIUS OVER THE SAMNITES — C. PONTIUS IS LED IN TRIUMPH, AND PUT TO DEATH IN COLD BLOOD.

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“Ter totum fervidus irâ  
Lustrat Aventini montem; ter saxea tentat  
Limina nequidquam; ter fessus valle resedit.”  
VIRG. *Æn.* VIII. 230.

“Thrice did the indignant nations league their might,  
Thrice the red darkness of the battle’s night  
Shrouded the recreant terror of their flight.”  
MILMAN, *Judicium Regale*.

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THE peace with Samnium was immediately followed by a war with the Æquians. Since the Gaulish invasion, the very name of this people has vanished out of our sight, except on one single occasion in the year immediately following the recovery of the city, when Camillus is said to have taken from them the town of Bola<sup>1</sup>. As they took no part in the subsequent attacks made by the Volscians upon

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

War with  
the Æqui  
ans.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, VI. 2.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Rome, and did not even join their neighbours of Præneste, when they from the allies of the Romans became their enemies, so we may conclude with Niebuhr, that the Gaulish invasion had been even more fatal to them than to the Romans; that they must have been so weakened by some great disaster sustained at that period, as to have fallen back altogether from their advanced position on the edge of the Campagna to their older country in the upper valleys of the Turano<sup>2</sup> and the Salto, and near the western shore of the lake Fucinus. From their towns on the edge of the Campagna they were probably expelled by the Latins; and acquisitions of territory from the Æquians may have been among the causes which raised Tibur and Præneste after the Gaulish invasion, to greatness far above the rest of their countrymen. Meanwhile the Æquians were left unmolested in their remaining territory, and for nearly eighty years from the burning of Rome by the Gauls they seem to have remained perfectly neutral. But towards the end of the second Samnite war, when the Hernicans, in their jealousy of the growing power of Rome, took up arms against

<sup>2</sup> The Turano is the stream which, rising at the back of the hills which form the northern boundary of the valley of the Anio, flows thence in a northerly direction, and joins the Velino just below Rieti. The Salto rises very near to the lake Fucino, and in its earlier course is called the Imele; but it sinks into a fissure in the limestone a little below the famous

battle-field of Scurgola, the scene of Conradin's defeat by Charles of Anjou, and when it re-appears it receives the name of Salto. It flows through the pastoral country of the Cicolano, and falls into the Velino above Rieti. See Bunsen's article, "Esame del sito dei più antichi stabilimenti Italici," &c. in the *Annals of the Archaeological Society of Rome*, Vol. VI. p. 110.

her, the Æquians also, probably from similar motives, were induced to join in the quarrel. Æquian soldiers<sup>3</sup> were found, it was said, together with Hernicans, in that Samnite army which Q. Fabius, when proconsul in the year 447, had defeated at Allifæ; and after the Hernican war in the year following, the whole Æquian people joined the Samnites. Thus when the Samnites, in the year 450, were obliged to sue for peace, the Æquians were left in a position of no small danger. Rome, it appears, was willing to forgive them on no other terms than those just imposed on the Hernicans; namely, that they should become citizens of Rome without the right of voting in the comitia; in other words that they should submit to become Roman subjects. Hopeless as their condition was, their old spirit would not yet allow them to yield, and they resolved to abide a contest with the whole undivided power of the Roman commonwealth.

Both consuls, P. Sempronius and P. Sulpicius<sup>†</sup>, with two consular armies, marched at once into the Æquian territory. Such a force, amounting to about 40,000 men, confounded all plans of resistance. Few Æquians of that generation had ever seen war; their country had not been exposed to the ravages of an enemy within the memory of any man then living. Abandoning all hope of maintaining the field against the invaders, they took refuge in their several towns, hoping there to baffle the first assault

Their country is overrun, and their towns taken.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, IX. 45.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, IX. 45.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

of the enemy, and trusting that time might bring some of the neighbouring people to their aid. But their towns were small, and were thus each weak in the number of their defenders: the Romans well knew the effect of a first impression, and in the places which they first stormed, they probably, according to their usual practice, made a bloody execution, in order to strike terror into the rest. We have seen, under the influence of a general panic, some of the strongest fortresses and one of the most warlike nations of modern Europe taken and conquered in the space of two months; so that we cannot wonder that fifty days were sufficient to complete the Æquian war, and that forty-one towns were taken within that period<sup>5</sup>, the greater part of which were destroyed and burnt. The polygonal walls of many of them are still in existence, and are to be found scattered along the pastoral upland valley of the Himella or Salto, from Alba almost to the neighbourhood of Reate. The Romans, however, did their work of destruction well; for although the style of the walls in these ruins denotes their high antiquity, yet no traces are to be found of the name, or race, or condition of their inhabitants: the actual remains will tell as little of the history of the Æquian people as we can glean from the scanty reports of their conquerors.

They submit and receive the Roman franchise.

The fate which the Æquians had vainly striven to avert now fell upon the remnant of their nation,

<sup>5</sup> Livy, IX. 45. Diodorus, XX. 101.



after the greatest portion of the people had perished or been led away into slavery. The survivors, after seeing the greatest portion of their territory converted into Roman domain land, were obliged to become Roman citizens without suffrage. But five years afterwards, when war with Etruria and with the Samnites was again threatening, the Romans admitted them to the full franchise<sup>6</sup>, and they formed a considerable part of the citizens enrolled in the year 455 in the two tribes then created, the Aniense and Terentine.

When the Samnites had made peace with Rome they were required to restore Lucania to its independence; that is, they were obliged to give back the hostages whom they had kept as a pledge of the nation's fidelity, and to withdraw their garrisons from

The Roman party predominant in Lucania. Rome and Lucania at war with Tarentum. The Taren-

<sup>6</sup> "Majores nostri," says Cicero, "Æquos in civitatem acceperunt." De Officiis, I. 11. That they were admitted into the tribes Aniense and Terentina is not expressly stated by any ancient writer; but the date of the creation of these tribes connects them with the Æquians, and the tribe Aniense must have included the upper valley of the Anio, which was Æquian. The tribe Terentina contained at a later period, as we know, the people of the Volscian city of Atina (Cicero pro Plancio, 8. 16. 22); and Niebuhr thinks that they were included in it, because it was in their neighbourhood. But the Arpinatians, who lived nearer to the Æquian country than the people of Atina, were included in the Cornelian tribe (Livy, XXXVIII. 36): and we can-

not always conclude that a tribe contained only the people of one particular district. The origin of the name Terentina is quite unknown. We know of no town Terentum which could have given it its name, nor of any river Terens. What was the ancient name of the Turano, which, as it runs near to the site of Carseoli, must have flowed through the Æquian territory? Bunsen has shown that it is a mere mistake to suppose that the Tolenus or Telonius was the Turano. (Annali dell' Istituto, &c. tom. VI. p. 104.) Could the Turano have been anciently called Terens, or Terentus, and could the tribe Terentina have been named from this river, as the Aniense was from the Anio?

CHAP.  
XXXIII.  
—  
times call  
Cleonymus  
the Spartan  
to their aid.

the Lucanian towns. The Roman party in Lucania upon this regained its ascendancy, and the foreign relations of the country were so changed, that from having been in alliance with the Samnites and Tarentines against Rome, the Lucanians now took part with Rome against Tarentum. During the Samnite war, the Tarentines, covered as they were by the territory of their allies, had nothing to fear from the Roman armies; and by sea, as the Roman navy was very inconsiderable, they carried on the contest with advantage. But now a consular army<sup>7</sup>, supported by their old enemies the Lucanians, might at any moment appear under their very walls; and they looked out therefore for some foreign aid. They sent to Greece, and to their own mother-city Sparta, imploring that an army might be sent to help them, and that Cleonymus might be its general. Cleonymus was the younger son of Cleomenes<sup>8</sup>, king of Sparta, and the grandson of Cleombrotus who fell at Leuctra. His nephew Areus, Cleomenes' grandson by his elder son Acrotatus, had been now for about six years on the throne; and Cleonymus, like Dorieus of old, not liking to remain in Sparta as a private citizen, was eager for any opportunity of distinguishing himself abroad. Areus was no less ready to let him go; and accordingly he complied at once with the invitation of the Tarentines, and

<sup>7</sup> Diodorus says expressly, Ταραντίνοι πόλεμον ἔχοντες πρὸς Λευκανοὺς καὶ Ῥωμαίους. XX. 104.

<sup>8</sup> Pausanias, III. 6. Plutarch, Agis, 3, and Pyrrhus, 26. Com-

pare the article on the kings of Sparta in the Appendix to the second volume of Mr. Fynes Clinton's Fasti Hellenici.

having levied at their expense about 5000 Greek mercenaries, he crossed over into Italy. There he raised 5000 mercenaries more, and the native forces of Tarentum are reckoned at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse<sup>9</sup>. Most of the Italian Greeks, together with the Sallentines, who had already been engaged in hostilities with Rome, joined his standard; and had Cleonymus possessed the ability of Pyrrhus, he might have rallied around him the Samnites and Etruscans, and after the exhaustion of a twenty years' war, the Romans would have found it no easy matter to withstand him.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

As it was, the display of his force terrified the Lucanians, and they made their peace with Tarentum<sup>10</sup>. It is remarkable that Diodorus, who states this in express terms, and who had just before named the Romans as being also at war with the Tarentines, yet makes no mention of any peace between Tarentum and Rome. A treaty, however, must have been concluded, for the attack made by the Tarentines on a Roman fleet, eleven years afterwards, is said<sup>11</sup> to have been occasioned by a violation of the conditions of the peace between the two nations; and had it not been made at this time, we cannot conceive that Cleonymus could so immediately have engaged in other enterprises. It seems probable that no other terms were required on either side than the renewal of a preceding treaty; and this treaty was originally concluded at a period when

Peace between Rome and Tarentum.

<sup>9</sup> Diodorus, XX. 104.

<sup>10</sup> Diodorus, XX. 104.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, Samnitic. VII.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

the only conceivable intercourse between Rome and Tarentum could have been by sea. It stipulated<sup>12</sup> in the usual language that no Roman ships, meaning probably ships of war, were to advance along the south coast of Italy nearer to Tarentum than the headland of Lacinium, which forms the southern extremity of the Tarentine gulph. There was no doubt a similar stipulation, restraining the Tarentines from advancing with their ships of war nearer to Rome than the headland of Circeii.

Cleonymus, being thus no longer needed by the Tarentines, employed his arms with various success in plundering operations along the eastern coast of Italy, till at last he was beaten off by the inhabitants and obliged to return to Greece. He is not heard of again till he invited Pyrrhus to assist him in his attempt to seize the throne of Sparta.

Short war  
with the  
Marsians.

Two years after the end of the Samnite war, the Marsians, who had then, as we have seen, made peace with Rome like the other allies of the Samnites, were again engaged in hostilities. The Roman account<sup>13</sup> states that they resisted the settlement of a

<sup>12</sup> Δημαγωγὸς . . παλαιῶν τοὺς Ταραντίνους ἀνεμίμησκε συνθηκῶν, μὴ πλεῖν Ῥωμαίους πρόσω Λακινίας ἄκρας.—Appian, Samnitic. VII.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, X. 3. At this point we lose the connected history of Diodorus. The last consulship noticed in his twentieth book is that of M. Livius and M. Æmilius, which was the second year after the end of the Samnite war, and according to Diodorus the third year of the hundred and nineteenth Olym-

piad. Although we have numerous fragments of his later books, yet these can ill supply the place of a regular narrative, which with all its faults has certainly preserved to us some very valuable and probable accounts of many events in the Roman history. We miss also his notices of the several writers from whom his work was compiled, and his occasional mention of obscure nations and cities, of which we have scarcely any

Roman colony at Carseoli, one of the Æquian towns lately conquered, and themselves maintained the place by force. This is scarcely credible, for they had made no opposition to the colonizing of Alba, a more important position, and one much nearer to their own country. However the war, whatever was its cause, was short, and ended in the speedy submission of the Marsians, who were obliged to cede a portion of their domain. The same penalty had been paid in the preceding year by the Hernicans of Frusino, for an alleged attempt to excite their countrymen to revolt; and these acquisitions of land by the Romans are memorable, not so much as increasing their power against foreign enemies, but for their effect on their own state of society at home. We must remember that the land thus gained was mostly held in occupation by the Roman nobility, and often to a much larger extent than the Licinian law allowed; and that this great increase of their wealth, and accumulation of extensive domains, "Latifundia," led gradually to a system of slave cultivation, and contributed more than any other cause to the great diminution of the free population throughout Italy.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

In this same year the Vestinians<sup>14</sup>, of whom we have heard nothing since their unfortunate war with Rome in 429, are said to have sought the friendship of the Romans, and to have concluded with them a treaty of alliance. Since the conquest of the

The Vestinians and Picentians in alliance with Rome.

other knowledge. Thus for the third Samnite war Livy is almost our sole authority.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, X. 3.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Æquians the Roman frontier had become contiguous to theirs; so that relations with Rome, either friendly or hostile, were become inevitable. Through this treaty, Rome completely separated the Samnites from the Etruscans; as her own territory or that of her allies reached now across the whole width of Italy from the mouth of the Tiber to that of the Aternus on the Adriatic. Two or three years<sup>15</sup> afterwards the Picentians, whose country stretched along the coast of the Adriatic northward of the Vestinians, lapping as it were round Umbria on the east, and reaching as far as the settlements of the Senonian Gauls on the Metaurus and the Æsis, became also the allies of Rome. Their friendship was of importance; for not only were the Etruscans and Umbrians already at war with Rome, but it was known that the Gauls had been solicited to take part in the contest; and the situation of Picenum was most favourable for carrying the war into the

<sup>15</sup> Livy, X. 10. Another year is inserted by the chronologers between the consulship of M. Livius and M. Æmilius, and that of M. Valerius and Q. Appuleius. Like two or three other years in the fifth century of Rome, it is said to have been a year without consuls, and marked only by a dictatorship. Thus the chronology becomes more and more confused, for these dictatorships if real could not have lasted for more than six months, and the next consuls would therefore come into office half a year after their predecessors' term was

expired. In this manner the beginning of the consular year was continually varying, and these portions of years being reckoned as whole years, the reckoning fell more and more in disorder. How constantly do the perplexities of the Roman Fasti remind one of the truth of Thucydides' remark, that the natural chronology of the seasons of the year was the only sure guide; the civil chronology, he says was a perpetual source of mistakes: οὐ γὰρ ἀκριβές ἐστίν, οἷς καὶ ἀρχομένοις καὶ μεσοῦσι, καὶ ὅπως ἔτυχεν τῷ, ἐπεγένετό τι.—V. 20.

Gauls' own country, if they should attempt to stir, or for threatening the flank and rear of the Etruscans and Umbrians, if they should move either on Rome or towards Samnium.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Meanwhile the Etruscan war, which was so soon to kindle a new war with the Samnites, broke out partially in the year 453. Its origin is ascribed to the internal factions of the Etruscan city of Arretium<sup>16</sup>; the powerful house of the Cilnians, of which Mæcnas was a descendant, was at variance with the people or commons of Arretium, and was suspected also by some of the neighbouring cities, as likely to endanger their independence. The Cilnians applied for aid to Rome, already known as the natural supporter of the high aristocratical party throughout Italy, and thus, we are told, a Roman army was sent into Etruria. The details, as is so often the case, are utterly conflicting; but it is said that the Cilnians were reconciled to the popular party, and hostilities ended for the present. In the next year, 454, we find one of the consuls besieging the Umbrian town of Nequinum<sup>17</sup> on the Nar, on what provocation we know not. The siege, however, was protracted till the year following; for the inhabitants well availed themselves of the strong site of their town, built on a narrow ledge in the mountain side, with an almost abrupt ascent above, and a descent no less steep down into the narrow gorge of the Nar below. At last the town was betrayed to

A new  
Etruscan  
war. Siege  
of Nequinum in  
Umbria.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, X. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, X. 9.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

the Romans ; and they immediately sent a colony to occupy the spot<sup>18</sup>, which from henceforth took the name of Narnia. It commands the defile which leads from the valley of the Tiber into the plain of Interamna or Terni, one of the richest tracts of central Italy.

The Samnites exert themselves vigorously to form a new coalition against Rome.

Some accounts<sup>19</sup> related that the Samnites had supported the people of Nequinum in their obstinate resistance, and had sent troops to their succour. It is manifest that the Samnite government was at this period making the greatest exertions, in the hope, probably, that the Etruscans would create a diversion in their favour by drawing off a part of the forces of Rome to her northern frontier. The Samnite plans were, moreover, unexpectedly furthered by a new inroad of the Gauls ; new hordes had lately arrived from beyond the Alps<sup>20</sup>, and their countrymen in the plains of the Po, having no room for them, were anxious to speed them on their way southwards ; they encouraged them to cross the Apennines, and even joined themselves in the enterprise. The Etruscans had already perhaps engaged their services against the Romans ; so that the Gauls

<sup>18</sup> Livy, X. 10.

<sup>19</sup> "M. Fulvius Cn : F. Cn. N. Pætinus Cos. De Samnitibus Nequinatibusque . Ann : CD . . . VII. K. Oct."—Fasti Capitol.

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, II. 19. This account is again different from that of Livy, who represents the Gauls as quarrelling with the Etruscans about the terms of their service, and thus as not invading the Ro-

man dominion at all. There can be no doubt that Polybius has preserved the truer version of these events. He fixes also this Gaulish invasion at about eighty-seven years after the first invasion, when Rome was taken, that is, according to his reckoning, Olymp. 120-1, or B.C. 300. The common reckoning places it in 299, a difference not worth dwelling upon.

marched through Etruria still onwards, and with an Etruscan force co-operating with them, they poured into the Roman dominions<sup>21</sup>. It is probable that they followed their old line by the valley of the Clanis into Umbria, and that their ravages were carried on rather in the territory of the allies of Rome than in that of Rome itself. But the invaders won a great spoil without any opposition, and the Gauls recrossed the Apennines to carry it home in safety. They would have been tempted, probably, by their success, to renew their inroad in the next year; but fortunately for the Romans, they quarrelled with one another about the division of their plunder<sup>22</sup>; and the greatest part of their multitude were destroyed by each others' swords. Whilst the Gauls, however, were on the left bank of the Tiber, the whole force of Rome was watching their movements; and the Samnites seized the opportunity to march into Lucania<sup>23</sup>. The appearance of a Samnite army revived the Samnite party in Lucania; the Roman party was everywhere overpowered; town after town was recovered to the Samnite

<sup>21</sup> ἐκ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπαρχίας ἀσφαλῶς ἐπανήλθον.—Polyb. II. 19.

<sup>22</sup> Polybius, II. 19.

<sup>23</sup> Livy, X. 11. Dionysius, XVI. 11. For these sudden revolutions in the condition of Lucania, we may compare the conquest of Bœotia by Myronides, and its loss a few years afterwards through the event of the battle of Coronea; and also the accession of Achaia to the Athenian alliance, a little

before the thirty years' peace, and its loss again, through the stipulations of that treaty. It is manifest that the Roman and Samnite parties in Lucania, or, in other words, the aristocratical and popular parties, each as they gained the ascendancy, took to themselves the name of the Lucanian nation, and spoke of the foreign supporters of the opposite party as the national enemies.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

alliance; and the partisans of Rome sent an embassy in all haste to the senate, praying for instant succour. But the Samnite government did not stop here; their ambassadors endeavoured to rouse all the nations of Italy to arms, and to form one great coalition against Rome. They solicited the Picentians to join them<sup>24</sup>; but there the influence of the Roman party was predominant; and the Picentian government made a merit of communicating instantly to the Romans the attempt of the Samnites to shake their faith. Old jealousies probably influenced the Marsians, Marrucinians, and Pelignians; they had often found the Samnites restless neighbours, and dreaded the restoration of their former power. But the Sabines<sup>25</sup> seem to have listened to the Samnite overtures; there the ties of blood drew the two people towards one another; and the new Roman tribes, lately created in the Æolian territory, brought the Romans into too close neighbourhood to Reate and the valley of the Velinus. Etruria was already engaged in a quarrel of her own with Rome; so far as the endless party revolutions in the Etruscan cities might allow any dependence on the stability of her counsels. The weakness of Umbria might yield to fear, if Etruria on one side and the

<sup>24</sup> Livy, X. 11.

<sup>25</sup> Amiternum, a Sabine town in the upper valley of the Aternus, was taken from the Samnites by the Romans in 461. Livy, X. 39. This implies a previous occupation of it by the Samnites, and an alliance therefore between the two

countries. And an inscription relating to Appius Claudius the blind, states that he "defeated an army of Sabines and Etruscans" in his consulship, namely, in the year 458. See Orelli, *Inscript. Latin. Collectio*, No. 539.



Sabines on the other, and the Gauls hanging on her northern frontier, should together call upon her to join the confederacy. Nor were the Samnites neglectful of the nations of the south: they had already, as we have seen, recovered the greatest part of Lucania, and their arms giving timely aid to their party within the country, must at this period have won also the majority of the Apulian nation to desert the Roman alliance, and to acknowledge once again the supremacy of Samnium<sup>26</sup>. The indefatigable Samnite government, after all these efforts, might have well remonstrated, like the Homeric goddess, with that hard destiny which was to render them all fruitless—

*πῶς ἐθέλεις ἄλιον θείναι πόνον ἢδ' ἀτρέστον,  
ἰδρῶ θ' ὄν ἰδρωσα μόγῳ; καμέτην δέ μοι ἵπποι  
λαὸν ἀγειροῦσιν, Πριάμῳ κακὰ τοιοῦτε παίσιν.*

The Romans, as might have been expected, readily listened to the prayer of their friends in Lucania. An alliance<sup>27</sup> was concluded with the Lucanian people, and hostages, taken probably from some of the families of the Samnite party, were given to the Romans as a pledge of their allies' fidelity. Ambassadors were sent into Samnium, to require the Samnites to withdraw their troops from Lucania, and with a threat of instant war if the demand were not complied with. The Samnites ordered the ambassa-

Beginning of  
the THIRD  
SAMNITE  
WAR.

<sup>26</sup> Because in the year 457 we find an Apulian army in the field in aid of the Samnites; and P. Decius is said to have defeated it at Maleventum, when on its march to join the Samnite army. Livy, X. 15.  
<sup>27</sup> Livy, X. 11, 12. Dionysius, XVI. 11, 12.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

dors to leave Samnium without an audience; and the general council of the Samnite nation resolved that each separate state of their union should make its preparations for the support of the common cause. On the other side, the Romans made a formal declaration of war; and thus the desperate struggle began again with increased animosity.

Superior  
strength of  
the Roman  
confederacy.

When we read of the Samnites, Etruscans, and Gauls, with the Lucanians and Apulians, some of the Sabines and most of the Umbrian states, engaged in one great confederacy against Rome, we are first inclined to wonder how the Romans could have escaped destruction. But when we consider that under the name of Rome were included all those nations which were in her alliance, and of whose forces she had the supreme disposal, we find that it was but a weaker and far worse organized confederacy opposed to one stronger in itself, and much more firmly united. From the Ciminian hills to the bay of Naples, the territory of the Romans, Latins, and Campanians presented a compact mass of states and people, far superior in population, in resources, and in union, to the long and ill-organized line of its enemies; whilst in the centre of Italy, and reaching to the coast of the Adriatic, the Marsians, Pelignians, Marrucinians, Frentanians, Vestinians, and Picentians, formed a separate mass of Roman allies, who by their position might either obstruct the enemies' communications, or threaten their rear. In fact, it was only the desperate resolution of the Samnite people, and the great energy and ability of their

leaders, which could afford any chance of success, where the resources of the contending parties were so unequal. The Gauls were like all barbarians uncertain and unmanageable; and the repeated vacillations of the Etruscan counsels made the alliance of Etruria as unsafe a support as that of Egypt to the kings of Judah: to lean on the Etruscans was indeed to lean on a broken reed.

No combined plan of operations on the part of the enemies of Rome can be traced in the first campaign of the war. The Gauls could not be prevailed on as yet to take the field; and the Roman party in Lucania was not entirely put down, so that the Samnites were still employed in that quarter, and could not send an army into Etruria.

The Roman consuls of the year 456, the first year of the renewed Samnite war, were L. Cornelius Scipio and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus<sup>28</sup>. L. Scipio was the great grandfather of the conqueror of Hannibal; and he is the first Roman of whom a contemporary record has reached our times; the famous epitaph<sup>29</sup> on his tomb, which declares him to have

<sup>28</sup> Livy. X. 11.

<sup>29</sup> The sarcophagus which contained the bones of L. Cornelius Scipio was discovered in 1780; and is now in the Vatican Museum. The epitaph is as follows, written in the old Saturnian verse:

"Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbat-  
us Gnaivod

Patre prognatus fortis vir sapiens-  
que

Quoius forma virtutei parisuma  
fuit,

Consol censor aidilis quei fuit  
apud vos,

Taurasia Cisauna Samnio cepit  
Subigit omne Loucana opsidesque  
abdoucit."

"Gnaivod" in the first line would, in modern Latin, be "Cnæo," and "quoius" in the third line is "cuius." I have copied the inscription from Bunsen and Platner's "Beschreibung Roms," Vol. III. p. 616. It may be found also in Orelli's Collection of Inscriptions,

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

been “a brave man and a wise, whose form well matched his nobleness.” Yet such are the perplexities of the uncertain history of these times, that no one action recorded in Scipio’s epitaph is noticed by Livy, while no action which Livy ascribes to him is mentioned in his epitaph. The accounts of his colleague’s exploits are no less varied; some making him win a great battle in northern Samnium<sup>30</sup>, and saying that he afterwards besieged and took Bovianum and Aufidena; while others placed the seat of his campaign on the Lucanian frontier, and extolled<sup>31</sup> the ability with which he had conducted his operations against a superior enemy. A third account is followed by the *Fasti Capitolini*, that Fulvius triumphed over the Samnites and Etruscans; which seems to contradict the story followed by Livy, that Scipio invaded Etruria, advanced as far as Volaterræ, and gained a hardly won victory under the walls of that city. It is only certain that this year was really marked by no great successes on the part of the Romans; on the contrary, they looked forward to the next campaign with great anxiety,

No. 550, and an engraving of the sarcophagus, exhibiting also the epitaph, is given in the *Gentleman’s Magazine* for April, 1787.

<sup>30</sup> Livy, X. 12.

<sup>31</sup> See the stories in Frontinus, *Strategem.* I. 6. § 1, 2, and I. 11. § 2, already referred to by Niebuhr. But the authority of the particular anecdotes contained in such collections as that of Frontinus is but small, and is not in itself

to be set in comparison with that of any moderately careful historian. In the present instance the anecdotes are curious, as showing how many different versions of the same events were in circulation, as long as no real historian existed to sift them all, and to choose the truest or the most probable; but they do not appear to me to be entitled to any peculiar credit.

and therefore<sup>32</sup> they pressed Q. Fabius to accept the consulship, notwithstanding his advanced age, and although he was not legally eligible, as ten years had not elapsed since he was consul before. It was in vain that he remonstrated; a dispensation<sup>33</sup>, according to a practice afterward so frequent, was passed in his favour; and the people proceeded to elect him. He then entreated of them that he might recommend to them P. Decius as his colleague: Decius and himself, he said, had been censors together, and there was no man with whom he could act so well as consul. Accordingly Q. Fabius and P. Decius were elected together: L. Scipio, the consul of the preceding year, served<sup>34</sup> under Fabius as his lieutenant, and a Fulvius<sup>35</sup> and a Valerius are named amongst his military tribunes.

At this moment, when the Romans expected to be assailed by the whole force of the enemies' confederacy, they found it suddenly paralyzed. Etruria for some reason or other was not ready to act<sup>36</sup>, and

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Second campaign. Destructive invasion of Samnium by Q. Fabius and P. Decius.

<sup>32</sup> Livy, X. 13.

<sup>33</sup> "Tribuni plebis . . . aiebant, se ad populum latus ut legibus solveretur."—Livy, X. 13. Legibus solvi is the regular expression used, when any one has a dispensation granted him, to release him from complying with the enactments of some particular law.

<sup>34</sup> Livy, X. 14. "Fabius . . . Scipionem legatum hastatos primæ legionis subtrahere . . . jubet."

<sup>35</sup> Livy, X. 14. The reading in the modern editions of Livy is "M. Fulvium et M. Valerium," but most of the MSS. read "Maximum Fulvium," and Nie-

buhr observes that Maximus was a surname of the Fulvian family, as appears from the Fasti Capitolini. It is probable that the military tribunes here spoken of were the sons respectively of Cn. Fulvius and of M. Valerius, who had been consuls in 454 and 456.

<sup>36</sup> "Ab Sutrio et Nepete et Faleriis legati, auctores concilia Etruriæ populorum de petendâ pace haberi."—Livy, X. 14. This perpetual vacillation in the Etruscan counsels arose no doubt from the balanced state of their domestic parties. If any difficulty arose in obtaining the expected aid from



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

the Roman frontier on that side might be safely left without an army. Accordingly, both consuls marched into Samnium<sup>37</sup>, Fabius by Sora and the upper Liris, Decius by the country of the Sidicinians and the line of the Volturnus. Fabius was met by the main Samnite army, which he defeated after a most obstinate battle; while Decius had encountered the Apulians near Beneventum on their march to join their allies, and defeated them also. The Samnites then acted on the defensive, and were obliged to suffer their country to be laid waste without opposition. Both of the Roman armies remained in Samnium, it is said, for five months<sup>38</sup>, moving about from one part of it to another, and carrying on their ravages so systematically, that Decius was recorded to have encamped his legions in forty-five several places, and Fabius in as many as eighty-six. But the Samnites must have driven their cattle to their mountain pastures, and many of these were so surrounded by forests, and so fenced round with precipitous cliffs, that a small force could have defended them with success against an army. The lower country<sup>39</sup>, however, was no doubt griev-

the Gauls, the Cilnii of Arretium, and other friends of the Roman connexion, would urge the danger of opposing Rome single-handed, and would advise delay; and fear and weakness counterfeiting prudence would easily be tempted to listen to them.

<sup>37</sup> Livy, X. 14.

<sup>38</sup> Livy, X. 15. The circumstantial statement of the number

of encampments in this campaign deserves credit; and the account of Fabius' victory is moderate and probable.

<sup>39</sup> In the former war the consuls of the year 448 had ravaged Samnium during five months, burning all the scattered houses, and destroying the fruit-trees. — Diodorus, XX. 80. But no enemy could have penetrated within the

ously wasted, and the Romans must have found plunder enough to encourage them to continue their invasion. Towards the end of the year Fabius returned to Rome to hold the comitia; after which he resumed his command, and both he and his colleague were ordered to remain in Samnium<sup>40</sup> for six months longer, with the title and power of proconsul.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

It was probably in this winter that the Samnite influence in Lucania and Apulia was completely overthrown, and both those countries returned to the Roman alliance. In both the aristocratical party was of itself eager to re-establish this connexion; and the presence of two Roman armies, and the inability of the Samnites to keep the field against them, destroyed the ascendancy of the popular party<sup>41</sup>, and changed accordingly the foreign relations of the whole people. It was now too, it seems, that L. Scipio, as lieutenant of the proconsul, Q. Fabius, had so great a share in effecting the revolution in Lucania, as to be able to boast, in the words of his epitaph, that he had "subdued all Lucania and carried off hostages." The hostages

Lucania and  
Apulia re-  
covered to  
the Roman  
alliance.

rocky walls of the Matese, and many other spots must have been equally secure.

<sup>40</sup> Livy, X. 16.

<sup>41</sup> "Lucanorum seditiones a plebeiis et agentibus ducibus ortas summâ optimatum voluntate per Q. Fabium proconsulem, missum eo cum vetere exercitu, compres-

serat."—Livy, X. 18. Nothing is mentioned of the Apulians after their defeat at Beneventum; but as they do not appear again as the allies of the Samnites, it is probable that they followed the example of the Lucanians, and returned in this winter to their old connexion with Rome.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

would be demanded from the principal families of the popular or Samnite party, as a security that they should not again excite their countrymen to revolt from Rome.

Revival of  
the war in  
Etruria.

Thus having recovered Lucania and Apulia, having overrun Samnium without resistance during several months, and having succeeded apparently, through the influence of their party in the Etruscan cities, in separating Etruria from the coalition, the Romans thought that their work was done; the two proconsular armies marched home and were disbanded, and the consuls of the year, L. Volumnius and App. Claudius, after having hitherto remained quiet at Rome, were ordered to march with their newly-raised legions<sup>42</sup> into Samnium, as if to receive the final submission of their exhausted enemy. But scarcely had the consuls left the city, when tidings came that all the cities of Etruria were in arms<sup>43</sup>, that several of the Umbrian states had joined them, that they were engaging the services of a large force of Gaulish auxiliaries; and that a Samnite general with a Sam-

<sup>42</sup> The accounts which Livy followed, represent the proconsuls as being still in Samnium when the new consuls took the field, X. 18. But Niebuhr observes that his narrative contradicts itself, for the legions raised by the consuls are expressly said to have been the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th as usual; whereas, had two consular armies been under arms at that time, the new legions must have been the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th. Besides, some of

the annals reported that Appius Claudius and Volumnius both carried on war in Samnium (Livy, X. 17, ad finem); and it is not likely, as Niebuhr remarks, that four armies should have been employed before the war broke out in Etruria, and that two of them should then have been disbanded, just when their services were most needful.

<sup>43</sup> Livy, X. 18.

nite army was in the midst of this mass of enemies, to cement their union, and to breathe into their counsels a new spirit of decision and energy.

There is no finer scene in history than the embassy of Demosthenes to Thebes, when Philip had occupied Elatea. Triumphant alike over all old prejudices and all present fears, the great orator, almost in the very presence of the Macedonian army, and in spite of the influence of a strong Macedonian party in Thebes itself, prevailed upon the Thebans to throw themselves into the arms of Athens, and to share her fortune for life or for death in her contest against the common enemy of independent Greece. Most unlike to this action of Demosthenes in glory, yet not inferior to it in vigorous resolution, was the march of the Samnite general, Gellius Egnatius, into Etruria, in order by his presence to determine the wavering counsels of the Etruscans to a zealous co-operation against Rome. Seizing the moment when the proconsuls had left Samnium, and the new consuls had not yet taken the field, he fearlessly abandoned his own country to the attacks of the enemy, and, with a select army, marched through the land of the Sabines into Umbria, and from thence crossing the Tiber, arrived in the heart of Etruria. His sudden appearance raised the spirits of the friends of the Samnite alliance, and struck terror into the Cilnii and the party attached to Rome. The Etruscans resolved to renew the war, and, as we have seen, many of the Umbrian

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

March of  
Gellius Eg-  
natius from  
Samnium  
into Etruria,  
to organize  
the war  
against  
Rome.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

states and an army of Gauls were expected to join them.

Third campaign. Both consuls in Etruria. The Samnites invade Campania.

On the first tidings of this march of the Samnite general, the senate sent orders to Appius Claudius to follow him without delay. Appius, with the first and fourth Roman legions and 12,000 allies, was probably on his march towards the northern parts of Samnium, by the Latin road and the upper valley of the Liris, and thus could be sent into Etruria more readily than his colleague, who, we may suppose, had marched by the Appian road to attack the southern frontier of Samnium from Campania. Appius hastened into Etruria<sup>44</sup>, and the appearance of a Roman army at first revived the hopes of the partisans of Rome: but one consul was unequal to the combined forces of the enemy, and L. Volumnius was obliged to evacuate Samnium also, and hasten to join his colleague. No sooner was the whole force of Rome thus employed in Etruria, than the Samnites took the field with the forces which had been left to defend their own country, and burst into Campania<sup>45</sup>. There they laid waste not only the lands of the allies of Rome, but of all those Roman citizens who had obtained settlements in the Falernian district, and composed the Falerian tribe.

Alarm at Rome. The consul Volumnius marches

The march of Gellius Egnatius had thus completely attained its object; Samnium was wholly relieved, and the war was carried into the actual

<sup>44</sup> Livy, X. 18.

<sup>45</sup> Livy, X. 20.



territory of Rome. Even the mere suddenness of this change was enough to increase its terrors: the Roman government ordered all legal business to be suspended<sup>46</sup>, and troops to be raised for the defence of the city; nor were the levies confined to the military age, or to the free-born commons of the country tribes, but citizens above five and forty, and even freedmen of the four city tribes, were enrolled in the legions raised to meet the emergency. All these measures were directed in the absence of the consuls by P. Sempronius Sophus the prætor. Meanwhile L. Volumnius had received intelligence of the invasion of Campania, and was hastening back from Etruria to his own province. It is apparent from the stories which have been preserved of the meeting of the two consuls in Etruria, that there was no harmony between them; and thus the public service was likely to suffer the less from the division of their forces. We may believe also, that their junction for a time had revived the Roman interest in the Etruscan cities; and we may admit, not indeed the account given by Livy of a complete victory won over the Etruscan and Samnite armies, but that some advantages were gained<sup>47</sup> which saved Appius from his perilous situation, and enabled his colleague to leave him when a still more pressing danger called

CHAP.  
XXXIII.  
back from  
Etruria to  
deliver  
Campania.

<sup>46</sup> Livy, X. 21.

<sup>47</sup> In the midst of the battle, Appius vowed to build a temple to Bellona, if the goddess would grant him victory; and this temple was afterwards built. See Orelli, Inscript. Latinar. Collect.

No. 539. This may be taken as evidence that Appius repulsed the enemy and saved his own army, but it by no means proves that he won a decided victory. We have only to remember Coruña and Albuhera.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

him into Campania. Volumnius marched with the utmost rapidity, and on his reaching the scene of action, he obliged the Samnites instantly to retreat into their own country, and overtaking a party of them on their way, he defeated them with considerable loss<sup>48</sup>, and recovered a great portion of the spoil which they were carrying with them. This gleam of success was most welcome to the Romans; the usual course of business was resumed, after having been suspended for eighteen days, and a thanksgiving was ordered in the name of the consul for the favour which the gods had shown to the commonwealth under his auspices.

Great preparations for the ensuing campaign. Q. Fabius and P. Decius again chosen consuls.

Still, however, the aspect of affairs was most critical. In order to protect the Falernian district from the ravages of the Samnites, it was resolved that two Roman colonies should be planted there; one at Minturnæ<sup>49</sup> at the mouth of the Liris, and the other at Sinuessa, on the hills which divide the waters running to the Liris from those that feed the Savone. But settlements in this quarter were considered so insecure, and so exposed to perpetual ravages from the Samnites, that few were willing to accept a grant of land on such terms. As the consular elections drew near, L. Volumnius was recalled from Campania to hold the comitia; and the unanimous voice of the people again called upon Q. Fabius to accept the office of consul. He again yielded to the general wish, but begged as before

<sup>48</sup> Livy. X. 20, 21.

<sup>49</sup> Livy, X. 21.

that P. Decius might be his colleague; and Decius was accordingly elected consul with him<sup>50</sup>. Appius Claudius, who was still with his army in Etruria, was appointed prætor, and L. Volumnius had his command prolonged for another year as proconsul. L. Cornelius Scipio, who had served under Fabius in his last consulship, Cn. Fulvius who had been consul in the year 456, and had conducted the first campaign of this war in Samnium, together with L. Postumius Megellus, were appointed also to commands in this great campaign, with the title of proprætors.

The anxiety occasioned by the impending contest may be measured by the particular accounts of prodigies and their expiations which were to be found in the annals of this year. From the altar<sup>51</sup> of the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter there flowed for three successive days, so said the annals, first blood, then honey, and on the third day milk. The blood was interpreted as a sign that the blood of thank-offerings for victory should soon stream on the altar of Jupiter, but the favours of the gods would not be unmixed; for honey was the medicine of the sick, and foreshowed a heavy visitation of sickness: milk was the food of those whose corn had failed them, and was the sign of a coming famine. To avert the threatened anger of the gods, and to confirm them in their promised favour, solemn prayers<sup>52</sup> were ordered to be offered during two whole days; and frankincense and wine were furnished to every

A.U.C. 459.  
B.C. 295.  
Reported  
omens of the  
fate of the  
war.

<sup>50</sup> Livy, X. 22—26.  
<sup>51</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 1.

<sup>52</sup> Livy, X. 23.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

App. Clau-  
dius in  
Etruria.  
Winter  
march of  
Fabius to  
relieve him.

one at the public expense, that the prayers might be universal and unceasing.

The consuls at this time came into office about the beginning of the year; and as the snow was still thick on the Apennines, the Gauls could not yet take the field to march into Etruria, and the campaign would not be opened till the spring. But the position of Appius Claudius in the enemy's country was exceedingly perilous; and he himself, in the opinion of Fabius, was scarcely equal to the difficulties of his situation. Accordingly, Fabius himself having raised<sup>53</sup> a small force of 4000 foot and 600 horse, out of a great multitude who were eager to serve under so renowned a general, set out at once for Etruria. He found Appius Claudius busily employed in strengthening the fortifications of his camp, and the soldiers from thus acting solely on the defensive were dispirited, and mistrusted both themselves and their general. Fabius ordered them to level their fortifications; and having sent Appius home, he took the command of the army in person, and kept it continually in movement, marching rapidly from place to place, and restoring to the men their accustomed feeling of confidence. He then stationed one division<sup>54</sup> in the country of the Camertian Umbrians, the allies of the Romans, to observe the pass by which the Gauls were likely to cross the Apennines, apparently that of La Scheggia on the Flaminian road, descending on Nocera and Foligno.

<sup>53</sup> Livy, X. 25.

<sup>54</sup> Livy, X. 25.

This was placed under the command of L. Scipio; while Fabius himself returned to Rome to concert measures with his colleague for the operations of the approaching spring.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Two consular armies<sup>55</sup> were destined to take the field, consisting each of two Roman legions, and an unusually large force of Roman cavalry; together with 500 Campanian cavalry, and a force of allies still larger than that of the Romans themselves. Amongst the allies were undoubtedly the Lucanians<sup>56</sup> and Campanians, and in all probability the Marsians, Pelignians, Marrucinians and Vestinians, as well as the contingents of the colonies founded in the late war, and those of the still independent cities of the Latins. All the forces of the Picentians which could be spared from the defence of their own country, as well as those of the Camertians, were employed, we may suppose, with the army of L. Scipio, watching the movements of the enemy in Umbria.

Forces of the Romans and their allies employed in active operations.

Whilst this large force, consisting at least of between fifty and sixty thousand men, was to take the field in the north, two more Roman legions, with a proportionate number of allies, were to invade Samnium<sup>57</sup> under L. Volumnius as proconsul. A third army, under Cn. Fulvius as proprætor<sup>58</sup>, was to be stationed as a reserve in the Faliscan territory, at once to defend the passage of the Tiber, and preserve the

Their armies of reserve.

<sup>55</sup> Livy, X. 26.

<sup>56</sup> The Lucanians are mentioned as among the regular allies of the Romans, and quartered within the

consul's camp, in the year immediately following.—See Livy, X. 33.

<sup>57</sup> Livy, X. 27.

<sup>58</sup> Livy, X. 27.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

communications of the main army with Rome ; and also to create a diversion, if opportunity should offer, by acting on the offensive against Etruria. And lastly, a fourth army, commanded by L. Postumius Megellus<sup>59</sup>, also proprætor, was to be encamped in the Vatican district, on the right bank of the Tiber, to cover Rome itself.

L. Scipio's  
division is  
defeated by  
the Gauls  
and Sam-  
nites.

This account of the dispositions of the Romans is clear and perfectly credible ; but, unfortunately, we are left in total ignorance as to the numbers, movements, and position of the enemy. Why the Etruscans and Samnites did not crush Scipio's army, even before the arrival of the Gauls, we can scarcely understand, unless we suppose that party struggles again paralyzed the force of the Etruscans, and kept it in inactivity under a show of caution, till the whole army of the alliance should be assembled. At last the Gauls commenced their movement before the consuls had left Rome ; they hastened to force the passage of the Apennines, and no sooner had they arrived on the scene of war than they began to act in earnest. L. Scipio's army<sup>60</sup> was attacked by the Gauls and Samnites, and completely defeated ; one legion, it is said, was cut to pieces ; the rest of his division took shelter, probably, within some of the neighbouring towns, and the Gaulish horsemen over-

<sup>59</sup> Livy, X. 27.

<sup>60</sup> Livy, X. 26. Polybius, II. 19. We learn from Polybius, that the Samnites were engaged in this action as well as the Gauls, and that it was not a surprise, but a regular battle, *παρετάξαντο* 'Ρω-

*μαίους*. It was fought in the country of the Camertians, or people of Camerinum, perhaps near the point where the modern road from Ancona to Rome crosses the Apennines to descend upon Foligno.

running the country, fell in suddenly with the two consular armies, which had now taken the field, and first acquainted them with the defeat of their countrymen, by exhibiting the heads of the slain Romans affixed to their long lances, or hanging round the necks of their horses.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Exactly at this critical point of the campaign, Livy's narrative fails us, and all that passed between the destruction of the legion and the final battle at Sentinum, is a total blank : it is as much lost to us as a country travelled over during the night ; we were in one sort of scenery yesterday, and we find ourselves in another this morning : each is distinct in itself, but we know not the connexion between them. Earnestly must Gellius Egnatius have laboured to bring on a decisive battle in the plains of Umbria ; the allies had begun the campaign with happy omens, their whole force was united, the ground was favourable ; nothing could be gained, and every thing would be hazarded by delay. But whether the fault rested once again with the Etruscans, or whether the Picentians caused a timely diversion, by threatening to invade the country of the Gauls, or whether the consuls fell back upon Spoletum, and were able to avoid an action for the moment, we know not. But they sent orders to the prætors, Cn. Fulvius and L. Postumius, to advance into the heart of Etruria, and no sooner did the tidings of this movement reach the enemy's army, than the Etruscans and Umbrians insisted on march-

The Etruscans and Umbrians leave their allies. The Gauls and Samnites retreat behind the Apennines.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

ing to the defence of the Etruscan territory, and the Gauls and Samnites, indignant at their desertion, and refusing to follow them, had no choice themselves but to fall back behind the Apennines, and to resign their hopes of a victorious march upon Rome.

The Romans  
follow them.  
The two  
armies meet  
at Sentinum.

The Romans pursued them instantly, with two consular armies certainly, and with the wreck of L. Scipio's division; perhaps also with the two legions of L. Volumnius, which may have been recalled from Samnium. They found the enemy in the country of Sentinum, an Umbrian town on the north side of the Apennines<sup>61</sup>, just under the central chain, in a small valley which runs down into the larger valley of the *Æsis* or *Esino*, and not far on the right hand of the Flaminian road, at the point where it crosses the watershed of the mountains. It was of the utmost importance to the Roman generals to bring the contest to an issue whilst they had only the Gauls and Samnites to encounter, and in this they easily succeeded, for the Gauls had never yet fought the Romans without conquering them, and Gellius Egnatius knew enough of the inconstant humour of barbarians to be aware that they would soon be tired of a protracted war, and that if the Gauls too deserted him, his heroic march from Samnium would have been made in vain. So the two armies met by common consent in fair field; Q. Fabius was on the Ro-

<sup>61</sup> The ancient Sentinum stood on or near the site of the modern town of Sassoferrato, as is known by inscriptions which have been

discovered there. See Orelli, Nos. 3861 and 4949. But I have no good information as to the details of the topography.

man right, opposed to Gellius Egnatius and his Samnites<sup>62</sup>; P. Decius was on the left over against the Gauls. If L. Volumnius was present with the legions from Samnium, he probably, like Cn. Servilius at Cannæ, who had also been consul in the year before the battle, had his place in the centre. The Samnites could not alone have contended with Q. Fabius, whose right wing was equal to a regular consular army; and the Gauls must have been more than enough to overpower P. Decius. It is probable, therefore, that the Gauls composed the greater part of the enemy's line of battle, and that only the extreme left was held by Gellius Egnatius and his Samnites.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

While the two armies fronted each other, and were on the very eve of battle, a hind<sup>63</sup>, said the Roman story, came running down from the mountains between the two opposing lines, with a wolf in chase of her. She ran in amongst the Gaulish ranks, and the Gauls transfixed her with their long javelins. The wolf ran towards the Romans, and they instantly gave free passage to the beast which had given suck to the founder of their city; and whose image they had only in the preceding year<sup>64</sup> set up beneath that very sacred fig tree in the comitium, which tradition pointed out as the scene of the miracle. "See," cried out one of the soldiers, "Diana's sacred hind has been slain by the barbarians, and will bring down her wrath upon them; while the

A favourable omen  
encourages  
the Romans.

<sup>62</sup> Livy, X. 27.

<sup>63</sup> Livy, X. 27.

<sup>64</sup> Livy, X. 23.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Roman wolf, unhurt by sword or spear, gives us a fair omen of victory, and bids us think on Mars and on Quirinus our divine founder." So the Roman soldiers, as encouraged by a sign from the gods, rushed cheerfully to the onset.

BATTLE OF  
SENTINUM.

This story, with some other circumstances related of the battle itself, are blended strangely with the perfectly historical substance of the general narrative. When the armies closed<sup>65</sup>, the Roman left wing struggled vigorously against the numbers, and strength, and courage of the Gauls. Twice, it is said, did the Roman and Campanian cavalry charge with effect the Gaulish horsemen; but in their second charge they were encountered by a force wholly strange to them, the war chariots of the enemy, which broke in upon them at full speed, and with the rattling of their wheels, and their unwonted appearance, so startled the horses of the Romans, that they could not be brought to face them, and horse and man fled in confusion. Uncouth and almost ridiculous as these chariots may seem to our notions, yet a force which terrified Cæsar's veterans, and which that great master of war speaks of as formidable, could not have been ridiculous in reality; and the undoubted effect of the British chariots against the legions of Cæsar, may well convince us that the Gaulish chariots at Sentinum must have struck terror into the soldiers of Decius.

P. Decius  
devotes

The Roman cavalry were driven back upon their

<sup>65</sup> Livy, X 27, 28.



infantry; the first line of the legions was broken, and the Gauls, following their advantage, pressed on with the masses of their infantry. Decius strove in vain to stop the flight of his soldiers; one way alone was left by which he might yet serve his country; he bethought him of his father at the battle by Vesuvius, and calling to M. Livius, one of the pontifices who attended him in the field, he desired him to dictate to him the fit words of self-devotion. Then, in the same dress, and with all the same ceremonies, he pronounced also the same form of words which had been uttered by his father, and devoting himself and the host of the enemy with him to the grave and to the powers of the dead, he rode into the midst of the Gaulish ranks, and was slain.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

himself to  
death.

His last act as consul had been to invest the pontifex M. Livius<sup>66</sup> with the command of his legions as proprætor, and to order his lictors to follow the new general. Fabius also, learning the danger of his colleague, had sent two of his own lieutenants, L. Scipio and C. Marcius, to his aid, with reinforcements drawn from his own reserve; and thus the flight of the Romans was stayed, while the manner of Decius' death encouraged rather than dismayed his soldiers, as they believed that it was the price paid for their victory. But the Gauls though checked were yet neither beaten nor disheartened; they gathered into thick masses, with their huge shields covering almost their whole bodies, and,

The Gauls  
resist obsti-  
nately.

<sup>66</sup> Livy, X. 29.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

wielding their heavy broadswords, they stood unbroken and unassailed ; till the Romans picked up from the field of battle the javelins which had been discharged earlier in the action, and with these missiles endeavoured to wear down the mass of their enemies. The *pila* pierced through the wooden shields of the Gauls, encumbering them, even when they inflicted no wound ; but the Gauls stood as firm as the “ Scottish circle deep ” under the hail of the English arrows at Flodden ; and no efforts of the left wing of the Romans could secure the victory.

Fabius defeats the Samnites, and at last forces the Gauls to give way. Complete victory of the Romans.

Meanwhile, Fabius<sup>67</sup>, on the right, after a long and arduous contest with the Samnites, and finding that his infantry could not break them, at last succeeded in charging their flank with his cavalry, and at the same moment bringing all his reserves of infantry into action, he assailed their line in front, and decided the victory. The Samnites fled to their camp, and thus left exposed the flank of the Gauls, who were still maintaining their ground. Fabius saw his opportunity, and detached the Campanian cavalry, with the *principes* of the third legion, to attack the Gauls in the rear ; while he himself closely pursued the Samnites, and vowed aloud that if he won the day, he would build a temple and offer all the spoils of the enemy to Jupiter the victorious. The Samnites rallied under the ramparts of their camp, and still disputed the victory ; but the Gauls, assailed on all sides, were now hopelessly

<sup>67</sup> Livy, X. 29.

broken, and the last hope of the Samnites vanished, when their commander Gellius Egnatius fell. Still, CHAP.  
XXXIII. when the day was utterly lost, these brave men would neither surrender nor disperse; they left the field in a body, and immediately began their retreat to their own country.

The Roman accounts of this bloody battle<sup>68</sup> state the loss of their enemies at 25,000 killed, and 8000 prisoners: their own they make to have amounted to 8200 killed; but they give no report of the number of wounded. Of the total loss, only 1200 are said to have fallen in the right wing, while in the army of Decius there were killed 7000. The great slaughter in ancient warfare always took place when the line of battle was broken; and the disparity of loss on the two wings of the Roman army is therefore such as might have been expected.

Meanwhile Cn. Fulvius<sup>69</sup> had, according to his instructions, penetrated into Etruria; and had not only laid waste a large tract of country, but had defeated in the field an army sent out by the two cities of Perugia and Clusium to check his ravages. Operations  
in Etruria.

It is quite plain that the Etruscans were at this time suffering the full evil of distracted counsels, and that they were neither unanimous for peace nor for

<sup>68</sup> Livy, X. 29.—Duris of Samos, a contemporary writer, but whose information of these events could come only from common report, and who delighted to exaggerate the disasters of the Gauls, related that in the Gaulish and Samnite army 100,000 men had fallen.—See Diodorus, XXI. Frag.

Hoeschel. p. 490. Duris supposed that the Etruscans were engaged in the battle; and some of the Roman writers gave the same account, and made the allied army to consist of a million of men.—See Niebuhr, Vol. III. note 647.

<sup>69</sup> Livy, X. 30.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

war. What was become of the forces of Arretium, of Volaterræ, of Rusellæ, of Cortona, and of Vulsinii, when Clusium and Perugia were left to resist the Roman invasion alone?

Funeral of  
Decius.

The body of Decius<sup>70</sup> was found under a heap of slaughtered Gauls, and honourably buried. Fabius celebrated his funeral, and pronounced his funeral oration; a fit tribute from one who had been twice his colleague in the consulship and once in the censorship; nor had any man enjoyed better opportunities of knowing his excellence. He had proved his skill and courage in war, and his wisdom and moderation in peace; and he had experienced also the noble frankness of his nature, which never allowed any selfish jealousy to stand in the way of his private friendship, and much less of his devotion to his country's service.

The Gauls  
cannot be  
induced to  
serve again  
against  
Rome.

Such was the great battle of Sentinum, the Austerlitz of the third Samnite war. But as more than eighteen months elapsed between the battle of Austerlitz and the peace of Tilsit, so neither was the coalition against Rome dissolved at once by the victory of Sentinum. The Gauls, indeed, remained quiet after their defeat, for their interest in the war was only that of mercenary soldiers, and they were not tempted to a service which seemed likely to bring with it more loss than profit. But even Etruria would not yet submit to Rome, and the Samnites, hoping still to keep the war at a distance from their own country, were eager to renew the contest.

<sup>70</sup> Livy, X. 29.

Yet the Romans could not but feel great relief from their victory. The armies of the proprætors, Cn. Fulvius and L. Postumius, were recalled to Rome<sup>71</sup> and disbanded; and Fabius marched into Etruria with his consular army, and was strong enough to obtain fresh advantages over the Perusians, who alone of all the Etruscan people ventured it seems to meet the Romans in the field. He then returned to Rome and triumphed on the 4th of September over the three principal powers of the late coalition, the Etruscans, the Gauls, and the Samnites; and the soldiers who followed his chariot, in the rude verses which they were accustomed to utter on such occasions, commemorated the death of Decius as fully equal in glory to their own general's safe and victorious return. It is mentioned<sup>72</sup> that each soldier received out of the spoil taken in the late battle, eighty-two *asses*, and a coat, and military cloak; "rewards," says Livy, sadly feeling how whole districts of Italy had in his days been portioned out amongst the legions of Augustus, "which the soldiers of those times did not think despicable."

CHAP.  
XXXIII.  
Triumph of  
Fabius.

<sup>71</sup> This appears from the circumstance that Fabius marched into Etruria and engaged the Perusians; which shows that Cn. Fulvius must have already been recalled, and also because App. Claudius the prætor was ordered to support L. Volumnius in Samnium with the remains of the army of Decius: had the proprætors' armies been still embodied, one of them would probably have been employed on that service. I have followed Niebuhr in placing Fabius' victories over the Perusians

before his triumph, whereas Livy makes him march back to Etruria after his triumph. But as Niebuhr says, his army would be disbanded as a matter of course after his triumph, and the Fasti Capitolini say that he triumphed over the Etruscans, as well as the Samnites and Gauls; which he could not have done had he only triumphed for his victory at Sentinum, as no Etruscans were engaged there.

<sup>72</sup> Livy, X. 30.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

The Samnite army forces its way back to Samnium.

The wreck of the Samnite army<sup>73</sup>, still, it is said, amounting to 5000 men, made its way unhurt or unopposed through the countries of the Picentians and Vestinians, and from thence proceeded towards Samnium through the country of the Pelignians, by Sulmo and the Five-mile plain to the valley of the Sagrus or Sangro. The Pelignians, more zealous in the quarrel, because they were nearer neighbours to the Samnites, and their lands no doubt had often suffered from Samnite incursions, endeavoured to cut off the retreating army. But the Samnites, with some loss, beat off this new enemy, and entered their own country in safety.

Operations in Samnium and Campania during this campaign.

It is manifest that during this year Samnium enjoyed a complete respite from invasion; and that L. Volumnius, even if we suppose that he was not called away to the great seat of war in Umbria, was not a match for the Samnite forces opposed to him.

His defeat of a Samnite army which had taken refuge in the Matese is entitled to no credit whatever; on the contrary, we find that the Samnites again invaded the Roman territory in two different directions<sup>74</sup>; that one army descended into the districts of Formiæ and Vescia, and another laid waste

<sup>73</sup> Livy, X. 30.

<sup>74</sup> Livy, X. 31. He describes the scene of the second Samnite inroad in these words, "in Æserninum quæque Vulturno adjacent flumini." The word which in the modern editions of Livy is printed as "Æserninum" varies, however, in the MSS. greatly. Æsernia in Samnium seems out of the

question, for it was only in the beginning of the first Punic war that the Romans planted a colony there; unless we suppose that portions of its domain had already been ceded to the Romans in the second Samnite war, which, however, considering how deep the city lies in the heart of Samnium, seems improbable.

the banks of the Volturnus apparently where it first issues out on the plain of Campania. After the battle of Sentinum, the legions of Decius were recalled from Etruria, and put under the command of Appius Claudius the prætor, and he and L. Volturnus, acting together with their two armies, obliged the Samnites to retreat within their frontier. But as the Etruscans had not yet made peace with Rome, the Samnites were not discouraged, and trusted that another year might enable them to retrieve their defeat at Sentinum.

The events of the next year, however, are involved in such confusion that it is impossible to disentangle them. L. Postumius Megellus, one of the proprætors of the year before, was now consul, and M. Attilius Regulus was his colleague. The seat of war was again transferred to Apulia<sup>75</sup>, where the Samnites, well understanding the importance of acting on the offensive, laid siege to Luceria. Here there was fought a bloody and indecisive battle, in which the Romans were in such danger that the consul vowed to build a temple to Jove the stayer of flight, if his army were saved from total rout. At the end of the campaign the Roman army wintered at Interamna<sup>76</sup> in the valley of the Liris, to save that country from the ravages of the enemy; and the consul returned to Rome to hold the comitia. His colleague had been recalled from Samnium earlier in the season to carry on the war in Etruria; and this

A.U.C. 460.  
A.C. 294.  
Fifth campaign. The Romans obtain no advantages in it.

<sup>75</sup> Livy, X. 35.

<sup>76</sup> Livy, X. 36.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

he did, according to the Roman accounts, with such success<sup>77</sup>, that Vulsinii, Perusia, and Arretium sued for peace, and obtained a truce for forty years. But which consul it was who fought at Luceria, and which had marched into Etruria, the annalists did not know, and therefore guessed variously<sup>78</sup>. Some accounts went so far as to say that both consuls triumphed<sup>79</sup>; but most said that only one obtained that honour, and again they did not agree in determining which consul it was. It is probable that neither of the consuls triumphed; nor does it seem likely that the Romans obtained any advantages in this year, except perhaps over the ever-restless but ever-vacillating and divided Etruscans. The Samnites therefore resolved to try their fortune once again.

A.U.C. 461.  
A.C. 293.  
Sixth Cam-  
paign. Con-  
sulship of  
L. Papirius  
and Sp. Car-  
vilius.

The next year was undoubtedly marked by great successes on the side of the Romans; but its history is still uncertain in the details, and much of the geography of the campaign is wholly inexplicable.

<sup>77</sup> Livy, X. 37.

<sup>78</sup> Livy says that Atilius fought at Luceria, and Postumius marched into Etruria. Claudius Quadrigarius, as quoted by Livy, maintained exactly the contrary; and Fabius, whose narrative of this war seems to have depended chiefly on the memoirs of the Fabian family, and to have become uncertain where they failed him, did not venture to say which it was.—See Livy, X. 37.

<sup>79</sup> Fasti Capitolini.—Livy says that Atilius did not triumph, but that Postumius did, by his own

authority, without the sanction of the senate. But this story is referred by Dionysius to Postumius' third consulship three years afterwards; and Claudius said that Postumius never triumphed at all. It does not appear that the narrative of Fabius gave a triumph to either of them.—Livy, X. 37.

Orosius' description of the events of this year is far nearer the truth, I think, than the account of Livy. "Sequitur annus quo Romani instaurato a Samnitibus bello victi sunt, atque in castra fugerunt." III. 22.

The consuls were L. Papirius Cursor, son of that Papirius who had been so famous in the second Samnite war, and Sp. Carvilius Maximus. Carvilius took the command<sup>80</sup> of the army which had wintered near Interamna on the Liris; Papirius commanded two new legions, and both consuls were ordered to invade Samnium.

The Samnites on their part are said to have raised an army with unusual care, and to have bound their soldiers by the most solemn oaths, taken amidst the most mysterious and horrid ceremonies, that they would either conquer or die. The men thus pledged were arrayed in a peculiar manner, with waving plumes on their helmets, and with coats of white linen, exactly as had been done fifteen years before, when the old Papirius, the father of the present consul, was appointed dictator to encounter them; and the repetition of these same ceremonies by the Samnites now made the Romans for the omen's sake appoint another Papirius Cursor to be consul; as if the Papirian family<sup>81</sup> was chosen by the gods to meet and to overcome the most desperate efforts of their Samnite enemies.

It was no doubt the failure of all co-operation in Etruria, and the knowledge, therefore, that they would have to withstand the whole force of Rome, which led the Samnites to apply these extraordinary excitements to the courage of their soldiers. Yet it seems as if they had not abandoned all hopes of

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Desperate  
resolution of  
the Sam-  
nites.

They retain  
their hold on  
the country  
of the Sa-  
bines.

<sup>80</sup> Livy, X. 39.

<sup>81</sup> Livy, X. 38, 39.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Etruscan aid, and that they had learned from their enemies the wisdom of acting on the offensive; for the first operations of the Roman armies were the capture of Amiternum<sup>82</sup>, and the ravaging of the country of Atina. This seat of war implies that the Samnites still obstinately retained their line of communication with Etruria amidst all the invasions of their own country, and with this view still held fast to their alliance those Sabine and Volscian cities which at the beginning of the coalition had been forced or persuaded to espouse their cause.

And ravage  
Campania.

A Samnite army was also sent into Campania, to ravage the territory<sup>83</sup> of the Romans and their allies on the Liris and Vulturnus, whilst another was kept in Samnium for home defence; and it was, perhaps, to the soldiers of this last army, consisting of the oldest and youngest men capable of bearing arms, that the excitements of enthusiasm were applied, to make up for their inferiority in strength and in experience.

Both the  
Roman con-  
suls invade  
Samnium.  
Operations  
on the north  
of the Ma-  
tese.

The Roman consuls<sup>84</sup> having jointly laid waste the territory of Atina proceeded to enter Samnium. The seat of war lay apparently in the country of the Pentrian Samnites on the north of the Matese: Carvilius laid siege to Cominium: Papirius, after having taken Duronia, marched against Aquilonia, where the Samnite army was stationed: all these three places are quite unknown to us, and we can only conclude that they lay on the north side of the Matese, because

<sup>82</sup> Livy, X. 39.

<sup>83</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 1.

<sup>84</sup> Livy, X. 39.



two of them are described as being near to Bovianum, the site of which is known. The Samnites, attacked at once by two consular armies, were compelled to divide their forces; and eight thousand men were detached from the army before Aquilonia to relieve Cominium. A deserter acquainted Papius with this movement, and he instantly sent off a messenger to warn his colleague, while he himself attacked the enemy at the moment when he knew their force to be thus untimely weakened. The auspices had been reported to be most favourable; "the fowls ate so eagerly," so said their keeper to the consul, "that some of the corn dropped from their mouths on the ground<sup>85</sup>." This was the best possible omen; but just as the consul was on the point of giving the signal for action, his nephew, Sp. Papirius, came to tell him that the keeper had made a false report. "Some of his comrades have declared the truth," said the young man; "and far from eating eagerly, the fowls would not touch their food at all." "Thou hast done thy duty, nephew, in telling me this," replied his uncle, "but let the keeper see to it if he has belied the gods. His report to me is that the omens are most favourable, and therefore I forthwith give the signal for battle. But do you see," he added to some centurions who

<sup>85</sup> "Pullarius auspicium mentiri ausus tripudium solistimum."—Livy, X. 40. "Quia quum pascentur (aves) necesse est aliquid ex ore cadere et terram pavire, terripodium primo, post terripodium

dictum est: hoc quidem jam tripudium dicitur. Quum igitur offa cecidit ex ore pulli, tum auspicanti tripudium solistimum nuntiant."—Cicero, de Divinat. II. 34.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

stood by, "that this keeper and his comrades be set in the front ranks of the legions." Ere the battle cry was raised on either side, a chance javelin struck the guilty keeper, and he fell dead. His fate was instantly reported to the consul. "The gods," he exclaimed, "are amongst us: their vengeance has fallen on the guilty." While he spoke a crow was heard just in front of him to utter a full and loud cry. "Never did the gods more manifestly declare their presence and favour," exclaimed the consul, and forthwith the signal was given, and the Roman battle-cry arose loud and joyful.

Victory  
gained by  
L. Papirius.

The Samnites met their enemies bravely<sup>86</sup>; but the awful rites under which they had been pledged gave them a gloomy rather than a cheerful courage; they were more in the mood to die than to conquer. On the Roman side the consul's blunt humour, which he had inherited from his father, spread confidence all around him. In the heat of the battle, when other generals would have earnestly vowed to build a temple to the god whose aid they sought, if he would grant them victory, Papirius called aloud to Jupiter the victorious, "Ah, Jupiter<sup>87</sup>, if the enemy are beaten, I vow to offer to thee a cup of honeyed wine before I taste myself a drop of wine plain." Such irreverent jests do not necessarily imply a

<sup>86</sup> Livy, X. 41.

<sup>87</sup> "Voverat Jovi Victori, si legiones hostium fudisset, pocillum mulsi priusquam temetum biberet sese facturum." Livy, X. 42. Mulsum was "honeyed wine," a

favourite beverage of the Romans in the early times; temetum, in the older Latin, was merely "wine." See Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* XIV. 13. § 90, Ed. Sillig.

scoffing spirit; they mark superstition or fanaticism quite as much as unbelief: nor would the consul's language shock those who heard it, but rather assure them that he spoke in the full confidence of being heard with favour by the gods, as a man in hours of festivity would smile at the familiarity of an indulged servant. Besides, Papirius performed well the part of a general; he is said to have practised the trick which was so successful at Bannockburn<sup>88</sup>; the camp servants were mounted on the baggage mules, and appeared in the midst of the action on the flank and rear of the Samnites: the news ran through both armies, that Sp. Carvilius was come up to aid his colleague, and a general charge of the Roman cavalry and infantry at this moment broke the Samnite lines, and turned them to flight. The mass of the routed army fled either to their camp, or within the walls of Aquilonia; but the cavalry, containing all the chiefs and the nobility of the nation, got clear from the press of the fugitives, and escaped to Bovianum.

The Romans<sup>89</sup> followed up their victory, and stormed the Samnite camp, and scaled the walls of Aquilonia, which was abandoned by the enemy during the night. Carvilius meanwhile had taken Cominium, while the detachment sent to relieve it had been recalled to the main army when Papirius began his attack, and thus had wasted the day in marching backwards and forwards, without being

Successes of  
Sp. Car-  
vilius.

<sup>88</sup> Livy, X. 40, 41.

<sup>89</sup> Livy, X. 41—43.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

present at either scene of action. These soldiers, however, having halted during the night in the neighbourhood of Aquilonia, pursued their march the next day, and with a very trifling loss effected their retreat to Bovianum, which was now the common rallying point.

The consuls  
attack the  
Samnite  
towns on  
the east of  
the Matese.

Both Aquilonia <sup>90</sup> and Cominium were given up to be plundered by the conquerors, and were then set on fire. It was late in the season, (a circumstance which shows how imperfect are our accounts of these wars,) but the consuls having now no enemy in the field, wished to follow up their blow, and to attack the several Samnite cities; a service most welcome to the soldiers, as it offered to them the prospect of plunder. Bovianum however was too strong to be attacked as yet; so the consuls moved on farther into the heart of the country, and fixed the seat of war on the eastern side of the Matese. Here Papius laid siege to Sæpinum, a place not far from the sources of the Tamarus, near the modern road from Benevento to Campobasso, the capital of Molise. Carvilius attacked a town, called variously in the MSS. of Livy, Vella, Velia, or Volana, but the position of which is altogether unknown.

Sp. Carvilius is recalled and sent into Etruria.

The tidings of these successes<sup>91</sup> were received at Rome with the greatest joy; and thanksgivings were offered for four days; the longest period of public rejoicings for victory which has been hitherto mentioned in the Roman annals. Just at this time, as

<sup>90</sup> Livy, X 44, 45.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, X. 45.

we are told, there came complaints from the Roman allies on the Etruscan frontier, that is, we must suppose from the people of Sutrium, that the Etruscans were again in arms, and that the Faliscans, hitherto the allies of Rome, had now taken part with the enemy. It is vain to attempt to explain all these movements in Etruria; or to decide whether the Etruscans were tempted to renew the contest by the employment of both consuls in Samnium, or whether the Romans were encouraged by their victories there to take vengeance for past offences on the Etruscans. At any rate the consuls were ordered to determine by lot which of them should march into Etruria: and the lot fell upon Carvilius. His soldiers were glad to go, it is said, because the cold of Samnium was becoming intolerable; but they had other reasons besides the cold, for wishing to change their seat of war; for whatever might be the plunder of the Samnite towns, it was not always to be easily won; and though Carvilius had taken three of them, yet it had been at the cost of two actions in the field, in which his own loss had exceeded that of the enemy. Papirius, on his side, was detained for a long time before Sæpinum; the Samnites made repeated sallies, and would not allow him even to form the siege of the place; and their resistance was so protracted, that when at last they were overpowered, and the town was taken, the winter was so far advanced, that any farther operations were impracticable, and Papirius having, as we may suppose, burnt Sæpinum, evacuated Samnium.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Triumphs of  
both con-  
suls.

The operations of Sp. Carvilius in Etruria<sup>92</sup>, were short and successful; Troilium and some small mountain fortresses were taken, and the Faliscans purchased a truce for a year by the payment of 100,000 asses, and a year's pay to the soldiers of the Roman army. Both consuls enjoyed a splendid triumph<sup>93</sup>; and a very large treasure of copper and of silver was brought home by Papirius, and paid by him into the treasury, his victorious soldiers receiving nothing. Carvilius brought home also a large treasure; but he divided a part of it amongst his troops, and their pay had already been provided to them out of the contribution paid by the Faliscans; so that the ungracious conduct of Papirius was doubly odious,—for his soldiers received nothing from the plunder, and the war tax, or tributum, was made to furnish them with their pay; and thus his victories brought to the poorer citizens no relief from the burdens of the war. The captured arms<sup>94</sup> were so numerous, that the allies and colonies of Rome received a large share to ornament their own cities; and Sp. Carvilius<sup>95</sup> made out of those which fell to his portion, a colossal statue of Jupiter, of such magnitude, that when it was set up on the Capitoline hill at Rome,

<sup>92</sup> Livy, X. 46.

<sup>93</sup> Carvilius triumphed on the 13th of January, and Papirius on the 13th of February. *Fasti Capitolini*. The weight of silver taken from the temples and houses of the several cities of Samnium which had been captured, amounted to 1330 lbs; the copper money

which had been obtained by the ransom or sale of the prisoners, amounted to 2,033,000 asses of full weight, that is, to so many pounds weight of copper.

<sup>94</sup> Livy, X. 46.

<sup>95</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* XXXIV. § 43. Ed. Sillig.

it could be seen from the temple of the Latin Jupiter on the summit of the mountain of Alba; a distance in a straight line of not less than twelve English miles. CHAP.  
XXXIII.

After such an issue of this campaign, we read with astonishment that Papirius led back his army to winter in the neighbourhood of Vescia<sup>96</sup>, because that country was still infested by the incursions of the Samnites. And in the next year we find, after a long interval, C. Pontius of Telesia once more at the head of the Samnite armies, we find him carrying on war in Campania, and again victorious. Austria lost five armies in the campaign of 1796, before she would consent to treat for peace; and when the French were besieging Cadiz, and had won almost all the fortresses of the kingdom, Spain still continued to resist, and the Guerillas often inflicted defeat upon their triumphant enemy. But the Samnite victory obtained over Fabius Gurgus in Campania in the year immediately following the triumphs of Papirius and Carvilius, is more extraordinary than the fortitude either of Austria or Spain; and so far as the circumstances are known to us, it can only be paralleled by the triumphant career of the Vendéans in Bretagne, when, after repeated defeats in their own country they effected their desperate expedition beyond the Loire.

We may ask why the Roman government, little apt to hold its hand till the work was fully done,

C. Pontius  
again com-  
mands the  
Samnite  
armies.

A.U.C. 462.  
A.C. 292.  
Q. Fabius  
Gurgus the

<sup>96</sup> Livy, X. 46.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

new consul  
is sent alone  
to invade  
Samnium.

and having nothing to fear on the side of Etruria, contented itself with sending a single consular army into the field in the year following the great victories of Papirius and Carvilius, instead of employing its whole force, and thus again overrunning the enemy's country. The reason probably is to be found in the severe visitation of pestilence which at this time fell upon Rome<sup>97</sup>; and this may farther explain why the legions of Papirius wintered in Campania; for as such disorders are generally more or less local, an army might be in perfect health on the hills by Vescia, while had it remained in or near Rome, it would have been losing men daily. However, the new consul, Q. Fabius Gurgus<sup>98</sup>,

<sup>97</sup> Livy, X. 47. Zonaras, VIII.

1. <sup>98</sup> Livy, X. 47. In the last chapter of his tenth book, Livy names the consuls who were elected for the year 462, Q. Fabius Gurgus, and D. Junius Brutus. And here the first decade of Livy's history ends, and as the second decade is lost, we shall now be without his assistance for the remainder of this volume. We should be glad to possess the eleventh book, which contained the account of the secession to the Janiculum and of the Hortensian laws: yet, on the whole, a careful study of the ninth and tenth books will dispose us to be more patient of the loss of those which followed them. How little does the tenth book tell us of the internal state of Rome, how uncertain are its accounts of the several wars! Its most valuable information consists in the miscellaneous notices

with which Livy generally concludes his account of every year; such as his notice of the paving of a part of the Appian road, and of the building of several temples. But we might cheerfully resign, not the second decade only, but the first, third, and fourth, in short, every line of Livy's history which we at present possess, if we could so purchase the recovery of the eighth and ninth decades, which contained the history of the Italian war, and of the civil war of Marius and Sylla which followed it. For this period, of which we know, as it is, so little, Livy's history would have been invaluable. He would have been writing of times and events sufficiently near to his own to have been perfectly understood by him; his sources of information would have been more numerous and less doubtful, and then his fair and upright mind, and the beauty

son of the great Fabius, took the command of the army in Campania, and proceeded towards the frontiers of Samnium. C. Pontius Herennius, of whom nothing is known since the affair of the pass of Caudium, again commanded the Samnite army; whether it was that he was now called upon in the extreme danger of his country, as the only man capable of saving it, or whether the southern Samnites, or Caudinians, had in fact taken no part in the war for many years, and only now, when the Pentrians were nearly exhausted, came forward to uphold their cause.

The ravages which the pestilence was at this time making in Rome encouraged the enemy<sup>99</sup>; and C. Pontius boldly invaded Campania. Q. Fabius, forgetting how formidable is the last struggle of the hunted lion, thought that to meet the Samnites was to conquer them; and when he fell in with some of their look-out parties, and they retired before him, he believed the whole Samnite army to be retreating, and leaving his baggage behind him, he pushed on as to a certain victory. His men were already tired and disordered by the haste of their march, when they found the Samnite army in perfect order ready to receive them. They were presently defeated; 3000 men were killed on the place<sup>100</sup>, many were

Seventh  
campaign.  
The Romans  
are defeated  
by C. Pon-  
tius.

of his narrative, would have given us a picture at once faithful, lively, and noble.

<sup>99</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2.

<sup>100</sup> Eutropius, II. Suidas, in *Φάβιος Μάξιμος*. We should like to know from whom Suidas bor-

rowed this article; but who, except Niebuhr, has a sufficient power of divination to discover it?

I owe my knowledge of the passage in Suidas to Freinsheim's supplement of the eleventh book of



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

wounded, and night alone saved the army from destruction. But they could not retreat to their baggage<sup>101</sup>, and passed a miserable night in the open country, without any means of relieving their wounded, whose sufferings filled the whole army with horror and dismay. Day dawned, and the Romans expected to be attacked by the conquerors: but Pontius, it is said, heard that the old Fabius was close at hand, coming up with a second army to support his son, and therefore he allowed the beaten Romans to retreat unmolested. This is improbable<sup>102</sup>, but the truth is lost beyond recovery, and it is vain to attempt to restore the details of this most important campaign.

Livy; and as he has consulted almost every passage in the ancient writers which relates to these times, I have in other instances been indebted to him in like manner. But it is right to state, that I have always consulted the passages to which he refers, and have myself verified them: and of this the reader may be assured, that no quotation has been made in these notes which I have not myself verified: if it has ever happened that I have not had the book within my reach, the circumstance has been and will be especially noticed.

<sup>101</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2.

<sup>102</sup> Zonaras, who copies Dion Cassius, represents the old Fabius as having been appointed lieutenant to his son at the beginning of the campaign; and he says that the consul left Rome before his father, and was anxious to fight the Samnites before he joined

him, that the glory of the action might be his own. Livy, (Epitome. XI.) Eutropius, and the writer from whom Suidas copied his article, "Fabius Maximus," say that the old man was only made his son's lieutenant after his defeat, and upon his own request, in order to save him from being deprived of his command. But if this be true, and it seems the more probable account, how could Pontius expect the arrival of the old Fabius on the instant after his son's defeat? Perhaps the consul fought with only a part of his army, and his lieutenant brought up the other part to his rescue from the camp which he had left so rashly; and something of this sort is probable, for if Q. Fabius had been defeated by the enemy in a fair battle without any fault of his own, the senate, according to its usual practice, would not have treated his defeat so severely.



The defeat of Fabius excited great indignation at Rome ; and the political adversaries of his father, such as Appius Claudius and L. Papirius, the latter of whom was now prætor, would not fail to exaggerate his misconduct. It was moved in the senate that he should be recalled from the army, in other words, that his imperium or consular power should be taken from him ; a measure without example in Roman history, except in the case of L. Cinna. The simple course would have been to order the consul to name a dictator ; and he would in that case have named his father, who by universal consent was the man best fitted to meet the need. But the more violent course was preferred by the party opposed to Fabius, and would have been carried, had not the old Fabius<sup>103</sup> moved the senate by offering to go himself to the army, not in the majesty of the dictator's office, as most befitted his age and glory, but merely as lieutenant to his son. This could not be refused, and the old man followed his son to the field, leading with him, we may be sure, sufficient reinforcements ; for every Roman loved the old Q. Fabius, and felt confident that in marching under his command he was marching to victory.

A second battle followed ; where fought, or how brought about, we know not. The old Fabius was the Talbot of the fifth century of Rome ; and his personal prowess, even in age, was no less celebrated than his skill as a general. When the consul was

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

The old Q.  
Fabius  
serves under  
his son as  
his lieute-  
nant.

C. Pontius  
is defeated  
and taken  
prisoner.

<sup>103</sup> Livy, Epit. XI. Dion Cass. Fragm. Peiresc. XXXVI.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

surrounded by the enemy in the heat of the battle<sup>104</sup>, his aged father led the charge to his rescue; and the Romans, animated by such an example, could not be resisted, and won a complete victory. C. Pontius was taken prisoner, and 4000 Samnites shared his fate, while 20,000 were slain on the field.

A.U.C. 463.  
A.C. 291.  
Eighth campaign. Samnium again ravaged by two consular armies.

What resources of hope or of despair could still be left to the Samnites after a disaster so irreparable? Yet they resisted for another year, during which the war was carried on by two consular armies<sup>105</sup> in the heart of their country: many of their towns were taken; and amongst the rest, Venusia, a place on the frontiers of Lucania and Apulia, and important both from its strength and its position. So completely indeed was the power of Samnium broken, that now for the first time the Romans resolved to establish a colony in its territory. Venusia was the spot chosen for this purpose; but it marks the sense still entertained of the Samnite spirit of resistance, that no fewer than 20,000 colonists were sent out to occupy and maintain the new settlement.

Triumph of Q. Fabius Gurges. C. Pontius is led prisoner in the procession and put to death.

After his victory Q. Fabius, the consul, was continued in his command for some time as proconsul. It was not, therefore, till the summer of the year 463 that he returned to Rome, and triumphed. While he was borne along in his chariot, according

<sup>104</sup> Orosius, III. 22.

<sup>105</sup> By L. Postumius, the consul, with his own army, and by Q.

Fabius, the consul of the former year, as proconsul. — Dionysius, XVI. 16.

to custom, his old father rode on horseback behind him as one of his lieutenants<sup>106</sup>, delighting himself with the honours of his son. But at the moment when the consul and his father having arrived at the end of the Sacred Way turned to the left to ascend the hill of the Capitol, C. Pontius, the Samnite general, who with the other prisoners of rank had thus far followed the procession, was led aside to the right hand to the prison<sup>107</sup> beneath the Capitoline hill, and there was thrust down into the underground dungeon of the prison, and beheaded. One year had passed since his last battle; nearly thirty since he had spared the lives and liberty of two Roman armies, and, unprovoked by the treachery of his enemies, had afterwards set at liberty the generals who were given up into his power as a pretended expiation of their country's perfidy. Such a murder, committed or sanctioned by such a man as Q. Fabius, is peculiarly a national crime, and proves but too clearly that in their dealings with foreigners the Romans had neither magnanimity, nor humanity, nor justice.

In the year 464, P. Cornelius Rufinus and M'. Curius Dentatus were chosen consuls. Both entered Samnium with their armies<sup>108</sup>, but it was rather to entitle themselves to the honour of a triumph, than to overbear any real opposition. Every resource of

A.U.C. 464.  
A.C. 290.  
Ninth campaign. The Samnites lay down their arms and submit to Rome.

<sup>106</sup> Plutarch in Fab. Maxim. c. 24. proves of this atrocious practice. "Supplicia, quæ debentur hostibus victis."

<sup>107</sup> So the well-known passage in Cicero, Verres, Act. II. v. 30, where he describes and even ap-

<sup>108</sup> Eutropius, II.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

the Samnites was exhausted, and they again submitted. They were again received as dependent allies of Rome; what territory was taken from them besides that of Venusia, we are not told, or what other sacrifices were required of them. Such was the end of the third Samnite war.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

INTERNAL HISTORY, FROM THE PASSING OF THE OGULNIAN LAW TO THE LANDING OF PYRRHUS IN ITALY  
—SECESSION TO THE JANICULUM—DICTATORSHIP OF  
Q. HORTENSIUS—HORTENSIAN AND MÆNIAN LAWS.  
—FROM A.U.C. 454 TO 474.

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“Clearly a difficult point for government, that of dealing with these masses;—if indeed it be not rather the sole point and problem of government, and all other points mere accidental crotchets, superficialities, and beatings of the wind.”—CARLYLE, *Hist. of French Revolution*, Vol. I. p. 48.

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THERE is often in well-contrived works of fiction a point in the middle of the story, at which all its circumstances seem tending towards a happy catastrophe: and it is only because the reader knows that there is much of the story yet to come, and that something therefore must occur to spoil the fair prospect, that he doubts the stability of the hero's or heroine's good fortune. So promising was the domestic state of Rome in the year 454, when the censorship of Fabius and Decius on the one hand, followed by the Ogulnian and Valerian laws on the other, seemed to announce that society had arrived

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Changes for  
the worse in  
the internal  
state of  
Rome.



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

at its perfect settlement; in which every member of it had found his proper place, and the artificial institutions of man seemed to correspond faithfully to the model, existing in truth though not in fact, which our reason declares to be the will of God.

These  
changes  
were social  
rather than  
political.

But it should ever be borne in mind, that history looks generally at the political state of a nation; its social state, which is infinitely more important, and in which lie the seeds of all the greatest revolutions, is too commonly neglected or unknown. What is called the constitution of Rome, as far as regards the relations of patricians and plebeians to each other, was in fact perfected by the Ogulnian law, and remained for centuries without undergoing any material change. By that law the commons were placed in all respects on a level with the patricians; and the contests between these two orders were brought to an end for ever. The comitia too had assumed that form, whatever it was, which they retained to the end of the commonwealth; the powers of the magistrate as affecting the liberty of the citizen underwent but little subsequent alteration. But however stationary political institutions may remain, the social state of a nation is for ever changing; peace affects this no less than war, and many times even more: nay seasons of profound political quiet may be working far more extensive alteration than periods of faction, or even of civil war. And so it was with the years which followed the passing of the Ogulnian law. Politically they are almost a blank; they present no new law, nothing that de-

serves the name of a contest between orders in the commonwealth, scarcely between individuals; the public attention seems to have been fixed exclusively on the events of the war with Etruria and Samnium. Yet we know that they must have wrought great social changes; for so violent a measure as a secession could never have been so much as contemplated, had it not been preceded by long and general distress, producing social irritation first, and then political.

In the seven years which followed immediately after the passing of the Ogulnian law, we find mention made of a season of great scarcity<sup>1</sup> (A.U.C. 454), and of two years<sup>2</sup> of pestilence (459 and 461). We also read of prosecutions by the ædiles in three several years for violations of the Licinian law<sup>3</sup> (456, 458, 461); and also of prosecutions by the same magistrates for a breach of the law which forbade the taking of interest upon a debt<sup>4</sup> (458). Now, although there may be some caprice in Livy's notice or omission of such particulars, yet it is at least remarkable that he has recorded so many of them at this period; while in the twenty-three years previous to the Ogulnian law, a term which includes the whole of the second Samnite war, we have no mention of any one of them, with the exception of an uncertain report of a pestilence in the year 441<sup>5</sup>. And the argument is the stronger, because we do

Occasioned  
partly by  
seasons of  
scarcity and  
pestilence.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, X. II. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, X. 31. 47.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, X. 13. 23. 47.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, X. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, IX. 28.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

find notices before the second Samnite war of prosecutions both for the breach of the Licinian law, and for taking an illegal interest<sup>6</sup> (398 and 411); so that we may fairly conclude that the second Samnite war itself was a period comparatively exempt at any rate from offences of this nature, as also from the visitations of pestilence and famine. The causes of these last evils belong indeed to a law of God's providence which is to us unknown; but the occurrence of particular crimes at particular periods may in general be explained, if we are fully acquainted with the history of the time; and even in the fifth century of Rome, meagre as our knowledge of it is, we may in some measure account for the facts presented to us.

Partly by  
the en-  
croachments  
of the rich  
on the com-  
mon pasture  
lands.

The close of the second Samnite war in 450, the conquest of the Æquians in the same year, that of the Hernican state of Frusino in the year following, and of the Marsians in 452, must have added greatly to the domain land of the Romans. It was but a small proportion of this which was assigned to the 14,000 colonists of Alba, Carseoli, and Sora; the remainder would be either let to the old inhabitants on payment of a rent or vectigal to Rome, or would be occupied or beneficially enjoyed by individual citizens of Rome or of her allies. Now, as slaves were not yet numerous, there would be a difficulty in procuring labourers to cultivate tracts of land lying mostly at a distance from Rome, and, in many

<sup>6</sup> Livy, VII. 16. 28.

instances, liable to the incursions of an enemy in time of war. It would be more convenient, therefore, to the occupiers to throw their land into pasture wherever it was practicable; and large tracts of domain would be fit for nothing but pasture, such as the higher valleys, and the sides and summits of the mountains; and these would not be occupied by any one particular person, but would be common land, on which any one would have a right to turn out a certain number of sheep and oxen, limited by the Licinian law. Now the acts of violence which were practised, even under the emperors, by powerful men against the property of their weaker neighbours, and the allusion to forcible ejection, as to a thing of no unusual occurrence, in the language of the prætor's interdict, may warrant our believing that the cattle of a small proprietor, when turned out on the mountain pastures at a distance from Rome, would be liable to continual injuries, and that the common land would be exclusively enjoyed by wealthy men, who would little scruple to exceed the legal number of sheep and oxen which they were permitted to feed. These were the *pecuarii* whom Livy twice notices as impeached by the ædiles and heavily fined; but the temptation to violate the law was perpetually recurring; and the chances of a prosecution must have been very uncertain; nor was it always impossible for a powerful man<sup>7</sup> of fair military reputation to escape from his prosecutors, by

<sup>7</sup> As in the case of L. Postumius, which will be noticed hereafter.—See Livy, X. 46.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

getting the consul to name him as one of his lieutenants.

Partly by  
the conti-  
nued wars.

Thus, on the one hand, the years which immediately followed the second Samnite war, furnished the rich with many opportunities of becoming richer. On the other hand, there were many causes at work which made the poor yet poorer. A season of extreme scarcity, such as that of the year 455, must have obliged many of the small tradesmen and artificers of the city to incur debts. Two or three years of pestilence following closely upon one another, as in 459, 461, and 462, must have created great distress not only amongst the town population, but also amongst the agricultural commons: where the father was carried off by the disorder, his wife and family, who were solely dependent on his labour, would be at once reduced to poverty, or again would be forced to relieve their immediate necessity by borrowing. If the pestilence was local, and raged most in Rome and its immediate neighbourhood, yet the more distant tribes suffered from evils of another sort. The tribes on the Etruscan frontier suffered perhaps something in 455 from an inroad of the Gauls, which no doubt aggravated the scarcity of that year; the Falerian tribe in Campania was repeatedly, as we have seen, exposed to the invasions of the Samnites. The extraordinary military exertions of the Romans in the third Samnite war must have rendered necessary a heavy amount of taxation. In the great campaign of 459, six legions were raised, besides two armies of reserve; and in the



preceding year there had been a levy<sup>8</sup> of the whole population of the city, which had been kept under arms for nearly three weeks, whilst the two consular armies were at the same time employed in the field. Nor were the services of the soldier required only for a few weeks in the summer or autumn; the legions were more than once<sup>9</sup> kept abroad during the whole winter; which in itself must have been a great hardship to the small landed proprietor, whose land could ill spare his presence and his labour. Besides, even in the unfair accounts which remain to us of the events of the war, it is confessed that the Roman loss in battle was often very severe; and although their writers do not acknowledge it, the Romans must have lost also many prisoners, whose ransom, if they were not left in hopeless captivity, was an additional burden upon their families. And when, after all this, the most valuable part of the spoil won in a successful campaign was wholly put into the treasury, as was done by L. Papirius in 461<sup>10</sup>, and the soldier received nothing but what he might have gained for himself in sacking one or more of the Samnite cities, the mass of the population would feel, that while the burdens of the war were mostly

<sup>8</sup> Livy, X. 21. "Senatus—delectum omnis generis hominum haberi jussit, nec ingenui modo aut juniores sacramento adacti, sed seniorum etiam cohortes factæ, libertinique centuriati."

<sup>9</sup> App. Claudius' army was kept in Etruria during the winter of

468. Livy, X. 25. The army of M. Atilius wintered near Interamna on the Liris in 460, and that of L. Papirius was kept out in the country of Vescia through the winter of 461. Livy, X. 39. 46.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, X. 46.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

borne by them, they had scarcely any share of its occasional advantage.

Obscurity of  
the history  
of this pe-  
riod.  
Friends and  
opponents  
of the popu-  
lar cause.

Thus it is conceivable that, within three or four years after the end of the third Samnite war, a large portion of the Roman people should have been again involved in debt, and thus should have been irritated against their richer countrymen, and ready to catch fire on the smallest provocation. But the deepest obscurity involves this part of the Roman history : for Livy's tenth book ends with the consulship of L. Papirius and Sp. Carvilius, and from that time to the war with Pyrrhus, we have no other record of events than the meagre epitomes of Zonaras, Orosius, and Eutropius, and a few fragments and incidental notices from other writers. Even the *Fasti Capitolini* are wanting for this period ; so that the very lists of consuls can only be made out from recent authorities<sup>11</sup>. Thus we neither know the immediate causes, nor the leaders, nor the principal opponents, nor even the exact date of the great popular movement which was finally appeased by Q. Hortensius, as dictator. We may conjecture that Appius Claudius, so far as his infirmities might permit him, was most

<sup>11</sup> From Cassiodorus, from what are called the *Fasti Siculi*, published by Scaliger in his edition of Eusebius ; from the anonymous *Fasti*, first published by cardinal Noris from a manuscript in the imperial library at Vienna, and reprinted by Grævius in his great collection of Roman antiquities, Vol. XI. p. 335, and lastly, from the *Fasti* which go by the name

of the *Fasti* of Idatius, published also by Grævius in the same volume, p. 247. The two last *Fasti* give only the cognomina of the consuls, and this is too often the case with the Sicilian *Fasti* also ; they are also often corrupt, but, such as they are, they are almost our sole authority for the consuls of this dark period.

zealous in his opposition to the demands of the people; and that L. Papirius Cursor took the same side. On the other hand, the claims of the popular party were supported, as is most probable, by one of the most eminent Romans of this period, M'. Curius Dentatus.

CILAP.  
XXXIV.

This is a name familiar to every ear, and associated with our highest ideas of ancient Roman virtue. Yet there is not a single great man within the historical period of Rome of whose life less is known to us. Like the Fulvii, and like Ti. Coruncanius and C. Fabricius, he was not of Roman extraction; he came from one of the Latin towns which had received the full Roman franchise<sup>12</sup>, and he was a man of no inherited fortune. His merit as a soldier must have first brought him into notice; and the plain resoluteness of his character, not unlike that of Marius, and perhaps combined, as in his case, with a marked abhorrence of the wealthy aristocracy, caused him to be elected tribune of the commons. In his tribuneship<sup>13</sup> he resisted the most eloquent and overbearing of the patricians, Appius Claudius, who, when holding the comitia as interrex, refused to allow the election of a plebeian consul. Curius compelled the curiæ to ratify the choice of the centuries beforehand, on whomsoever it might fall; and thus the candidate, when elected by the comitia, needed no farther confirmation of his title;

M'. Curius  
Dentatus  
opposes  
Appius  
Claudius.

<sup>12</sup> This appears from the speech of Cicero, *pro Sullâ*, 7, § 23; but we have no information, I believe, as to the particular town from which he came.

<sup>13</sup> Cicero, *Brutus*, 14, § 55.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

he was at once consul. Such is the anecdote as related by Cicero; but we cannot with certainty fix the date of it<sup>14</sup>. It must, however, have occurred before the year 464, when Curius was consul, and, as we have seen, put an end to the third Samnite war.

His con-  
quest of the  
Sabines.

His consulship was rendered farther memorable by the beginning and end of another war<sup>15</sup>, that with the Sabines. Some aid given by them to their kinsmen the Samnites afforded the Romans a pretext for attacking them, after the peace between the two nations had lasted since the year after the expulsion of the decemvirs; that is, during a period of a century and a half. The Sabines dwelt in the heart of Italy, in the valley of the Velinus on the south of the central Apennines, and along the upper part of the course of the Aternus, which runs into the Adriatic. It was an extensive and populous country, for it came down to the left bank of the Tiber at Cures, only nineteen miles from Rome, and it stretched beyond the Apennines as far as the confines of the Vestinians and Picentians. It was rich in oil<sup>16</sup> and wine, and the acorns of its forests fat-

<sup>14</sup> We find from Livy, X. 11, that Appius Claudius was interrex in the year 455, at the breaking out of the third Samnite war. But, as Niebuhr observes, Appius Claudius was interrex three several times, as appears from the inscription recording the principal dignities and actions of his life, Orelli, No. 539, so that we cannot tell in which of his three interregna the circumstance noticed by Cicero took place. When he was a candidate for his second consulship

in 457, he earnestly endeavoured to get Q. Fabius elected with himself in order to exclude a plebeian, Livy, X. 15; but this must not be confounded with Cicero's story; it only shows the habitual temper of the man, and that he never lost sight of his object, of restoring the old ascendancy of the patricians.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, Epitom. XI. Auctor, de Viris Illustr. in M<sup>o</sup>. Cur. Den-  
tat.

<sup>16</sup> Strabo, V. 3, § 1. p. 228.

tened innumerable herds of swine. But the long peace which had increased its wealth, had also made its people unwarlike; they fell almost without a struggle; and their conquest, according to the old historian, Fabius Pictor<sup>17</sup>, first made the Romans acquainted with riches. For his double victory over the Samnites and Sabines, Curius triumphed twice in the same year; and he declared of himself in the assembly of the people on his return to Rome: "I have conquered such an extent of country that it must have been left a wilderness, had the men whom I have made our subjects been fewer: I have subjected such a multitude of men, that they must have starved if the territory conquered with them had been smaller." The Sabines were obliged<sup>18</sup> to become subjects of Rome; that is, to receive the citizenship without the right of voting.

For his double victory over the Samnites and Sabines, Curius, it is recorded<sup>19</sup>, triumphed twice in the course of the year of his consulship. But a far harder contest, and one in which no triumphs could be gained, awaited him at Rome. He saw on the

He brings forward an agrarian law.

<sup>17</sup> Strabo, V. 3, § 1, p. 228. This contrasts strangely with our notions of Sabine simplicity and frugality: "*hanc vitam veteres olim tenuere Sabini*," &c. But possibly Strabo did not give Fabius' meaning correctly; and the old historian may have spoken not of the Sabines only, but of them and the Samnites together, calling them both, perhaps, by the common name of "Sabellians," a term by which the Samnites are called in Livy, X. 19. Fabius

meant probably to speak of the period of Curius' consulship, when he conquered both the Samnites and Sabines, and made the speech reported in the text. But that speech is especially referred by the author of the work "*de Viris Illustribus*," to the Samnite conquests of Curius, and not to his successes against the Sabines.

<sup>18</sup> Paternulus, I. 14. "Sabini sine suffragio data civitas."

<sup>19</sup> Livy, Epitom. XI.



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

one hand the extreme distress of the poorer citizens, whom war and pestilence together had overwhelmed with misery; on the other hand he had conquered large tracts of land, which, if granted out under an agrarian law, might go far towards the relief of their sufferings; and farther, the grasping and insolent spirit of some of the nobility disgusted him with the system of the occupation of the domain lands by individuals. It was only in the preceding year that L. Postumius had employed a Roman army as his slaves<sup>20</sup>, and had made his soldiers clear a wide extent of public land won from the enemy, which he had been allowed to occupy for himself. The actual colleague of Curius in the consulship was P. Cornelius Rufinus<sup>21</sup>, a man already notorious for his rapacity and corruption, and who, doubtless, was turning his Samnite conquests to his own account, and appropriating to himself, at this very moment, the spoil won by the valour of his soldiers. So Curius thought that justice and the public good required that the

<sup>20</sup> A more detailed account of the mad conduct of Postumius in his consulship is given in a subsequent part of this chapter. His trial and fine took place probably in the very year when Curius and P. Cornelius Rufinus were consuls.

<sup>21</sup> Dion Cassius seems to have placed the well-known story of Fabricius voting for Rufinus at the consular comitia, because "he would rather be robbed than sold as a slave," in the first consulship of Rufinus, that is, in the year 464. See the mutilated fragment in Mai's *Scriptor. Veter. Collect.*

Dion. XLI. which, when compared with the entire story as given by Cicero, *de Oratore*, II. 66, clearly relates to the same circumstance. Yet it is difficult to understand, how in either of Rufinus' consulships, the Republic was in such perilous circumstances that great military skill was needed to save her from destruction, which is the meaning of Fabricius' words; and therefore, Niebuhr thinks that the story may refer to the time of Rufinus' dictatorship just after the defeat of Lævinus by Pyrrhus.

conquests of the nation should be made available for the relief of the national distress; and he proposed an agrarian law, which should allot to every citizen a portion of seven jugera<sup>22</sup>.

Who were  
his principal  
opponents.

He arrayed at once against him, not the patricians only, but many families no doubt of the new nobility, who, having attained to wealth and honours, felt entirely as the older members of the aristocracy. The ancestors of Lucullus, and of the Metelli, and of the orator Hortensius, already, we may believe, had joined that party which their descendants so constantly upheld. They made common cause with Appius Claudius, the uncompromising enemy of their whole order, who despised the richest of the Licinii as heartily as the poorest citizen of one of the city tribes. L. Scipio was likely to entertain the same spirit of resistance to the agrarian law of Curius, which Scipio Nasica, nearly two hundred years afterwards, displayed so fiercely against the measures of Ti. Gracchus; and L. Papirius Cursor, with all his father's inflexible temper and unyielding courage, would be slow to comply with the demands of a plebeian multitude. The old Q. Fabius was

<sup>22</sup> "Quaterna dena agri jugera viritum populo divisit." Auctor de Viris Illustribus.—M'. Curius. But these fourteen jugera must be understood of two separate agrarian laws, the one passed or proposed in the first consulship of Curius, the other in his second consulship, after the final defeat of Pyrrhus. It is not expressly stated that this first allotment was vehemently opposed; but the frag-

ment from Appian, preserved by Suidas, and quoted below, proves that Curius was in a state of violent opposition to the senate, and this is likely to have been on account of his agrarian law. It may be, however, that he also brought forward some of those measures which were afterwards conceded by the aristocracy, and which were contained in the Hortensian laws.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

respected and loved by all orders of his countrymen, and he had been opposed to the party of the high aristocracy; but perhaps his civil courage was not equal to his courage in the field; he had shown on a former occasion<sup>23</sup> that he might be moved by the reproaches of his order, and if he took no part against Curius, yet we cannot believe that he supported him.

Tumults  
and violent  
state of par-  
ties. The  
agrarian law  
is passed.

I have tried to recal the individual actors in these troubles, in order to give to them something more of reality than can belong to a mere account of actions apart from the men who performed them. And the contest no doubt was violent; for it is said that Curius was followed by a band of eight hundred picked young men<sup>24</sup>, the soldiers, we may suppose, who had so lately conquered under his auspices, and who were ready to decide the quarrel, if needful, by the sword. They saved Curius from the fate of Ti. Gracchus, but it does not appear that they committed any acts of outrage themselves. But an impenetrable veil conceals from our view the particulars of all these disturbances; the law of Curius was finally passed, but we know not at what time, nor whether it was obtained by any other than peaceful and legal means.

<sup>23</sup> When he only refused to violate the Licinian law, and to return two patrician consuls, because he himself would have been one of them. Otherwise he is represented as saying that he would have complied with the wishes of the patricians, and have broken the law.—Livy, X. 15.

*εἶπετο νέων λογάδων πλήθος ὀκτακοσίων, ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ἔργα ἑτοιμοὶ. καὶ βαρὺς ἦν τῇ βουλῇ παρὰ τὰς ἐκκλησίας.*

This is a quotation made from Appian by Suidas, and is to be found in Suidas' lexicon, in ζῆλος, or in Schweighauser's Appian, Samnitic. Extract. V.

<sup>24</sup> *Δεντάτω κατὰ ζῆλον ἀρετῆς*

Between the consulship of Curius and Cornelius Rufinus, and that of P. Dolabella and Cn. Domitius, when the Gaulish war broke out, there intervened a period of seven years, all the records of which have so utterly perished, that not a single event can be fixed with certainty in any one particular year. But with all the chronology of these years we have lost also the history; we cannot ascertain the real character of the events which followed, nor the relations of parties to each other, nor the conduct of particular persons<sup>25</sup>. Some of the tribunes<sup>26</sup> proposed a law for the abolition of all debts; whether before or after the passing of Curius' agrarian law we know not. Nor can we tell whether Curius held on with the popular party till the end of the contest;

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Laws proposed for other popular objects.  
SECESSION OF THE PEOPLE TO THE JANICULUM.

<sup>25</sup> For example, a speech of Curius has been recorded, in which he said, "that the man must be a mischievous citizen who was not contented with seven jugera of land." Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* XVIII. § 18. Ed. Silig. But the application of this speech is most uncertain. According to Plutarch it was spoken to reprove some violent supporters of the popular party, who thought that Curius' agrarian law did not go far enough, and that the whole of the state's domains ought to be allotted to separate proprietors, without allowing any portion to be occupied in great masses as at present.—*Apophthegm.* p. 194. E. But Valerius Maximus transfers the speech to Curius' second consulship, and makes it accompany his refusal of an unusually large portion of land which the senate proposed to allot to himself. IV. 3,

§ 5. Frontinus also makes it accompany his refusal of an offer made to himself; but he places it in his first consulship, after the Sabine war. *Strategemat.* IV. 3, § 12. It might also have been spoken against the occupiers of large tracts of domain land, who would not be contented with an allotment of seven jugera as property, but wished to occupy whole districts. So impossible is it to see our way in the history of a period where the accounts are not only so meagre, but also at variance with one another.

<sup>26</sup> *δημάρχων τινῶν χρῆων ἀποκοπήν εἰσηγησαμένων.* — Zonaras, VIII. 2. The words *εἰσηγουμένων τῶν δημάρχων* are legible in a mutilated fragment of Dion Cassius relating to these times, which Mai has printed in such a state as to be in many parts absolutely unintelligible. *Fragn.* XLII.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

or whether, as often happens with the leaders of the beginnings of civil dissensions, he thought that the popular cause was advancing too far, and either left it, or even joined the party of its opponents. We only know that the demands of the people<sup>27</sup> rose with the continuance of the struggle; that political questions were added to those of debtor and creditor; that points which, if yielded in time, would have satisfied all the wishes of the popular party, were contested inch by inch, till, when gained, they were only regarded as a step to something farther; and that at last the mass of the people left Rome and established themselves on the Janiculum<sup>28</sup>. Even then, if Zonaras may be trusted, the aristocracy would not yield, and it was only the alarm of a foreign enemy<sup>29</sup>, perhaps some gathering of the forces of Etruria, which at this time was meditating on a real and decisive trial of strength with Rome, which induced the senate to put an end at any price to the existing dissensions.

They are brought back by Q. Hortensius, who passes the HORTENSIAN LAWS.

Accordingly Q. Hortensius<sup>30</sup> was appointed dictator. He was a man of an old plebeian family, for we find an Hortensius amongst the tribunes of the year 332<sup>31</sup>; but individually, he is unknown to us, and we cannot tell what recommended him to the choice of the consuls on this occasion. He assem-

<sup>27</sup> This appears from the legible part of the fragment of Dion Cassius just noticed: *τελευτώντες οὐκ οὐδ' ἐθελόντων τῶν δυνατῶν πολλῶ πλείω τῶν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλπισθέντων σφίσιν ἀφείναι, συνηλλάγησαν.*

<sup>28</sup> Livy, Epitom. XI.

<sup>29</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Livy, Epitom. XI. Pliny, *Histor. Natur.* XVI. § 37. Ed. Sillig.

<sup>31</sup> Livy, IV, 42.



bled the people, including under that name the whole nation, those who had stayed in Rome no less than those who had withdrawn to the Janiculum, in a place called "the Oak Grove"<sup>32</sup>, probably without the walls of the city; and in that sacred grove were passed, and ratified probably by solemn oaths, the famous Hortensian laws.

These contained, in the first place, an abolition<sup>33</sup>, or at least a great reduction of debts; 2nd, an agrarian law on an extensive scale, allotting seven jugera of the domain land to every citizen; and 3rd, one or more laws affecting the constitution; of which the most important was that which deprived the senate of its veto, and declared the people assembled<sup>34</sup> in their tribes to be a supreme legisla-

Their provisions.

<sup>32</sup> "Q Hortensius, dictator, cum plebs secessisset in Janiculum, legem in esculeto tulit, ut quod ea jussisset omnes Quirites teneret." Pliny, Hist. Nat. XVI. § 37. Ed. Sillig.

<sup>33</sup> This is not stated in direct terms in the scanty notices of these events which alone have been preserved to us. But as the abolition of debts was the main thing required by the people, and as the fragment of Dion Cassius, above referred to, speaks of the people having their first demands granted and then going on to insist upon others, and as we have seen an abolition of debts carried once before in the disturbances of 413, it does not seem too much to conclude that a similar measure was carried on on the present occasion also. With regard to the agrarian law, it may have been passed

two or three years earlier; but from the statement already quoted, (Auctor de Viris Illustribus, in M'. Curio,) "that Curius granted fourteen jugera to each citizen, it is clear that an agrarian law proposed by him must have been carried at some time or other in the period between his consulship and the dictatorship of Hortensius. It may thus be numbered amongst the Hortensian laws, as belonging to the measures which the people at this period forced the aristocracy to concede to them.

<sup>34</sup> The statement in the text follows Niebuhr, who, as is well known, supposed that the Hortensian laws differed from the Publilian, inasmuch as the Publilian abolished the veto of the curiæ, and the Hortensian did away the veto of the senate. The tribes in the forum and the senate were thus

CHAP.  
XXIV.

tive power. Accidental mention has been preserved to us of another law, or possibly of a particular clause in the former law, by which the *nundinæ*<sup>35</sup> or weekly market days which had hitherto been days of business for the commons only, and sacred or holy days for the patricians, were now made days of business for the whole nation alike. Was the object of this merely to abolish a marked distinction between the two orders; or was it to enable the patricians to take part in the meeting of the tribes in the forum, which were held on the *nundinæ*, and had they hitherto belonged only to the tribes in that other but to us undiscoverable form, in which they voted at the *comitia* of centuries on the field of Mars?

The legislative power of the tribes established.

Thus the sovereign legislative power of the assembly of the tribes in the forum was fully established; and consequently, when C. Flaminius brought forward another agrarian bill, about fifty years afterwards, for a division of the recently conquered country of the Senones, the senate, however

placed on a footing of equality; neither had a veto on the enactments of the other; and the tribunes had a veto upon both alike. Both also were considered as equal to laws; for "*senatus consultum legis vicem obtinet*;" (Gaius, *Institut* I. § 4) and by the Hortensian law, "*plebiscita legibus æquata sunt*." (Gaius, *Institut* I. § 3) It may be doubted whether the limits of these two powers were ever very definitely settled; although one point is mentioned as lying exclusively in the power of the tribes, namely, the right of admitting any strangers to the

franchise of Roman citizens.—Livy, XXXVIII. 36.

<sup>35</sup> Macrobius, *Saturnal*. I. 16. The reason assigned by Macrobius for this enactment of the Hortensian law may also be admitted; that it was made to suit the convenience of the citizens from the country, who coming up to Rome on the market days, wished to be able to settle their legal business at the same time; but this could not be done, at least in the prætor's court, as there, according to the patrician usage, the market days were holydays, and consequently the court did not sit.

strongly averse to it, could not prevent it from becoming a law. The only check, therefore, which now remained on the absolute legislative power of the tribes, consisted in the veto of their own tribunes; and to secure the negative of a tribune became accordingly the ordinary resource of the aristocracy in the contests of the seventh century.

Another important law is supposed to have been passed at the same period with the law of Hortensius, though our knowledge of all particulars respecting it is still more scanty. A law bearing the name of Mænian<sup>36</sup>, and proposed, therefore, either by the good dictator C. Mænius himself, or as is more probable by one of his family, took away the veto which the curiæ had hitherto enjoyed in the election of curule magistrates. They were now to sanction

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

The Mæ-  
nian law.

<sup>36</sup> What we know of the Mænian law comes chiefly from a passage of Cicero (*Brutus*, c. 14. § 55), in which he says of M'. Curius, that he "patres ante auctores fieri coegerit, quod fuit permagnum, nondum lege Mæniâ latâ." Livy must allude also to this law, when he says, "hodie—priusquam populus suffragium inerat, in incertum comitiorum eventum patres auctores fiunt." I. 17. It must be observed that the power taken away by the Mænian law from the "patres" was taken away from the senate no less than from the curiæ; for the senate in its original form was only a select assembly of the patres, whose great assembly was the comitia curiata. And gradually the senate drew to itself both the name and the power of the greater patri-

cian assembly, so that what is said of the patres or patricians is commonly to be understood of the senate, and not of the curiæ, even although the senate had long ceased to be exclusively a patrician assembly. This view would coincide with Niebuhr's distinction between the Publilian and Hortensian laws. When the former were passed, the curiæ were still an efficient body, and the term "patres" therefore applied to them much more than to the senate. But in the fifty years that followed, the curiæ had dwindled away so much that the senate was become the principal assembly of the patres; and therefore the Hortensian law extended to the senate what had before been enacted by the Publilian law with respect to the curiæ.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

beforehand the choice of the centuries, on whomsoever it might happen to fall. And thus their share in the elections being reduced to an empty form, they soon ceased to be assembled at all; and in later times of the commonwealth they were represented merely by thirty lictors, who were accustomed for form's sake to confirm the suffrages of the centuries, and to confer the imperium on the magistrates whom the centuries had elected.

These laws did not make the constitution of Rome a democracy.

But although supreme legislative power was now bestowed on the assembly of the tribes, and although the elections were freed from all direct legal control on the part of the aristocracy, yet we know full well that the Roman constitution was very far from becoming henceforward a democracy. To us, indeed, who are accustomed to enact more than five hundred new laws every year, and who see the minutest concerns of common life regulated by act of parliament, the possession of an independent legislative power by a popular assembly must seem equivalent to absolute sovereignty. But our own early history may teach us not to apply our present notions to other times and other countries. The legislative power, even in the days of the Tudors and Stuarts, was of small importance when compared with the executive and judicial. Now, the Hortensian law enabled the Roman people to carry any point on which they considered their welfare to depend; it removed all impediments, which after all do but irritate rather than hinder, out of the way of the strongly declared expression of the pub-



lie will. But the public will was in the ordinary state of things quiescent, and allowed itself to be represented by the senate and the magistrates. It resigned to these even the power of taxation, and except in some rare or comparatively trifling cases, the whole judicial power also: those judges who were appointed by the prætor to try questions of fact, in all the most important civil and criminal cases, were taken exclusively from the order of senators. All the ordinary administration was conducted by the senate; and its decrees on all particular points, like the *ψηφίσματα* of the Athenian popular assembly, had undoubtedly the force of laws.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

According to Theophilus<sup>37</sup>, this was a concession made by the people to the aristocracy, and embodied in the laws of Hortensius, that the decrees of the senate should be binding on the people, as the decrees or resolutions of the tribes were to be binding on the senate. At any rate it is certain that the senate retained high and independent powers of its own, which were no less sovereign than those possessed by the assembly of the tribes; and in practice each of these two bodies kept up for a hundred and fifty years a healthy and vigorous life in itself, without interfering with the functions of the other. Mutual good sense and good feeling, and the continual moderating influence of the college of tri-

Their effects  
were lasting  
and bene-  
ficial.

<sup>37</sup> See Hugo, *Geschichte des Rom. Rechts*, p. 339. (9th Edit.) The passage in Theophilus is one which I have not verified, as I have not had an opportunity of consulting the book. But Hugo professes to quote it fully, and I have no doubt of his correctness.



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

bunes, whose peculiar position as having a veto on the proceedings both of the senate and people disposed them to regulate the action of each, prevented any serious collision, and gave to the Roman constitution that mixed character, partly aristocratic and partly popular, which Polybius recognized and so greatly admired. And thus the event seems to have given the highest sanction to the wisdom of the Hortensian laws: nor can we regard them as mischievous or revolutionary, when we find that from the time of their enactment the internal dissensions of the Romans were at an end for a hundred and fifty years, and that during this period the several parts of the constitution were all active; it was a calm not produced by the extinction of either of the contending forces, but by their perfect union.

Prospect of  
a new coa-  
lition against  
Rome.

It may be conjectured that the sickness which had visited Rome during three or four successive years at the close of the Samnite war returned, partially at least, in the concluding year of these domestic troubles, for Q. Hortensius died before the expiration of his dictatorship; an event hitherto unexampled in the Roman annals, and regarded as of evil omen; so that Augustine<sup>38</sup> makes it a reproach to the impotence of the god Æsculapius, that

<sup>38</sup> De Civitate Dei, III. 17. Augustine's notice of the secession to the Janiculum is probably taken from Livy, and may be given here, as it contains one or two particulars not mentioned in any other existing record. "Post graves et longas Romæ seditiones ad ultimum plebs in Janiculum

*hostile diremptione* secesserat: cujus mali tam dira calamitas erat, ut ejus rei causâ quod in extremis periculis fieri solebat, dictator crearetur Hortensius; qui plebe revocatâ in eodem magistratu expiravit, quod nulli dictatori ante contigerat."

although he had been so lately brought from Greece with the utmost solemnity, and had been received at Rome with due honours, that his presence might stay the pestilence, he yet suffered the very dictator of the Roman people to fall its victim. Nearly about the same time also, if we can judge from the place and apparent drift of one of the fragments of Dionysius<sup>39</sup>, Rome suffered from an earthquake. And scarcely were the Hortensian laws passed, when the prospect of foreign war on a most extensive scale presented itself. Tarentum, it is said, was busily organizing a new coalition, in which the Lucanians, Samnites, and Bruttians in the south were to unite with the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls in the north, and were again to try their combined strength against Rome.

In the mean time, before we trace the events of this great contest, we may bring together some few scattered notices of domestic affairs, relating to the state of Rome in the middle of the fifth century.

A new magistracy had its origin<sup>40</sup> somewhere between the years 461 and 466; that of the *triumviri capitales*, or commissioners of police. These officers were elected by the people, the *comitia* being held by the *prætor*. Their business was to enforce the payment of fines due to the state<sup>41</sup>; to try by

Miscellaneous notices of domestic events.

Institution of the *triumviri capitales*.

<sup>39</sup> Ch. 39. *Fragm. Dionys. apud Maium. Scriptor. Veter. Vatican. Collect. Vol. II. p. 501.*

<sup>40</sup> Livy, *Epitome*, XI.

<sup>41</sup> Festus, in "*Sacramentum*." The appointment of the "*triumviri capitales*" was proposed, ac-

cording to Festus, by L. Papirius, whom he calls "tribune of the commons." One cannot but suspect with Niebuhr, that the person meant was L. Papirius Cursor, who was *prætor* in the year 462 (Livy, X. 47); and then the ap-

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

summary process all offenders against the public peace who might be taken in the fact; to have the care of the state prison, and to carry into effect the sentence of the law upon criminals. They resembled exactly in all these points the well known magistracy of the eleven at Athens.

The probable occasion of its institution.

The creation of this office seems to mark an increase of ordinary crimes against person and property; and such an increase was the natural consequence of the distress which prevailed about this time, and particularly of the severe visitations of pestilence which occurred at this period. It is well known that such seasons are marked by the greatest outbreaks of all sorts of crime; and that never is a strong police more needed than when the prospect of impending death makes men reckless, and eager only to indulge their passions while they may.

Returns of the census at this period.

The census of the year 461 gave a return of 262,322 Roman citizens<sup>42</sup>; that of the year 466, notwithstanding the havoc caused in the interval by the double scourge of pestilence and war, exhibited an increase of 10,000<sup>43</sup> upon the preceding return. This was owing to the conquest of the Sabines, and their consequent admission to the Roman franchise in the year 464: for the census included, as is well

pointment would coincide with the year when the plague was at its height, and when the deputation was sent to Epidaurus to invite Æsculapius to Rome.

Varro. de L. L. V. 81. Ed. Müller. Pomponius, de Origine Juris, Digest. I. Tit. II. § 39.

Livy, XXV. 1. XXXII. 26. Valerius Maximus, V. 4, § 7.

Etymologicon Magn. in ἑνδεκα. See Herman, Pol. Antiq. of Greece, § 137.

<sup>42</sup> Livy, X. 47.

<sup>43</sup> Livy, Epitom. XI.

known, not only those citizens who were enrolled in the tribes, but those also who enjoyed the private rights of citizenship without as yet partaking in the right of suffrage.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Amongst other traits of resemblance between the Spartan and the Roman aristocracies, we may notice the extreme moderation shown by each of them towards the faults of their distinguished citizens. It was not till after repeated proofs of his treasonable designs that the Spartan government would take any serious steps against Pausanias; and the forbearance of the Romans towards Appius Claudius was no less remarkable. Another memorable example of the same spirit occurred in the case of L. Postumius Megellus. He belonged to a family whose pride and hatred of the commons had been notorious in the political contests of the beginning of the fourth century<sup>44</sup>; and, as Niebuhr has truly observed, the peculiar character of a Roman family was preserved from generation to generation, and it was rarely found that any of its members departed from it. He had been consul in 449, and again in 460, and had acquired in each of his commands the reputation of a brave and skilful soldier. But his conduct as a citizen was far less meritorious; and it was probably for some overbearing or oppressive behaviour in his second consulship that he was threatened with impeachment by one of the tribunes as soon as he went out of office. In the crisis of the

Story of L.  
Postumius  
Megellus.

<sup>44</sup> See Chap. XIII. of this history, note 48.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Samnite war, however, military merit atoned for all other defects; the consul Sp. Carvilius named him one of his lieutenants<sup>45</sup>, and the trial was delayed till the campaign should be over; but when it had ended triumphantly, the popularity and brilliant victories of Sp. Carvilius pleaded strongly in favour of his lieutenant, and the trial never was brought forward. Two years afterwards, in 463, Postumius was again chosen consul, when the great victory obtained in the preceding year by Q. Fabius made it probable that the war might soon be brought to a triumphant issue.

His quarrels  
with his col-  
league in his  
third con-  
sulship.

His proud and bad nature was more irritated by having been threatened at first with impeachment, than softened by the favour shown to him afterwards; so that his conduct in his third consulship was that of a mischievous madman. His first act<sup>46</sup> was to insist on having Samnium assigned to him as his province, without referring the decision as usual to lot; and though his colleague, C. Junius Bubulcus, remonstrated against this arrogance, yet the nobility and powerful interest of Postumius prevailed, and C. Junius forbore to dispute what he perceived he could not resist with success.

He employs  
his soldiers  
in clearing  
his own  
land.

Then followed, as usual, the levying of the legions for the service of the year; but the Samnites were so humbled that nothing more was to be feared from them, and Q. Fabius Gurgus still commanded an army in Samnium as proconsul. It was not neces-

<sup>45</sup> Livy, X. 46.

<sup>46</sup> Dionysius, XVI. 15.



sary therefore for the consul to begin active operations immediately; but he, notwithstanding, took the field with his army, and advanced towards the enemy's frontier. In the course of the late campaigns, he had become the occupier of a large tract of the territory conquered from the Samnites; but much of it was uncleared land, and as slaves at Rome were yet but few, labourers were not easily to be procured in these remote possessions in sufficient numbers. Postumius did not scruple to employ his soldiers as though they had been his slaves: he set two thousand<sup>47</sup> men to work in felling his woods, and in this manner he engaged for a considerable time a large portion of a Roman army.

When, at last, he was ready to commence active operations against the enemy, his pride displayed itself in a new form. Q. Fabius Gurges was still, as we have seen, commanding an army in Samnium as proconsul; and he was now laying siege to Cominium, which, though taken and burnt by the Romans two years before, appears to have been again occupied by the Samnites as a fortress; for the massy walls of their towns could not easily be destroyed, and these exist in many instances to this day, encircling nothing but desolation within them. The consul wrote to Fabius<sup>48</sup>, ordering him to withdraw from Samnium: Fabius pleaded the authority of the senate, by which he had been continued in his command; and the senate itself sent a deputation to

His behaviour towards Q. Fabius Gurges.

<sup>47</sup> Dionysius, XVI. 15. Livy, Epitome, XI. <sup>48</sup> Dionysius, XVI. 16.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Postumius, requiring him not to oppose their decree. But he replied to the deputies, that so long as he was consul it was for him to command the senate, not for the senate to dictate to him; and he marched directly towards Cominium, to compel Fabius to obedience by actual force. Fabius did not attempt to resist him; and the consul, having taken the command of both armies, immediately sent Fabius home.

He triumphs in spite of the prohibition of the senate.

In actual war Postumius again proved himself an able soldier: he took Cominium<sup>49</sup>, and several other places, and he conquered the important post of Venusia, and, well appreciating the advantages of its situation, he recommended that it should be made a Roman colony. The senate followed his advice, but would not appoint him one of the commissioners<sup>50</sup> for assigning the lands to the colonists, and superintending the foundation of the new settlement. He in his turn distributed all the plunder of the campaign amongst his soldiers, that he might not enrich the treasury; and he marched home and gave his soldiers leave of absence from their standards, without waiting for the arrival of his successor. Finally, when the senate refused to allow him to triumph<sup>51</sup>, he, having secured the protection of three of the tribunes, celebrated his triumph in defiance of the prohibition of the other seven, and in contempt of the senate's refusal.

<sup>49</sup> Dionysius, XVI. 17.

<sup>50</sup> Dionysius, XVI. 17.

<sup>51</sup> Dionys. XVI. 18. Livy relates this story of Postumius' se-

cond consulship, X. 37. But it agrees on every account better with his third consulship, of which it is related by Dionysius.

For such a course of outrageous conduct, he was prosecuted as soon as he went out of office, by two of the tribunes, and was condemned by all the three and thirty tribes unanimously. But his accusers did not prosecute him capitally, they only sued him for a fine; and although the fine was the heaviest to which any Roman had been hitherto sentenced, for it amounted to 500,000 asses<sup>52</sup>, yet it was but small in comparison of the penalties imposed with far less provocation by the governments of Greece. It amounted, in Greek money, to no more than fifty thousand drachmæ, whereas Agis the king of Sparta had been condemned, even by the Spartans, to pay a fine of one hundred thousand<sup>53</sup> for a mere want of judgment in his military operations. Postumius, in addition to his own large possessions, would probably have many wealthy clients, who were bound to pay their patron's fine. His family, at any rate, was not ruined or disgraced by his sentence, for his son was elected consul a few years afterwards, in the third year of the first Punic war.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

He is tried  
and heavily  
fined.

Of the miscellaneous particulars recorded of this period one of the most remarkable is the embassy sent to Greece in the year 462, to invite the god Æsculapius to Rome, in order that he might put a stop to the plague which had then been raging for three years. The head of the embassy was Q. Ogulnius<sup>54</sup>, the proposer of the law by which the com-

Embassy  
sent to Epi-  
daurus to  
invite the  
god Æscu-  
lapius to  
Rome.

<sup>52</sup> Dionysius, XVI. 18.

<sup>53</sup> Thucydides, V. 63.

<sup>54</sup> Valerius Maximus, I. 8.

Auctor "de Viris Illustribus,"  
in "Æsculap. Rom. advect."

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

mons had been admitted to the sacred offices of pontifex and augur, and who more recently, as curule ædile, had caused the famous group of the she-wolf suckling Romulus and Remus to be placed by the sacred fig-tree in the comitium. The deputation arrived at Epidaurus, the peculiar seat of Æsculapius, and entreated permission to invite the god to Rome, and that they might be instructed how to offer him acceptable worship. This was no unusual request; for many cities, had, in like manner, received his worship from Epidaurus; Sicyon<sup>55</sup>, Athens, Pergamus, and Cyrene. Accordingly, one of the snakes which were sacred to the god crawled from his temple to the city of Epidaurus, and from thence made its way to the sea-shore, and climbed up into the trireme of the Roman ambassadors, which was as usual drawn up on the beach. It was under the form of a snake that Æsculapius was said to have gone to Sicyon<sup>56</sup>, when his worship was introduced there; and the Romans, instructed by the Epidaurians, considered that he was now going to visit Rome in the same form, and they immediately sailed away with the sacred snake to Italy. But when they stopped at Antium, on their way home, the snake, so said the story<sup>57</sup>, left the ship, and crawled out into the precinct of the temple of Æsculapius, for the god it seems was worshipped at Antium also, and coiled himself round a tall palm tree, where he

<sup>55</sup> Pausanias, II. 10, 26.

<sup>56</sup> Pausanias, II. 10.

<sup>57</sup> As given by Valerius Maxi-

mus; I. 8. by the author "de Viris Illustribus," and above all by Ovid, Metamorphos. XV. 622, &c.

remained for three days. The Romans anxiously waited for his return to the ship; and at last he went back, and did not move again till the ship entered the Tiber. Then when she came to Rome, he again crawled forth, but instead of landing with the ambassadors, he swam to the island in the middle of the Tiber, and there went on shore and remained quiet. A temple was built, therefore, to the god in the spot which he had himself chosen; and the island to this day preserves the memory of the story, for the travertino, which was brought there to form the foundation of the temple of the god, has been cut into a rude resemblance of a trireme, because it was on ship-board that Æsculapius had first visited the Romans, and received their worship.

There is no reason to doubt that the Romans did bring back with them a snake from Epidaurus, for there was a breed of snakes there, said to be peculiar to that country<sup>58</sup>, and perfectly harmless, which were accounted sacred to Æsculapius. And so complete is the ascendancy which man's art has obtained over the brute creation, that it is very possible that they may have been trained to perform various feats at the bidding of their keepers; and if one of these, as is likely, went with the sacred snake to Rome, wonders may have really been exhibited to the Roman people, which they would have certainly supposed to be supernatural.

This, if we except the doubtful story of the em-  
The story not impossible.  
Mutual knowledge

<sup>58</sup> Pausanias, II, 28.



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

of each  
other pos-  
sessed at  
this time by  
the Greeks  
and Ro-  
mans.

bassy to Athens immediately before the decemvirate, and one or two deputations to consult the oracle of Delphi, is the earliest instance recorded by the Roman annalists of any direct communication between their country and Greece since the beginning of the commonwealth. Greek writers, as we have seen, mentioned an embassy sent to Alexander at Babylon, and a remonstrance made by Demetrius Poliorcetes against the piracies of the Antiatiens, at a time when they were subject to the Romans. We may be sure, at any rate, that in the middle of the fifth century the two people were no strangers to each other: and whether it be true or not that Demetrius acknowledged the Romans to be the kinsmen of the Greeks, yet when the Epidaurians gave them their god Æsculapius, they would feel that they were not giving him to a people utterly barbarian, but to one which had for centuries paid divine honours to Greek heroes, which worshipped Hercules, and the twin gods Castor and Pollux; and which, within the memory of the existing generation, had erected statues in the comitium to the wisest and bravest of the men of Greece<sup>59</sup>, Pythagoras and Alcibiades. Nor can we doubt that Q. Ogulnius was sufficiently acquainted with the Greek language to address the Epidaurians, as L. Postu-

<sup>59</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XXXIV. § 26. Ed. Sillig. These statues were set up "bello Samniti," probably in the second war; and were erected in consequence of the command of the Delphian

oracle, which the Romans had probably consulted after their disaster at the pass of Caudium, as they did afterwards after the defeat at Cannæ. Livy, XXII. 57.

mius a few years later addressed the Tarentines, without the help of an interpreter.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

We are now arrived, however, at the period when the histories of Greece and Rome unavoidably intermix with one another ; when the greatest prince and general of the Greek nation crossed over into Italy, and became the head of the last coalition of the Italian states against Rome. We must here then pause, and before we enter upon the new Samnite and Tarentine war, in which Pyrrhus so soon interfered, and before we notice those renewed hostilities with the Gauls, which owed their origin, in part at least, to the intrigues of the Tarentines, we must once more cross the sea, after an interval of more than a hundred years, and observe what was now the state of Greece and of the eastern world ; what new powers had succeeded to Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and the great king, who had inherited the fragments of the empire of Alexander, and what was the condition of the various states of the Grecian name in Greece itself and in Sicily. We must endeavour too to obtain some more lively notion of Rome and the Roman people at this same period, than could be gained from the imperfect record of political and military events ; to conceive what that city was which Cineas likened to a temple ; what was the real character of that people whose senate he described as an assembly of kings.

It becomes here necessary to describe the state of the east and the internal condition of Rome.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

STATE OF THE EAST — KINGDOMS OF ALEXANDER'S  
SUCCESSORS — SICILY — GREECE — KINGDOM OF EPI-  
RUS, AND EARLY FORTUNES OF PYRRHUS.

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“When he was strong the great horn was broken; and for it came up four notable ones toward the four winds of heaven.”—DANIEL, VIII. 8.

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CHAP.  
XXXV.

The 124th  
Olympiad is  
a remark-  
able period  
in Grecian  
history.

THE hundred and twenty-fourth Olympiad witnessed, says Polybius<sup>1</sup>, the first revival of the Achæan league, and the deaths of Ptolemy the son of Lagus, of Lysimachus, of Seleucus Nicator, and of Ptolemy

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, II. 41. Some explanation may perhaps be required of the length of this chapter, devoted as it is to matters not directly connected with the Roman history of the fifth century of Rome. But it is impossible to forget that all the countries here spoken of will successively become parts of the Roman empire; the wars in which they were engaged with Rome will hereafter claim our attention, and therefore their condition immediately before those wars cannot be considered foreign to my subject. Besides, the distinctness of the eastern empire from the western was productive of the

most important consequences; and this distinctness arose from the spread of the Greek language and manners over Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, by Alexander's conquests, and the establishment of his successive kingdoms. As for the notices of Greece itself, of Sparta, of Thebes, and of Athens, they cannot plead quite the same justification; but I trust that they may be forgiven, as an almost involuntary tribute of respect and affection to old associations and immortal names, on which we can scarcely dwell too long or too often.

Ceraunus. The same period was also marked by the Italian expedition of Pyrrhus, and immediately afterwards followed the great inroad of the Gauls into Greece and Asia, their celebrated attack upon Delphi, and their establishment in the heart of Asia Minor, in the country which afterwards was called from them Galatia. This coincidence of remarkable events is enough of itself to attract attention; and the names which I have just mentioned, contain, in a manner, the germ of the whole history of the eastern world; all its interests and all its most striking points may be fully comprehended, when these names have been rendered significant, and we have formed a distinct notion of the persons and people which they designate.

Forty years<sup>2</sup> had elapsed since the death of Alexander, when Seleucus Nicator, the last survivor of his generals, was assassinated at Lysimachia<sup>3</sup> by Ptolemy Ceraunus. The old man, for Seleucus was more than seventy-five years old, had just before destroyed the kingdom of Lysimachus, the last survivor except himself of the immediate successors and former generals of Alexander; and after fifty years' absence, was returning as the sovereign of Asia to that country which he had left as an unknown officer in Alexander's army. But an oracle, it is said, had bidden him beware of Europe<sup>4</sup>; for

Seleucus is  
assassinated  
by Ptolemy  
Ceraunus,  
who seizes  
the throne  
of Macedo-  
nia.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander died Olymp. 114-1-2. B.C. 323. Seleucus was murdered Olymp. 124-4. B.C. 280. See Fynes Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, *Syriac*. 62. Porphyry, *apud Eusebium, Chronic.* p. 63. Ed. Scaliger.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, *Syriac*. 63.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

that the appointed seat of his fortunes was Asia. And scarcely had he landed on the Thracian Chersonesus, when he was assassinated by one of his own followers, by Ptolemy Ceraunus<sup>5</sup>, the half brother of Ptolemy Philadelphus the reigning king of Egypt, who had first been a refugee at the court of Lysimachus, and, after his death, had been taken into the service of Seleucus, and had been treated by him with the greatest kindness and confidence. Seleucus' vast kingdom, which reached from the Hellespont to the Indus, was inherited by his son Antiochus<sup>6</sup>; but his murderer seized upon the throne of Macedonia, which having been in rapid succession filled by various competitors, and having lastly been occupied by Lysimachus, now, in consequence of his overthrow and death, and of the murder of his conqueror, seemed to lie open to the first pretender.

Ptolemy  
the son of  
Lagus reigns  
in Egypt,  
Cyrene, and  
Cyprus.

Seleucus outlived by about two years<sup>7</sup> his old ally and his protector in his utmost need, Ptolemy the son of Lagus, king of Egypt. With more unbroken good fortune than any other of his contemporaries, Ptolemy had remained master of Egypt, first as satrap and afterwards as king, from the first division of Alexander's empire down to the period of

<sup>5</sup> Ptolemy Ceraunus was the son of Ptolemy Soter, by Eurydice, the daughter of Antipater; Ptolemy Philadelphus was his son by Berenice. Porphyry, *apud* Euseb. p. 63. Pausanias, I. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Memnon *apud* Photium, p. 226. Ed. Bekker.

<sup>7</sup> Ptolemy Soter, the son of Lagus, died just forty years after the death of Alexander, of whose actions he and Aristobulus were the earliest and most authentic historians. His death took place Olymp. 124-2. B.C. 283.



his own death. The distinct and almost unassailable position of Egypt saved it from the sudden conquests which often changed the fortune of other countries; the deserts and the Nile formed a barrier not easily to be overcome. To Egypt, Ptolemy had added the old commonwealth of Cyrene<sup>8</sup>, where the domestic factions, according to the frequent fate of the Greek cities, had at last sacrificed their common independence to a foreign enemy. He was also master of the rich island of Cyprus<sup>9</sup>, and, after the defeat of Antigonus at Ipsus, he had extended his dominion in Syria, as far as the valley of the Orontes, the country known by the name of Cœle-Syria<sup>10</sup>, or the vale of Syria. His dominion, next to that of Seleucus, was by far the most extensive, as it was, without any exception, the most compact and secure of all the kingdoms formed out of Alexander's empire.

When Alexander died at Babylon, only seven years had elapsed since his conquest of Persia, and not more than four since his victory over Porus and his campaign in India. That his conquests could not have been completely consolidated within so short a period, is evident; but it affords a wonderful proof of the ascendancy of the Greek race over the Asiatics, that the sudden death of the great con-

The Greek  
dominion  
was not  
shaken by  
Alexander's  
death.

<sup>8</sup> Diodorus, XVIII. 21.

<sup>9</sup> Ptolemy reduced the several petty kings of the island, and made himself master of it, Olymp. 117-1. B.C. 312. [Diodorus, XIX. 79.] He afterwards lost it, in consequence of his great naval defeat

by Demetrius near Salamis, Olymp. 118-2. [Diodorus, XX. 53] and finally recovered it after the victory of Ipsus. [Plutarch, Demetr. 35.]

<sup>10</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Vatican. XXI. 1.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

queror did not destroy his unfinished work; that not a single native chief ventured to assert the independence of his country, but every province continued in the unity of the Macedonian empire, and obeyed without dispute a Macedonian satrap<sup>11</sup>. Nor did the subsequent wars between the Macedonian generals destroy the spell of their superiority. Eumenes and Antigonus carried on their contest in Susiana and Media, and disposed at their will of all the resources of those countries; and, after the murder of the last of Alexander's children, fourteen years after his own death, when obedience was no longer claimed even nominally for the blood and name of the great conqueror, still the Greek dominion was unshaken; and Seleucus, by birth a simple Macedonian subject, sat undisturbed in Babylon, on the throne of Nebuchadnezzar, and held the country of Cyrus as one amongst his numerous provinces.

This was owing partly to his conciliatory policy towards the Asiatics.

This continuance of the Macedonian power was owing, no doubt, in no small measure, to Alexander's comprehensive wisdom. He made a Macedonian soldier of his guard, Peucestes<sup>12</sup>, satrap of Persia; but the simple soldier, unfettered by any literary or philosophical pride, did not scruple to adopt the Persian dress, and to learn the Persian

<sup>11</sup> See the account of the division of the provinces, and of the Macedonian generals appointed to be satraps over each, in Justin, XIII. 4, and Diodorus, XVIII. 3. 39. There is scarcely a single Asiatic name on the list; only Oxyartes, the father of Roxana,

Alexander's queen, had the country of the Paropamisadæ; and Porus and Taxilas retained for a time their governments on the Hydaspes and the Indus.

<sup>12</sup> Arrian, de Expedit. Alexand. VI. 30.

language: confirming his own and his nation's dominion by those very compliances which many of his more cultivated but less wise countrymen regarded as an unworthy condescension to the barbarians<sup>13</sup>. The youth of the Asiatic provinces<sup>14</sup> were enlisted in the Macedonian army, were taught the discipline of the phalanx, and the use of the Greek shield and pike; the bravest of them were admitted into the more distinguished bodies of cavalry and infantry known by the name of the king's companions; and the highest of the Persian nobility were made, together with the noblest of the Macedonians, officers of the king's body-guard. Thus, where the insulting display of superiority was avoided, its reality was felt and acknowledged without murmuring; and when the king's officers became independent satraps, the Asiatics saw their Macedonian comrades preferred, almost without a single exception, to these dignities, and they themselves remained the subjects of men whom they had so lately seen nominally their equals.

Thus there was spread over Asia, from the shores of the Ægean to the Indus, and over the whole of Egypt also, an outer covering at the least of Greek civilization, however thinly it might have been laid on here and there, on the solid and heterogeneous mass below. The native languages were not extirpated, they were not even driven, as afterwards in the western provinces of the Roman em-

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Spread of  
the Greek  
language  
and man-  
ners. Foun-  
dation of  
Greek cities  
in Asia.

<sup>13</sup> Arrian, VII. 6.

<sup>14</sup> Arrian, VII. 6. 11.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

pire, to a few mountainous or remote districts; they remained probably in general use for all the common purposes of life: but Greek was every where the medium of communication between the natives of different countries; it was the language of the court, of the government, and of literature. Many new cities were also founded, where the predominant element of the population was Greek from the beginning: such as Antioch, Laodicea, Apamea, Seleucia in Syria<sup>15</sup>, Seleucia on the Tigris, and many other places built also by the same founder, Seleucus, in the several provinces of his empire. From these an influence was communicated to other cities in their neighbourhood, which were older than the Greek conquest; and the Greek character was revived in places, which, like Tarsus, claimed to be originally Grecian settlements<sup>16</sup>, but in the lapse of years had become barbarized.

Upper Asia was soon lost to the Greek dominion, and was again governed by native princes, the Arsacidæ.

In this manner Asia Minor and Syria were pervaded in every part by the language and institutions of Greece, and retained the impression through many centuries down to the period of the Saracen

<sup>15</sup> Appian, Syriac. 57.

<sup>16</sup> Κτίσμα τῶν μετὰ Τριπολέμου πλανηθέντων Ἀργείων κατὰ ζήτησιν Ἰοῦς. Strabo, XIV. p. 673. One should not pay much regard to such a story, were there not other grounds for believing that the Greeks at a very early period had settled on the coasts of Cilicia. See the remarkable statement preserved in the Armenian translation of Eusebius, and copied by Eusebius from Alexander Polyhistor or

Abydenus, that Sennacherib was called down from Nineveh by the news of a Greek descent on Cilicia, which he repelled after a very hard fought battle. Compare Niebuhr's *Kleine Schriften*, p. 203. Might not the sons of Javan, to whom the Phœnicians sold Israelitish captives at a much earlier period (Joel iii. 6), be the Greek settlers on the Cilician coast as well as the more remote inhabitants of Greece itself?

and Turkish conquerors. Upper Asia, from the Euphrates to the Indus, was affected much more slightly; and the connexion of these countries with Greece was finally broken about thirty years after the period at which we are now arrived, by the restoration of a native monarchy in the line of the Arsacidæ<sup>17</sup>. Seleucia on the Tigris then became the capital of a barbarian sovereign; and although it with some of the other Greek cities founded by Seleucus<sup>18</sup> in Media and Parthia had not lost their national character even in the time of Strabo, yet it was enough if they could retain it themselves; there was no possibility of communicating it in any degree to the nations around them.

We may be excused however from extending our view beyond the Euphrates, and may return to a more minute examination of those countries of western Asia and Africa which were all destined to become successively provinces of Rome. And here although we at first sight see nothing but the two great monarchies of Syria and Egypt, yet a nearer view shows us some smaller kingdoms which had been overlooked by the strength of the first Macedonian kings, and established themselves boldly against the weakness of their successors: kingdoms ruled by a race of princes, partly or chiefly of bar-

Kingdoms  
half Greek  
half barbarian existing  
in Asia  
Minor.

<sup>17</sup> In Olymp. 132-3. B.C. 250. This was in the reign of Antiochus Theos. See Justin. XLI. 4, who makes a mistake, however, as to the reign, and Arrian, Parthie. apud Photium, p. 17. Ed. Bekker. See also Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hel-

lenici, Vol. III. under the year B.C. 250, A. U. C. 404.

<sup>18</sup> Περιποιείται (ἡ Μηδία) πόλεσιν Ἑλληνίσιν κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου, φυλακῆς ἐνεκεν τῶν συγκυρούντων αὐτῇ βαρβάρων. Polybius, X. 27.



CHAP.  
XXXV.

barian descent, but where the Greek character notwithstanding gave the predominant colour to their people, and even to themselves. Such were the kingdoms of Bithynia and Pontus on the northern side of Asia Minor. Another distinct state, if so it may be called, was formed in the 125th Olympiad by the settlement of the Gauls to the south of Bithynia, and to the north-west of Cappadocia: and the kingdom of Pergamus grew up not long afterwards on the coasts of the Ægean and the Propontis; but as yet it had not come into existence.

Kingdom of  
Bithynia.

In the 124th Olympiad Zipætēs<sup>19</sup> or Zibætēs was still, at the age of more than seventy, reigning over the Bithynians. His father had seen the torrent of Alexander's invasion pass by him without touching his dominions; and whilst the conqueror was engaged in Upper Asia, the Bithynian prince had

<sup>19</sup> He reigned from 336 B. C. to 278, and was born in 354. His father Bas was born in 397 B. C. Memnon apud Photium, p. 227, 228. Ed. Bekker.

This reference may perhaps require explanation for some readers. Photius, who was patriarch of Constantinople in the latter half of the ninth century, has left a sort of catalogue raisonné, or rather an abstract, of the various books which he was in the habit of reading. In this work, which he called his library, there are preserved abridgments of many books which would otherwise have been altogether lost to us; and amongst the rest there is an abstract of a history of Heraclea on the Euxine sea, written by one Memnon, who flourished at a period not certainly known, but which cannot be

placed earlier than the times of the early Roman emperors. In speaking of Heraclea, Memnon was often led to notice the neighbouring kings of Bithynia, and thus we are enabled to give the succession and the dates of the reigns of those obscure princes. So capricious is the chance which has preserved some portions of ancient history from oblivion, while it has utterly destroyed all record of others. But Photius' library, compiled in the ninth century, shows what treasures of Greek literature were then existing at Constantinople, which in the course of the six following centuries perished irrecoverably. In this respect the French and Venetian conquest in the thirteenth century was far more destructive than the Turkish conquest in the fifteenth.

repelled with success the attack of one of his generals, who was left behind to complete the conquest of the countries which Alexander had merely overrun. After Alexander's death, European Thrace and the southern coast of the Euxine were assigned in the general partition of the empire to Lysimachus; but the Bithynian princes held their ground against him, and still continued to reign over a territory more or less extensive, till Lysimachus and his dominions were conquered by Seleucus in the battle on the plain of Corus in Phrygia. Zipætēs then was as jealous of Seleucus as he had been before of Lysimachus; and after Seleucus' death, he cherished the same feelings towards his son Antiochus, and continued to resist him with success till the end of his life.

In the geography of Herodotus<sup>20</sup> the name of Cappadocia is applied to the whole breadth of Asia Minor eastward of the Halys, from the chain of Taurus to the shores of the Euxine. The government of all this country had been bestowed by Darius<sup>21</sup>, the son of Hystaspes, on one of the Persian chiefs who had taken part with him in the conspiracy against Smerdis, and it had remained from that time forward with his posterity. But in the time of Xenophon<sup>22</sup>, the tribes along the Euxine

Cappadocia  
and its divi-  
sions.  
Northern  
Cappadocia  
or Pontus.

<sup>20</sup> Herodot. I. 72. 76, compared with V. 49.

<sup>21</sup> Polybius, V. 43. Diodorus, XIX. 40. Appian, Mithridat. 9. 112, makes Mithridates to have been descended from Darius himself. We find no Mithridates or

Ariobarzanes in either of the lists of the conspirators against Smerdis given by Herodotus and Ctesias.

<sup>22</sup> Anab. VII. 8. In his time Mithridates was satrap of Cappadocia and Lycaonia.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

were practically independent of any Persian satrap, and the name of Cappadocia was then, as afterwards, restricted to the southern and more inland part of the country. The same state of things prevailed in the early part of the reign of Philip of Macedon; Scylax in his *Periplus* notices a number of barbarian tribes between Colchis and Paphlagonia; yet immediately to the eastward of Paphlagonia he places what he calls Assyria; and Syria, as we know, was the name anciently given by the Greeks to that country which they afterwards learnt to call by its Persian name Cappadocia<sup>23</sup>. But while the southern part of their old satrapy passed into other hands, the descendants of Darius' fellow-conspirator strengthened their hold on the northern part of their original dominion; and in the reign of Alexander, Mithridates, son of Ariobarzanes, is called<sup>24</sup> by Diodorus, "king," and his kingdom extended along the coast of the Euxine from the confines of Bithynia to those of Colchis. Though a king, however, he was regarded as a vassal by Alexander's general, Antigonus, when he, after the death of Eumenes, became master of all Asia from the Euphrates to the Ægæan; and Antigonus suspecting his fidelity when he was on the eve of his decisive struggle against Cassander, Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus, caused him to be put to death<sup>25</sup>. His son,

<sup>23</sup> Herodot, I. 72. And in the *Periplus* of the Euxine ascribed to Marcianus of Heraclea (Hudson, *Geogr. Min.* p. 73), it is said that the Cappadocians were called by some White Syrians, and

that the old geographers made Cappadocia extend as far as the coast of the Euxine.

<sup>24</sup> Diodorus, XVI. 90.

<sup>25</sup> Diodorus, XX. 111.

Mithridates, notwithstanding, succeeded to his father's dominions, retained them during the lifetime of Seleucus, and for a period of nearly eighteen years afterwards, and having lived to witness the irruption<sup>26</sup> of the Gauls and their settlements on the very borders of his kingdom, died, after a reign of thirty-six years, immediately before the beginning of the first Punic war, and was succeeded in his turn by his son Ariobarzanes.

Southern Cappadocia meanwhile had passed before the conquest of Alexander into the hands of a satrap named Ariarathes<sup>27</sup>, to whom Diodorus gives the title of king. Like every other prince and state in Asia, he had been unable to resist the power of the Macedonian invasion, but Alexander's death broke, as he supposed, the spell of the Greek dominion, and Ariarathes ventured to dispute the decision of the council of generals which had assigned Cappadocia to Eumenes, and to retain the possession of it himself. Such an example of resistance, if successful, might have at once dissolved the Macedonian empire, and Perdiccas hastened to put it down. He encountered Ariarathes<sup>28</sup>, defeated him, made him prisoner and crucified him; and then, according to the arrangement of the council, bestowed the government of Cappadocia on Eumenes. The nephew and heir of Ariarathes, who also bore his

<sup>26</sup> Memnon, apud Photium, p. 229. Ed. Bekker. Diodorus, XX. 111.

<sup>27</sup> Diodorus, XXXI. Excerpt. Photii.

<sup>28</sup> Diodorus, XXXI. apud Photium, and XVIII. 16.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

name, took refuge<sup>29</sup> in Armenia; and there waited for better times. He saw the Macedonian power divided against itself; Perdiccas, his uncle's conqueror, had been killed by his own soldiers; Eumenes, who had been made satrap of Cappadocia, had been put to death by Antigonus; and Antigonus, who had become sovereign of all Asia Minor, was engaged in war with Seleucus the ruler of Mesopotamia and the eastern provinces. Amidst their quarrels, Ariarathes, with the help of the prince of Armenia, made his way back to his country, drove out the Macedonian garrisons by which it was occupied, and made himself king of Cappadocia.

All the Asiatic governments, whether Greek or barbarian, were alike oppressive and corrupt.

The sovereignty of a native prince gratified the national feelings of the people, while from a Greek ruler they may have derived some improvements in art and civilization. But from neither were they likely to receive the blessings of just and good government; and in this respect, probably, the Greek and barbarian rulers were perfectly on a level with each other. From time immemorial indeed, in Asia, government had seemed to have no other object than to exact from the people the largest possible amount of revenue, and the system of finance consisted merely in the unscrupulous practice of oppression and fraud. Never was there a more disgraceful monument of an unprincipled spirit in such matters, than that strange collection of cases of open robbery or fraudulent dealing, which was so long ascribed to

<sup>29</sup> Diodorus, XXXI. apud Phot.



Aristotle, and which still is to be found amongst his works, under the title of the second book of the *Economics*. Its real date and author are unknown<sup>30</sup>; but it must have been written for the instruction of some prince or state in Asia, and it gives a curious picture of the ordinary ways and means of a satrap or dynast, as well as of the expedients by which they might supply their extraordinary occasions. "A satrap's revenue," says the writer<sup>31</sup>, "arises from six sources: from his tithes of the produce of all the land in his satrapy; from his domains; from his customs; from his duties levied on goods within the country, and his market dues; from his pastures; and, sixthly, from his sundries," amongst which last are reckoned a poll-tax<sup>32</sup>, and a tax on manufacturing labour. And amongst a king's ways and means is expressly mentioned, a tampering with the currency, and a raising or lowering of the value of the coin<sup>33</sup> as it might suit his purposes.

But far above the kingdoms of Asia, whether Greek or semi-barbarian, were those free Greek cities which lined the whole coast of Asia Minor, from Trapezus, at the south-eastern corner of the Euxine, to Soli and Tarsus, with their Greek or half Greek population, at the mouth of the Gulf of Issus, and

Free Greek cities on the coasts of Asia Minor.

<sup>30</sup> See the article on this subject in Niebuhr's *Kleine Schriften*, p. 412, and another by Mr. Lewis, in the first volume of the *Philological Museum*.

<sup>31</sup> ἔστι δὲ εἶδη ἑξ τῶν προσόδων· ἀπὸ γῆς, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἰδίῳ γενομένων, ἀπὸ ἐμπορίων, ἀπὸ τε-

λῶν, ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων. *Economic*. II. 1.

<sup>32</sup> ἕκτη δὲ, ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπι- κεφάλαιόν τε καὶ χειρωναξίον προσ- αγορευομένη.

<sup>33</sup> περὶ τὸ νόμισμα λέγω, ποῖον καὶ πότε τίμιον ἢ εὐνων ποιητέον.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

almost on the frontier of Syria. Of these Greek cities, Sinope and Heraclea were the most famous on the north coast; the shore of the Ægean was covered with towns whose names had been famous from remote ages; but the noblest state, not of Asia Minor only, but almost of the whole world, was the great and free and high-minded commonwealth of Rhodes.

RHODES.  
Its wise and  
good go-  
vernment,  
and the just  
and heroic  
spirit of its  
citizens.

The island of Rhodes, till nearly the end of the Peloponnesian war, was divided between the three Dorian cities, Lindus<sup>34</sup>, Ialysus, and Camirus. But in the 93rd Olympiad, about three years before the battle of Ægospotami, the three states agreed to found a common capital<sup>35</sup>, to which they gave the name of the island, and from that time forwards the city of Rhodes became eminent amongst the cities of the Greek name. It was built on the northern side of the island, after a plan given by Hippodamus of Miletus<sup>36</sup>, the most famous architect of his age, and it stood partly on the low ground nearly at the level of the sea, and partly, like Genoa, on the side of the hill, which formed a semicircle round the lower part of the town. Rhodes was famous alike in war and peace; the great painter, Protogenes, enriched it with pictures of the highest excellence, and which were universally admired; the famous colossal figure of the sun, more than a hundred feet in height, which bestrode the harbour's mouth, was

<sup>34</sup> Thucydides, VIII. 44.

<sup>35</sup> Diodorus, XIII. 75.

<sup>36</sup> Compare Strabo, XIV. p. 654,

and Aristot. Politic. II. 6, and  
Diodorus, XIX. 45.

reputed one of the wonders of the world; and the heroic resistance of the Rhodians against Demetrius Poliorcetes was no less glorious than the defence of the same city against the Turks in later times by the knights of St. John. But Rhodes could yet boast of a better and far rarer glory, in the justice and mutual kindness which distinguished her political institutions, and the social relations of her citizens<sup>37</sup>; and, above all, in that virtue so rare in every age, and almost unknown to the nations of antiquity, a spirit of general benevolence, and of forbearance even towards enemies. The naval power of Rhodes was great, but it was employed, not for purposes of ambition, but to put down piracy<sup>38</sup>. And in the heat of the great siege of their city, when Demetrius did not scruple to employ against them the pirates<sup>39</sup> whose crimes they had repressed, and when a thousand ships, belonging to merchants of various nations, had come to the siege, like eagles to the carcase, to make their profit out of the expected plunder of the town, and out of the sale of its citizens as slaves, this noble people rejected with indignation the proposal of some ill-judging orators, to pull down the statues of Antigonus and Demetrius<sup>40</sup>, and resolved that their present hostility to those princes should not tempt them to destroy the memorials of their former friendship. The Rhodians, in the midst of a struggle

<sup>37</sup> Strabo, XIV. p. 652, 653.  
πολιτευομένη κάλλιστα τῶν Ἑλλή-  
νων, is the character given of  
Rhodes by Diodorus, XX. 81.

<sup>38</sup> Diodorus, XX. 81. Strabo,  
XIV. p. 652.

<sup>39</sup> Diodorus, XX. 82, 83.

<sup>40</sup> Diodorus, XX. 93.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

for life and death, allowed the statues of their enemies to stand uninjured in the heart of their city. The Romans, after all danger to themselves was over, could murder in cold blood the Samnite general, C. Pontius, to whom they owed not only the respect due to a brave enemy, but gratitude for the generosity with which he had treated them in his day of victory.

The literature of this period has almost wholly perished.

I have thus attempted to give a sketch of the state of Asia in the 125th Olympiad; but it should be remembered, that although the Greek literature of this period was very voluminous, yet it has so entirely perished, that hardly a single writer has escaped the wreck. Thus we know scarcely more of Greece and Asia in the middle of the fifth century of Rome, than we know of Rome itself; that is, we have in both cases the skeleton of political and military events, but we have no contemporary pictures of the real state of either nation. Almost the sole remains of the Greek literature of this period are, perhaps, that treatise on public economy or finance, which has been falsely ascribed to Aristotle<sup>41</sup>, and the corrupt fragments of Dicæarchus, a scholar of Aristotle, and a friend of Theophrastus, on the

<sup>41</sup> That it is not Aristotle's work, seems to me certain; but I do not think that it can be much later than Aristotle's age, for the writer appears to regard the dominion of Alexander as still being one governed by the king, with his satraps in the several provinces, a notion which certainly may have

outlasted the life of Alexander himself, for his generals for several years professed to be the subjects of his infant son, but which must have passed away, at any rate within a few years, when the generals assumed severally the kingly diadem.

topography of Greece. And not only the contemporary, but the later literature, which might have illustrated these times, has also for the most part perished; the entire and connected history of Diodorus ends for us with the 119th Olympiad, and the history of the subsequent years can be gleaned only from scattered and meagre sources; from one or two of the lives of Plutarch, from Justin's abridgment, from the mere sketches contained in Appian, and from the fragments of the chronologers, which are exclusively chronological, preserved to us by Eusebius.

The names of Sicily, of Syracuse, and of Agathocles, are never once mentioned in the ninth and tenth books of Livy, while he is giving the history of the second and third Samnite wars; nor would any one suspect from his narrative, that there had existed during a period of twenty-eight years, from 436 to about 464 or 465<sup>42</sup>, separated from Italy only by a narrow strait, one of the greatest powers and one of the most remarkable men to be found at that time in the world. But this is merely one of the consequences of the absence of all Roman historians

SICILY.  
The Romans must have regarded with anxiety the great power of Agathocles.

<sup>42</sup> The beginning of Agathocles' dominion is placed by Diodorus in Olymp. 115-4, which, according to his synchronism, is the year of the consulship of M. Fossilius and L. Plautius, and the ninth year of the second Samnite war. His death cannot be determined exactly, because of the confusions and different systems of the Roman chronology. It would fall in

Olymp. 122-4, or B.C. 289; but whether that year would coincide with the consulship of M. Valerius and Q. Cædicius, one year after the end of the third Samnite war, or with one of the two succeeding consulships, it is impossible to fix certainly. Agathocles reigned in all twenty-eight years. See Diodorus, XXI. 12. Fragm. Hoeschel.



contemporary with the fifth century. Livy did and could only copy the annalists of the seventh, or of the middle of the sixth century, and the very oldest of these, separated by an interval of a hundred years from the Samnite wars, and having no original historian older than themselves, did but put together such memorials of the past as happened to be still floating on the stream of time, stories which had chanced to be preserved in particular families, or which had lived in the remembrance of men generally. Thus, as I have before observed, the military history of the Samnite wars is often utterly inexplicable: the detail of marches, the objects aimed at in each campaign, the combinations of the generals, and the exact amount of their success, are lost in oblivion; but particular events are sometimes given in great detail, and anecdotes of remarkable men have been preserved, while their connexion with each other has perished. Agathocles never made war with the Romans, and his name therefore did not occur in the triumphal Fasti of any great Roman family. What uneasiness his power gave to the senate; how gladly they must have seen his arms employed in Africa<sup>43</sup>; how anxiously they must have watched his movements when his fleet invaded and conquered the Liparæan islands<sup>44</sup>, or when he crossed the Ionian gulph, and defended Corcyra with success

<sup>43</sup> During four years, from Olymp. 117-3 to Olymp. 118-2 inclusive; that is, during the Etruscan campaigns of Q. Fabius

in the second Samnite war.

<sup>44</sup> In Olymp. 119-1, the last year of the second Samnite war. Diodorus, XX. 101.

against the power of Cassander<sup>45</sup>; above all, when he actually landed in Italy, with Etruscan and Ligurian soldiers in his service, and formed an alliance with the Apulians and Peucetians or Pediculans<sup>46</sup>, to assist him in his conquest of Bruttium: this no Roman tradition recorded, and therefore no later annalist has mentioned; but they who can represent to themselves the necessary relations of events, can have no difficulty in conceiving its reality.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

It is mentioned also, that Agathocles<sup>47</sup> in his African wars had many Samnite soldiers in his army as well as Etruscans, and in the year 446 or 447 an Etruscan fleet of eighteen ships<sup>48</sup> came to his relief at Syracuse, when he was blockaded by the Carthaginians, and enabled him to defeat the enemy and effect his passage once more to Africa. This was three or four years before the end of the second Samnite war, and just after the submission of the principal Etruscan states to Rome, in consequence of the great successes of Q. Fabius. We are told also, that at one time the Tarentines<sup>49</sup> applied to him to command their forces against the Messapians and Lucanians, and that he went over to Italy accordingly, which, though the date is not mentioned,

His connection with some of the nations of Italy.

<sup>45</sup> In the 120th Olympiad, but the exact year is not known, and therefore, somewhere about the beginning of the third Samnite war. Diodorus, XXI. 2. Fragm. Hoeschel. Compare also Fragm. Vatican. XXI. 2.

after his expedition to Corcyra. Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel, XXI. 3, 4.

<sup>47</sup> Diodorus, XX. 11. 64.

<sup>48</sup> Diodorus, XX. 61. In Olymp. 118-2.

<sup>49</sup> Strabo, VI. p. 280.

<sup>46</sup> About the same period, just

CHAP.  
XXXV.

must have taken place in the latter part of his reign, when he was making war upon the Bruttians; that is, as nearly as we can fix it, in the 120th or 121st Olympiad, whilst the third Samnite war was raging. It is strange, that neither the Samnites nor the Etruscans ever asked him to aid them against Rome, or, if they did, that he should not have been tempted to engage in so great a contest. But the nearer interest of humbling the Carthaginians, and of establishing his power on the south coast of Italy, prevented him from penetrating through the straits of Messina, and sending a fleet to the mouth of the Tiber. And, no doubt, if he had attacked the Romans, they would have formed a close alliance with Carthage against him, as they did shortly afterwards against Pyrrhus; nay, it is probable that the renewal of the old league between the two countries, which took place in 448<sup>50</sup>, may have been caused in some degree by their common fear of Agathocles, who had at that period finally evacuated Africa, but had not yet made peace with Carthage.

Distracted  
state of  
Sicily during  
his govern-  
ment. Mi-  
sery of his  
later years.

Agathocles died in the last year of the 122nd Olympiad, about three years after the end of the third Samnite war. Had he lived fifty years earlier, he, like Dionysius, would have been known by no other title than that of tyrant; but now the successors of Alexander had accustomed men to tolerate the name of king, in persons who had no hereditary right to their thrones; and Agathocles certainly as

<sup>50</sup> Livy, IX. 43.

well deserved the title as Lysimachus, or the ruffian Cassander. Polybius accused Timæus of calumniating him; but surely his own character of him must be no less exaggerated on the other side, when he says<sup>51</sup>, that although in the beginning of his career he was most bloody, yet when he had once firmly established his power, he became the gentlest and mildest of men. Like Augustus, he was too wise to indulge in needless cruelty; but his later life was not so peaceful as that of Augustus, and whenever either cruelty or treachery seemed likely to be useful, he indulged in both without scruple. The devastation and misery of Sicily during his reign must have been extreme. Dinocrates, a Syracusan exile<sup>52</sup>, was at the head of an army of 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse, and had made himself master of several cities, and so well was he satisfied with his buccaneer condition, that he rejected Agathocles' offer of allowing him to return to Syracuse, and of abdicating his own dominion that the exiles might return freely. Then Agathocles called the Carthaginians over to put Dinocrates down; and gave up to them as the price of their aid all the cities which they had formerly possessed in Sicily. The exiles were afterwards defeated, and Dinocrates was now glad to make his submission<sup>53</sup>; and from this time, A.U.C. 449, we hear of no further civil wars or massacres in Sicily, till the period immediately preceding Agathocles' death, which took place sixteen or seven-

<sup>51</sup> Polybius, IX. 23<sup>53</sup> Diodorus, XX. 89, 90.<sup>52</sup> Diodorus, XX. 77, 78.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

teen years later. But his last days were full of misery. His son Agathocles<sup>54</sup> was murdered by his grandson Archagathus, and the old tyrant, who was now reduced almost to the brink of the grave by a painful and hopeless disorder, dreaded lest Archagathus should murder the rest of his family as soon as he should himself be no more. Accordingly he resolved to send his wife Texena<sup>55</sup>, with his two young sons, and all his treasure, to Egypt, her native country, whilst he himself should be left alone to die. On his death the old democracy<sup>56</sup> was restored without a struggle, his property was confiscated, and his statues thrown down. But it was a democracy in name only, for we find that the same man, Hicetas, was continued in the office of captain-general for the next nine years<sup>57</sup> successively; and so long a term of military command in times of civil and foreign war was equivalent to a despotism or tyranny.

Excesses  
committed  
by the mer-  
cenary sol-  
diers. They  
occupy  
Messana.

At the moment of Agathocles' death, there was a Syracusan army<sup>58</sup> in the field, consisting as usual chiefly of mercenaries, and commanded by the tyrant's grandson, Archagathus. But Mænon, who is said in Diodorus' account to have poisoned Agathocles, and who was now with the army of Archagathus

<sup>54</sup> Diodorus, XXI. 12. Fragm. Agathocles which Diodorus has copied apparently from Timæus.

<sup>55</sup> Justin, XXIII. 2. The account of the parting between Agathocles and his family is given by Justin with much simplicity and good feeling, and it is much to his credit that he preferred this story to the horrible and incredible tales about the last days of

<sup>56</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXI. 12.

<sup>57</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXII. 6. His expressions are, *Ἰκέτας ἐννέα ἔτη δυναστεύσας—ἐκβάλλεται τῆς τυραννίδος.*

<sup>58</sup> Diodorus, Frag. Hoeschel. XXI. 12, 13.



gathus, contrived to murder Archagathus and to get the army into his own hands. He then attempted to get possession of Syracuse and to make himself tyrant, and finding himself resisted by the new government and the captain-general Hicetas, he too called in the Carthaginians. Syracuse was quite unable to resist, and submitted to the terms which they imposed. They gave 400 hostages, and consented to receive back all the exiles, under which term all Mænon's army were included. What was become of Mænon himself we know not; but the mercenaries, being mostly Samnite or Lucanian foreigners, were still looked upon as an inferior caste to the old Syracusan citizens; and as these last formed the majority of the people, none of the new citizens could ever get access to any public office. This led to fresh disturbances, but at last the strangers agreed to sell their properties within a certain time, and to leave Sicily. They accordingly came to Messina<sup>59</sup> in order to cross the strait and return to Italy; but being admitted into the city they rose by night and massacred the principal inhabitants, and kept the women and the city for themselves. From this time forwards the inhabitants of Messina were known by the name of Mamertini, sons of Mamers or Mars, that being the name by which these Italian soldiers of fortune had been used to call themselves.

While Messina had thus fallen into the hands of Tyrants in the several

<sup>59</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXI. 13. Polybius, I. 7.

CHAP.  
XXXV.  
cities of  
Sicily.

a barbarian soldiery, the condition of the rest of Sicily was scarcely happier. Hicetas had the power of a tyrant in Syracuse, Phintias<sup>60</sup> was tyrant in Agrigentum, Tyndarion in Tauromenium, Heraclides in Leontini, and other men whose names have not reached posterity exercised the same dominion in the smaller cities. Hicetas and Phintias made war upon each other, made plundering inroads into each other's territories, and mutually reduced the frontier districts to a state of utter desolation. Gela was destroyed by Phintias, and its inhabitants removed to a new town which he founded on the coast near the mouth of the Himera, and called after his own name. And the Mamertines availed themselves of all this misery to extend their own power, even to the opposite side of the island; they sacked Camarina and Gela<sup>61</sup>, which had been again partially inhabited after its destruction by Phintias, and obliged several of the Greek cities to pay them tribute. Thus the Greek power in Sicily, which had been so formidable under Agathocles, was now quite prostrated, and the whole island seemed likely to become the spoil of the Carthaginians and Mamertines. This course of events on one side of the strait, and the extension of the Roman dominion a few years later to the extreme coast of Bruttium on the other side, tended inevitably to bring about a collision between Rome and Carthage, such as Pyrrhus foretold when he found it impossible to revive

<sup>60</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXII. 2. 11.

<sup>61</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIII. 2. Polybius, I. 8.

and consolidate the Greek interest, and restore in a manner the dominion of Agathocles.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

And now, before I speak of Pyrrhus himself and the fortunes of his early years, we must turn our eyes to Greece, the worn out and cast off skin from which the living serpent had gone forth to carry his youth and vigour to other lands. Greek power, Greek energy, Greek genius, might now be found indeed any where rather than in Greece. Drained of all its noblest spirits, for so hopeless was the prospect at home, that any foreign service<sup>62</sup> offered a temptation to the Greek youth to enter it; yet exposed to the miseries of war, and eagerly contended for by rival sovereigns, because its possession was still thought the most glorious part of every dominion; mocked by every despot in turn with offers of liberty, yet as soon as it was delivered from the yoke of one, condemned under some pretence to receive the garrison of another into its citadels; Greece, in the middle of the fifth century of Rome, seemed utterly exhausted and lay almost as dead. Demetrius Poliorcetes had retained his hold upon it after his Asiatic dominion had been lost by the event of the battle of Ipsus; and even when he himself engaged in his last desperate attempt upon Asia, and whilst he was passing the last years of his life as a prisoner in the hands of Seleucus, Greece was still, for the most part, under the power of his son Antigonus Gonatas. But upon the death of

GREECE.  
Its degraded  
condition.  
Attempt of  
the Greeks  
to throw off  
the Mace-  
donian yoke  
after the  
death of  
Seleucus.

<sup>62</sup> Diodorus, XX. 40.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Seleucus Nicator, when Antigonus was disputing the sovereignty of Macedonia with Ptolemy Ceraunus, Seleucus' murderer, the Greeks made<sup>63</sup> a feeble attempt to assert their liberty. Sparta once more appeared at the head of the national confederacy, and Areus the Spartan king was entrusted with the conduct of the war. The Greeks attacked Ætolia, which appears at this time to have been in alliance with Antigonus, but they were repulsed with loss; and then, as usual, jealousy broke out, and the confederacy was soon dissolved. Yet, almost immediately afterwards, there was formed the first germ of a new confederacy, which existed from this time forwards till the total extinction of Grecian independence, and in which there was revived a faint image of the ancient glory of Greece, the pale martinmas summer of her closing year. This confederacy was the famous Achaian or Achæan league.

Formation  
of the  
Achæan  
league.

The Achaian name is conspicuous in the heroic ages of Greece, and in her last decline, but during the period of her greatness is scarcely ever brought before our notice. The towns of Achaia were small and unimportant, and the people lived for many generations in happy obscurity; but after the death of Ptolemy Ceraunus, when dread of a Gaulish invasion kindled a general spirit of exertion, and when Antigonus was likely to have sufficient employment on the side of Macedonia, four Achæan cities<sup>64</sup>, Dyme, Patræ, Tritæa, and Pharæ, formed a

<sup>63</sup> Justin, XXIV. 1.

<sup>64</sup> Polybius, II. 41.

federal union for their mutual defence. According to the constitution of the league, each member was to appoint in succession, year by year, two captains-general<sup>65</sup>, and one secretary, or civil minister, to conduct the affairs of the union. These four states, like the forest cantons of Switzerland, were the original members, and in a manner the founders of the confederacy; and at the period of Pyrrhus' invasion of Italy, it consisted of these alone.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

It is not possible to discover the condition of the several states of Greece, however much their ancient fame must excite an interest even for their last decay. But generally they were subjected to the Macedonian king Antigonos<sup>66</sup>, either directly, by having a Macedonian garrison in their citadels, or indirectly, as being ruled by a tyrant from among their own people, who for his own sake upheld the Macedonian supremacy. Sicyon<sup>67</sup> had been governed by various tyrants ever since it had been taken by Demetrius Poliorcetes, when he destroyed the lower town, and removed the whole population within the precincts of the old citadel. Megalopolis<sup>68</sup> about this time must have been under the

The cities of Peloponnesus mostly held in subjection by tyrants.

<sup>65</sup> Polybius, II. 43.

<sup>66</sup> Polybius, II. 41. IX. 29.

<sup>67</sup> Diodorus, XX. 102. Plutarch, Aratus, 9. He says that when Aratus delivered Sicyon in 251 B.C. some of the exiles whom he then restored had been in banishment fifty years. And Cicero, copying from the same source however, namely, Aratus' own memoirs, says the same

thing. De Officiis, II. 23.

<sup>68</sup> Pausanias, VIII. 27. He puts Aristodemus however too early, when he says that he became tyrant soon after the Lamian war, and confounds Acrotatus, son of Areus, with Acrotatus, son of Cleomenes. In 318 B.C. Megalopolis was governed by a strict oligarchy. See Diodorus, XVIII. 68. Compare Polybius, X. 25.



CHAP.  
XXXV.

dominion of its tyrant Aristodemus of Phigalea, who owed his elevation to factions in the oligarchy by which the city had been before governed. In Argos<sup>69</sup> Aristippus had the ascendancy, through the support of king Antigonus. The Acropolis of Corinth<sup>70</sup> was held by one Alexander (we know not when or by what means he won it), and the strength of the place enabled him to enjoy a certain degree of independence; so that, after his death, Antigonus was obliged to employ stratagem in order to get it for himself out of the hands of Alexander's widow, Nicæa. Society was generally in a state of disorder, robbery and plundering forays were almost universal, and Greece could no longer boast that she had banished the practice of carrying arms in peace<sup>71</sup>; for men now went armed so commonly, that conspirators could meet and arm themselves in open day without exciting any suspicion.

Northern  
Greece.  
State of  
Bœotia.  
Disorders at  
Thebes.

Something more of life was to be seen in the states to the north of the isthmus of Corinth. When the Gauls invaded Greece in the second year of the 125th Olympiad, Athens, Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, Locris, and Ætolia sent a confederate army to Thermopylæ to oppose them; and the Bœotian force<sup>72</sup> amounted to 10,000 heavy-armed infantry, and 500 horse, a number equal to that which won the battle of Delium against the whole power of Athens in the Peloponnesian war. Thebes had twice revolted from Demetrius Poliorcetes, and had

<sup>69</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 30.

<sup>70</sup> Plutarch, Aratus, 16, 17.

<sup>71</sup> Plutarch, Aratus, 6.

<sup>72</sup> Pausanias, X. 20.

been twice reduced by him<sup>73</sup>, and after his second conquest of it he had pulled down its walls<sup>74</sup> and left it defenceless. Antigonus Gonatas retained possession of it till he succeeded in establishing himself in Macedonia; then his hold upon southern Greece was relaxed, except on those cities where he still kept a garrison of his soldiers, or where a tyrant who looked to him for protection governed almost as his officer. But Bœotia seems to have been left to itself, with nearly its old constitution; according to which Thebes enjoyed a certain supremacy over the other cities, but nothing like that dominion which she had claimed in the days of her greatness. The country was safe and flourishing when compared with Peloponnesus, and Tanagra is mentioned<sup>75</sup> as a place at once prosperous and deserving its prosperity; its citizens were wealthy yet simple in their manners, just, and hospitable. Thebes on the contrary is described as a scene of utter anarchy; acts of violence were constantly committed with impunity, and justice was so evaded or overborne by violence, that twenty-five or even thirty years<sup>76</sup> some-

<sup>73</sup> Plutarch, Demetrius, 39, 40.

<sup>74</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXI. 10.

<sup>75</sup> Dicæarchus, Stat. Græc. p. 13. Ed. Hudson. The inscriptions of this period show that there was still a government for all Bœotia, *κοινὸν Παμβοιωτῶν συνέδριον*, and Bœotarchs, as in ancient times; there was also a magistrate called *ἀρχὼν ἐν κοινῷ Βοιωτῶν*, or *ἀρχὼν Βοιωτοῖς*, who seems to have been the head of the Bœotarchs, and of whom there is no mention

I believe in the older constitution. Böckh thinks that it was one of the prerogatives of Thebes, that this magistrate should be always a Theban. Corpus Inscriptt. Vol. I. p. 729.

<sup>76</sup> Polybius, XX. 6. Dicæarchus, Stat. Græc. p. 15, et seqq. Hudson. The text in these fragments of Dicæarchus is often hopelessly corrupt; but they seem also, independently of such faults, to have been interpolated by some more modern writer, or rather their

CHAP.  
XXXV.

times elapsed before the injured party could obtain a hearing for his cause before the magistrates. This was owing principally to the numerous societies or clubs which existed, avowedly for mere objects of convivial entertainments; but which becoming extremely wealthy, for men without children, and even some who had had children, often left all their property to their club, were enabled no doubt to corrupt justice in order to screen the outrages of their members. A strong but not improbable picture of the worst abuses of such clubs, which even in their best state, and in the healthiest condition of society, are always fraught with evil either politically or morally.

ATHENS.  
The democracy over-  
thrown by  
Antipater.

Forty years had now passed since Athens had lost Demosthenes. His death, as was most fitting, coincided exactly with the period of his country's complete subjection; within a month<sup>77</sup> after Antipater had established a Macedonian garrison in Munychia, Demosthenes escaped his vengeance by a sudden and painless death<sup>78</sup> in the island of Calauria. The shade of Xerxes might have rejoiced to see that his own people had a share in the humiliation of his old

substance to have been given by him in his own language, not without many additions. We know the manner in which old topographical accounts are copied by one writer after another, each of whom adds something to them of his own; and thus the work of Dicaearchus seems to have formed the groundwork of the existing fragments, which have been wrought up by a later writer, and altered both in their language and matter.

<sup>77</sup> Plutarch, in Demosth. 28.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. 30. The common story was that Demosthenes killed himself by a poison which he carried about him; but his nephew, Demochares, expressed his belief that his death was natural; or rather, in his own language, "that the gods in their care for him had rescued him from the cruelty of the Macedonians by a speedy and gentle death."

enemy; for in the army with which Antipater crushed the Greek confederates in the Lamian war there were Persian archers, slingers, and cavalry<sup>79</sup>, who had been brought to his aid from Asia by Craterus, and who thus strangely found, in their actual subjection to a Greek power, an opportunity of revenging the fatal days of Salamis and Plataea. That great democracy, with all its faults by far the noblest example of free and just government which the world had then witnessed, was again destroyed by Antipater, after a duration of seventy-one years since its restoration by Thrasybulus. All citizens whose property fell short of 2000 drachmæ were deprived of their political rights; and more than half the Athenian people were thus disfranchised. Lands in Thrace were offered to them, and they migrated thither in great numbers<sup>80</sup>; whilst the remnant, who were now exclusively the Athenian people, were left in mockery to the enjoyment of Solon's laws, while a Macedonian garrison occupied Munychia, and commanded the entrance into the harbour of Piræus.

Then followed a period of fifteen years, during which Athens remained subject, first to Antipater and then to Cassander his son; and although the qualification of a citizen was reduced by Cassander<sup>81</sup> to 1000 drachmæ, only half of the sum fixed by his father, and thus the internal government became somewhat more popular, yet still, whilst Munychia

CHAP.  
XXXV.

<sup>79</sup> Diodorus, XVIII. 16.

<sup>80</sup> Diodorus, XVIII. 18.

<sup>81</sup> Diodorus, XVIII. 74.

And nominally restored by Demetrius Poliorcetes.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

and Piræus were in the power of a foreign prince, Athens could have no independent national existence. In the year of Rome 447, three years before the end of the second Samnite war, Cassander's garrisons were driven out by Demetrius Poliorcetes<sup>82</sup>, the old democracy was restored, and the Athenians were declared to be free. But it was only a shadow of the "fierce democratie," and of the real freedom of the days of Pericles and Demosthenes. The utmost baseness of flattery was lavished on Demetrius, such flattery as was incompatible with any self-respect, and which confessed that Athens was dependent<sup>83</sup> for the greatest national blessings not on itself, but on foreign aid.

Demetrius himself occupies Athens, and the Athenians drive out his garrisons.

A few years afterwards, when his fortune was ruined by the event of the battle of Ipsus, the Athenians refused to receive him into their city; and this so stung him that when his affairs began to mend, he laid siege to Athens, and having obliged it to surrender, he not only occupied Piræus and Munychia, but put a garrison into the city itself, converting the hill<sup>84</sup> of the Museum into a Mace-

<sup>82</sup> Diodorus, XX. 45, 46.

<sup>83</sup> Who can help remembering Mr. Wordsworth's beautiful lines?

                  " So ye prop,  
Sons of the brave who fought at  
Marathon!  
Your feeble spirits. Greece her  
head hath bowed,  
As if the wreath of Liberty thereon  
Would fix itself as smoothly as a  
cloud,

Which, at Jove's will, descends on  
Pelion's top.

\*       \*       \*       \*

Ah! that a conqueror's word  
should be so dear!  
Ah! that a boon could shed such  
rapturous joys!  
A gift of that which is not to be  
given  
By all the blended powers of  
earth and heaven."

<sup>84</sup> Plutarch, Demetr. 30. 34.  
Pausanias, I. 25.



donian citadel. It was recovered again, when he had been driven out of Macedonia by Lysimachus and Pyrrhus, by one of the last successful efforts of Athenian valour. Olympiodorus<sup>85</sup>, who had already acquired the reputation of a soldier and a general, led the whole population of Athens into the field; he defeated the Macedonians, stormed the Museum, and delivered Piræus and Munychia. This was in the second year of the 123rd Olympiad: so that when Pyrrhus sailed for Italy seven years afterwards, Athens was really independent, for she had gained her freedom, not by the gift of another but by her own sword.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

This, however, was almost a solitary gleam of light amidst the prevailing darkness. In general there were neither soldiers, statesmen, nor orators now to be found in Athens. The great tragedians had long since become extinct; and Thucydides has neither in his own country, whether free or in subjection, nor in any other country or age of the world, found a successor to rival him. Plato's divine voice was silent, and the "Master of the Wise"<sup>86</sup> had left none to inherit his acuteness, his boundless knowledge, and his manly judgment, at once so practical and so profound. The theatre, indeed, could boast of excellence, but it was only in the new comedy, the sickliest refinement of the drama, and a sure mark of a declining age. Still there was intellectual life of no common kind existing at this time in

Intellectual  
state of  
Athens.  
Zeno and  
Epicurus.

<sup>85</sup> Plutarch, Demetr. 46. Paulanias, I. 26.

<sup>86</sup> "Vidi 'l maestro di color che sanno  
Seder tra filosofica famiglia."

DANTE, Inferno, IV.

F f

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Athens. There were now living and teaching within her walls, two men whose doctrines in philosophy were destined to influence most widely and lastingly the characters and conduct of their fellow-creatures, the founders of the two great rival sects of the later age of the Roman republic,—Epicurus and Zeno.

ÆTOLIA.  
Its bands of  
adventurers  
or "Pirates."

But Bœotia and Athens were no longer the principal powers of northern Greece; the half-barbarous Ætolians had risen to such an eminence, that we find them able, at a somewhat later period, to contend single-handed with the kingdom of Macedon. Their country was still, as in the days of Thucydides, separated from Acarnania<sup>87</sup> by the Achelous, and stretched in length from the shores of the Gulf of Corinth to those of the Malian Bay, at the back of Locris, Doris, and Phocis. But a sort of federal government succeeded, in later times, to the multitude of scattered and independent villages which formerly composed the Ætolian nation; a general assembly of deputies from all the Ætolian towns met every year at Thermum to elect a captain-general<sup>88</sup>, a

<sup>87</sup> It had, however, acquired several towns situated in its neighbourhood which had formerly been independent. The date of these several acquisitions is difficult to fix precisely. The Ætolians had occupied the famous Cirrhæan plain just after the death of Seleucus; a repetition of the old Phocian sacrilege, which was the cause or pretence of a general attack upon them by the Peloponnesian Greeks under the supremacy of Sparta. But in this new sacred war, the authors of the sacrilege were more fortunate than the Phocians of old, and the Æto-

lians repelled their assailants with great loss. Justin, XXIV. 1. About the same time, in the year before the Gaulish invasion, the Ætolians obtained possession of Heraclea in Trachinia. (Pausanias, X. 20, § 9.) At a later period, Naupactus was become an Ætolian town, but we do not know when it was conquered.

<sup>88</sup> Polybius, V. 8. XXII. 15, § 10. The captain-general and secretary were officers also of the Achæan league. Whether the Ætolian league was formed on the Achæan model, or whether it existed earlier, we cannot tell.

master of the horse, and a secretary for the general government of the confederacy; great fairs<sup>89</sup> and festivals, to which the people came up from all parts of the country, were held at the same place; and Thermum thus grew in wealth and magnificence, and its houses became noted for the magnificence of their furniture, as the inhabitants, on these great occasions, opened their doors to receive all comers, with a hospitality not common in Greece since the heroic ages. But there were other points in which the Ætolians equally retained the habits of an early state of society; in the best days of Grecian civilization, when life and property were scarcely less secure at Athens than they are at this day in the best governed countries of Europe, the Ætolians went always armed<sup>90</sup>; and the character of a robber was still deemed honourable amongst them, as it had been in all parts of Greece in the Homeric age. As the nation became more powerful, this spirit was displayed on a larger scale, and Ætolian adventurers, countenanced, but not paid or organized, by the national government, made plundering expeditions on their own account both by land and sea, and were not very scrupulous in their choice of the objects of their attack. These adventurers were called “pirates,” *πειραταί*, a name<sup>91</sup> which occurs in the written

<sup>89</sup> *ἀγοραὶ καὶ πανηγύρεις*. Polyb. V. 8. These fairs and religious festivals, held along with the assemblies for political purposes, remind us of the great Etruscan assemblies at the temple of Voltumna. The fairs seem to imply

that the towns in Ætolia were still little better than villages, so as to have but few shops for the regular supply of commodities.

<sup>90</sup> Thucydides, I. 5.

<sup>91</sup> Polybius, IV. 3. 6. Valcke-naer says that the word *πειρατής*

CHAP.  
XXXV.Political re-  
lations of  
Ætolia.

language of Greece for the first time about this period, when the long wars between Alexander's successors and the general decline of good government had multiplied the number of such marauders.

The Ætolians will play an important part hereafter in this history, when their quarrels with Macedon and the Achæan league led them to conclude an alliance with Rome, and to array themselves with the Roman armies, on their first crossing the sea to carry on war in Greece. At present their place in the Greek political system seems not to have been definitely fixed; they were in alliance with Antigonus Gonatas<sup>92</sup> before he obtained possession of Macedon, at the time when their occupation of the Cirrhæan plain involved them in a sacred war with Peloponnesus, and they were also the allies of Pyrrhus and the Epirots; but their peculiar hostility to Macedon and to the Achæans had not as yet been called into existence. Polybius, from whom we derive most of our knowledge of them, was too much their enemy to do them full justice; and on the great occasion of the Gaulish invasion of Greece, they performed their duty nobly, and no state served

occurs, for the first time in the surviving Greek literature, in the Septuagint translation of the Bible. There it is to be found in Job XXV. 3 and Hosea VI. 10; in both instances, I think, signifying a robber by land rather than by sea. And so *πειρατήριον* is used in Genesis XLIX. 19. Thus the Scholiast on Pindar, Pyth. 62. says that *πειραταὶ* properly means *οἱ ἐν ὁδῷ κακούργοι*. See Valckenaer on Ammonius, p. 194.

The Greek translators of the Bible could not have got the word from old Greece, but the robber population of Isauria and Cilicia, who made the name of pirate so famous about two centuries afterwards, had probably already begun to be troublesome, and to molest the Egyptian merchant vessels.

<sup>92</sup> Justin, XXIV. 1. Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Peiresc.* XXXIX.

the common cause more bravely or more effectually. Yet a people who made plunder their glory can have had little true greatness; and it must have been an evil time for Greece, when the Ætolians became one of the most powerful and most famous of the Grecian states.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Northward of the Ambracian gulf, and lying without the limits of ancient as of modern Greece, the various Epirot tribes occupied the coast of the Ionian sea as far as the Acroceraunian promontory, reaching inland as far as the central mountains which turn the streams eastward and westward, and form the western boundary of Thessaly and Macedonia. Within these limits the Molossians, Thesprotians, Chaonians, and many other obscurer people, had from the earliest times led the same life, and kept the same institutions. They lived mostly in villages<sup>93</sup> or in small village-like towns, scattered over the mountains, in green glades opening amidst the forests, or along the rich valleys by which the mountains are in many places intersected, going always armed, and, with the outward habits, retaining also much of the cruelty and faithlessness of barbarians, attended by their dogs, a breed of surpassing excellence<sup>94</sup>, and maintaining themselves chiefly by

EPHROS. Its various tribes, their manner of living, and early history and traditions.

<sup>93</sup> οἰκοῦσι κατὰ κόμης, is the character given by Scylax of the Chaonians, Thesprotians, and Molossians equally. Periplus, p. 11, 12. Ed. Hudson. But we hear of some towns among them, although of none of any considerable size or importance.

<sup>94</sup> The ancient character of the Molossian dogs is well known. Mr. Hughes found them as numerous and as fierce as they were in ancient days; the breed, he thinks, has in no respect degenerated. He describes them as "varying in colour through different



CHAP.  
XXXV.

pasturage, their oxen<sup>95</sup> being amongst the best of which the Greeks had any knowledge. In the heart of their country stood the ancient temple of Dodona, a name famous for generations before Delphi was yet in existence; the earliest seat of the Grecian oracles, whose ministers, the Selli, a priesthood of austere life, received the answers of the god through no human prophet, but from the rustling voice of the sacred oaks which sheltered the temple. These traditions ascend to the most remote antiquity; but Epirus had its share also in the glories of the heroic age, and Pyrrhus the son of Achilles was said to have settled in the country of the Molossians after his return from Troy<sup>96</sup>, and to have been the founder of the line of Molossian kings. The government, indeed, long bore the character of the heroic period; the kings, on their accession, were wont, it is said, to meet their assembled people<sup>97</sup> at Passaron, and swore to govern according to the laws, while the people swore that they would maintain the monarchy according to the laws. In later times Epirus had become connected with Macedonia by the marriage of Olympias, an Epirot princess, with Philip the father of Alexander. Her brother, Alexander of Epirus, was killed, as we have seen, in Italy, where he had

shades from a dark brown to a bright dun, their long fur being very soft, and thick and glossy; in size they are about equal to an English mastiff: they have a long nose, delicate ears finely pointed, magnificent tail, legs of a moderate length, with a body nicely round-

ed and compact." *Travels in Albania, &c.* Vol. I. p. 483.

<sup>95</sup> See Kruse's *Hellas*, Vol. I. p. 368, and the authorities there quoted.

<sup>96</sup> Pausanias, I. 11.

<sup>97</sup> Plutarch, *Pyrrhus*, 5.

carried on war in defence of the Greek Italian cities against the Lucanians; and on his death his first cousin<sup>98</sup> Æacides succeeded to the throne. Æacides married Pthia, the daughter of Menon of Pharsalus, a distinguished leader in the last struggle between Greece and Macedon after the death of Alexander, and the children of this marriage were two daughters, Troias and Deidamia, and one son, Pyrrhus.

Æacides had taken part with his cousin Olympias<sup>99</sup>, when Cassander wanted to destroy all the family of Alexander in order to seat himself on the throne of Macedon. But Cassander had tampered with some of the Epirot chiefs; the cause of Olympias was not popular, and the Epirots did not wish to be involved in a quarrel with the party which was likely to be the ruling power in Macedon. They accordingly met in a general assembly, and deposed and banished their king. Æacides himself was out of their power, as he was still in the field on the frontiers of Macedonia with the few soldiers who remained true to him, and his daughter Deidamia was with Olympias. But Pyrrhus, then an infant, had been left at home, and the rebel chiefs<sup>100</sup> having murdered many of his father's friends, sought for him also to destroy him. He was hurried off in

Early fortunes of Pyrrhus. He is brought up in exile in Illyria.

<sup>98</sup> For the family of Pyrrhus, see Plutarch, Pyrrh. I. Pausanias, I. 11. Diodorus, XVI. 72, and XIX. 51. See also Justin, XVII. 3; but in his account there are some things which might mislead; as for instance he confounds Tharyntas or Tharypus, the great

grandfather of Æacides, with Arybas his father; and makes Æacides and Alexander brothers instead of cousins, unless by the term "frater" he means "frater patruelis" and not "frater germanus."

<sup>99</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 36.

<sup>100</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 2.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

his nurse's arms by a few devoted followers, and carried safely into Illyria, where Glaucias, one of the Illyrian kings, protected him, and as his father was killed in battle soon afterwards<sup>101</sup>, Pyrrhus remained under Glaucias' care, and was brought up by him along with his own children.

He recovers  
his father's  
throne, loses  
it, and recovers  
it again.

Ten or eleven years afterwards, when the power of Cassander in Greece seemed to be tottering, and Demetrius Poliorcetes had re-established the democracy at Athens, Glaucias<sup>102</sup> entered Epirus with an armed force, and restored Pyrrhus to the throne. But again the face of affairs changed; the great league between Cassander, Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus was formed, and Demetrius was obliged to loosen his hold on Greece, that he might help his father in Asia; thus Cassander's party recovered their influence in Epirus, and Pyrrhus, who was still only seventeen years old, was driven a second time into exile. He now joined Demetrius, who, besides their common enmity to Cassander, had married Deidamia his sister; and with him he crossed over into Asia, and was present at the battle of Ipsus. After that great defeat he still remained faithful to Demetrius, and went as a hostage for him<sup>103</sup> into Egypt, when Demetrius had concluded a separate peace with Ptolemy Soter. Here fortune first began to smile upon him; he obtained the good opinion and regard of Ptolemy's queen, Berenice, and received in marriage Antigone, her daughter by a former husband. By

<sup>101</sup> Diodorus, XIX. 74.

<sup>102</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 3.

<sup>103</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 4.

Berenice's assistance he was supplied with men and money, and returned once more to Epirus. His kinsman, Neoptolemus, the son apparently of Alexander, who had died in Italy, had been placed on the throne, when he himself had been driven from it; but Neoptolemus was become unpopular, and Pyrrhus found many partisans. Dreading, however, lest Neoptolemus should apply to some foreign prince for aid, he entered into a compromise with him<sup>104</sup>, and the two rivals agreed to share the regal power between them. The end of such an arrangement could not be doubtful; suspicions arose, and Pyrrhus accusing Neoptolemus of forming designs against his life, did himself what he charged his rival with meditating, and having treacherously murdered him, after having invited him to his table as a guest, he remained the sole sovereign of Epirus.

His old enemy Cassander died in the first year of the 121st Olympiad, five years after the battle of Ipsus. Not one of Alexander's successors had gained his power by more or worse crimes than Cassander; and as his house had been founded in blood, by the murder of Alexander's family, so now in its own blood was it to perish. His sons Antipater and Alexander<sup>105</sup> quarrelled for his inheritance. Antipater murdered his own mother Thesalonica, the daughter of the great Philip of Macedon, and half-sister of Alexander; and now the last survivor of the old royal family of the race of

He interferes in the quarrels between the sons of Cassander.

<sup>104</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 5.

apud Euseb. Chronic. Ed. Scalliger. p. 58. 63. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 6.

<sup>105</sup> Porphyry and Dexippus;

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Hereules. Alexander his brother applied to Pyrrhus for aid, and purchased it by ceding to him all that the Macedonian kings had possessed on the western side of Greece; Tymphæa and Parauæa<sup>106</sup>, just under the central ridge which turns the streams to the two opposite seas, and Ambracia, Acarnania, and Amphilochia, on the northern and southern shores of the Ambracian gulf. These were added permanently to the kingdom of Pyrrhus, and he fixed his capital at Ambracia.

Extinction  
of Cassan-  
der's family.

The price was thus paid, and Alexander drove out his brother, by Pyrrhus' help, and became king of Macedonia. Antipater fled to Lysimachus for protection, and was afterwards put to death by him<sup>107</sup>. Alexander was in his turn murdered by Demetrius Poliorcetes, who after all his reverses thus esta-

<sup>106</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 6. The present text reads *τὴν τε Νυμφαίαν καὶ τὴν παραλίαν τῆς Μακεδονίας*. Palmer had corrected *Στυμφαίαν* or *Τυμφαίαν* instead of *Νυμφαίαν*, and Niebuhr with no less certainty has restored *Παραναίαν* for *παραλίαν*. Rom. Geschichte, Vol. III. p. 536. He observes that *παραλίαν* could only mean the coast between Dium and the Strymon, which it is absurd to suppose ceded to Pyrrhus. Tymphæa and Parauæa, Niebuhr adds, are mentioned together by Arrian, Exped. Alexand. I. 7, as countries which Alexander passed by on his march from Illyria into Thessaly. The Parauæans are reckoned along with the Epirot tribes by Thucydides, II. 80, and it appears that Alexander was but restoring to

Pyrrhus countries which geographically belonged more to Epirus than to Macedon, and some of which had in earlier times been connected with it politically.

In Stephanus Byzant. in *Χαονία*, there is a quotation from Proxenus, (an historian who wrote about Pyrrhus; see Dionys. Halic. XIX. 11, Fragm. Mai, and Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellen. Vol. III. 563,) enumerating the people of Chaonia. It runs, *Τυμφαῖοι, Παραύλιοι, Ἀρύμονες*, where K. O. Muller corrects *Τυμφαῖοι, Παραναῖοι*. "Uber die Makedoner. N. 33." His correction and Niebuhr's mutually confirm one another.

<sup>107</sup> Porphyry and Dexippus, apud Euseb. pp. 58-63. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 7. Demetrius, 36.



blished his family on the throne of Macedon; and the bloody house of Cassander utterly perished.

Six or seven years afterwards the restless ambition of Demetrius leagued his old enemies, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, once more against him, and they encouraged Pyrrhus to invade Macedonia. Pyrrhus dethroned Demetrius<sup>108</sup>, and obtained possession of a part of his dominions, the other part being claimed by Lysimachus. But at the end of seven months<sup>109</sup> Lysimachus made himself master of the whole of Macedonia, and drove Pyrrhus across the mountains into his native kingdom of Epirus. There he reigned in peace for about six years, his dominions including not Epirus only, but those other countries which had been the price of his first interference in the quarrels of Cassander's sons, Tymphæa and Parauæa, on the frontiers of Macedonia, and the coasts on both sides of the Ambracian gulf. He united himself in an alliance with his neighbours the Ætolians, which was renewed in the reign of his son. And thus he had leisure to ornament his new capital, Ambracia, which he enlarged by adding to it a new quarter<sup>110</sup> called after his own name, and decorated it with an unusual number of statues and pictures.

But although Pyrrhus himself was reigning peaceably in Epirus, yet the period which elapsed between his expulsion from Macedonia and his Italian expedi-

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Pyrrhus wins Macedonia and loses it. He reigns over Epirus and parts of the neighbouring countries in peace for about six years.

<sup>108</sup> Plutarch, Demetrius, 44. apud Euseb. pp. 58-63. Pyrrh. 11.

<sup>109</sup> Porphyry and Dexippus, <sup>110</sup> See Polybius, XXII. 10. 13.

Revolutions during that period in other countries.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

tion was marked by great revolutions elsewhere. Ptolemy, the founder of the Macedonian dynasty in Egypt, died after a reign or dominion of forty years from the death of Alexander. Demetrius Poliorcetes ended his days about the same time after a two years' captivity in Syria. Lysimachus was killed soon afterwards, as has been already mentioned, in a battle with Seleucus, and Seleucus himself, the last survivor of Alexander's immediate successors, was murdered seven months after his victory by Ptolemy Ceraunus. The murderer, who was half-brother to Ptolemy Philadelphus, the second of the Macedonian kings of Egypt, took possession of the vacant throne of Macedonia, and became immediately involved in war with Antiochus, son of Seleucus, and with Antigonus, the son of Demetrius<sup>111</sup>; the first of whom wished to revenge his father's death, while the other was trying to recover Macedonia, which, as having been held by his father during six or seven years, he regarded as his lawful inheritance. In the mean time, he was actually the sovereign of Thessaly, and exercised a great power over all the states of Greece; and was in alliance with Pyrrhus and the Ætolians. The Greeks, as we have seen, made a fruitless attempt to assert their independence, by attacking his allies the Ætolians; but they were easily beaten, and Antigonus seems to have reigned without farther molestation in Thessaly and Bœotia, whilst Ptolemy Ceraunus still held his ill-gotten power in Macedonia.

<sup>111</sup> Justin, XXIV. 1. Memnon, apud Photium, p. 226. Ed. Bekker.

CHAP.  
XXXV.Pyrrhus is  
invited by  
the Taren-  
tines into  
Italy.

Things were in this state when ambassadors<sup>112</sup> from Tarentum entreated Pyrrhus to cross over into Italy, to protect both themselves and the other Greek cities of Italy from a barbarian enemy far more formidable than the Lucanians, the old enemies of his kinsman Alexander. Times were now so changed that the Lucanians and Samnites were leagued in one common cause with the Greeks, with whom they had been so long at enmity; the Etruscans had taken part also in the confederacy; yet the united efforts of so many states were too weak to resist the new power which had grown up in the centre of Italy, and was fast arriving at the dominion of the whole peninsula. To conquer these fierce barbarians, and to save so many Greek cities from slavery, was a work that well became the kinsman of the great Alexander, the descendant of Achilles and of Æacus.

The prayer of the Tarentines suited well with the temper and the circumstances of Pyrrhus. He promised them his aid, and began forthwith to prepare for his passage to Italy, and for his war with the Romans.

<sup>112</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 13.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

ROME AND THE ROMAN PEOPLE AT THE BEGINNING  
OF THE WAR WITH THE TARENTINES AND WITH  
PYRRHUS.

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“Privatus illis census erat brevis,  
Commune magnum ; nulla decempedis  
Metata privatis opacam  
Porticus excipiebat Arcton,  
Nec fortuitum spernere cespitem  
Leges sinebant, oppida publico  
Sumtu jubentes et deorum  
Templa novo decorare saxo.”

HORAT. Carmin. II. 15.

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CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
Sketch of  
the internal  
state of  
Rome.

THE preceding chapter has been compiled from materials which in their actual state are often fragmentary, and even when they are perfect, are not original. But yet they were derived from original sources ; for although the contemporary histories of Alexander's successors have long since perished, yet they did once exist, and were accessible to the writers whom we read and copy now. We cross the Adriatic to inquire into the state of Italy, and not only are our existing materials the merest wreck of a lost history, not only would they tell their story to

us at second hand, if they had been preserved entire ; but even these very accounts could have been taken from no contemporary historians, for none such ever existed. In this absolute dearth of direct information, it is impossible that the following sketch should be other than meagre, and it must also rest partly on conjecture. Unsatisfactory as this is, yet the nature of the case will allow of nothing better ; and I can but encourage myself, while painfully feeling my way amid such thick darkness, with the hope of arriving at length at the light, and enjoying all the freshness and fulness of a detailed contemporary history.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

In the middle of the fifth century, the Roman people was divided into three and thirty tribes<sup>1</sup> ; and the total number of citizens, which included, besides those enrolled in the tribes, the ærarians, and the people of those foreign states, which had been

The divisions of the Roman people.

<sup>1</sup> That is to say, twenty tribes are known to have existed in the earliest period of the commonwealth, and another was added soon afterwards. The number of twenty-one continued till after the Gaulish invasion, when four more were added on the right bank of the Tiber, in 368 ; namely, the Stellatine, the Tromentine, the Sabatine, and the Arniensian. Two more were added in 397 for the inhabitants of the old Volscian lowlands near the Pomptine marshes, the Pomptine and the Publilian. Two more were added after the Latin war in 422, the Mæcian and the Scaptian, for the Lanuvians and some other people of Latium. In the Second Sam-

nite war, in 436-7, the Ufentine and Falerian tribes were created, which included the Privernatians, and the settlers in the Falernian plain. And, lastly, after the Æquian war, two more were added in 455, the Aniensian and the Terentine, in which were enrolled the Æquians.

All these are clearly local tribes, and their situation is well known. The same may be said of the four city tribes, the Colline, the Esquiline, the Palatine, and the tribe of Subura. But to the remaining seventeen, which are mostly named after some noble Roman family, as the Æmilian, the Cornelian, the Fabian, &c. it is extremely difficult to assign their proper locality.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

obliged to receive the *civitas sine suffragio*, amounted to 272,000<sup>2</sup>. What proportion of these were enrolled in the tribes, or, in other words, enjoyed the full rights of citizenship, we cannot tell, nor have we any means of estimating the number of the *æriani*; nor again, can we draw any inference as to the population of the city of Rome, as distinguished from the country tribes; nor can we at all compute the proportion of slaves at this time to freemen. The class of *æriani*, however, must have been greatly diminished, since freedmen and persons engaged in retail trade or manufactures had been enrolled in the tribes; and it could have only contained those who had forfeited their franchise, either in consequence of their having incurred legal infamy, or by the authority of the censors.

Manner of  
life of the  
citizens of  
the country  
tribes.

The members of the country tribes, of those at least which had been created within the last century, lived on their lands, and probably only went up to Rome to vote at the elections, or when any law of great national importance was proposed, and there was a powerful party opposed to its enactment. They were also obliged to appear on the Capitol on the day fixed by the consuls for the enlistment of soldiers for the legions<sup>3</sup>. Law business might also call them up to Rome occasionally, and the Roman games, or any other great festival, would no doubt draw them thither in great numbers. With these exceptions, and when they were not serving in the

<sup>2</sup> Livy, *Epit.* XI.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, VI. 19.

legions, they lived on their small properties in the country; their business was agriculture, their recreations were country sports, and their social pleasures were found in the meetings of their neighbours at seasons of festival; at these times there would be dancing, music, and often some pantomimic acting, or some rude attempts at dramatic dialogue, one of the simplest and most universal amusements of the human mind. This was enough to satisfy all their intellectual cravings; of the beauty of painting, sculpture, or architecture, of the charms of eloquence and of the highest poetry, of the deep interest which can be excited by inquiry into the causes of all the wonders around us and within us, of some of the highest and most indispensable enjoyments of an Athenian's nature, the agricultural Romans of the fifth century had no notion whatsoever.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

But it was not possible that an equal simplicity should have existed at Rome. Their close and constant intercourse with other men sharpens and awakens the faculties of the inhabitants of cities; and country sports being by the necessity of the case denied to them, they learn earlier to value such pleasures as can be supplied by the art or genius of man. Besides, the conduct of political affairs on a large scale, much more when these affairs are publicly dicussed either in a council or in a popular assembly, cannot but create an appreciation of intellectual power and of eloquence; and the multiplied transactions of civil life, leading perpetually to disputes, and these disputes requiring a legal decision, a know-

And of those of the city. Study of the law. Appius Claudius, Ti. Coruncanius, and the Ogulnii.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

ledge of law became a valuable accomplishment, and the study of law, which is as wholesome to the human mind as the practice of it is often injurious, was naturally a favourite pursuit with those who had leisure, and who wished either to gain influence or to render services. Thus the family of the Claudii seem always to have aspired after civil rather than military distinction. Appius Claudius, the censor, was a respectable soldier, but he is much better known by his great public works and by his speech against making peace with Pyrrhus, than by his achievements in war; nay, it is said, that his plebeian colleague in the consulship, L. Volumnius, taunted him with his legal knowledge and his eloquence, as if he could only talk<sup>4</sup> and not fight. The Claudii, however, were distinguished by their high nobility, independently of any personal accomplishments; but the family of the Coruncanii owed its celebrity entirely, so far as appears, to their acquaintance with the law. Ti. Coruncanus<sup>5</sup> was consul with P. Lævinus in the year when Pyrrhus came into Italy, and was named dictator more than thirty years afterwards for the purpose of holding the comitia. He left no writings behind him, but was accustomed to the very latest period of his life, to give answers on points of law to all that chose to consult him; and his reputation was so high that he was the first plebeian<sup>6</sup> who was ever appointed to the dignity of

<sup>4</sup> Livy, X. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Pomponius, de Origine Juris,  
§ 35. 38. Cicero, Brutus, 14.

Cato Major, 9.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, Epit. XVIII.

pontifex maximus. The Ogulnii also appear to have been a family distinguished for knowledge and accomplishments. Two brothers of this name were, as we have seen, the authors of the law which threw open the offices of augur and pontifex to the commons, and afterwards in their ædileship they ornamented the city with several works of art; and one of them, besides his embassy to Epidaurus, already noticed, was sent as one of three ambassadors<sup>7</sup> to Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, soon after the retreat of Pyrrhus from Italy.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

There was as yet no regular drama, for Livius Andronicus did not begin to exhibit his plays till after the first Punic war<sup>8</sup>; but there were pantomimic dances performed by Etruscan actors<sup>9</sup>, there were the saturæ<sup>10</sup> or medleys, sung and acted by native performers; and there were the comic or satirical dialogues on some ludicrous story (fabellæ atellanæ), in which the actors were of a higher rank, as this entertainment was rather considered an old national custom, than a spectacle exhibited for the

Total absence of all literature.

<sup>7</sup> Dionysius, XX. 4. Fragm. Vatic. Valer. Maxim. IV. 3, § 9.

<sup>8</sup> Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Vol. III. p. 25, B.C. 240.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, VII. 2.

<sup>10</sup> I am not venturing to determine the etymology of this word, but giving merely a description of the thing. "Olim carmen quod ex variis poematibus constabat, satyra vocabatur, quale scripserunt Pacuvius et Ennius." Diomedes, III. 9. Livy speaks of the saturæ or satyræ, as an intermediate state in the dramatic art be-

tween the acting of regular stories with a plot, and the mere rude *sparring* with coarse jests, "*versum in compositum temere ac rudem alternis jaciebant*," which used to go on between two performers. The saturæ appear then to have been comic songs in regular verse, in which a great variety of subjects were successively noticed, without any more connexion than as being each of them points on which the hearers could be readily excited to laughter.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

public amusement. There were no famous poets, nor any Homer, to embody in an imperishable form the poetical traditions of his country; but there were the natural elements of poetry, and the natural love of it; and it was long the custom at all entertainments<sup>11</sup> that each guest in his turn should sing some heroic song, recording the worthy deeds of some noble Roman. So also there was no history, but there was the innate desire of living in the memory of after-ages; and in all the great families, panegyric orations were delivered at the funeral of each of their members, containing a most exaggerated account of his life and actions<sup>12</sup>. These orations existed in the total absence of all other statements, and from these chiefly, the annalists of the succeeding century compiled their narratives; and thus every war is made to exhibit a series of victories, and all the most remarkable characters in the Roman story are represented as men without reproach, or of heroic excellence.

Public  
amuse-  
ments. The  
great games  
of the  
circus.

But whilst literature was unknown, and poetry, and even the drama itself, were in their earliest infancy, the Romans enjoyed with the keenest delight the sports of the circus, which resembled the great national games of Greece. Every year in the month of September<sup>13</sup> four days were devoted to the

<sup>11</sup> Cicero, Brutus, 19.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero, Brutus, 16. Livy, VIII. 40.

<sup>13</sup> The fullest work on the games of the circus, is, I suppose, that of Onuphrius Panvinius,

(Onofrio Panvini, a Veronese, who flourished in the latter part of the 16th century,) published in the ninth volume of Grævius' Collection of Roman Antiquities. The view of the circus and the Pala-



celebration of what were called indifferently, the Great or the Roman Games. Like all the spectacles of the ancient world, they were properly a religious solemnity, a great festival in honour of the three national divinities of the Capitoline temple, Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. On the first day of the festival, the whole people went in procession<sup>14</sup> from the Capitol through the forum to the circus; there the sacrifice was performed, and afterwards the exhibition of the various games began, which was so entirely a national ceremony, that the magistrate of highest rank who happened to be in Rome gave the signal for the starting of the horses in the chariot race. The circus itself was especially consecrated to the sun, and the colours by which the drivers of the chariots were distinguished, were supposed to have a mystical allusion to the different seasons<sup>15</sup>. Originally there were only two colours, white and red, the

tine, given in Panvinus' work, is curious, as showing how greatly Rome has changed in the last 250 years. A shorter account may be found in Rosini and Dempster's work on Roman antiquities; and the topography of the circus is given in Bunsen and Platner's description of Rome, Vol. III. p. 91. Gibbon has given one of his lively and comprehensive sketches of the games of the circus, in his account of the reign of Justinian: which notices every important point in the subject. A representation of the circus is given on several coins, which may be seen in Panvinus' work, and which enable us to form a sufficient no-

tion of its appearance. The bands or factions of the drivers are noticed in numerous inscriptions.

<sup>14</sup> Tertullian, *De Spectaculis*, VII. His enumeration of the several parts of the great procession is full and lively. "*De simulacrorum serie, de imaginum agmine, de curribus, de thensis, de armamaxis, de sedibus, de coronis, de exuviis, quanta præterea sacra, quanta sacrificia præcedant, intercedant, succedant, quot collegia, quot sacerdotia, quot officia moveantur, sciunt homines illius urbis in quâ dæmoniorum conventus consedit.*"

<sup>15</sup> Tertullian, *ibid.* VIII. IX.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

one a symbol of the snows of winter, the other of the fiery heat of summer; but two others were afterwards added, the spring-like green, and the autumnal grey or blue. The charioteers, who wore the same colours, were called the red or white, or green or blue band, (*factio*), and these bands became in later times the subject of the strongest party feeling; for men attached themselves either to one or the other, and would have as little been induced to change their colour in the circus as their political party in the commonwealth. It does not appear that these colours were connected with any real differences, social or political; there were no ideas of which they were severally the symbols; and thus, while the commonwealth lasted, the bands of the circus seem to have excited no deeper or more lasting interest, than the wishes of their respective partisans for their success in the chariot race. But afterwards, when the emperor was known to favour any one colour more than another, that colour would naturally become the badge of his friends, and the opposite colour the rallying point of his enemies; and when a real political feeling was connected with these symbols, it was not wonderful that the bands of the circus became truly factions, and that their quarrels in the lower empire should have sometimes deluged Constantinople with blood.

Public  
works. Nu-  
merous tem-  
ples built  
and orna-  
mented.

The Romans in the fifth century enjoyed the games as keenly as their descendants under the emperors; but the lavish magnificence of the imperial circus was as yet altogether unknown. Wooden

boxes<sup>16</sup> supported on poles, like the simplest form of a stand on an English race-course, were the best accommodation as yet provided for the spectators; and it was only in the fifth century that the *carceres*<sup>17</sup> were first erected, a line of buildings of the common volcanic tufo of Rome itself, extending along one end of the circus, each with a door opening upon the course, from which the horses were brought out to take their places, before they started on the race. But although the works of this period were simple, yet they now began to be very numerous, and some of them were on a scale of very imposing grandeur. Livy has recorded the building of seven new temples<sup>18</sup> within ten years, between 452 and 462; for the period immediately following we have no detailed history, but the foundation of the temple of *Æsculapius*, about two years later, is noticed in the epitome of Livy's eleventh book; and many others may have been founded, of which we have no memorial. It is mentioned also that *C. Fabius*<sup>19</sup> ornamented one of these temples, that of *Deliverance from Danger*, with frescoes of his own execution, in consequence of which he obtained the

<sup>16</sup> Livy, I. 35.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, VIII. 20. Suetonius in Claud. 21. There are representations of the *carceres* in one or two of the engravings of Panvinus's work, copied from antiques.

<sup>18</sup> Namely, a temple of *Bellona*, vowed by Appius Claudius in 458, (Livy, X. 19); another of *Jupiter the Victorious*, vowed by Q. Fabius in the great battle of *Sentium* (X. 29); a third near the

circus, dedicated to *Venus* (X. 31); a fourth dedicated to *Victory* (X. 33); a fifth to *Jupiter the Stayer of Flight*, (X. 37); a sixth to *Fortis Fortuna* (X. 46); and a seventh to *Salus*, or *Deliverance from Danger*, which was the temple painted by Fabius Pictor. (Livy, X. 1.)

<sup>19</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natur.* XXXV. § 19.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

surname of Pictor. The date of the Greek artists, Damophilus and Gorgasus<sup>20</sup>, who painted the frescoes of the temple of Ceres, close by the circus, we have no means of determining, but several notices show that a taste for the arts was beginning at this time to be felt at Rome. The colossal bronze statue of Jupiter, set up by Sp. Carvilius in the Capitol, in the year 461, has been already noticed, as well as the famous group of the she-wolf suckling Romulus and Remus, which was placed in the comitium three years before. And at the same time a statue of Jupiter in a chariot drawn by four horses<sup>21</sup>, the work of an Etruscan artist, and wrought in clay, was erected on the summit of the Capitol.

Family  
images worn  
like masks  
at funerals.

The temple of Bellona, built by Appius Claudius<sup>22</sup> in fulfilment of a vow made on the field of battle, was decorated with a row of shields or escutcheons, on which were represented his several ancestors, with scrolls recording the offices which they had filled, and the triumphs which they had won. Whoever of these had been the father of a family was repre-

<sup>20</sup> Pliny, Hist. Natur. XXXV. § 45.

<sup>21</sup> Pliny, Hist. Natur. XXXV. § 158.

<sup>22</sup> Pliny (Hist. Nat. XXXV. § 2, 3) ascribes these shields to the first Appius Claudius, who was consul with P. Servilius in 259. But unless the words "qui consul cum Servilio fuit anno urbis CCLIX." are an unlucky gloss of some ignorant reader, as is most probable, they seem to show an extraordinary carelessness in Pliny himself; for, to say nothing of the

direct testimony, which ascribes the foundation of the temple of Bellona to Appius the Blind in 458, Pliny's own statement says, that Appius caused the figures of his ancestors, and scrolls recording the offices which they had filled, to be affixed to this temple: but who could have been the ancestors of the first Appius, and what offices could they have filled at Rome, when he himself was the first of his family who became a Roman.

sented with all his children by his side, as in some of our own old monuments. In these and in all similar works, an exact likeness<sup>23</sup> was considered of much greater importance than any excellence of art; for the object desired was to transmit to posterity a lively image of those who had in their generation done honour to their name and family. For this purpose waxen busts, the scorn of the mere artist, were kept in cases ranged along the sides of the court in the houses of all great families; these were painted to the life, and being hollow, were worn like a mask<sup>24</sup> at funerals by some of the dependents of the family, who also put on the dress of the office or rank of him whose semblance they bore; so that it seemed as if the dead were attended to his grave by all the members of his race of past generations, no less than by those who still survived. None were so represented who had not in their lifetime filled some honourable public station, and thus the number of images worn at any funeral was the exact measure of the family's nobility.

No other aqueduct had yet been added to that constructed by Appius Claudius in his famous censorship; nor had any later road rivalled the magnificence of the Appian. This was paved with lava in the year 461, from the temple of Mars<sup>25</sup>, a little on the outside of the city walls, to Bovillæ, at the foot of the Alban hills.

The Appian  
road paved  
as far as  
Bovillæ.

<sup>23</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. XXXV. § 6. Polybius, VI. 53.  
§ 4. 6.

<sup>24</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. XXXV.

<sup>25</sup> Livy, X. 47.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.Extent and  
aspect of  
the city.

The city itself was still confined within the walls of Servius Tullius. The Capitol and the Quirinal hills formed its northern limit, and looked down immediately on the open space of the Campus Martius, now covered with the greatest part of the buildings of modern Rome. Art or caprice had not yet effaced the natural features of the ground, by cutting down hills and filling up valleys, nor had the mere lapse of time as yet raised the soil by continued accumulations to a height far above its original level. The hills, with their bare rocky sides, and covered in many parts with sacred groves, the remains of their primeval woods, rose distinctly and boldly from the valleys between them; on their summits were the principal temples and the houses of the noblest families; beneath were the narrow streets and lofty houses<sup>26</sup>, roofed only with wood, of the more populous quarters of the city, and in the midst, reaching from the Capitoline hill to the Palatine, lay the comitium and the Roman forum.

Description  
of the  
forum.

A spot so famous well deserves to be described, that we may conceive its principal features, and image to ourselves the scene as well as the actors in so many of the great events of the Roman history. From the foot of the Capitoline hill<sup>27</sup> to that of the

<sup>26</sup> Pliny, XVI. § 36. quoting from Cornelius Nepos.

<sup>27</sup> The whole of the following description of the forum is taken from Bunsen's article in the third volume of the "Beschreibung der Stadt Rom." The substance of

this article has been given by its author in another form, in a letter to the Chevalier Canina, written in French. (Rome, 1837.) He has also prefixed to some impressions of his German article, which have been printed separately, all

Palatine, there ran an open space of unequal breadth, narrowing as it approached the Palatine, and enclosed on both sides between two branches of the Sacred Way. Its narrower end was occupied by the comitium, the place of meeting of the *populus* or great council of the burghers in the earliest times of the republic, whilst its wider extremity was the forum, in the stricter sense, the market-place of the Romans, and therefore, the natural place of meeting for the commons, who formed the majority of the Roman nation. The comitium was raised a little above the level of the forum, like the dais or upper part of our old castle and college halls, and at its extremity nearest the forum stood the rostra, such as I have already described it, facing at this period towards the comitium, so that the speakers addressed, not indeed the patrician multitude as of old, but the senators, who had in a manner succeeded to their

the passages in the ancient writers which throw any light on the topography of the forum.

Since this chapter was written, I have seen Nibby's latest work on the topography of Rome, which was published in 1839. His plan of the forum differs topographically from Bunsen's; he places it farther to the west, and arranges the buildings differently. But historically his views are so imperfect, and he follows so contentedly the old popular accounts, without the slightest knowledge, so far as appears, of the light which Niebuhr has thrown on the Roman history, that his topography is necessarily rendered of

less value. Bunsen has had every advantage of local knowledge no less than Nibby, but with his local knowledge he combines other qualities which Nibby is far from possessing equally.

However, the general correctness of the description of the forum in the fifth century of Rome, as given in the text, is independent of the question whether the position of the forum is to be fixed a certain number of yards more to the eastward or to the westward. And most of those buildings, the site of which has been so much disputed, were not in existence at the period to which this sketch relates.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

place, and who were accustomed to stand in this part of the assembly, immediately in front of the senate house, which looked out upon the comitium from the northern side of the Via Sacra. The magnificent basilicæ, which at a later period formed the two sides of the forum, were not yet in existence, but in their place there were two rows of solid square pillars of peperino, forming a front to the shops of various kinds, which lay behind them. These shops were like so many cells, open to the street, and closed behind, and had no communication with the houses which were built over them. Those on the north side of the forum had been rebuilt or improved during the early part of the fifth century, and were called in consequence the new shops, a name which, as usual in such cases, they retained for centuries. On the south side, the line of shops was interrupted by the temple of Castor and Pollux, which had been built, according to the common tradition, by the dictator, A. Postumius, in gratitude for the aid afforded him by the twin heroes in the battle of the lake Regillus. On the same side also, but farther to the eastward, and nearly opposite to the senate-house, was the temple of Vesta, and close to the temple was that ancient monument of the times of the kings which went by the name of the court of Numa.

Statues, &c.  
in the  
forum.

In the open space of the forum might be seen an altar which marked the spot once occupied by the Curtian pool, the subject of such various traditions. Hard by grew the three sacred trees<sup>28</sup> of the

<sup>28</sup> Pliny, Hist. Natur. XV. § 78.

oldest known civilization, the fig, the vine, and the olive, which were so carefully preserved or renewed that they existed even in the time of the elder Pliny. Farther towards the Capitol, at the western extremity of the Forum, were the equestrian statues of C. Mænius and L. Camillus, the conquerors of the Latins.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

Nor was the interior of the comitium destitute of objects entitled to equal veneration. There was the black stone which marked, according to one tradition, the grave of Faustulus the foster-father of Romulus, according to another that of Romulus himself. There was the statue of Attius Navius the famous augur; and there too was the sacred fig-tree, under whose shade the wolf had given suck to the two twins, Romulus and Remus. A group of figures representing the wolf and twins had been recently set up in this very place by the ædiles Q. and Cn. Ogulnius, and the fig-tree itself had been removed by the power of Attius Navius, so said the story<sup>29</sup>, from its original place under the Palatine, that it might stand in the midst of the meetings of the Roman people. Nor were statues wanting to the comitium any more than to the forum. Here were the three sibyls, one of the oldest works of Roman art; here also were the small figures of the Roman ambassadors who had been slain at Fidenæ

Statues and other objects of interest in the comitium.

<sup>29</sup> The passage in Pliny which mentions this story, XV. § 77, is clearly corrupt, and various corrections of it have been attempted.

Bunsen has given one in a note to his article on the forum, *Beschreib. der Stadt Rom*. III. p. 62.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

by the Veientian king Tolumnius; and here too, at the edge of the comitium where it joined the forum, were the statues which the Romans, at the command of the Delphian oracle, had erected in honour of the wisest and bravest of the Greeks, the statues of Pythagoras and Alcibiades.

Character of  
the popula-  
tion; the  
shops, &c.

The outward appearance of the forum in the fifth century was very different from its aspect in the times of the Cæsars, and scarcely less different was the population by which it was frequented at either period. Rome was not yet the general resort of strangers from all parts of the world; the Tiber was as yet not only unpolluted by the Syrian Orontes, but its waters had received no accession from the purer streams of Greece; and the crowd which thronged the forum, however numerous and busy, consisted mainly of the citizens, or at least of the inhabitants of Rome. The shops of the silversmiths had lately superseded those of a less showy character on the north side of the forum; but, on the other side, the butchers' and cooks' shops still remained, as in the days of Virginius, and it marks the manners of the times, that the wealthier citizens used to hire cooks<sup>30</sup> from these places to bake their bread for them, having as yet no slaves who understood even the simplest parts of the art of cookery.

Great fami-  
lies of this  
period.

The names of the principal families, as well as of the most distinguished men of this period, have na-

<sup>30</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natur.* XVIII. § 108. So in the *Aulularia* of Plautus, the cooks are hired in the forum to go to Euclio's house, and dress his daughter's wedding dinner.



turally been mentioned already in the course of the narrative. It is enough to remark that Appius Claudius was still alive, though now old and blind, that M. Valerius Corvus was also living, but his public career had been for some time ended; and that Q. Fabius, the hero of the third Samnite war, had died not long after its conclusion. Q. Publilius Philo was also dead, and with him expired the nobility of his family. But there were ready to meet Pyrrhus, the two victorious generals of the great campaign of 461, L. Papirius Cursor and Sp. Carvilius Maximus; M. Curius Dentatus was still in the vigour of life, and Q. Fabius and P. Decius had both left sons to uphold the honour of their name. The great Cornelian house contributed eminent citizens for their country's service from three of its numerous branches; among the consuls of the fourth Samnite war we find a Cornelius Lentulus, a Cornelius Rufinus, and a Cornelius Dolabella. Two other names will demand our notice for the first time, those of C. Fabricius and L. Cæcilius Metellus, the first pre-eminent in the purest personal glory, but a glory destined to pass away from his family after one generation, "no son of his succeeding;" while L. Cæcilius, if he did not attain himself to the highest distinction, was yet "the father of a line of more than kings," of those illustrious Metelli who, from the first Punic war to the end of the commonwealth, were amongst the noblest and best citizens of Rome.

Against a whole nation of able and active men

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

the greatest individual genius of a single enemy must ever strive in vain. The victory of Pyrrhus at Heraclea was endangered by a rumour that he was slain, for in his person lay the whole strength of his army and of his cause. But had the noblest of the Fabii or Cornelii fallen at the head of a Roman army, the safety of the commonwealth would not have been for a single moment in jeopardy. This contrast alone was sufficient to ensure the decision of the great war on which we are now about to enter.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

FOREIGN HISTORY FROM 464 TO 479—WARS WITH  
THE ETRUSCANS, GAULS, AND TARENTINES—FOURTH  
SAMNITE WAR — PYRRHUS KING OF EPIRUS IN  
ITALY — BATTLES OF HERACLEA, ASCULUM, AND  
BENEVENTUM.

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Non Simois tibi nec Xanthus nec Dorica castra  
Defuerint ; alius Latio jam partus Achilles.

VIRGIL. *Æn.* VI. 87.

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THE third Samnite war ended in the year 464, and Pyrrhus invaded Italy exactly ten years later, in the year 474. The events of the intervening period, both foreign and domestic, are, as we have seen, involved in the deepest obscurity ; but as I have attempted to present an outline of the internal state of Rome, so I must now endeavour to trace the perplexed story of her foreign relations, from the first seeds of war, which the jealousy of the Tarentines either sowed or earnestly fostered, to the organization of that great coalition, in which the Gauls at first, and Pyrrhus afterwards, were principal actors.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Fourth  
Samnite war  
and coalition  
against  
Rome.

On the side of Etruria there had been for a long time past neither certain peace nor vigorous war.

State and  
dispositions  
of the Etru-  
cans.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Jealousies between city and city, and party revolutions in the several cities themselves, were, as we have seen, for ever compromising the tranquillity and paralyzing the exertions of the Etruscan nation. In 461 the cities of southern Etruria had taken up arms, and had persuaded the Faliscans to join them; and in 462 we hear of victories obtained over the Faliscans by the consul, D. Junius Brutus<sup>1</sup>. No farther particulars are known of the progress of the contest, but it appears from the epitome of Livy's eleventh book, that at some time or other within the next eight years, the people of Vulsinii took a principal part in it, and in 471 the whole or nearly the whole of the Etruscan nation were engaged in it once again.

Of the  
Gauls,

Farther to the north, "the Senonian Gauls remained quiet," says Polybius<sup>2</sup>, "for a period of ten years after the battle of Sentinum." If we take this statement to the letter, we must fix the renewal of the Gaulish war in 469; yet we cannot trace any act of hostility till the year 471. The Gauls appear first to have engaged as mercenaries in the Etruscan service, and afterwards to have joined the new coalition in their own name.

Of the Lu-  
canians and  
Tarentines.

To the south of Rome, Lucania during the third Samnite war had remained faithful to the Romans, and in the year 460 we expressly read of Lucanian cohorts serving with the Roman legions<sup>3</sup>. Of Tarentum nothing is recorded after its short war with the

<sup>1</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, II. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, X. 33.

Lucanians and Romans in 451, which appears to have been ended, as I have already observed<sup>4</sup>, by an equal treaty.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Italy was in this state when the Lucanians attacked the Greek city of Thurii. We know not the cause or pretext of the quarrel, but those unfortunate Greek cities of Italy were at this time the prey of every spoiler; Agathocles had made repeated expeditions to that coast in the latter years of his reign, and had taken Croton and Hipponium<sup>5</sup>, while the Italian nations of the interior had from time immemorial regarded them as enemies. Thurii itself had been taken by Cleonymus in 452<sup>6</sup>, when he was playing the buccaneer along all the coasts of Italy; and a Roman army had then come to its aid, but too late to prevent its capture. This was perhaps remembered now, when the city was threatened by the Lucanians, and the Romans were implored once again to bring help to the people of Thurii. The request was not at first granted; as far as we can make out the obscure story of these times, the first attacks must have been made about the period of the domestic troubles at Rome, when the commons occupied the Janiculum, and obliged the senate to consent to the Hortensian laws. During two successive summers, the Lucanians ravaged the territory of Thurii<sup>7</sup>, and so far as appears, there was no power

The Lucanians attack Thurii, and the Thurians apply to the Romans for aid.

<sup>4</sup> See page 315 of this volume.

<sup>5</sup> Diodorus, XXI. 4. 8, *Fragm.* Hoeschel.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, X. 2.

<sup>7</sup> The data for the arrangement

of all these events in order of time are as follows: 1. The interposition of the Romans in behalf of the Thurians is mentioned in the epitome of the eleventh book



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

The people  
in their  
tribes vote  
for war with  
the Luca-  
nians.

of resistance in the inhabitants themselves, and no foreign sword was drawn to defend them.

Meanwhile the Hortensian laws were passed, and with them, or shortly before, an agrarian law had

of Livy, and the twelfth book began apparently with the consulship of Dolabella and Domitius in the year 471. 2. M'. Curius obtained an ovation or smaller triumph for his victories over the Lucanians. (*Auctor de Viris Illustribus*, in M'. Curio.) This must either have been in the year after his consulship, when he was perhaps prætor, or else in 471, when we know that he was appointed prætor after the defeat and death of L. Cæcilius. 3. But when C. Ælius carried his resolution for a war with the Lucanians, the Lucanian general Statilius had *twice* assailed the Thurians ("bis infestaverat," Pliny *Hist. Natur.* XXXIV. § 32), which I think implies that he had ravaged their lands for two successive years; but the peace with the Samnites was only concluded in the year when Curius was consul; and throughout the war the Lucanians were in alliance with Rome, nor were they likely then to meddle with the Thurians. 4. C. Ælius passed his resolution as tribune: but before the Hortensian laws were carried, such a resolution was not likely to have been brought forward by a tribune, nor would it have been carried had the senate been opposed to it; and had they not been opposed to it, it would have been moved probably by one of the consuls with their authority. 5. There is a C. Ælius recorded in the consular *Fasti*, as having been consul in 468; we do not know whether this is the same person with the tribune; but if he were, his tribuneship as preceding

his consulship must have taken place before the year 468. 6. The date of the Hortensian laws is unknown, but several modern writers place it in the very year 468, when C. Ælius was consul. On the whole, I would arrange these events in the following order:

A. U. C. 464. End of the third Samnite war.

A. U. C. 466, 467. Lucanians attack the Thurians.

A. U. C. 467. The Hortensian laws. C. Ælius, tribune, carries his motion in the assembly of the tribes for a war with the Lucanians.

A. U. C. 468. C. Ælius, consul, chosen perhaps as a reward for his popular conduct in his tribuneship.

A. U. C. 471. M'. Curius prætor. His ovation over the Lucanians.

A. U. C. 472. C. Fabricius consul. He defeats the Lucanians, and raises the siege of Thurii.

If it be thought that this scheme leaves too great an interval between the declaration of war against the Lucanians, and any recorded events of the war, (although in the total absence of all details of this period, this objection is not of much weight,) then we must suppose that C. Ælius the tribune and C. Ælius the consul were different persons; and we might then place the resolution against the Lucanians a year or two later. But it seems more probable that the consul and the tribune were one and the same man, and then I think the above scheme offers fewer difficulties than any other.

been passed also. The power of the assembly of the tribes had been acknowledged to be sovereign, and the popular party for some years from this time, feeling itself to have the disposal of all that the state might conquer, appears to have been as fond of war as ever was the Athenian democracy under Pericles, while the aristocratical party, for once only in the history of Rome, seems to have adopted the peaceful policy of Cimon and Nicias. C. Ælius, one of the tribunes, proposed and carried in the assembly of the tribes what Pliny<sup>8</sup> calls a law against Stenius Statilius<sup>9</sup> the captain-general of the Lucanians; in other words, he moved that war should be declared against Stenius Statilius and all his followers and abettors; and the tribes gave their votes for it accordingly. The people of Thurii voted to Ælius, as a mark of their gratitude, a statue and a crown of gold, and probably a Roman army was sent to their aid, and relieved them from the present danger; but the Lucanians were not subdued, and it was evident that they would not be left to contend against Rome single-handed.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

These events appear to have taken place about six years after the conclusion of the third Samnite war, in the year 470, when C. Servilius Tucca and L. Cæcilius Metellus were consuls. Whatever was

The Tarentines are busy in forming a coalition against Rome.

<sup>8</sup> Histor. Natur. XXXIV. § 32.

<sup>9</sup> It was probably a rogatio to the following effect, "Vellent iuberentne cum Stenio Statilio Lucanorum prætores, quique ejus sectam secuti essent, bellum iniri." If there was a Roman party still

predominant in any part of Lucania, it would explain why the rogatio should have rather specified Statilius personally than declared war against the whole Lucanian people.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

the cause, the Tarentines<sup>10</sup> at this period were most active in forming a new coalition against Rome. They endeavoured to excite the Samnites to renew the war, and the Samnites, with the Lucanians, Apulians, and Bruttians, were to form a confederacy in the south of Italy, of which Tarentum was to be the head. The Romans sent C. Fabricius to the several Samnite and Apulian cities, to persuade them, if possible, to remain true to their alliance with Rome. But the states to whom he was sent laid hands on him and arrested him, and then despatched an embassy with all speed into Etruria, to secure, if possible, the aid of the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls. Fabricius, we may suppose, was made a hostage for the safety of those Samnite hostages who had been demanded by the Romans after the late peace, and his release was probably the stipulated price of theirs.

General  
war. The  
Etruscans  
and Gauls  
besiege Ar-  
retium,  
which re-  
mains faith-  
ful to Rome.

In the following year, 471, the Roman consuls were P. Cornelius Dolabella and Cn. Domitius Calvinus. The storm broke out against Rome in every direction. In the south the Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, and probably the Apulians, were now in a state of declared hostility; while in the north the mass of the Etruscans were in arms, and had engaged<sup>11</sup>, it seems, large bodies of the Senonian Gauls in their service, although the Senonians as a nation still professed to be at peace with Rome. In Arretium, however, the Roman party was still predomi-

<sup>10</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2, and Dion Cassius, *Fragm.* Ursin. CXLIV.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *de Rebus Gallic.* XI. Samnitic. VI.

nant; the Arretines would not join their countrymen against Rome; and accordingly Arretium<sup>12</sup> was besieged by an Etruscan army, of which a large part consisted as we have seen of Gaulish mercenaries.

The new consuls came into office at this period about the middle of April; so that the season for military operations had begun before they could be ready to take the field. Thus L. Cæcilius Metellus, the consul of the preceding year, had been left apparently with his consular army in Etruria during the winter; and when the Etruscans began the siege of Arretium, he marched at once to its relief. According to the usual practice of this period, he was elected prætor for the year following his consulship, and he seems to have just entered upon his new office when he led his army against the enemy. We know nothing of the particulars of the battle, but the result was most disastrous to the Romans<sup>13</sup>. L. Metellus himself, seven military tribunes, and 13,000 men were killed on the field; and the remainder of the army were made prisoners.

The consternation caused by such a disaster at such a moment must have been excessive. M'. Curius Dentatus was appointed prætor in the room of Metellus, and sent off with all haste with a fresh

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 471.  
A.C. 283.

L. Cæcilius Metellus is defeated and slain in a battle near Arretium.

The Gauls massacre the Roman ambassadors.

<sup>12</sup> Polybius, II. 19.

<sup>13</sup> Orosius, III. 22, and Augustine, de Civitate Dei, III. 17. Orosius dedicated his history to Augustine, and the exact similarity of the notices about the defeat of L. Metellus in both writers shows that both are taken from a com-

mon source, which doubtless was Livy. They vary from the account given by Polybius, in representing the murder of the Roman ambassadors as preceding the defeat of Metellus. Appian, copying from Dionysius, agrees with Polybius.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 471.  
A.C. 283.

army to maintain his ground if possible. At the same time an embassy was sent to the Gauls to complain that their people were serving in the armies<sup>14</sup> of the enemies of Rome, while there was peace between the Gauls and Romans, and to demand that the prisoners taken in the late battle might be released. But the Gauls were at once elated and rendered savage by their late victory. The Romans assuredly had not sold their lives cheaply; many brave Gauls had fallen, and amongst the rest one of their noblest chiefs, Britomaris. His son, the young Britomaris, called for vengeance for his father's blood; and the Roman ambassadors, the sacred *feciales* themselves, were murdered by the barbarians, and their bodies hewed in pieces, and the mangled fragments cast out without burial.

Great victories obtained over the Senonian Gauls.

The consul P. Dolabella had already left Rome with the usual consular army, and was on his march into northern Etruria<sup>15</sup>, when he received the tidings of this outrage. Immediately he resolved on vengeance, and instead of advancing into Etruria, he turned to the right, marched through the country of the Sabines into Picenum, and from thence led his army into the territory of the Gauls. The flower of their warriors were absent in Etruria; those who were left, and endeavoured to resist the invaders, were defeated with great slaughter: no quarter was given to any male able to bear arms: the women and children were carried off as slaves, the villages

<sup>14</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragg. VI. Gallic. XI.

<sup>15</sup> Appian, Samnitic. VI. Gallic. XI.



and houses were burnt, and the whole country was made a desert. Meanwhile the Gauls in Etruria, maddened at these horrors, and hoping to enjoy a bloody revenge, urged the Etruscans to seize the opportunity, and to march straight upon Rome. But Cn. Domitius, with the other consular army<sup>16</sup>, was covering the Roman territory; perhaps M'. Curius had joined him, or was hanging on the rear of the enemy during their march through Etruria, and was so at hand to co-operate in the battle. At any rate, the victory of the Romans was complete; and the Gauls who survived the battle slew themselves in despair. It was resolved by the senate to occupy their country without delay, and to plant in it a Roman colony.

These events had passed so rapidly that the season for military operations was not yet nearly at an end. The Boian Gauls<sup>17</sup>, the neighbours of the Senonians, enraged and alarmed at the total extermination of their countrymen, took up arms with the whole force of their nation, poured into Etruria, and encouraged the party adverse to Rome to try the fortune of war once again. What the Samnites and Lucanians were doing at this moment we know not; but probably a prætorian or proconsular army with the whole force of the Campanians, and perhaps of the Marsians and Pelignians, was in the field against them; and after the loss of C. Pontius we hear of no Samnite leader whose ability was equal to the urgency of the

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 471.  
A.C. 283.

And also  
over the  
Boian  
Gauls and  
Etruscans.  
Battle of the  
lake Vadi-  
mon.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, Samnitic. VI. Gallic. XI.

<sup>17</sup> Polybius, II. 20.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 471.  
A.C. 283.

contest. Thus Dolabella and Domitius were enabled to turn their whole attention to the Etruscans and Gauls. Again, however, all details were lost, and we only know that the scene of the decisive action<sup>18</sup> was the valley of the Tiber just below its junction with the Nar, and the neighbourhood of the small lake of Vadimon, which lay in the plain at no great distance from the right bank of the river.

The victory of the Romans was complete<sup>19</sup>; the flower of the Etruscan army perished, while the Gauls suffered so severely that a very few of their number were all that escaped from the field.

A.U.C. 472.  
A.C. 282.

The Gauls  
make peace  
with Rome.

The consuls of the ensuing year were C. Fabricius and Q. Æmilius Papus. Again the Etruscans and Gauls renewed their efforts, but one consular army was now thought enough to oppose to them, and Æmilius alone defeated them utterly, and obliged the Gauls to conclude a separate peace<sup>20</sup>. The Etruscans

<sup>18</sup> Polybius II. 20. Dion Cassius, Mai Scriptor. Vatican t. II. p. 536. Florus, II. 13. The lake Vadimon was esteemed sacred. See Pliny, Epist. VIII. 20, where he gives a description of it.

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, II. 20. One of the fragments of Dion Cassius, published by Mai in his Scriptor. Veter. Vatican. Collect. Vol. II. p. 536, states that Dolabella attacked the Etruscans as they were crossing the Tiber, and that the bodies of the enemy carried down by the stream brought the news of the battle to Rome before the arrival of the consul's messenger. The same story is told of one of the battles fought between Tar-

quinius Priscus and the Sabines; but there at any rate the scene of the action was within a very few miles of Rome. Livy, I. 37.

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, II. 20. It must have been Æmilius who defeated the Gauls, because we know that Fabricius was employed in the south: but the fragments of the Fasti Capitolini for this year contain only thus much:

“ . . . eisque . . . III. Non. Mart.”

Dionysius, however, says expressly that Æmilius the colleague of Fabricius commanded against the Etruscans in this year. XVIII. 5.

who seemed to "like nor peace nor war," would not yet submit; or perhaps some states yielded while others continued the contest; but there remained only the expiring embers of a great fire; and the Roman party in the several cities was gradually gaining the ascendancy, and preparing the way for that lasting treaty which was concluded two years afterwards.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 472.  
A.C. 282.

In the south, C. Fabricius was no less successful. He defeated the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians in several great battles<sup>21</sup>, and penetrated through the enemy's country to the very shores of the Ionian sea, where Thurii was at that very time besieged by Statilius at the head of a Lucanian and Bruttian army. Fabricius defeated the enemy, stormed their camp, and raised the siege of Thurii<sup>22</sup>; for which service the Thuriens expressed their gratitude as they had done two years before to the tribune C. Ælius, by voting that a statue should be made and given to him, to be set up by him in Rome. Thus the coalition which the Tarentines had formed seemed to be broken to pieces, while its authors had

Victories of  
Fabricius in  
the south  
over the Lu-  
canians.

<sup>21</sup> Dionysius, XVIII. 5.

<sup>22</sup> Dionysius, XVIII. 5. Valerius Maximus, I. 8, § 6. Pliny, Hist. Natur. XXXIV. § 32. Mr. Fynes Clinton by mistake refers the account in Valerius Maximus to Fabricius' second consulship in 476. But the mention of the relief of Thurii shows clearly that it belongs to his first consulship.

The story in Valerius Maximus relates a wonderful appearance of a warrior of extraordinary stature,

who led the Romans to the assault of the enemy's camp, and who was not to be found the next day when the consul was going to reward him with a mural crown. This, it was said, was no other than Mars himself, who fought on this day for his people. Compare the story in Herodotus of the gigantic warrior whose mere appearance struck the Athenian Epizelus blind at Marathon, VI. 117.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

A.U.C. 472.  
A.C. 282.

A Roman  
fleet is  
sent to  
cruise on the  
coasts of the  
Tarentines.

not yet drawn the sword, and were still nominally at peace with the Romans.

Fabricius left a garrison in Thurii, and led his army back to Rome with so rich a treasure of spoil<sup>23</sup>, that after having made a liberal distribution of money amongst his soldiers, and returned to all the citizens the amount of the war-taxes which they had paid in that year, he was still able to put four hundred talents into the treasury. In the mean time, as the army was withdrawn from Lucania, a fleet was sent to protect the Thurians, and to watch probably the movements of the Tarentines, whose dispositions must, ere this, have become sufficiently notorious. Accordingly, L. Valerius<sup>24</sup>, one of the two officers annually chosen to conduct the naval affairs of the commonwealth, with a fleet of ten ships of war, sailed on to the eastward of Thurii, and unexpectedly made his appearance before the walls of Tarentum<sup>25</sup>,

<sup>23</sup> Dionysius, XVIII. 16.

<sup>24</sup> Appian calls him "Cornelius," Samnitic. Fragm. VII. Dion Cassius, Fragm. Bekker. e libro IX, calls him "Valerius," and so does Zonaras who copies Dion, VIII. 2.

<sup>25</sup> The harbour of Tarentum was a deep gulf or land-locked basin running far into the land, and communicating with the open sea by a single narrow passage. It is now called the Mare Piccolo. The ancient city formed a triangle, one side of which was washed by the open sea, and another by the waters of the harbour: the base was a wall drawn across from the sea to the harbour, and the point of the triangle came down to the

narrow passage which was the harbour's mouth. Here at the extreme point of the city was the citadel, the site of which is occupied by the modern town. An enemy entering the harbour of Tarentum would therefore be as completely in the heart of the city, as in the great harbour of Syracuse; and Cicero's description will apply even more strongly to Tarentum than to Syracuse; "quo simul atque adisset, non modo a latere sed etiam a tergo magnam partem urbis relinqueret."—Verres, Act. II. V. 38. See Keppel Craven, Tour through the southern provinces of Naples, p. 174, and Gagliardo, Descrizione di Taranto.

and seemed to be preparing to force his way into the harbour.

It was the afternoon<sup>26</sup> of the day, and as it was the season of the Dionysia, when the great dramatic contests took place and the prizes were awarded to the most approved poet, the whole Tarentine people were assembled in the theatre, the seats of which looked directly towards the sea. All saw a Roman fleet of ships of war, in undoubted breach of the treaty existing between the two states, which forbade the Romans to sail to the eastward of the Lacinian headland, attempting to make its way into their harbour. Full of wine, and in the careless spirits of a season of festival, they readily listened to a worthless demagogue named Philocharis, who called upon them to punish instantly the treachery of the Romans, and to save their ships and their city. Wiser citizens might remember, that by the Greek national law, ships of war belonging to a foreign power appearing under the walls of an independent city, in violation of an existing treaty<sup>27</sup>, were liable to be treated as enemies. But explanations and questionings were not thought of now: the Tarentines manned their ships, sailed out to meet the Romans, put them in-

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

A.U.C. 472.  
A.C. 282.

The Tarentines attack and defeat it.

<sup>26</sup> Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Ursin.* CXLV. Zonaras, VIII. 2.

<sup>27</sup> The Corcyreans agreed to receive a single Athenian or Lacedæmonian ship into their harbour, but if a greater number appeared they were to be treated as enemies. Thucyd. III. 71. And when the Athenian expedition coasted along Iapygia on its way to Syracuse,

Tarentum would neither allow them to enter the city, nor even to bring their vessels to shore under the walls. Thucyd VI. 44. So again the Camarinæans, although they had been in alliance with Athens a few years before, refused to admit more than a single ship of the Athenian armament within their harbour. VI. 52.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 472.  
A.C. 282.

stantly to flight, sunk four of their ships without resistance, and took one with all its crew. L. Valerius the duumvir was killed, and of the prisoners, the officers and soldiers serving on board were put to death, and the rowers were sold for slaves.

They expel  
the Romans  
from Thurii.

Thus fully committed, the Tarentines determined to follow up their blow. They taxed the Thurians<sup>28</sup> with preferring barbarian aid to that of Tarentum, a neighbouring and a Greek city, and with bringing a Roman fleet into the Ionian sea. They attacked the town, allowed the Roman garrison to retire unhurt, on condition of their opening the gates without resistance, and having thus become masters of Thurii, they drove the principal citizens into exile, and gave up the property of the city to be plundered.

And insult  
the ambas-  
sadors, who  
are sent to  
demand sa-  
tisfaction for  
these aggres-  
sions.

The Romans immediately sent an embassy to demand satisfaction for all these outrages. L. Postumius was the principal ambassador<sup>29</sup>, and the instant that he and his colleagues landed, they were beset by a disorderly crowd, who ridiculed their foreign dress, the white toga wrapped round the body like a plaid, with its broad scarlet border. At last they were admitted into the theatre, where the people were assembled, but it was again a time of festival,

<sup>28</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragm. VII.

<sup>29</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2. Dion Cassius, Fragm. Ursin. CXLV. Who this L. Postumius was is not known. He may have been one of the Postumii Albinii, although the L. Postumius Albinus, who was consul in 520, was the son and grandson of two Auli Postumii. But it may

have been the consul who had been fined for his mad conduct in 464, for with all his faults he was an able and resolute man, and the ambassadors sent to so great a city as Tarentum were likely to have been men of consular dignity.

and the Tarentines were more disposed to coarse buffoonery and riot than to serious counsel. When Postumius spoke to them in Greek, the assembly broke out into laughter at his pronunciation, and at any mistakes in his language; but the Roman delivered his commission unmoved, gravely and simply, as though he had not so much as observed the insults offered to him. At last a worthless drunkard of known profligacy came up to the Roman ambassador, and purposely threw dirt in the most offensive manner upon his white toga. Postumius said, "We accept the omen; ye shall give us even more than we ask of you," and held up the sullied toga before the multitude, to show them the outrage which he had received. But bursts of laughter pealed from every part of the theatre, and scurril songs, and gestures, and clapping of hands, were the only answer returned to him. "Laugh on," said the Roman, "laugh on while ye may; ye shall weep long enough hereafter, and the stain on this toga shall be washed out in your blood." The ambassadors left Tarentum, and Postumius carefully kept his toga unwashed, that the senate might witness with their own eyes the insult offered to the Roman name.

He returned to Rome with his colleagues late in the spring of the year 473, after the new consuls, L. Æmilius Barbula and Q. Marcius Philippus had already entered upon their office. Even now the Romans were reluctant to enter on a war with Tarentum, whilst they had so many enemies still in arms against them, and the debates in the senate

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 472.  
A.C. 282.

A.U.C. 473.  
A.C. 281.  
The Romans  
declare war  
against the  
Tarentines.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 473.  
A.C. 281.

lasted for several days. It was resolved<sup>30</sup> at last to declare war; but still, when the consuls took the field as usual with their two consular armies, Q. Marcius was sent against the Etruscans, and L. Æmilius was ordered, not immediately to attack Tarentum, but to invade Samnium and subdue the revolted Samnites.

L. Æmilius invades and lays waste the Tarentine territory. Struggles of parties in Tarentum.

But whether the exhausted state of Samnium assured Æmilius that no great danger was to be apprehended there, or whether a prætorian army was sent to keep the Samnites in check, and to leave the consul at liberty for a march into southern Italy, it appears that instructions were sent to L. Æmilius soon after his arrival in Samnium<sup>31</sup>, to advance at once into the territory of Tarentum, and after offer-

<sup>30</sup> Dionysius, XVII. 10. Reiske has made Dionysius say just the contrary to this, by altering *οὔτοι* into *αἱ*. He gives no reason for the alteration, but merely says, "*αἱ* de meo dedi, pro vulg. *οὔτοι*." The old reading, however, is quite correct in grammar, and perfectly intelligible, and seems to be recommended by the general structure of the passage. It may be thought that it is inconsistent with Appian's account, who says that the consul Æmilius was already in Samnium when he received orders to march against the Tarentines (Samnitic. Fragm. VII. 3), whereas Dionysius makes him to have been present in the senate when the question of war or peace was debated; and had immediate war been then resolved upon, would he not, it may be said, have been ordered to attack Tarentum at once, instead of being sent into

Samnium, and receiving a subsequent order to march against Tarentum? This, however, would not necessarily follow; for the senate may have thought it unsafe to hazard an army at the extremity of Italy till measures had been taken to secure it against an attack of the Samnites on its rear. When this was provided for, the consul might safely be ordered to advance upon Tarentum.

<sup>31</sup> The consuls came into office in April, and Æmilius was in the Tarentine territory before the corn was cut, for the Fragment of Dionysius, XVII. 12, clearly relates to this invasion: *ἀρούρας τε ἀκμαίων ἤδη τὸ σιτικὸν θέρος ἐχούσας πυρὶ διδοῦς*. In 1818 Mr. Keppel Craven found the harvest going on briskly a little to the south-west of Tarentum on the 1st of June. —Tour through the southern Provinces of Naples, p. 197.

ing once again the same terms which Postumius had proposed before, to commence hostilities immediately if satisfaction should still be refused. The terms were again rejected by the Tarentines, and Æmilius began to ravage their territory with fire and sword. But knowing that the aristocratical party in Tarentum, as elsewhere, were inclined to look up to Rome for protection, he showed much tenderness to some noble prisoners who fell into his hands<sup>32</sup>, and dismissed them unhurt. Nor did the result disappoint him, for the presence of the Roman army struck terror into the democratical party, while the mildness shown to those who had taken no part in the shameful outrages offered to the Romans, induced moderate men to hope that peace with Rome was a safer prospect for their country than an alliance with Pyrrhus. Agis, one of the aristocratical party, was chosen captain-general, and it was likely that the Tarentines would now in their turn offer that satisfaction which hitherto they had scornfully refused.

But before any thing could be concluded, the popular party regained their ascendancy. An embassy to Pyrrhus king of Epirus had been sent off early in the summer<sup>33</sup>, inviting him over to Italy in the name of all the Italian Greeks, to be their leader against the Romans. All the nations of southern Italy, he was assured, were ready to join his standard; and he would find amongst them a force of 350,000 infan-

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 473.  
A.C. 281.

Pyrrhus is  
invited into  
Italy.

<sup>32</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 13.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

A.U.C. 473.

A.C. 281.

He sends  
over Milo  
to occupy  
the citadel  
of Taren-  
tum. The  
popular  
party reco-  
vers the  
ascendancy.

try, and 20,000 cavalry able to bear arms in the common cause.

Every Greek looked to foreign conquest only as a means of establishing his supremacy over Greece itself, the proudest object of his ambition. Victorious over the Romans<sup>34</sup>, thence easily passing over into Sicily, and from thence again assailing more effectually than Agathocles the insecure dominion of the Carthaginians in Africa, Pyrrhus hoped to return home with an irresistible force of subject allies, to expel Antigonus from Thessaly and Bœotia, and the ruffian Ptolemy Ceraunus from Macedonia, and to reign over Greece and the world, as became the kinsman of Alexander and the descendant of Achilles. He promised to help the Tarentines; but the force needed for such an expedition could not be raised in an instant; and when the invasion of the Roman army, and the probable ascendancy of their political adversaries, made the call of the popular party for his aid more urgent, he sent over Cineas<sup>35</sup>, his favourite minister, to assist his friends by his eloquence and address, and shortly afterwards Milo, one of his generals, followed with a detachment of 3000 men, and was put in possession of the citadel. A political revolution immediately followed<sup>36</sup>; Agis was deprived of his command, and succeeded by one of the popular leaders who had been sent on the embassy to Pyrrhus; all prospect of peace was at an end, and

<sup>34</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 14.

<sup>35</sup> <sup>36</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2.



the democratical party held in their hands the whole government of the commonwealth.

The Tarentines were masters of the sea, and the arrival of an experienced general and a body of veteran soldiers gave a strength to their land-forces, which in numbers were in themselves considerable. Winter was approaching, and Æmilius proposed to retreat into Apulia, to put his army into winter-quarters in those mild and sunny plains. He was followed by the enemy<sup>37</sup>, and as his road lay near the sea, the Tarentine fleet prepared to overwhelm him with its artillery, as his army wound along the narrow road between the mountain sides and the water. Æmilius, it is said, put some of his Tarentine prisoners in the parts of his line of march most exposed to the enemy's shot, and as the Tarentines would not butcher their helpless countrymen, they allowed the Romans to pass by unmolested. The Roman army wintered in Apulia, and both parties had leisure to prepare their best efforts for the struggle of the coming spring.

It was still the depth of winter<sup>38</sup> when Pyrrhus himself arrived at Tarentum. His fleet had been dispersed by a storm on the passage, and he himself had been obliged to disembark on the Messapian coast with only a small part of his army, and to proceed to Tarentum by land. After a time, however, his scattered ships reached their destination safely,

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

A.U.C. 473.  
A.C. 231.  
The Roman  
army re-  
treats from  
the Taren-  
tine terri-  
tory.

Pyrrhus ar-  
rives at  
Tarentum.  
His strict  
discipline is  
irksome to  
the Taren-  
tines.

<sup>37</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2. Frontinus, Pyrrh. 15, 16. Appian, Samnitic. Strategem. I. 4, § 1.

<sup>38</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 2. Plutarch,

Pyrrh. 15, 16. Appian, Samnitic. Fragg. VIII.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

A.U.C. 473.  
A.C. 281.

and he found himself powerful enough to act as the master rather than the ally of the Tarentines. He shut up the theatre, the public walks, and the gymnasium, obliged the citizens to be under arms all day, either on the walls or in the market-place, and stopped the feasts of their several clubs or brotherhoods, and all revelry and all riotous entertainments throughout the city. Many of the citizens, as impatient of this discipline as the Ionians of old when Dionysius of Phocæa tried in vain to train them to a soldier's duties, left the city in disgust; but Pyrrhus, to prevent this for the future, placed a guard at the gates, and allowed no one to go out without his permission. It is farther said that his soldiers were guilty of great excesses towards the inhabitants, and that he himself put to death some of the popular leaders, and sent others over to Epirus; and this last statement is probable enough, for the idle and noisy demagogues of a corrupt democracy would soon repent of their invitation to him, when they experienced the rigour of his discipline; and if they indulged in any inflammatory speeches to the multitude, Pyrrhus would consider such conduct as treasonable, and would no doubt repress it with the most effectual severity.

Amount of  
the forces  
of Pyrrhus.

So passed the winter at Tarentum. But the Italian allies, overawed perhaps by the Roman army in Apulia, were slow in raising their promised contingents<sup>39</sup>, and Pyrrhus did not wish to commence

<sup>39</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 16.

offensive preparations till his whole force was assembled. What number of men he had brought with him or received since his landing from Greece itself, it is not easy to estimate: 3000 men crossed at first under Milo; the king himself embarked with 20,000 foot, 3000 horse<sup>40</sup>, 2000 archers, 500 slingers, and 20 elephants, and Ptolemy Ceraunus is said to have lent him for two years the services of 5000 Macedonian foot, 4000 horse, and 50 elephants<sup>41</sup>. The Macedonian foot may have been included in the 20,000 men whom he himself brought into Italy, the cavalry and elephants of course cannot have been so, if the numbers are correctly given; but we find his cavalry afterwards spoken of as amounting only to 3000, and we can hardly think that he had at any time so many as 70 elephants. Some deductions must also be made in all probability for losses sustained by shipwreck, when the armament was dispersed by a storm in its passage. Yet still the Greek army with which Pyrrhus was ready to take the field from Tarentum in the spring of the year 474, must have been more numerous, both in foot, horse, and elephants, than that with which Hannibal, about sixty years later, issued from the Alps upon the plain of Cisalpine Gaul.

The Romans, on their part, finding that not Tarentum only, but so great a king and good a soldier as Pyrrhus was added to their numerous enemies, made

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 473.  
A.C. 281.

<sup>40</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 15. Zonaras agrees as to the number of elephants; of the numbers of the infantry and cavalry he gives no account.

<sup>41</sup> Justin, XVII. 2.

A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.  
And of the  
Romans.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

extraordinary exertions to meet the danger. Even the proletarians<sup>42</sup>, or the poorest class of citizens, who were usually exempt from military service, were now called out and embodied, and these probably formed a great part of the reserve army kept near Rome for the defence of the city. The new consuls were P. Valerius Lævinus and Ti. Coruncanius, of whom the latter was to command one consular army against the Etruscans, while the former was to oppose Pyrrhus in the south. No mention is made of the army of L. Æmilius, which had wintered in Apulia, so that we do not know whether it joined that of Lævinus, or was employed to watch the doubtful fidelity of the Apulians, and to prevent the Samnites from joining the enemy's army. We learn accidentally<sup>43</sup>, that a Campanian legion was placed in garrison at Rhegium, and other important towns were no doubt secured also with a sufficient force; but the whole disposition of the Roman armies in this great campaign cannot be known, from the scantiness of our remaining information respecting it.

State of the  
allies of  
Rome.

It is briefly stated in the narrative of Zonaras<sup>44</sup> that the Romans chastised some of their allies who were meditating a revolt, and that some citizens of Præneste were suddenly arrested and sent to Rome, where they were imprisoned in the vaults of the ærarium on the Capitol, and afterwards put to death. If even the Latin city of Præneste could waver in its fidelity, what was to be expected from the more

<sup>42</sup> Orosius, IV. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Orosius, IV. 3. Polybius, I. 7.

<sup>44</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 3.

remote and more recent allies of Rome, from the Vestinians, Marsians, Pelignians, Sabines, and even from the Campanians, whose faith in the second Samnite war, little more than thirty years before, had been found so unstable? Yet one of the consuls for this year, Ti. Coruncanius, was a native of Tusculum, and those Latin, Volscian, and Æquian towns which had received the full rights of Roman citizenship were incorporated thereby so thoroughly into the Roman nation, that no circumstances could rend them asunder. Still the senate thought it best on every ground to keep the war, if possible, at a distance from their own territory, and Lævinus therefore marched into Lucania, to separate Pyrrhus from his allies, and to force him to a battle whilst he had only his own troops and the Tarentines to bring into the field.

“Lævinus,” says Zonaras<sup>45</sup>, “took a strong fortress in Lucania, and having left a part of his army to overawe the Lucanians, he advanced with the remainder against Pyrrhus.” Yet Pyrrhus after all, fought, we are told, with an inferior army<sup>46</sup>; nor indeed can we conceive that so able a general would have exposed himself to the unavoidable disadvantage of seeming to dread an encounter with the enemy, had the number of his troops been equal to theirs. But a Roman consular army never contained more than 20,000 foot soldiers, and 2400 horse; and the army which Pyrrhus brought with him from

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

Lævinus,  
the Roman  
consul,  
marches  
against  
Pyrrhus.

<sup>45</sup> VIII. 3.

<sup>46</sup> Justin, XVIII. 1.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

Epirus was more numerous than this, without reckoning the Tarentines, and allowing that Milo and his detachment of 3000 men still garrisoned the citadel of Tarentum. It is clear then, either that Lævinus had taken with him the whole or the greater part of the consular army which had wintered in Apulia, or that a prætorian army had marched under his command from the neighbourhood of Rome, so that his force cannot be estimated at less than 30,000 foot and 3600 horse.

Pyrrius  
endeavours  
to gain time  
till his allies  
should have  
joined him.

Pyrrius not thinking himself strong enough to meet the enemy with the army actually at his disposal, endeavoured to gain time by negotiation. He wrote to Lævinus<sup>47</sup>, offering his mediation between the Romans and his Italian allies, and saying that he would wait ten days for the consul's answer. But his offer was scornfully rejected; and, in the same spirit, when one of his spies was detected in the Roman camp, Lævinus is said to have allowed the spy to observe his whole army on their usual parade<sup>48</sup>, and then to have sent him back unharmed, with a taunting message, that if Pyrrius wished to know the nature of the Roman army, he had better not send others to spy it out secretly, but he should come himself in open day, and see it and prove it.

The Ro-  
mans attack  
him.  
BATTLE OF  
HERACLEA.

Thus provoked, or more probably fearing to lose the confidence of his allies, if he should seem to have crossed the sea only to lie inactive in Tarentum, Pyrrius with his own army and with the Tarentines

<sup>47</sup> Dionysius, XVII. 15, 16.

<sup>48</sup> Dionysius, XVIII. 1. Zonaras, VIII. 3.

took the field and advanced towards the enemy. The Romans lay encamped on the right or southern bank of the Siris not far from the sea, and Pyrrhus having crossed the Aciris between the towns of Pandosia and Heraclea, encamped in the plain<sup>49</sup> which lies between the two rivers, and which was favourable at once for the operations of his heavy infantry, and for his cavalry and elephants. A nearer view of the strength of the Roman army determined him still to delay the battle, and he stationed a detachment of troops on the bank of the Siris, to obstruct, if possible, the passage of the stream. But the river, though wide, is shallow<sup>50</sup>, and while the legions prepared to cross directly in front of the enemy, the cavalry<sup>51</sup> passed above and below, so that the Greeks, afraid of being surrounded, were obliged to fall back towards their main body. Pyrrhus then gave orders to his infantry to form in order of battle in the middle of the plain, while he himself rode forward with his cavalry, in hopes of attacking the Romans before they should have had time to form after their passage of the river. But he found the long shields of the legionary soldiers advancing in an even line

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 289.

<sup>49</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 16. At present a thick forest covers the western part of this plain, extending along the left bank of the Siris for several miles upwards from its mouth, as far as the point where the hills begin. See Keppel Craven, p. 203, and Zannoni's map. But in ancient times it is probable that the whole plain between the two rivers was open, and mostly

corn land. The plain rises in a gradual slope from Policoro, supposed to be the site of the ancient Heraclea, for about three miles, and is for the most part highly cultivated.

<sup>50</sup> Keppel Craven, p. 204. Mr. Keppel Craven forded it below the point where the Roman army effected its passage.

<sup>51</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 16.

CHAP.  
XXXV I  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

from the stream, and their cavalry in front ready to receive his attack. He charged instantly, but the Romans and their allies, although their arms were very unequal to those of the Greek horsemen, maintained the fight most valiantly, and a Frentanian captain<sup>52</sup> was seen to mark Pyrrhus himself so eagerly, that one of his officers noticed it, and advised the king to beware of that barbarian on the black horse with white feet. Pyrrhus, whose personal prowess was not unworthy of his hero-ancestry, replied, "What is fated, Leonatus, no man can avoid; but neither this man nor the stoutest soldier in Italy shall encounter with me for nothing." At that instant, the Frentanian rode at Pyrrhus with his levelled lance, and killed his horse; but his own was killed at the same instant, and while Pyrrhus was remounted instantly by his attendants, the brave Italian was surrounded and slain.

Panic occasioned by the supposed death of Pyrrhus.

Finding that his cavalry could not decide the battle, Pyrrhus at length ordered his infantry to advance and attack the line of the Roman legions<sup>53</sup>. He himself, knowing the importance of his own life to an army in which his personal ascendancy was all in all, gave his own arms, and helmet, and scarlet cloak to Megacles, one of the officers of his guard, and himself put on those of the officer in exchange. But Megacles bought his borrowed splendour dearly:

<sup>52</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 16. Dionysius, XVIII. 2—4. Part of this story of the Frentanian captain has been copied by Plutarch from Dionysius, but he has some other

particulars which are not to be found in Dionysius, and which he got probably from Hieronymus.

<sup>53</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 17.

every Roman marked him, and at last he was struck down and slain, and his helmet and mantle carried to Lævinus, and borne along the Roman ranks in triumph. Pyrrhus feeling that this mistake was most dangerous, rode bareheaded along his line to show his soldiers that he was still alive; and the battle went on so furiously that either army seven times<sup>51</sup>, it is said, drove the enemy from the ground, and seven times was driven from its own.

Lævinus, true to the tactic of his country, proposed to win the battle by keeping back his last reserve<sup>55</sup> till all the enemy's forces were in action. His triarii it seems were already engaged, and their long spears might enable them to encounter, on something like equal terms, the pikes of the phalanx; but Lævinus held back a chosen body of his cavalry, hoping that

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

The Romans are  
defeated and  
their camp  
taken.

<sup>54</sup> Τροπὰς ἑπτὰ λέγεται φεύγοντων ἀνάπαλιν καὶ διωκόντων γενέσθαι. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 17. From this and other circumstances related of this battle, it appears certain that only a very small part of Pyrrhus' infantry could have had the arms and array of the regular phalanx. For as the ground was open and level, and the two armies met front and front, if Pyrrhus' heavy-armed infantry had been numerous, they must have had the same advantage which the phalanx had at Cynocephalæ and at Pydna as long as it kept its line unbroken; and the Roman infantry could not have maintained the contest. While, on the other hand, if the phalanx did not keep its order, so that the Romans were able to penetrate it in several places, then they would have ob-

tained an easy victory, as the phalanx when once broken became wholly helpless. But it would seem that the Greek infantry in this battle consisted mostly of peltastæ, or troops not formed in the close array of the phalanx: such were the Epirots generally, and such would be also the Ætolians and Illyrians, some of whom it is said [Dion Cassius, Fragm. Peiresc. XXXIX.] were serving at this time in Pyrrhus' army. Thus the infantry in both armies were armed and formed in a manner not very different from each other; and this would account for the length and obstinacy of the action, and the number of slain on both sides.

<sup>55</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 3. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 17.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

their charge might at last decide the day. They did charge, but Pyrrhus met them with a reserve still more formidable, his elephants. The Roman horses could not be brought to face monsters strange and terrible alike to them and to their riders; they fell back in confusion—the infantry were disordered by their flight; and Pyrrhus then charged with his Thesalian cavalry, and totally routed the whole Roman army. The vanquished fled over the Siris<sup>56</sup>, but did not attempt to defend their camp, which Pyrrhus entered without opposition. They retreated to a city in Apulia<sup>57</sup>, which Niebuhr supposes must have been Venusia, with a loss variously estimated as usual by different writers<sup>58</sup>, but sufficient at any rate to cripple their army, and to leave Pyrrhus undisputed master of the field.

Effects of  
the victory.

His Italian allies now joined him<sup>59</sup>; and though

<sup>56</sup> The destruction of the Roman army was prevented, according to Orosius, by an accident. One Minucius, a soldier of the fourth legion, cut off with his sword the trunk of one of the elephants; which made the animal turn, and run back upon his own army. The confusion and delay thus occasioned enabled the Romans to escape over the Siris with the bulk of their army. Orosius, IV. 1.

<sup>57</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 3.

<sup>58</sup> Hieronymus, a contemporary, who in his account of the loss sustained in the battle of Asculum is known to have copied Pyrrhus' own commentaries, makes the Roman loss in the first battle to have amounted to 7000 men, and that of Pyrrhus to less than 4000. Dionysius stated the Roman loss

at 15,000 and that of Pyrrhus at 13,000, copying probably from the exaggerated accounts of some of the Roman annalists, perhaps from Valerius Antias himself. See Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 17. Orosius, copying from Livy, who in his turn probably followed Fabius, reckons the Roman loss at 11,880 killed, and 310 prisoners; while of their cavalry 243 were killed and 802 taken. He says also that twenty-two standards were taken. But what is curious, and which shows that neither he himself nor Livy could have at all consulted the Greek writers on this war, he asserts that of the loss on Pyrrhus' side no record had been preserved.

<sup>59</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 3. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 17.



he complained of the tardiness of their aid, he distributed to them a share of the spoils of his victory. The allies of Rome began to waver; and the Roman garrisons in distant cities, cut off from relief, were placed in extreme jeopardy. The Locrians rose upon the garrison of their city, and opened their gates to Pyrrhus<sup>60</sup>. At Rhegium<sup>61</sup> the garrison, which consisted of the eighth legion, composed of Campanian soldiers, acted like the garrison of Enna, in similar circumstances in the second Punic war: they anticipated the inhabitants by a general massacre of all the male citizens, and made slaves of the women and children. For this alone they might have received reward rather than punishment from the Roman government; and the Roman annalists would have pleaded necessity as a sanction for the act. But the Campanians, looking to the example of their Mamertine countrymen on the other side of the strait, and thinking that Rome was in no condition to enforce their allegiance any more, held the city in their own name, and refused to obey the consul's orders. Thus Rhegium, no less than Locri, was for the present lost to the Romans.

Pyrrhus, however, had not won his victory cheaply. Nearly four thousand of his men had fallen, and amongst these a large proportion of his best officers and personal friends; for the Greek loss must have fallen heavily on the cavalry, and when the king exposed his own life so freely, those immediately

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.  
The Roman  
garrison  
seizes Rhe-  
gium and  
massacres  
the inha-  
bitants.

Pyrrhus  
resolves to  
send an em-  
bassy to  
Rome.

<sup>60</sup> Justin, XVIII. 1.

Dion Cassius, Fragm. Peiresc. XL.

<sup>61</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragm. IX.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

about his person must have suffered in an unusual proportion. The weather also, if we may trust some stories in Orosius<sup>62</sup>, was very unfavourable, and the state of the roads may have retarded the advance of the victorious army, and particularly of the elephants. Besides, so complete a victory, won by Pyrrhus with his own army alone, before the mass of his allies had joined him, might dispose the Romans to peace without the risk of a second battle. Accordingly, whilst the army advanced slowly from the shores of the Ionian Sea towards central Italy, Cineas was sent to Rome with the king's terms of peace and alliance<sup>63</sup>.

He proposes  
terms of  
peace.

The conditions offered were these:—peace, friendship, and alliance between Pyrrhus and the Romans<sup>64</sup>; but the Tarentines were to be included in it, and all the Greek states in Italy were to be free and independent. Further, the king's Italian allies, the Lucanians, Samnites, Apulians, and Bruttians, were to recover all towns and territories which they had lost in war to the Romans. If these terms were agreed to, the king would restore to the Romans all the prisoners whom he had taken without ransom.

<sup>62</sup> Orosius, IV. 1. One of the Roman foraging parties soon after the battle was overtaken by so dreadful a storm, that thirty-four men were knocked down, and twenty-two left nearly dead; and many oxen and horses were killed or maimed.

<sup>63</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragg. X. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 18.

<sup>64</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragg. X.

These terms showed sufficient respect on the part of Pyrrhus for the power and resolution of the Romans; but they would not satisfy the Roman vanity, and accordingly, Plutarch says that "the king merely asked for peace for himself and indemnity for the Tarentines, and offered to aid the Romans in conquering Italy." Pyrrh. 18.

Cineas, the ambassador of Pyrrhus on this memorable occasion, was in the versatility and range of his talents worthy of the best ages of Greece. He was a Thessalian<sup>65</sup>, and in his early youth he had heard Demosthenes speak; and the impression made on his mind by the great orator was supposed to have enkindled in him a kindred spirit of eloquence: the tongue of Cineas, it was said, had won more cities than the sword of Pyrrhus. Like Themistocles, he was gifted with an extraordinary memory; the very day after his arrival at Rome, he was able to address all the senators<sup>66</sup> and the citizens of the equestrian order by their several proper names. He had studied philosophy, like all his educated countrymen, and appears to have admired particularly the new doctrine of Epicurus<sup>67</sup>; which taught that war and state affairs were but toil and trouble, and that the wise man should imitate the blissful rest of the gods, who, dwelling in their own divinity, regarded not the vain turmoil of this lower world. Yet his life was better than his philosophy; he served his king actively and faithfully in peace and in war, and he wrote a military work<sup>68</sup>, for which he neither wanted ability nor practical knowledge. He excited no small attention as he went to Rome, and

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.  
Cineas sent  
as his am-  
bassador.

<sup>65</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 14.

<sup>66</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natur.* VII. § 88.

<sup>67</sup> Cicero, *de Senectut.* 13. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 20.

<sup>68</sup> At least Cicero in writing to Pætus says, "Plane nesciebam te tam peritum esse rei militaris.

Pyrrhi te libros et Cineæ video lectitasse." *Ad Familiar.* IX. 25. Now the commentaries of Pyrrhus are referred to by Plutarch, and it would seem therefore that the allusion to the writings of Cineas is also to be taken literally.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

his sayings at the places through which he passed were remembered and recorded<sup>69</sup>. Some stories said that he was the bearer of presents to the influential senators, and of splendid dresses<sup>70</sup> to win the favour of their wives; all which, as the Roman traditions related, were steadily refused. But his proposals required grave consideration, and there were many in the senate who thought that the state of affairs made it necessary to accept them.

Appius  
Claudius is  
led to the  
senate, and  
speaks  
against the  
peace.

Appius Claudius, the famous censor, the greatest of his countrymen in the works of peace, and no mean soldier in time of need, was now, in the thirtieth year after his censorship, in extreme old age, and had been for many years blind. But his active mind triumphed over age and infirmity; and although he no longer took part in public business, yet he was ready<sup>71</sup> in his own house to give answers to those who consulted him on points of law, and his name was fresh in all men's minds, though his person was not seen in the forum. The old man heard that the senate was listening to the proposals of Cineas, and was likely to accept the king's terms of peace. He immediately desired to be carried to the senate-house, and was borne in a litter by his slaves through the forum. When it was known that Appius Claudius was coming, his sons and sons-in-law<sup>72</sup> went out

<sup>69</sup> At Aricia on the Appian Way. Cineas had remarked the luxuriance of the vines, as they festooned on the very summits of the elms, and at the same time complained of the harshness of the wine,—“The mother which bore

this wine well deserves,” he said, “to be hung on so high a gibbet.” Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* XIV. § 12.

<sup>70</sup> Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 18.

<sup>71</sup> Cicero, *de Senectut.* 6. 11. *Tusculan. Disp.* V. 38.

<sup>72</sup> Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 18. He had

to the steps of the senate-house to receive him, and he was by them led in to his place. The whole senate kept the deepest silence as the old man arose to speak.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

No Englishman can have read thus far without remembering the scene in all points so similar, which took place within our fathers' memory in our own house of parliament. We recollect how the greatest of English statesmen, bowed down by years and infirmity like Appius, but roused like him by the dread of approaching dishonour to the English name, was led by his son and son-in-law into the house of lords, and all the peers with one impulse arose to receive him. We know the expiring words of that mighty voice, when he protested against the dismemberment of this ancient monarchy, and prayed that if England must fall, she might fall with honour. The real speech of Lord Chatham against yielding to the coalition of France and America, will give a far more lively image of what was said by the blind Appius in the Roman senate, than any fictitious oration which I could either copy from other writers, or endeavour myself to invent; and those who would wish to know how Appius spoke should read the dying words of the great orator of England.

Similar scene in English history.

When he had finished his speech, the senate voted that the proposals of Pyrrhus should be rejected, that

The senate rejects the terms proposed.

four sons and five daughters, but how many of his daughters were married, we know not. See Cicero de Senect. 11. A speech was extant in Cicero's time purporting to be that which Appius spoke on this occasion. De Senectut. 6. Brutus, 16. But Cicero does not seem to have regarded it as genuine.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

no peace<sup>73</sup> should be concluded with him so long as he remained in Italy, and that Cineas should be ordered to leave Rome on that very day.

And pre-  
pare vigor-  
ously for  
war.

Even whilst the senate had been considering the king's proposals, there had been no abatement of the vigour of their preparations for war. Two new legions<sup>74</sup>, which must have been at least the ninth and tenth in number, were raised while Cineas was at Rome by voluntary enlistment, proclamation being made, that whoever wished to offer his services to supply the place of the soldiers who had fallen in battle, should enrol himself immediately. Niebuhr supposes that this was the period of P. Cornelius Rufinus' dictatorship, and that he superintended the recruiting of the armies. The new legions were sent to reinforce Lævinus, who, as Pyrrhus began to advance northwards, followed him hanging upon his rear, but not venturing to engage in a second battle.

Pyrrhus ad-  
vances into  
Campania.

Cineas returned to the king, to tell him that he must hope for nothing from negotiation. He ex-

<sup>73</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 19. Appian, Samnitic. X. 2. Zonaras, VIII. 4.

<sup>74</sup> Appian Samnitic. X. 3. The Campanian legion which garrisoned Rhegium had been the eighth. Orosius, IV. 3. But perhaps, the proletarians raised to form the army of reserve had already formed a ninth and tenth legion, in which case those now raised would be the eleventh and twelfth. We can account for four legions in the two consular armies, two more under the proconsul L. Æmilius; one or two, we know not which, forming the reserve army under the walls of Rome,

and one in garrison at Rhegium. The legions of Lævinus had suffered so greatly in the battle that their numbers were no doubt very incomplete; but the reinforcements formed two fresh legions, and did not merely serve to recruit the old ones, as appears both by Appian's express language, and also by what is afterwards said of the punishment of the legions which had fought on the Siris, for it would have been very hard to have involved in their sentence the newly-raised soldiers who had no share in the defeat.

pressed, according to the writers<sup>75</sup> whom we are obliged to follow, the highest admiration of all that he had seen. "To fight with the Roman people was like fighting with the hydra, so inexhaustible were their numbers and their spirit." "Rome was a city of generals, nay rather of kings," or according to another and more famous version of the story, "The city was like a temple, the senate was an assembly of kings." Did we find these expressions recorded by Hieronymus of Cardia, who wrote before Rome was the object of universal flattery, we might believe them; but from the later Greek writers they deserve no more credit, than if reported merely by the Romans themselves; and nothing is more suspicious than such statements of the language of admiration proceeding from the mouth of an enemy. But be this as it may, Pyrrhus now resolved to prosecute the war with vigour. At the head of a large army<sup>76</sup>, for the Italian allies had now joined him, he advanced through Lucania and Samnium into Campania. The territory of the allies of Rome had now for some years been free from the ravages of war<sup>77</sup>, and its scattered houses, its flourishing cultivation, and luxuriant fruit trees, were a striking contrast to the wasted appearance of Samnium and Lucania. All was ravaged and plundered without mercy, by the Italians in revenge, by the Greeks to enrich

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

<sup>75</sup> Plutarch, in Pyrrh. 19. Ap-  
pian, Samnit. X. 3. Florus, I. 18.  
Dion Cassius apud Maium,  
Script. Veter. Collect. tom. II. p.  
538.

<sup>76</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 4. Eutro-  
pius, II. Florus, I. 18.

<sup>77</sup> Dion Cassius, Fragm. 50.  
Script. Veter. Collect.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

themselves and force their enemy to submission, but in some instances it only provoked a firmer resistance, and Neapolis and Capua<sup>78</sup> were attacked, but refused to surrender, nor could Pyrrhus make himself master of either of them.

And  
through the  
Hernican  
country. He  
takes Præ-  
neste, and  
advances  
within eigh-  
teen miles  
of Rome.

From Campania he ascended the valley of the Liris, and followed the Latin road towards Rome. Fregellæ<sup>79</sup>, wrested formerly from the Volscians by the Samnites, and the occupation of which by the Romans had led to the second Samnite war, now yielded to the Greek conqueror. The Hernicans, who, under the name of Roman citizens, without the right of suffrage, were in fact no better than Roman subjects, received Pyrrhus readily, and Anagnia<sup>80</sup>, their principal city, opened its gates to him. Still advancing, he at last looked out upon the plain of Rome from the opening in the mountains under Præneste; and Præneste itself<sup>81</sup>, with its almost impregnable citadel, fell into his hands, for the Prænestines remembered the execution of their principal citizens a few months before, and longed for vengeance. Præneste is barely twenty-four miles distant from Rome, but Pyrrhus advanced yet six miles farther<sup>82</sup>, and from the spot where the road descends from the last roots of the mountains to the wide

<sup>78</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 4.

<sup>79</sup> Florus, I. 18.

<sup>80</sup> Appian, Samnitic. X. 3.

<sup>81</sup> Florus, I. 18. Eutropius, II.

<sup>82</sup> "Milliario ab urbe octavo-decimo." Eutropius. If this statement is correct, Pyrrhus must

have passed beyond Zagarolo, and reached the spot where the road descends to the level of the Campagna, close by what is called the lake of Regillus, and just at the junction of the modern road from La Colonna. (Labici.)

level of the Campagna he cast his eyes upon the very towers of the city.

One march more would have brought him under the walls of Rome, where, as he hoped, there was nothing to oppose him but the two legions, which at the beginning of the campaign had been reserved for the defence of the capital. But at this moment he was informed that the whole Etruscan nation had concluded a peace<sup>83</sup> with Rome, and Ti. Coruncanus with his consular army was returned from Etruria, and had joined the army of reserve. At the same time Lævinus was hanging on his rear, and before he could enter Rome, both consuls would be able to combine their forces, and he would have to deal with an army of eight or nine Roman legions, and an equal number of their Latin and other allies. Besides his own army was feeling the usual evils of a force composed of the soldiers of different nations; the Italians complained of the Greeks<sup>84</sup>, and charged them with plundering the territory of friends and foes alike; the Greeks treated the Italians with arrogance, as if in themselves alone lay the whole strength of the confederacy. Pyrrhus retreated, loaded with plunder, and returned to Campania; Lævinus fell back before him, but it is said that when Pyrrhus<sup>85</sup> was going to attack him, and ordered his soldiers to raise their battle cry, and the Greeks to strike their spears against their brazen shields,

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

The Etruscans suddenly make peace with Rome, and the second consular army is employed against Pyrrhus. He retreats to Campania.

<sup>83</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 4. See also Appian, X. 3, although his statement is not quite accurate as to time.

<sup>84</sup> Dion Cassius, Fragn. 50. Script. Veter. Collect.

<sup>85</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 4. Dion Cassius, Fragn. LI.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

and when the elephants, excited by their drivers, uttered at the same time their fearful roarings, the Roman army answered with a shout so loud and cheerful, that he did not venture to bring on an action. Neither party made any further attempt at active operations; the Samnites and Lucanians wintered in their own countries, Pyrrhus himself returned to Tarentum, and the Romans remained within their own frontiers<sup>86</sup>, excepting only the legions which had been beaten in the first battle, and which were ordered to remain in the field during the winter in the enemy's country, with no other supplies than such as they could win by their own swords.

A Roman  
embassy  
sent to Pyrrhus. His  
interview  
with Fabricius.

As soon as the campaign was over, the senate despatched an embassy to Pyrrhus, to request that he would either allow them to ransom his Roman prisoners, or that he would exchange them for an equal number of Tarentines and others of his allies who were prisoners at Rome<sup>87</sup>. The ambassadors sent to Pyrrhus were C. Fabricius, Q. Æmilius, and P. Dola-

<sup>86</sup> Frontinus, *Strategem.* IV. 1, § 24. The name of the place to which Lævinus' army was sent is corrupt. Oudendorp and the Bipont edition read "Firmum," which of course must be wrong, as Firmum was far away from the seat of war. Niebuhr conjectures Samnium or Ferentinum, supposing that Ferentinum the Hernican town had revolted, and that these legions were employed in reducing it. But nothing can be decided with certainty.

<sup>87</sup> Appian, *Samnitic.* *Fragm.* X. 4, 5. The names of the Roman ambassadors, and long speeches

put into the mouths of Pyrrhus and of Fabricius, are to be found in the fragments of Dionysius, XVIII. 5—26. The famous anecdotes, how Fabricius was neither to be bribed by the king's money, nor frightened by the sudden sight of one of his elephants, which at a signal given stretched out its trunk immediately over his head, are given by Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 20. Speeches of Pyrrhus and of Fabricius in answer, declining the king's offers, are also preserved in the Vatican Fragments of Dion Cassius, LIII. LIV.



bella, all of them men of the highest distinction, but Fabricius was the favourite hero of Roman tradition, and the stories of this embassy spoke of him alone. That Pyrrhus was struck with the circumstance of his being at once so eminent among his countrymen, and yet so simple in his habits, and even, according to a king's standard of wealth, so poor, is perfectly probable: he may have asked him to enter into his service, for the Greeks of that age thought it no shame to serve a foreign king; and if the Thessalian Cineas was his minister, he could not suppose that a similar office would be refused by the barbarian Fabricius. It was the misfortune of Pyrrhus to live in a state of society where patriotism was become impossible; the Greek commonwealths were so fallen, and their inner life so exhausted, that they could inspire their citizens neither with respect nor with attachment, and the military monarchies founded by Alexander's successors could know no deeper feeling than personal regard for the reigning monarch; loyalty to his line could not yet have existed, and love for the nation under a foreign despotism is almost a contradiction. In Rome, on the other hand, the state and its institutions were in their first freshness and vigour, and so surpassed any individual distinction, that no private citizen could have thought of setting his own greatness on a level with that of his country, and the world could offer to him nothing so happy and so glorious as to live and die a Roman. But the particular anecdotes recorded of the king and Fabricius are so ill

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 474.  
A.C. 280.

attested and so suspicious, and the speeches ascribed to them both are so manifestly the mere invention of the writers of a later age, that I have thought it best to exclude them from this history, and merely to give a slight mention of them in a note, on account of their great celebrity.

His generous treatment of the Roman prisoners.

Pyrrhus would neither ransom nor exchange his prisoners, unless the Romans would accept the terms of peace proposed to them by Cineas<sup>88</sup>. But to show how little he wished to treat them with harshness, he allowed Fabricius to take them all back with him to Rome to pass the Saturnalia, their winter holydays, at their several homes, on a solemn promise that they would return to him when the holydays were over, if the senate still persisted in refusing peace. The senate did persist in its refusal, and the prisoners returned to Pyrrhus; the punishment of death having been denounced by the Roman government against any prisoner who should linger in Rome beyond the day fixed for their return. And thus both parties prepared to try the fortune of war once again.

A.U.C. 475.  
A.C. 279.

Second campaign. Both consuls are opposed to Pyrrhus in Apulia.

The new consuls were P. Sulpicius Saverrio, whose father had been consul in the last year of the second Samnite war, and P. Decius Mus, the son of the Decius who had devoted himself at Sentinum, and

<sup>88</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragm. X. 4, 5. Zonaras, following Dion Cassius, and Dionysius also, place at this period the free release of all the Roman prisoners by Pyrrhus without ransom. And so also

does the epitome of Livy, XIII. Plutarch agrees with Appian, and their account is so much the more probable of the two that I have not hesitated to follow it.

the grandson of him who had devoted himself in the great battle with the Latins. The legions required for the campaign were easily raised<sup>89</sup>, every citizen being eager to serve in such a season of danger, and C. Fabricius acted as lieutenant to one of the consuls; but beyond this we know nothing of the number or disposition of the Roman armies, nor of their plan of operations, nor of the several generals employed in different quarters. Nor do we know whether any of the places which had revolted to Pyrrhus during his advance upon Rome, continued still to adhere to him after his retreat; nor, if they did, how much time and what forces were required to subdue them. We are only told that Pyrrhus took the field in Apulia, and reduced several places in that quarter<sup>90</sup>; and that he was employed in besieging Asculum when both consuls with their two consular armies advanced to relieve it and to offer him battle.

The ancient Asculum, if its site was exactly the same with that of the modern Ascoli, stood on a hill of inconsiderable size<sup>91</sup> on the edge of the plains of Apulia; but geologically speaking it belongs to the plains, for the hill is composed only of beds of sand and clay, and the range of the limestone mountains sweeps round it at some distance on the west and south. The country is for the most part open, and must have been favourable for the operations of the

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 475.  
A.C. 279.

Preparations  
for battle on  
both sides.

<sup>89</sup> Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Vatic.* LV. Orosius, IV. 1.

<sup>90</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 4.

<sup>91</sup> See Dr. Daubeny's *Excursion to Amsanctus*, p. 30. Ascoli is a

poor town, though it contained in 1797, according to Giustiniani, 5270 souls. It has suffered repeatedly from earthquakes.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 475.  
A.C. 279.

king's phalanx and elephants, as the soil, which after the winter rains is stiff and heavy, must, later in the year, have recovered its hardness. When the armies were opposed to each other, a rumour spread among Pyrrhus' soldiers<sup>92</sup> that the consul Decius intended to follow the example of his father and grandfather, and to devote himself together with the enemy's army to the powers of death, whenever they should join battle. The men were uneasy at this report, so that Pyrrhus thought it expedient to warn them against yielding to superstitious fears, and to describe minutely the dress worn by any person so devoting himself. "If they saw any one so arrayed," he said, "they should not kill him, but by all means take him alive:" and he sent a message to the consuls, warning them that if he should take any Roman practising such a trick, he would put him to an ignominious death as a common impostor. The consuls replied, that they needed no such resources, and trusted to the courage of Roman soldiers for victory.

BATTLE OF  
ASCULUM.

The first encounter took place on rough ground<sup>93</sup>, and near the swampy banks of a river; and Pyrrhus, having assailed the Romans in such a position, was repulsed with loss. But he manœuvred so as to bring them fairly into the plain, and there the two armies engaged. He kept his cavalry and elephants to act as a reserve; the Tarentines formed the centre

<sup>92</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 5. Dion  
Cassius, Fragm. Vatican. LV.

<sup>93</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 21.

of his line; the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Sallentines<sup>91</sup> were on the left, and the Greeks and Samnites on the right. The Romans, as usual, had their cavalry on the wings, and their own legions formed the first line, and also the reserve; the troops of their allies forming a second line between them. If this be true, the Romans must have suspected the fidelity of their allies; for their courage had been proved in a hundred battles; and the Marsians and Pelignians now, as at Pydna, would have thrown themselves on the pikes of the phalanx as fearlessly as the bravest Roman. On the other hand, Pyrrhus intermingled the Samnites with his Greek infantry, on purpose to combine the advantages of the Italian tactic<sup>95</sup> with those of the Macedonian; that if his line should be attacked in flank, or if the enemy should penetrate it in any quarter, the Samnites might meet the Romans with their own weapons, and allow the Greeks time to recover the position and close order which to their mode of fighting were indispensable.

But he had no occasion to try the effect of this disposition; for his phalanx kept its advantage, and as the nature of the ground obliged the Romans to attack it in front, they hewed in vain with their swords<sup>96</sup> at the invincible mass of the Macedonian pikes, or tried to grapple them with their hands and break them. The Greeks kept an even line, and

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 475.  
A.C. 279.

The Romans  
are defeated.

<sup>94</sup> Frontinus, *Strategem.* II. 3,  
§ 21.

<sup>96</sup> Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 21, copying  
apparently from Hieronymus.

<sup>95</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 11.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 475.  
A.C. 279.

the Romans, finding it impossible to get within the hedge of spears, were slaughtered without returning a wound. At last they gave way, and then the elephants charged, and completed the rout. The other parts of the line opposed to the Tarentines and Lucanians were obliged to follow the example, and the Roman army fled to its camp. This was so close at hand that the loss did not exceed six thousand men, while in the army of Pyrrhus there had fallen 3505 according to the statement copied by Hieronymus from the commentaries of the king himself. This loss must again have fallen on the cavalry, light troops, and peltastæ of Pyrrhus' army, unless it was sustained chiefly by his allies on the centre and left wing; for the circumstances of the battle make it certain that the victory of his heavy-armed Greek infantry must have been almost bloodless.

Exaggerated  
and false ac-  
counts of  
this battle.

In his account of the actual battle of Asculum Plutarch luckily chose to copy Hieronymus; but immediately after it he follows Dionysius, and we have nothing but the usual exaggerations of Roman vanity, which leave the real facts of the campaign in utter darkness. The victory of Asculum was not improved, and at the end of the season the Romans wintered in Apulia, and Pyrrhus again returned to Tarentum. A victory followed by no results is easily believed to be a defeat; and where there is no other memorial of events than unchecked popular report and unsifted stories, facts which have no witness in their permanent consequences are soon hopelessly perverted. Niebuhr declares from his own personal

observation, that within a few days after the battle of Bautzen every Prussian who had not actually been engaged in the action, maintained that the allies had been victorious; and we can remember the extraordinary misrepresentation which for a moment persuaded the English public that Napoleon had been defeated at Borodino. The successive steps of Roman invention with respect to the battle of Asculum are so curious, that I have given a view of them in a note<sup>97</sup>: but it is not so easy to determine what

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 475.  
A.C. 279.

<sup>97</sup> The account in the text is Plutarch's, copied, as I have said, from Hieronymus of Cardia, a contemporary historian. And Justin agrees with it; "The issue of the second battle," he says, "was similar to that of the first." XVIII. 1. Livy, if we may trust the epitome of his 13th book, described the action as a drawn battle: "dubio eventu pugnatum est." But Florus calls it a victory on the part of the Romans; and Eutropius and Orosius, copying apparently from the same source, say that Pyrrhus was wounded, many of his elephants destroyed, and 20,000 of his men killed, the Roman loss not exceeding 5000. Zonaras, copying Dion Cassius, says that Pyrrhus was wounded, and that his army was defeated; owing chiefly to an attack made on his camp during the battle by a party of Apulians, which spread a panic among his soldiers. According to Dionysius, as quoted by Plutarch, Pyrrhus was wounded, the Samnites, and not the Apulians, assaulted his camp during the action, and the loss on both sides was equal, amounting to 15,000 men in each army. It is

no less remarkable that, according to Cicero, the consul P. Decius did actually devote himself in this battle as his father and grandfather had done before him. *De Finib.* II. 19. *Tusculan. Disp.* I. 37. No other existing account notices this circumstance; and according to the author "*de Viris Illustribus*," Decius was alive some years afterwards, and was engaged in the last war with Volsinii. Probably it was either a forgetfulness in Cicero himself, or he followed some exaggerated account, which, as he was not writing a history of the period, he did not criticise, but adopted it without inquiry. But such enormous discrepancies in the several accounts show what is the character of the Roman history of this period, that, except in particular cases, it is merely made up of traditional stories and panegyrical orations, and can scarcely be called history at all. How different is the account given of the battle by the contemporary historian Hieronymus, who was writing from really good materials, not from guess or fancy, but from knowledge!

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 475.  
A.C. 279.

It is attend-  
ed with no  
results.  
League be-  
tween the  
Romans and  
Carthagi-  
nians.

were the real causes which neutralized to Pyrrhus the result of his victory, and made the issue of the campaign, as a whole, decidedly unfavourable to him.

Both Zonaras and Dionysius relate that the baggage of Pyrrhus was plundered during the battle by his Italian allies; by the Apulians according to Zonaras, or according to Dionysius by the Samnites. If this was so, not only did it imply such bad discipline and bad feeling on the part of his allies as to make it impossible for Pyrrhus to depend on their co-operation for the future; but the loss of their plunder and baggage would greatly discourage his own soldiers, and indispose them to the continuance of the war. Besides, it was manifest that the brunt of every battle must fall on the Greeks; already Pyrrhus had lost many of his best officers, and as he never lost sight of his schemes of conquest in Greece, he would not be willing to sacrifice his bravest soldiers in a series of hard-won battles in Italy, for the sake of allies on whom he could place no reliance. It is likely also that the Apulian cities which he had taken, overawed by the Roman power and disgusted with the arrogance and indiscriminate plundering of the Greeks, were ready to return to their alliance with Rome; and as the Roman army was certain to be speedily reinforced, whilst Pyrrhus could look for no additional soldiers from Epirus, it might be absolutely impossible for him to keep the field. Finally, the Romans had concluded a defensive alliance<sup>98</sup> with the Carthaginians, for their

<sup>98</sup> Livy, Epitome, XIII. Polybius, III. 25. Justin, XVIII. 2.

mutual support against Pyrrhus; and towards the autumn of the year Ptolemy Ceraunus, king of Macedon, was defeated and killed by the Gauls<sup>99</sup>, and the presence of these barbarians in Macedonia made it certain that no more soldiers could be spared from Epirus for foreign warfare, when their own frontier was in hourly danger of invasion.

Thus left with no prospect of farther conquests in Italy, Pyrrhus eagerly listened during the winter to offers from other quarters, inviting him to a new field of action. The death of Ptolemy Ceraunus and the anarchy which followed tempted him to win back his old dominion in Macedonia, while envoys from some of the principal cities of Sicily called upon him to aid them against Carthage, and promised to make him master of the whole island. He was thus eager to seize the first pretext for abandoning Italy, and early in the following spring such an occasion was afforded him. The new consuls, C. Fabricius and Q. Æmilius, were sent against him<sup>100</sup>; and he soon received a message from them to say that one of his servants had offered to poison him, and had applied to the Romans to reward his crime, but that the consuls, abhorring a victory gained by treason, wished to give the king timely notice of his danger. Pyrrhus upon this expressed his gratitude in the warmest terms, furnished all his prisoners with new clothing, and sent them back to their

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 475.  
A.C. 279.

Pyrrhus  
crosses over  
into Sicily.

A.U.C. 476.  
A.C. 278.

<sup>99</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 22.

Samnitic. Fragm. XI. Plutarch,

<sup>100</sup> Claudius Quadrigarius, quoted by A. Gellius, III. 8. Appian,

Pyrrh. 21.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 476.  
A.C. 278.

own country, without ransom and without conditions<sup>101</sup>. Immediately afterwards, without paying any regard to the remonstrances of his allies, he left Milo still in possession of the citadel of Tarentum<sup>102</sup>, and his second son Alexander at Locri, and set sail with the rest of his army for Sicily.

A Carthaginian fleet is sent to the aid of the Romans.

It was apparently soon after the battle of Asculum, that a Carthaginian fleet of 120 ships<sup>103</sup> was sent to Ostia to offer aid to the Romans, and the senate declining this succour, the Carthaginian commander sailed away to the south of Italy, and there it is said proposed to Pyrrhus that Carthage should mediate between him and the Romans, his real object being to discover what were the king's views with respect to Sicily. Was then the Tarentine fleet wasting the coasts of Latium, so that Rome stood in need of naval aid? Or did so large a fleet contain a Carthaginian army, and was Rome wisely unwilling to see an African general making war in Italy, and carrying off the plunder of Italian cities? The in-

<sup>101</sup> Plutarch and Appian say that the senate released an equal number of Tarentine and Samnite prisoners, and that Cineas was again sent to Rome to negotiate a peace, but that the Romans refused to treat while Pyrrhus remained in Italy. Yet Appian, in another fragment, says that Pyrrhus, "after his treaty with the Romans," *μετὰ τὰς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους συνθήκας*, went over to Sicily. Probably a truce for a certain period was agreed to, and with it a general exchange of prisoners. Whether Pyrrhus stipulated any thing for

the Tarentines we cannot tell; but the consuls of the two succeeding years, although they triumphed over the Samnites and Lucanians, yet appear to have obtained no triumph over Tarentum, and the successes for which Fabricius triumphed "*de Tarentinis*," (Fasti Capitol.) may have been obtained in the early part of his consulship, before the truce with Pyrrhus was concluded.

<sup>102</sup> Justin, XVIII. 2. Zonaras, VIII. 5.

<sup>103</sup> Justin, XVIII. 2.



sinuation against the good faith of the Carthaginian commander seems quite unfounded; this very armament helped the Romans<sup>104</sup> in attempting to recover Rhegium, and though the siege did not succeed, yet a large supply of timber, which the Campanians had collected for building ships, was destroyed, and the Carthaginians having made a league with the Mamertines of Messana, watched the strait with their fleet to intercept Pyrrhus on his passage. But it seems that their fleet was called off in the next year to be employed in the siege of Syracuse, so that Pyrrhus, avoiding Messana, crossed from Locri to Tauromenia<sup>105</sup> without opposition, and being welcomed there by the tyrant Tyndarion, landed his army, and marched to the deliverance of Syracuse. His operations in Sicily lasted more than two years<sup>106</sup>; his fortune, which at first favoured him in every enterprise, was wrecked in a fruitless siege of Lilybæum<sup>107</sup>; disgusts arose, as in Italy, between him and his allies; they were unmanageable and he was tyrannical, so that when at length his Italian allies implored him to come once again to their aid, he was as ready to leave Sicily as he had before been anxious to invade it.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 476.  
A.C. 278.

During his absence the Samnites, Lucanians, Progress of the war in

<sup>104</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXII. 9.

<sup>105</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXII. 11.

<sup>106</sup> From the middle of 476 to the latter end of 478. *ἔτει τριῖσι* is Appian's expression, Samnitic. *Fragm.* XII. which Mr. Fynes

Clinton wrongly understands of the year 479, for that, according to the Greek mode of reckoning, would not have been *ἔτει τριῖσι* but *τετάρτῳ*.

<sup>107</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXII. 14. Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 22, 23.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 476,  
477.  
A.C. 278,  
277.  
Italy during  
the absence  
of Pyrrhus.

Bruttians, and Tarentines still continued the war. They ventured no battles in the field, but resolutely defended their towns and fastnesses<sup>108</sup>, and sometimes, as always happens in such warfare, inflicted some partial loss on the enemy, without being able to change in any degree the general fortune of the contest. The consuls employed against them enjoyed a triumph at the end of each campaign; Fabricius at the end of the year 476<sup>109</sup>, C. Junius Brutus at the end of 477, and Q. Fabius Gurgus at the end of 478. In the mean time P. Cornelius Rufinus, the colleague of C. Junius in 477, had recovered Croton and Locri; but as he was considered the principal cause of a severe repulse sustained by himself<sup>110</sup> and his colleague from the Samnites at the beginning of the year, he was not thought deserving of a triumph.

A.U.C. 478.  
A.C. 276.  
Pyrrhus  
returns to  
Italy.

It seems to have been in the autumn of 478 that Pyrrhus returned to Italy<sup>111</sup>. But his return was beset with enemies, for a Carthaginian fleet attacked him on his passage, and sunk seventy of his ships of war<sup>112</sup>, and when he landed on the Italian coast he

<sup>108</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6.

<sup>109</sup> Fabricius triumphed in December, Brutus in January, thirteen months afterwards, and Fabius in the February of the year following, when Pyrrhus in all probability was already returned to Italy.

<sup>110</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6.

<sup>111</sup> Zonaras expressly says that Pyrrhus returned in the year after the consulship of P. Rufinus, that is, in 478. VIII. 6.

<sup>112</sup> Appian, Samnitic. Fragm. XII. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 24. Pyr-

rhus had obtained this fleet chiefly from the Syracusans, who, on his first arrival in Sicily gave up to him their whole navy, amounting to 140 ships of war. Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXII. 11. The Carthaginians employed in their engagement with Duilius in the first Punic war a large ship which they took from Pyrrhus, probably on his retreat from Sicily. (Polybius, I. 23.) We must suppose that the ships of war were conveying the transports on which Pyrrhus had embarked his army;

found that the Mamertines had crossed over from Messana to beset his road by land, and he had to cut his way through them with much loss. Yet he reached Tarentum with a force nearly as large as that which he had first brought over from Epirus; as large in numbers, but of a very different quality, consisting principally of mercenaries raised in his Sicilian wars, men of all countries, Greek and barbarian, and whose fidelity would last no longer than their general was victorious.

No sooner had he arrived at Tarentum than he commenced active operations. The Roman consuls were employed in Lucania and in Samnium<sup>113</sup>, but he received no interruption from them, and recovered Locri. He next made an attempt upon Rhegium, a place so important from its position to the success of any new expedition to Sicily, but the Campanian garrison resisted Pyrrhus<sup>114</sup> as stoutly as they had resisted the Romans, and the king was obliged to retire with loss. His old allies, the Samnites and Lucanians<sup>115</sup>, received him coldly, and, however anxious to obtain his aid, they had not, exhausted as they were, the means of supplying him with money, even if they had been disposed to rely on his constancy in their cause. Thus embarrassed, as he passed by Locri on his return from Rhegium to Tarentum, he listened to the advice of some of

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 478.  
A.C. 276.

He plunders  
the temple  
of Proser-  
pine at  
Locri.

and that their resistance enabled  
the transports to escape.

<sup>113</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6.

<sup>114</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6.

<sup>115</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 25. Dion  
Cassius, Fragm. Peiresc. XLII.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 478.  
A.C. 276.

his followers<sup>116</sup>, and plundered the temple of Proserpine. In the vaults underneath this temple was a large treasure, which had been buried for unknown generations, and no mortal eye had been allowed to look on it. This he carried off, and embarked his spoil on board of his ships, to transport it by sea to Tarentum. A storm however arose and wrecked the ships, and cast ashore the plundered treasure on the coast of Locri. Pyrrhus was moved, and ordered it to be replaced in the temple of the goddess, and offered sacrifices to propitiate her anger. But when there were no signs given that she accepted his offering, he put to death the three men who had advised him to commit the sacrilege, and even yet his mind was haunted by a dread of divine vengeance, and his own commentaries<sup>117</sup> recorded his belief that Proserpine's wrath was still pursuing him, and bringing on his arms defeat and ruin. If Pyrrhus himself, after his long intercourse with the Epicurean Cineas, entertained such fears, they weighed far more heavily doubtless on the minds of many of his soldiers and his allies; and the sense of being pursued by the wrath of heaven may have well chilled the hearts of the bravest, and affected in no small degree the issue of the war.

Religious  
terrors at  
Rome.

This was fast approaching. The consuls chosen for the year 479 were M'. Curius Dentatus and L.

<sup>116</sup> Dionysius, XIX. 9. Appian, Samnitic. Fragm. XII.

ὁ Πύρρος ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὑπομνήμασι γράφει.

<sup>117</sup> Dionysius, XIX. ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς

Cornelius Lentulus. The Romans on their side also were visited by religious terrors; during the year 478 a fatal pestilence had raged amongst them<sup>118</sup>, and now the clay statue of Jupiter on the summit of the Capitoline temple was struck by lightning, and shattered to pieces. The head of the image was no where to be found, and the augurs declared that the storm had blown it into the Tiber, and commanded that it should be searched for in the bed of the river. It was found in the very place in which the augurs had commanded the search to be made.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 479.  
A.C. 275.

Fears of the anger of the gods, together with the dread of the arms of Pyrrhus, made the Romans backward to enlist in the legions. Those who were summoned did not answer to their names, upon which the consul, M'. Curius<sup>119</sup>, commanded that the goods of the first defaulter should be publicly sold. A public sale of a man's property by the sentence of a magistrate rendered him incapable of exercising afterwards any political rights; but the necessity of a severe example was so felt that no tribune interposed in behalf of the offender, and the consul's order was carried into execution. The usual

Severity of  
the consul  
in the en-  
listment of  
soldiers.

<sup>118</sup> Orosius, IV. 2. Livy, Epitom. XIV. Cicero de Divinat. I. 10.

<sup>119</sup> Livy, Epitome, XIV. Valerius Maximus, VI. 3, § 4, adds to this story that Curius sold not only the property of the defaulter, but the man himself, saying "that the commonwealth wanted no citizen who did not know how to obey." If the tribunes did not

interfere, the consul's power might indeed extend to any thing; and we know that the Romans were most tolerant even of the greatest severity when the public service seemed to require it. But the authority of a collector of anecdotes is so small, that Valerius' addition to the story must be considered very doubtful.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

A.U.C. 479.  
A.C. 275.  
Pyrrhus and  
M'. Curius  
opposed to  
each other  
near Bene-  
ventum.

number of legions was then raised; Lentulus<sup>120</sup> marched into Lucania, Curius into Samnium.

Pyrrhus took the field against Curius with his own army, and the flower of the force of Tarentum, and a division of Samnites; the rest of the Samnite army was sent into Lucania to prevent Lentulus from coming to join his colleague. Curius, finding that Pyrrhus was marching against him, sent to call his colleague to his aid; and in the mean while the omens would not allow him to attack the enemy<sup>121</sup>, and he lay encamped in a strong position near Beneventum. There is much rugged and difficult country behind the town on the road towards Apulia, and there is a considerable extent of level ground in the valley of the Calore below it, which was the scene of the decisive battle between Manfred and Charles of Anjou. But whether they fought on the same ground which had witnessed the last encounter between Pyrrhus and the Romans, it is not possible to determine.

Unsuccess-  
ful night-  
march of  
Pyrrhus to  
surprise the  
Roman  
camp.

Pyrrhus resolved to attack Curius before his colleague joined him, and he planned an attack upon his camp by night<sup>122</sup>. He set out by torchlight, with the flower of his soldiers and the best of his elephants; but the way was long, and the country overgrown with wood, and intersected with steep ravines; so that his progress was slow, and at last the lights were burnt out, and the men were con-

<sup>120</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 25.

<sup>121</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 25.

<sup>122</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 25. Dio-  
nysius, XIX. 12—14.

tinually missing their way. Day broke before they reached their destination; but still the enemy were not aware of their approach till they had surmounted the heights above the Roman camp, and were descending to attack it from the vantage ground. Then Curius led out his troops to oppose them; and the nature of the ground gave the Romans a great advantage over the heavy-armed Greek infantry, as soon as the attempt to surprise them had failed. But the action seems to have been decided by an accident; for one of Pyrrhus' elephants was wounded, and running wild among its own men, threw them into disorder; nor could they offer a long resistance, being almost exhausted with the fatigue of their night-march. They were repulsed with loss<sup>123</sup>; two elephants were killed, and eight, being forced into impracticable ground from which there was no outlet, were surrendered to the Romans by their drivers.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 479.  
A.C. 275.

Thus encouraged, Curius no longer declined a decisive action on equal ground: he descended into the plain<sup>124</sup>, and met Pyrrhus in the open field. On one wing the Romans were victorious, on the other, oppressed by the weight of the elephants' charge, they were driven back to their camp<sup>125</sup>. But their

BATTLE OF  
BENEVEN-  
TUM. Pyr-  
rhus is de-  
feated.

<sup>123</sup> Dionysius, XIX. 14.

<sup>124</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 25. The scene of the battle is placed by Orosius and Florus "in campis Arusinis," or "sub campis Arusinis," but this name is unknown to us, and does not enable us to determine the place exactly.

<sup>125</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 25. The

story which Dionysius and Plutarch relate of the first action, is by Zonaras and Florus referred to the last and decisive battle; namely, that a young elephant having been wounded, and running about screaming, its cries were heard by its mother, and so excited her, that she too became

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
A.U.C. 479.  
A.C. 275.

retreat was covered by a shower of missiles from the guards on the rampart, and these so annoyed the elephants that they turned about, and fled through their own ranks, bearing down all before them. When the phalanx was thus disordered the Romans attacked it vigorously, and made their way into the mass; and then their swords had an immense advantage over the long spears of the enemy, and their victory was speedy and complete.

He finally  
leaves Italy  
and returns  
to Epirus.

What number of men were killed or taken is variously reported; but the overthrow was decisive; and Pyrrhus retreated to Tarentum, resolved immediately to evacuate Italy. Yet, as if he still clung to the hope of returning hereafter, he left Milo with his garrison in the citadel of Tarentum, and then embarked for Epirus<sup>126</sup>. He landed in his native kingdom with no more than eight thousand foot and five hundred horse<sup>127</sup>, and without money to maintain even these. Thus he was forced to engage in new enterprises; and often victorious in battle but never successful in war, he perished two or three years afterwards, as is well known, by a woman's hand, in his attack upon Argos.

ungovernable, and threw the Greek army into disorder, and that this accident first turned the fortune of the day.

<sup>126</sup> It is said that a report was purposely circulated by Pyrrhus, of the speedy arrival of reinforcements from the kings of

Macedonia and Syria, and that the Romans therefore did not venture to advance upon Tarentum. Pausanias, I. 13; compare Niebuhr, Vol. III. p. 610, and note 927.

<sup>127</sup> Plutarch, Pyrrh. 26.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

GENERAL HISTORY FROM THE DEPARTURE OF PYRRHUS FROM ITALY TO THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR—FINAL SUBMISSION OF SAMNIUM—CONQUEST OF TARENTUM—PICENTIAN AND VOLSINIAN WARS—ROME ACQUIRES THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ALL ITALY—DETACHED EVENTS AND ANECDOTES RELATING TO THIS PERIOD.—479 TO 489 A.U.C., 275 TO 265 A.C.

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“France was now consolidated into a great kingdom. . . . And thus having conquered herself, if I may use the phrase, and no longer apprehensive of any foreign enemy, she was prepared to carry her arms into other countries.”—HALLAM, *Middle Ages*, Chap. I. Part 11.

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WE have seen that a Carthaginian fleet appeared on the coasts of Latium in the heat of the war with Pyrrhus, to offer its assistance to the Romans. The offer was then refused, but very soon afterwards a treaty was concluded between Rome and Carthage<sup>1</sup>, in which both nations engaged to reserve to themselves the right of assisting one another, even if either should conclude an alliance with Pyrrhus; that is to say, their alliance with him was to be sub-

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

Relations  
between  
Rome and  
Carthage.

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, III. 25.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

ordinate to their alliance with each other, and instead of aiding him in his attacks against the other, they were in such a case to aid one another, even against him. Such were the relations subsisting between Rome and Carthage in the year 479; eleven years afterwards these friendly ties were broken to pieces, and the two nations were engaged in the first Punic war.

Preparation  
of events  
for the  
first Punic  
war.

In fact, from the moment that Pyrrhus embarked at Tarentum to return to Epirus, the whole stream of our history begins to set towards that great period when Rome and Carthage first became enemies. The relics of wars in Italy, which still remain to be noticed, are only like a clearing of the ground for that mightier contest; and the union of all Italy under one dominion is rather to be regarded for the present as the forging of that iron power by which Carthage was to be crushed, and the whole civilized world bowed into subjection, than as the completion of the magnificent and complicated fabric in which law and polity were to abide as in their appointed temple. The very barrenness of the political history of Rome during the half century which followed the war with Pyrrhus, is in itself a presumption that the energies of the Roman people at this time were employed abroad rather than at home. I shall therefore defer all notice of the internal state of Italy under the Roman sovereignty, till we come to the period of the second Punic war. Then, when Hannibal's sword was probing so deeply every unsound part in the Roman dominion, and when he



was labouring to array Campania and Samnium and Lucania and Bruttium in a fifth coalition against Rome, the internal relations of the Italian states towards the Romans and towards each other will necessarily demand our attention. But for the present I shall merely regard them as blended into one great mass, which was presently to be engaged in deadly conflict with the dominion of Carthage.

After Pyrrhus left Italy, his general Milo retained the citadel of Tarentum for nearly four years. The aristocratical party, which had been from the beginning opposed to the Epirot alliance, now endeavoured to rid themselves of it by force of arms. They failed, however, in their attempt to recover the citadel, and then leaving Tarentum, they occupied a fort in the neighbourhood<sup>2</sup>, from whence they carried on a plundering warfare against the city, and were able to make their own peace with the Romans. Even the popular party were tired of the foreign garrison and its governor, but feeling that they never could be forgiven by the Romans, they looked elsewhere for aid, and sent to the Carthaginian commanders<sup>3</sup> in Sicily to deliver them from Milo's dominion. A Carthaginian fleet appeared accordingly before the harbour, while L. Papirius

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

A.U.C. 482.  
A.C. 272.  
Siege of  
Tarentum.  
Milo retires  
to Epirus.  
Surrender of  
the town.

<sup>2</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6. This was like the aristocratical party in Corcyra, who after their expulsion from the city built a fort in the mountains from whence they plundered the lands of their opponents. Thucyd. III. 85.

<sup>3</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6. Orosius, IV. 3. But the account in Orosius

is greatly distorted and exaggerated, for he makes the Tarentines call in the aid of Carthage not against Milo, but against Rome, and says that a regular action took place between the Roman and Carthaginian forces, in which the Romans were victorious.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 482.  
A.C. 272.

Cursor the Roman consul was besieging the town by land. But Papirius, dreading the interference of Carthage, treated secretly with Milo<sup>4</sup>, and persuaded him to deliver up the citadel to the Romans, on condition of being allowed to retire in safety to Epirus with his garrison and all their baggage. Thus Tarentum was given up into the hands of the Romans, and the Carthaginian fleet returned to Sicily. The Roman government complained of its appearance on the coasts of Italy<sup>5</sup>, when its assistance had not been requested by Rome; and the Carthaginians, now that Tarentum was actually in the Roman power, disavowed the expedition as an unauthorized act of their officers in Sicily.

Subjugation  
of Taren-  
tum.

The death or banishment of the leaders of the democratical party at Tarentum atoned no doubt for the insult offered to the Roman ambassadors, and for the zealous enmity which had organized against Rome the fourth Samnite war. When vengeance was satisfied, policy demanded the complete humiliation of a city which had shown both the will and the power to injure<sup>6</sup>. Tarentum was dismantled, its fleet and all its stores of arms were surrendered, it

<sup>4</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6. Frontinus, Strategem. III. 3, § 1.

<sup>5</sup> Orosius, IV. 5. That the interference of the Carthaginians on this occasion was complained of by the Romans appears also from Livy, Epitom. XIV. and from Dion Cassius, Fragm. Vatican. LVII. Yet as Pyrrhus was the enemy of Carthage, the Carthaginians might lawfully aid the Ta-

rentines against his officer; the offence complained of, however, was in all probability the appearance of a foreign fleet, uninvited by the Romans, on the coasts of what they would consider the Roman dominion. But the Carthaginians might answer that the coast of Iapygia was not yet to be regarded as belonging to Rome.

<sup>6</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6.

was made to pay a yearly tribute, and a Roman garrison<sup>7</sup>, it seems, was quartered in the citadel. When thus effectually disarmed and fettered, the Tarentines were allowed to retain their municipal freedom, as the allies, and not the subjects of Rome.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 482.  
A.C. 272.

In the same year, immediately before the fall of Tarentum, Samnium, Lucania, and Bruttium, had made their final and absolute submission. L. Papirius Cursor and Sp. Carvilius Maximus, who had been consuls together one and twenty years earlier in the great campaign which decided the third Samnite war, were elected consuls together for the second time, to put the last stroke to the present contest. Carvilius invaded Samnium<sup>8</sup> and received the submission of the Samnites; Papirius received that of the Lucanians and Bruttians. The three nations all retained their municipal freedom, or rather their several towns or districts were left free individually, but their national union was dissolved; and they were probably not even allowed to intermarry with or to inherit property from each other. Besides this, they made undoubtedly large cessions of territory, and were obliged to give hostages<sup>9</sup> for their future good behaviour. It is mentioned in particular that the Bruttians ceded the half of their mountain and forest district, called Sila<sup>10</sup>, or the

<sup>7</sup> In the interval between the first and second Punic wars, a legion was regularly stationed at Tarentum. Polybius, II. 24. Niebuhr thinks that this had been the case ever since the surrender of the city.

<sup>8</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6.

<sup>9</sup> This appears from Zonaras, VIII. 7, where Lollius a Samnite hostage is said to have escaped from Rome.

<sup>10</sup> Dionysius, XX. 5. Sila is doubtless the same word as Silva

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

A.U.C. 482.  
A.C. 272.

Weald; a tract rich to this day in all varieties of timber trees, and in wide ranges of well-watered pastures, and famous for yielding the best vegetable pitch known to the ancients. The right of preparing this pitch was let as usual by the censors, and brought in to the republic a large revenue.

A.U.C. 484.  
A.C. 270.  
Punishment  
of the re-  
volted gar-  
rison of  
Rhegium.

Thus the Romans had put down all their enemies in the south of Italy, except the rebellious soldiers of the eighth legion who had taken possession of Rhegium. These however were reduced two years later by the consul, C. Genucius<sup>11</sup>. A separate treaty concluded with the Mamertines of Messana<sup>12</sup> had cut them off from their most natural succour, and Hiero, who since Pyrrhus had left Sicily had been raised by his merit and services<sup>13</sup> to the throne of Syracuse, took an active part against them, and supplied the Roman besieging army not with corn only, but with an auxiliary force of soldiers. Thus the town of Rhegium was at last stormed, and most of the garrison put to the sword in the assault. Of the survivors, all except the soldiers of the original legion were executed<sup>14</sup> by the consul on the spot; but these, as Campanian citizens<sup>15</sup>, and, therefore, having all the private rights of citizens of Rome, were reserved for the judgment of the senate and people. When they were brought to Rome, one of

and as ὤλη. For the actual state of this forest country, see Mr. Keppel Craven, *Tour in the Southern Provinces of Naples*, p. 242.

<sup>11</sup> Dionysius, XX. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6.

<sup>13</sup> Polybius, I. 8, 9. Justin, XXIII. 4. Zonaras, VIII. 6.

<sup>14</sup> Orosius, IV. 3.

<sup>15</sup> See Niebuhr, *Rom. Hist.* Vol. II. p. 57. Eng. Transl.



the tribunes pleaded in their behalf that they were Roman citizens<sup>16</sup>, and ought not to be put to death, except by the judgment of the people; but the people were as little disposed to mercy as the senate, and the thirty-three tribes<sup>17</sup> condemned them unanimously. They were thus all scourged and beheaded, to the number of more than three hundred, and their bodies were cast out unburied. Rhegium and its territory were restored to the survivors of the old inhabitants.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 484.  
A.C. 270.

In the next year one of the Samnite<sup>18</sup> hostages escaped from Rome, and revived a guerilla warfare in the country of the Caracenians in northern Samnium. Both consuls were employed to crush at once an enemy who might soon have become formidable, and the bands which had taken up arms were soon dispersed, and their strongholds taken, although

A.U.C. 485.  
A.C. 269.  
Short  
guerilla war  
in Samnium.

<sup>16</sup> Valerius Maximus, II. 7, § 15. The same thing happened after the reduction of Capua in the second Punic war. The Campanians being Roman citizens, the senate could not determine their fate without being empowered by the people to do so; and accordingly the tribes voted that whatever sentence the senate might pass should have their authority for its full execution. Livy, XXVI. 33. It is remarkable that the power of taking up the Roman franchise at pleasure should be considered as so completely equivalent to the possession of the franchise actually, which is Niebuhr's explanation of the condi-

tion of the Campanians. Vol. II. note 136. Eng. Transl. It rather appears from the definition of the term *municeps*, given by Festus from Ser. Sulpicius the younger, that the Campanians, and others in the same relation to Rome, enjoyed actually all the private rights of Roman citizens, without forfeiting their own Campanian franchise; and this too seems implied by the fact of their forming a regular legion in war, instead of being reckoned merely as auxiliaries.

<sup>17</sup> Dionysius, XX. 7. Polybius, I. 7.

<sup>18</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 7. Dionysius, XX. 9.



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

not without some loss and danger on the part of the conquerors.

A.U.C. 486.  
A.C. 268.  
War with  
and conquest of the  
Picentians.

A war followed with a people whose name has only once before been heard of in Roman history, the Picentians on the coast of the Adriatic. The Picentians had become the allies of Rome<sup>19</sup> thirty-one years before this period, at the beginning of the third Samnite war, and they had ever since observed the alliance faithfully. But in the year 486 we find two consular armies<sup>20</sup> employed against them, and after a short struggle they submitted at discretion. A portion of them was removed to the coast of the Tuscan sea, and settled in the country which had formerly belonged to the Samnites, on the shores of the gulf of Salernum<sup>21</sup>. It may have been that this migration had been commanded by the Roman government as a measure of state policy, in order to people the old Samnite coast with less suspected inhabitants, and to acquire as Roman domain the lands which the Picentians had left in their old country; and the Picentians perhaps, like the Carthaginians in the third Punic war, unwilling to be torn from their native land, rose against Rome in mere despair. But whatever was the cause of the war, it ended in the speedy and complete conquest<sup>22</sup> of the Picentian people.

<sup>19</sup> See page 318 of this volume.

<sup>20</sup> The *Fasti Capitolini* record that both the consuls of the year, P. Sempronius and Appius Clau-

dus, triumphed over the Picentians.

<sup>21</sup> Strabo, V. p. 251.

<sup>22</sup> The Picentian war is briefly

The last gleanings of Italian independence were gathered in during the two years which next followed. The Sallentines and Messapians had at one time taken part in the confederacy<sup>23</sup> of southern Italy against Rome, but they had withdrawn from the cause before its overthrow. Their repentance, however, availed them nothing, for the port of Brundisium in the Sallentine territory was a position which the Romans were very anxious to secure<sup>24</sup>; the more so as Alexander the son of Pyrrhus was reigning in Epirus, and had inherited much of the warlike temper of his father; and whether for attack or defence, the possession of Brundisium, the favourite point of communication in later times with Greece and the East, appeared therefore to the Romans very desirable. Accordingly the Sallentines and Messapians were reduced to submission, and Brundisium was ceded to the Romans. They did not send a colony thither till some years<sup>25</sup> afterwards, but the land must in the mean while have formed a part of their domain,

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 487  
& 488.  
A.C. 267  
& 266.  
Conquest of  
the Messa-  
pians. Oc-  
cupation of  
Brundi-  
sium.

noticed by Florus, I. 19, by Eutropius, and by Orosius, IV. 4. A great earthquake happened just as the Roman and Picentian armies were going to engage, upon which P. Sempronius the consul vowed to build a temple to the earth. The population of the Picentians, when they submitted to the Romans, amounted according to Pliny (Hist. Natur. III. § 110) to 360,000 souls.

<sup>23</sup> They had fought under Pyrrhus at Asculum; see Frontinus, Strategem. II. 3, § 21; and they are not mentioned as conquered by Papirius and Carvilius, when

the Samnites, Lucanians, and Brutians submitted, so that they had probably left the confederacy at an earlier period.

<sup>24</sup> Zonaras, copying from Dion Cassius, accuses the Romans of making war on the Sallentines because they wished to get possession of Brundisium. VIII. 7.

<sup>25</sup> In the latter part of the first Punic war. See Livy, Epitom. XIX. But Florus says [I. 20] that Brundisium with its famous port was reduced by M. Atilius, who was one of the consuls of the year 487. And so also does Eutropius.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

Conquest of  
the Sarsina-  
tians.

and the port in all probability was occupied by a Roman garrison.

In the midst of the Sallentine war, the consuls of the year 488 triumphed over the Sarsinians<sup>26</sup>, a people of Umbria, and the countrymen of the comic poet Plautus. Livy's epitome<sup>27</sup> speaks of the Umbrians generally, and says that they as well as the Sallentines submitted to the Romans at discretion.

War with  
the Volsi-  
nians.  
A.U.C. 489.  
A.C. 265.

One more conquest still remained to be achieved, a conquest called for by political jealousy no less than by national ambition. The aristocracy of Volsinii<sup>28</sup> applied to Rome for aid against the intolerable tyranny of their former serfs or vassals, who were now in possession of the government. As the necessity of keeping up a large navy in the Persian invasions first led to the ascendancy of the poorer classes at Athens, and as wars with foreign states had favoured

<sup>26</sup> Fasti Capitolini.

<sup>27</sup> Epitom. XV. "Umbri et Sallentini victi in deditionem accepti sunt."

<sup>28</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 7. Auct. de Viris Illustrib. "Decius Mus." Florus, I. 21. Valerius Maximus, IX. 1, Extern. § 2. Orosius, IV. 5. All these writers call the revolution at Volsinii a rising of slaves against their masters; just as Herodotus represents a similar revolution at Argos, after the old citizens had been greatly weakened by their wars with Sparta. VI. 83. The story told in the work "de Mirabil. Auscultationibus," 94. Ed. Bekker, wrongly ascribed to Aristotle, relates undoubtedly to

Volsinii, and shows the vague and exaggerated form in which even contemporary events in distant countries are related, when there is no real historian to sift them. According to this story, "the city is very strong; for in the midst of it there is a hill that runs up thirty stadia in height; and beneath there is a forest of all sorts of trees, and much water. So the people of the city fearing lest any of them should become a tyrant, set up their freedmen to be their magistrates; and these freedmen rule over them, and others of the same sort are appointed in their place at the end of the year."

the liberties of the Roman commons, so the long wars in which Volsinii had been engaged with Rome had obliged the aristocracy to arm and train their vassals, till they, feeling their importance and power, had risen against their old lords, and had established their own complete ascendancy. But in proportion as they had been more degraded and oppressed than the Roman commons, so was their triumph far less happy. Slaves let loose knew not how to become citizens; two only social relations had they ever known, those of oppressor and oppressed; and having ceased to be the one, they became immediately the other. They retaliated on their former masters the worst atrocities which they had themselves been made to suffer<sup>29</sup>; and when they found that some of the oppressed party had applied to Rome for aid, they put many of them to death<sup>30</sup>, as for an act of treason. This was more than sufficient to excite the Romans to interfere, and, as the present ruling party in Volsinii were regarded as little better than revolted slaves, the majority of the Roman commons would be ready to put them down no less than the senate. National ambition no doubt made the enterprise doubly welcome; perhaps too the accusation of Metrodorus<sup>31</sup> was not without foundation, when he as-

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 489.  
A.C. 265.

<sup>29</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 1. The worst of all the outrages there described was practised in some instances by the feudal aristocracy in modern Europe; and it is far more likely that the Volsinian serfs retaliated it upon their masters than that they should have been the first inventors of it.

<sup>30</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 7.

<sup>31</sup> Pliny, Hist. Natur. XXXIV. § 34. Metrodorus of Scepsis lived in the seventh century of Rome, and was intimate with Mithridates, whose hatred against the Romans he shared to such a degree, that he was called *ὁ μισο-ρώματος*. His charge, whether

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.A.U.C. 489.  
A.C. 265.

cribed the war to a baser passion, and said that the two thousand statues with which Volsinii was ornamented, tempted the Romans to attack it. Q. Fabius Gurgus, one of the consuls of the year 489, laid siege to Volsinii with a consular army<sup>32</sup>; but having been mortally wounded in one of the sallies of the besieged, he left the completion of his work to his successors<sup>33</sup>. In the following year Volsinii was taken; bloody executions took place, and the remnant of the new Volsinian citizens, who were not put to death, were given up as serfs once again to their former masters. But the old Volsinian aristocracy were not allowed to return to the city of their fathers. Volsinii was destroyed, its statues no doubt were carried to Rome, and its old citizens were settled in a new spot<sup>34</sup> on the lower ground near the shores of the lake, apparently on or near the site of the modern town of Bolsena.

The Romans sovereigns of all Italy.

Thus the whole extent of Italy from the Macra and the Rubicon to Rhegium and Brundisium was become more or less subject to Rome. But it was not merely that the several Italian nations were to

true or false, is at least consistent with those other representations which speak of the growing wealth and increased love of wealth among the Romans at this period.

<sup>32</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 7.

<sup>33</sup> The author "de Viris Illustrib." ascribe the conquest of Volsinii to Decius Mus, who was consul in 475, and fought with Pyrrhus at Asculum. But whether Decius was employed as præ-

tor, or as dictator, we know not. The same writer also says that Appius Claudius, the consul of the year 490, obtained the surname of Caudex after his conquests of the Volsinians; but the Fasti Capitolini give the honour of the conquest to his colleague, M. Fulvius Flaccus, who triumphed "de Vulsiniensibus, An. CDXXCIX. K. Nov."

<sup>34</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 7.



follow in war where Rome might choose to lead them; nor yet that they paid a certain tribute to the sovereign state, such as Athens received from her subject allies. The Roman dominion in Italy had wrested large tracts of land from the conquered nations in every part of the peninsula; forests, mines, and harbours had become the property of the Roman people, from which a large revenue was derived; so that all classes of Roman citizens were enriched by their victories; the rich acquired a great extent of land to hold in occupation; the poor obtained grants of land in freehold by an agrarian law: while the great increase of revenue required a greater number of persons to collect it, and thus from the quæstors to the lowest collectors or clerks employed under them, all the officers of government became suddenly multiplied.

The changes, indeed, which were wrought in the course of ten years, from the retreat of Pyrrhus to the conquest of Volsinii, must have affected the whole life and character of the Roman people. Even the mere fragmentary notices, which are all that we possess of this period, record, first, the increase of the number of quæstors from four to eight<sup>35</sup>: secondly, a distribution of land, in portions of seven jugerâ<sup>36</sup> to each citizen, to the Roman commons generally: thirdly, a distribution of money amongst the citizens<sup>37</sup>, probably amongst those of the city tribes who did not wish to become possessors

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 489.  
A.C. 265.

Great  
changes  
which took  
place at this  
period in the  
condition of  
the Romans.

<sup>35</sup> Livy, Epitom. XV.

<sup>36</sup> Columella, Præfat.

<sup>37</sup> Dionysius, XX. ad finem.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 489.  
A.C. 265.

of land; the money so distributed having arisen from the sale of conquered territory: fourthly, the first adoption of a silver coinage, copper having been hitherto the only currency of the state<sup>38</sup>: fifthly, the appointment of several new magistrates or commissioners, such as the decemviri litibus judicandis<sup>39</sup>, or the board of ten, who presided over the court of the centumviri or hundred judges; the board of four<sup>40</sup>, who had the care of the streets and roads; the board of five, who acted for the magistrates during the night<sup>41</sup>, the consuls' ordinary responsibility ceasing with the going down of the sun; and the board of three, who had the care of

<sup>38</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* XXXIII. § 44. The silver coinage was first introduced in the year 485; and the coins struck were denarii, quinarii, and sestertii. It is still a great question in whose hands the right of coining money was placed. The devices on the consular denarii are so various, and refer so peculiarly to the house of the individual who coined them, that Niebuhr supposes them to have been really a private coinage, like the tokens occasionally issued in England, a coinage issued by private persons for their own profit, but sanctioned by the state, and controlled by the triumviri monetales. Quæstors are known to have coined money when employed under a proconsul as his paymaster, but these coins are equally without any peculiar national device, and relate to something in the quæstor's own family or in the circumstances of his general. Thus on the gold coins struck by P. Lentulus Sпинther,

when he was quæstor to Cassius in Asia, we see the device of a cap of liberty and a dagger, in manifest allusion to the assassination of Cæsar. Yet the two-horsed and four-horsed chariots which appear so often on the denarii are noticed by Pliny as a general device, from which the oldest silver coins received their name. It seems probable that there was no fixed rule with respect to the right of coining; that sometimes the state issued a coinage, that sometimes money was struck by particular magistrates for the immediate use of their own department of the public service; and that sometimes also it was struck by individuals for their own profit, just as a large part of our own circulation at this day consists in the notes issued by private bankers.

<sup>39</sup> "Pomponius de origine juris," 29. See Niebuhr. *Rom. Gesch.* III. p. 649.

<sup>40 41</sup> Pomponius, § 30, 31.

the coinage. All these things are recorded as having been introduced for the first time about the period between the war with Pyrrhus and the first war with Carthage, and they clearly show what manifold changes the Roman people were then undergoing.

The conquest of Italy was indeed to Rome what the overthrow of the Athenian empire was to Sparta: the larger scale of all public transactions, the vast influx of wealth into the state, and the means of acquiring wealth unjustly which were put within the reach of many private individuals, were a severe shock to the national character. Many other Romans, no doubt, besides P. Cornelius Rufinus, were as corrupt and tyrannical as Gylippus and Lysander; and it was this very corruption which made men dwell so fondly on those who were untainted by it<sup>42</sup>; the virtue of Fabricius and Curius, like that of Callicratidas, shone the brighter, because the temptations which they resisted were so often yielded to by others. In the present state of Italy any eminent Roman might seriously affect the condition of any of the subject people either for good or for evil: hence the principal citizens of Rome were earnestly

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 439.  
A.C. 265.

Effects of  
these on the  
national  
manners.  
Anecdotes  
of Curius  
and Fabri-  
cius.

<sup>42</sup> Pope has said, that  
"Lucullus, when frugality could  
charm,

Had roasted turnips in the Sa-  
bine farm;"

as if the virtue of Curius had be-  
longed to his age and not to him-  
self. But this is the mistake of a  
satirist and fatalist, whose ten-  
dency it always is to depreciate  
human virtue. Had Lucullus  
lived in Curius' day, he would

have shown in the possession of  
ten pounds of silver-plate the  
same spirit which, in his own days,  
was shown in the splendour of his  
feasts in the Apollo: had Curius  
lived in the days of Cicero, he  
would have displayed like Cicero  
in the government of his province  
the same spotless integrity which  
he proved actually in sitting by  
his cottage fire, and refusing the  
humble presents of the Samnites.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 489.  
A.C. 265.

courted with compliments, and often, no doubt, propitiated with presents; and it was for refusing such presents, when offered to them by the Samnites, that Fabricius and Curius became so famous. All know how deputies from Samnium came to Curius<sup>43</sup> at his Sabine farm to offer him a present of gold. They found him seated by the fireside, with a wooden platter before him, and roasting turnips in the ashes. "I count it my glory," he said, "not to possess gold myself, but to have power over those who do." So again other Samnite deputies came to bring a present<sup>44</sup> of ten pounds of copper, five of silver, and five slaves, to Fabricius as the patron of their nation. Fabricius drew his hands over his ears, eyes, nose, and mouth, and then along his neck and down his body; and said that whilst he was the master of his five senses and sound in body and limb, he needed nothing more than he had already. Thus, whether refusing to have clients, or to accept from them their customary dues, Curius and Fabricius lived in such poverty as to be unable to give a dowry to their daughters<sup>45</sup>; and in both cases the senate paid it for them. Men of this sort, so indifferent to money, and at the same time not without a roughness of nature which would delight in vexing the luxury and rapacity of others, were likely to struggle hard against the prevailing spirit of covet-

<sup>43</sup> Cicero, de Senectut. 16. Valerius Maxim. IV. 3, § 5.

<sup>44</sup> Julius Hyginus, apud Gellium, I. 14. Valerius Maximus, IV. 3, § 6.

<sup>45</sup> I borrow this from Niebuhr, who refers for the story to Apuleius.

ousness and expense. When Fabricius was censor in 479, he expelled P. Rufinus<sup>46</sup> from the senate because he had returned amongst his taxable possessions ten pounds' weight of silver-plate; for there is often a jealousy against any new mode of displaying wealth, when the greatest expenditure in old and accustomed ways excites no displeasure. Silver-plate was a new luxury in the fifth century of Rome, and therefore attracted the censor's notice; three hundred years later, the possession of silver-plate to any amount was fully allowed<sup>47</sup>, but gold-plate was still unusual, and the senate, even in the reign of Tiberius, denounced it as an unbecoming extravagance. But Fabricius, no doubt, disliked the large domain lands held in occupation by Rufinus as much as his ten pounds of silver-plate, thinking that great wealth in the hands of private persons, however employed, was injurious to the commonwealth.

It must not be forgotten, amongst the other changes of this period, that the consulship of Appius Claudius and M. Fulvius<sup>48</sup>, the year which witnessed the final reduction of Volsinii, was marked by the first exhibition of gladiators ever known at Rome. Two sons of D. Junius Brutus exhibited them, it is recorded, at the funeral of their father. The principle of this, as a part of the funeral solemnity, was very ancient and very universal<sup>49</sup>; that the dead

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 489.  
A.C. 265.

First exhibition of gladiators.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

<sup>46</sup> Livy, Epitom. XIV. Niebuhr supposes that Fabricius may have suspected this plate to have been a part of the spoil won by Rufinus at Croton, and have

thought that he ought to have accounted for it to the treasury.

<sup>47</sup> Tacitus, Annal. II. 33.

<sup>48</sup> Valerius Maximus, II. 4, § 7.

<sup>49</sup> Every one remembers the



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

should not go on his dark journey alone, but that a train of other departed souls, whether of enemies slain to avenge him, or of followers to do him honour, should accompany him to the unseen world. But the Romans, it is said<sup>50</sup>, borrowed the practice of substituting a combat for a sacrifice, that the victims might die by each other's swords, immediately from the Etruscans; and when we recollect that the capture of Volsinii took place in this very year, we may conjecture that the gladiators of M. and D. Brutus were Volsinian prisoners, perhaps slaves who had been accustomed to fight before under the service of their former masters. The spectacle from the very beginning excited the liveliest interest at Rome; but for many years it was exhibited only at funerals, as an offering in honour of the dead; the still deeper wickedness of making it a mere sport, and introducing the sufferings and death of human beings as a luxury for the spectators in their seasons of the greatest enjoyment, was reserved for a later period.

Great prosperity of the

The ten years preceding the first Punic war were

slaughter of twelve Trojan prisoners over the funeral pile of Patroclus. When the Scythian kings died, some of all their servants were slain and were buried with them. (Herodotus, IV. 71.) In Thrace single combats took place at the funerals of the chiefs; and there also, as in India, the best beloved of the wives of the deceased was killed and buried with her husband. (Herodotus,

V. 5. 8.) In Spain, too, when Viriathus was burnt on his funeral pile, there were single combats fought around it in honour of him. Appian, de Rebus Hispan. 75. Cassander paid the same honour to Philip Arrhidæus and Eurydice at their funeral at Ægæ. Diyllus, apud Athenæum, IV. p. 155. Diodorus, XIX. 52.

<sup>50</sup> Nicolaus Damascenus, apud Athenæum, IV. p. 153.

probably a time of the greatest physical prosperity which the mass of the Roman people ever knew. Within twenty years two agrarian laws had been passed on a most extensive scale; and the poorer citizens had received besides what may be called a large dividend in money out of the lands which the state had conquered. In addition to this the farming of the state domains<sup>51</sup>, or of their produce, furnished those who had money with abundant opportunities of profitable adventure, while the accumulation of public business increased the demand for clerks and collectors in every branch of the service of the revenue. And the power of obtaining like advantages in all future wars seemed secured to the people by the Hortensian laws, which enabled them to pass an agrarian law whenever they pleased, in spite of the opposition of the senate. No wonder then that war was at this time popular, and that the tribes more than once resolved on taking up arms, when the senate would have preferred peace from considerations of prudence, and, we may hope, of national faith and justice. But our “pleasant vices” are ever made “instruments to scourge us:” and the first Punic war, into which the Roman peo-

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.  
Roman peo-  
ple at this  
period.

<sup>51</sup> See the well-known passage in Polybius, where he notices the extent of patronage possessed by the senate. Πολλῶν γὰρ ἔργων ὄντων τῶν ἐκδιδομένων ὑπὸ τῶν τιμητῶν διὰ πάσης Ἰταλίας εἰς τὰς ἐπισκευὰς καὶ κατασκευὰς τῶν δημοσίων, ἃ τις οὐκ ἂν ἐξαριθμήσαιτο ραδίως, πολλῶν δὲ ποταμῶν, λιμέ-

νων, κηπίων, μετάλλων, χώρας, συλ-  
λήβδην ὅσα πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥω-  
μαίων δυναστείαν, πάντα χειρίζεσθαι  
συμβαίνει τὰ προειρημένα διὰ τοῦ  
πλήθους, καὶ σχεδόν, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν,  
πάντας ἐνδεδέσθαι ταῖς ὠναῖς καὶ  
ταῖς ἐργασίαις ταῖς ἐκ τούτων.—  
IV. 17.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

ple forced the senate to enter, not only in its own long course bore most heavily upon the poorer citizens, but from the feelings of enmity which it excited in the breast of Hamilcar, led most surely to that fearful visitation of Hannibal's sixteen years' invasion of Italy, which destroyed for ever, not indeed the pride of the Roman dominion, but the well-being of the Roman people.

Aqueduct of  
Curius.  
Tiles used  
for roofing  
the houses  
at Rome.

But that calamitous period was only to come upon the children of the existing generation, and in the mean time all was going on prosperously. Another aqueduct was constructed by M'. Curius<sup>52</sup>, when he was censor soon after the retreat of Pyrrhus, by which a supply of water was conveyed to the northern parts of the city from the Anio above Tibur: and tiles<sup>53</sup> at this time began to supersede wood as the roofing material for the common houses of Rome.

Embassy to  
Ptolemy  
Philadelphus,  
king of Egypt.

Their victories over Pyrrhus spread the fame of the Romans far and wide; and immediately after his return to Greece, when he was again becoming formidable by his victories over Antigonus in Macedonia, Ptolemy Philadelphus<sup>54</sup>, king of Egypt, sent an embassy to Rome to conclude an alliance with the

<sup>52</sup> Frontinus, de Aquæductibus, 6. The Aqueduct of Curius was known by the name of "Anio vetus:" its whole length was forty-three miles; but like the older aqueduct of Appius Claudius it consisted mostly of pipes under ground, and was only conducted on an embankment above

ground for a distance of something less than a quarter of a mile.

<sup>53</sup> See Cornelius Nepos quoted by Pliny, as already noticed, Hist. Natur. XVI. § 36.

<sup>54</sup> Livy, Epitom. XIV. Zonaras, VIII. 6. Dionysius, XX. 4. Valerius Maximus, IV. 3, § 9.

Romans. The senate, delighted at such a compliment from so great a king, sent in return an embassy to Alexandria, consisting of three of the most eminent citizens in the commonwealth, Q. Fabius Gurges, who was then first senator (*princeps senatus*), Q. Ogulnius, who had gone to Epidaurus to invite Æsculapius to Rome, and Num. Fabius Pictor, the son of that Fabius who had painted the frescoes in the temple of deliverance from danger. The ambassadors found Alexandria at the height of its splendour, for these were the most brilliant days of the Greek-Egyptian kingdom; and Ptolemy Philadelphus<sup>55</sup>, with a fleet of 1500 ships of war, and a revenue of nearly 15,000 talents, reigned over the whole coast of the Mediterranean from Cyrene to the Nile, and from the Nile to the Triopian headland, at the south-western extremity of Asia Minor opposite to Rhodes; while to the south his power extended to the heart of Æthiopia or Abyssinia, and along both shores of the Red Sea. In his capital there met together the wisdom of Greece and of the east and of Egypt itself: Theocritus, Callimachus, and the seven tragedians of the Pleias<sup>56</sup>; the Jews

<sup>55</sup> The extent of Ptolemy Philadelphus' dominion and the flourishing condition of Egypt during his reign are described by Theocritus, an eye-witness, in his 17th Idyll, and in that remarkable inscription found at Adulis on the western shore of the Red Sea by Cosmas Indicopleustes in the reign of Justin, the father of Justinian. Cosmas copied the in-

scription into his work, which is to be found in Montfaucon's *Collectio Nova*, &c. Vol. II. p. 142. Some remarkable particulars as to the amount of Ptolemy's revenue are preserved by Jerome in his *Commentary on Daniel*, XI. 5.

<sup>56</sup> They were called the Pleias from their number, in allusion to the constellation. Different lists of them are given (see Fynes Clin-

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

who at this time began at Alexandria the translation of the Bible; and Manetho the famous historian of the ancient dynasties of Egypt. The Roman ambassadors were honourably entertained and received valuable presents; which on their return home they laid before the senate, but which the senate immediately gave back to them with permission to do with them as they thought proper.

Outrage to  
the ambas-  
sadors of  
Apollonia.  
The offend-  
ers given  
up to the  
Apollon-  
ians.

In the year 488<sup>57</sup>, the people of Apollonia, a Greek city on the coast of Epirus, sent an embassy to Rome, with what object we know not, but possibly to complain of some of the officers of the Roman government. Two Romans of rank, one of them a senator of the house of Fabius, insulted and beat the ambassadors, and were, in consequence of the outrage, given up to the Apollonians; one of the quæstors also was sent to escort the ambassadors and their prisoners to Brundisium, lest any attempt should be made to rescue them. But the Apollonians measuring rightly their own utter inability to cope with so great a nation as the Romans, and judging that it would be unwise<sup>58</sup> to interpret too closely the sentence of the senate, restored both offenders unhurt.

ton, *Fasti Hellen.* Vol. III. year B.C. 259.), but none of them are known to us by any existing works, if, as Mr. Fox and Niebuhr seem most justly to think, the Lycophron who wrote the *Alexandra* is a very different person from the Lycophron of the *Pleias*, and belongs to a later age. See Nie-

buhr's *Kleine Schrift* p. 438—450.

<sup>57</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 7. Livy, *Epit.* XV. Valer. Max. VI. 6, § 5.

<sup>58</sup> They may have remembered the wisdom of the Æginetans in like circumstances, when the Spartan king, Leutychidas, was given up to them by his countrymen, as



Our notices of the physical history of these times are very scanty. The winter of 484 was one of unusual severity<sup>59</sup>; the Tiber was frozen over to a great depth, the snow lay in the forum for nearly six weeks, the olives and fig-trees were generally killed, and many of the cattle perished for want of pasture, as they were dependent, even in winter, on such food as they could find in the fields. This great frost happened about one hundred and thirty years after the frost of 355, and seems to have equalled it in severity. Volcanic phenomena<sup>60</sup> are recorded during the two following years, and in 488 we hear of a very destructive pestilence, which lasted for more than two years more, and is described as exceedingly fatal<sup>61</sup>; but the language of Augustine is indefinite, and that of Orosius clearly exaggerated, so that we can neither discover the nature and causes of the disease, nor estimate the amount of the mortality.

Ten years, as they bring forward into active life a new generation, so they always sweep away some of the last survivors of former times, and bring down to a later period the range of living memory. Appius Claudius and Valerius Corvus, who were both alive

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
Physical history.  
Severe winter of  
484.

an atonement for some wrong which he had done to them. A Spartan had warned them not to take the Spartan government at its word, nor to believe that they might really carry the king of Sparta away as their prisoner, and punish him at their discretion. See Herodotus, VI. 85.

<sup>59</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 6. Augustine de Civit. Dei, III. 17.

<sup>60</sup> Orosius, IV. 4. The earthquake which happened in the Picentian war, just as the Romans and Picentians were going to engage, belongs to the volcanic phenomena of this period.

<sup>61</sup> Augustine, III. 17. Orosius, IV. 5.

A new generation coming forward. Deaths of Curius and Fabricius.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

when Pyrrhus was in Italy, died soon after his return to Epirus. L. Papirius Cursor, if he were still living, had yet appeared for the last time in a public station; neither he nor his colleague Sp. Carvilius are heard of again after their second censorship in the year 482. M'. Curius had obtained the censorship in that same year, three years after his victory at Beneventum; he employed the money arising from the spoils of his triumph in constructing, as we have seen, the second oldest of the Roman aqueducts; and after his censorship he was named by the senate one<sup>62</sup> of two commissioners for completing the work, but he died within a few days after his appointment. Thus one of the most honest and energetic men known to us in the Roman history, a man whose name is associated so closely with the uncorrupted period of the Roman character, was carried off apparently before he had arrived at old age. When Fabricius died we know not; but he is not heard of again after his censorship in 479, nor do we know any farther particulars of him than that he was buried, by a special dispensation, within the city walls<sup>63</sup>; a rare honour, which strongly marks the general sense entertained of the purity of his virtue; "as if," says Niebuhr, "his bones could be no defilement to the temples of the heavenly gods, nor his spirit disturb the peace of the living."

Conclusion. So passes away what may be called the spring-

<sup>62</sup> Frontinus de Aquæduct. 6.

the walls of Amphipolis, as having

<sup>63</sup> Cicero de Legibus, II. 23.

been the deliverer of the city.

Thus Brasidas was buried within

Thucyd. V. 11.

time of the Roman people. Wealth, and power, and dominion, have brought on the ripened summer, with more of vigour indeed, but less of freshness. Beginning her career of conquest beyond the limits of Italy, Rome was now entering upon her appointed work, and that work was undoubtedly fraught with good. The conqueror and the martyr are alike God's instruments; but it is the privilege of his conscious and willing instruments to be doubly and merely blessed; the benefits of their work to others are unalloyed by evil, while to themselves it is the perfecting and not the corrupting of their moral being: when it is done, they are not cast away as instruments spoiled and worthless, but partake of the good which they have given, and enjoy for ever the love of men, and the blessing of God.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

### CONSTITUTION AND POWER OF CARTHAGE.

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Πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς.

ARISTOTLE, Politic. II.

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CHAP.  
XXXIX.  
Internal  
condition of  
Carthage.

THE name of Carthage has already occurred more than once in the course of this history; and I have already noticed the extent of her dominion, and the inherent causes of its unsoundness, inasmuch as the Carthaginians and their African subjects were separated from one another by broad differences of race, language, and institutions; so that they could not blend together into one nation. The isolation of Carthage from all the surrounding people offers a striking contrast to the position of Rome in Italy, where the allies and the Latin name were bound to the Romans and to each other by manifold ties, and the communication of the Roman franchise, or at least the prospect of obtaining it hereafter, was every year effacing the painful memory of the first conquest, and effecting that consolidation of various elements into one great and united people, in which alone conquest can find its justification. But as the

Carthaginians will now occupy no small share of our attention, from the importance and long duration of their contest with the Romans, so it becomes desirable to look at them more closely, and see what was their internal state, and with what excellences and defects in their national character and institutions they encountered the iron strength of Rome.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

The constitution of Carthage was compared to that of Sparta, as containing in it the elements of monarchy and of aristocracy, and of democracy. But in such mixed governments, one element is always predominant: first, in the natural course of things, the monarchical, next the aristocratical, and, lastly, the democratical or popular. The predominance of one element by no means implies, however, the total inactivity of the others; and in their common, although not equal action, consists the excellence of such constitutions; not simply that the working of the principal power is checked by the direct legal rights of the other two, but much more because the nation retains by their means those ideas and those points of character which they peculiarly suggest and encourage, and is thus saved from that narrow-minded uniformity of views and of tastes which the exclusive influence of any single element must necessarily occasion. In Carthage there is reason to believe that the monarchical part of the constitution had once the ascendancy<sup>1</sup>, but during

Its government was mixed, but predominantly aristocratical.

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle says that Carthage had never suffered in any serious degree either from faction or from a tyrant. *Politic.* II. 11. Yet in another place he gives Carthage as an instance of a country where a tyranny had been succeeded by an aristocracy. *V.* 12. It seems then



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

those times in which she is best known to us, the aristocratical element was predominant; the full development of the democratical was prevented by the premature destruction of the whole nation.

The suffetes  
or judges.

The Carthaginian aristocracy was partly one of birth, but chiefly, as it should seem, of wealth. Indeed the older form of a pure aristocracy of birth must necessarily be rare in a colony, where the original settlers must almost always be a mixed body, and yet in their new settlement find themselves on an equality with each other. It appears, however, that nobility of birth was acknowledged in Carthage, and that their two chief magistrates, or judges<sup>2</sup>, suffetes, whom the Greeks called kings, were elected only from a certain number of families. How many these were, and what was the origin of their nobility, we are not informed. But wealth, contrary to the practice of the Roman government, was an indispensable qualification for all the highest offices. Nay, we are told that the very suffetes and captains-general of the commonwealth bought their high dignities<sup>3</sup>: whether this is to be understood of paying

that this tyranny must be understood of the earlier times of the Carthaginian history, before that constitution existed on which Aristotle comments.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *Politic.* II. 11. Βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μήτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος μηδὲ τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν. It is obvious that "suffes," or "sufes" is the same word with the Hebrew שופט, which was the title of those magistrates whom we call the judges. Now as the

judges in the Scripture history are distinguished from the kings, and it was a great change when the Israelites, tired of their judges or suffetes, desired to have a king; so it is probable that the suffetes at Carthage also were so named to show that they were not kings, and that the Greek writers in calling them βασιλεῖς, have used a term likely to mislead.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, VI. 56. Aristotle's account implies the same thing.

money to obtain votes, or, as is much more probable, that the fees or expenses of entering on an office were purposely made very heavy, to render it inaccessible to any but the rich.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

The great council, *σύγκλητος*, was probably an assembly as numerous as the Roman senate, and, like the senate, was a mixed body, containing members of different ages, who, in whatever manner appointed, were a sort of representation of the general feelings of the aristocracy. But from this great council there were chosen one hundred members<sup>4</sup>, who formed what was called the council of elders, and who in fact were the supreme authority in the state. They were originally appointed as a check upon the power of the captains-general, and were a court before which every general, on his return from a foreign command, had to render an account of his conduct. But by degrees they became not only supreme criminal judges in all cases, but also a supreme executive council, of which the two suffetes or kings were the presidents. In this capacity they were legally, we may presume, no more than a managing committee for the great council; but as they were themselves members of that council, so they became in ordinary cases its substitute, and in all cases

The great council, and the council of elders.

<sup>4</sup> "Centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur," says Justin, in giving an account of the origin of this council of elders, XIX. 2. The council of elders, or *γερονσία*, is distinguished expressly from the larger council, or senate, *σύγκλητος*. See Polybius, X. 18. and XXXVI. 2. For the

whole subject of the Carthaginian constitution I have been largely indebted to Heeren's Historical Researches on the African Nations, Vol. I. I have also derived some assistance from Kluge's Commentary on Aristotle's account of the Carthaginian constitution, published in 1824.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

The commissions or boards of five.

exercised such a control over it, that they are called a power for governing the general council itself<sup>5</sup>.

The hundred, or the elders, were chosen for life from the members of the great council, but not by the votes of the council at large. On the contrary, they were chosen by certain bodies which Aristotle calls *πενταρχίαι*, or commissions of five, and which formed so many close corporations, filling up their own vacancies. This is nearly all the information which we possess on the subject; for Aristotle only adds, that these commissions had great and various powers, and that their members remained longer in office than the ordinary magistrates, inasmuch as they exercised an authority both before and after their regular term of magistracy. The most probable conjecture is, that the more important branches of the public administration were, as we should say, put in commission, and vested in boards of five members; that thus the treasury would be entrusted to one commission of five, the care of public manners and morals, the censor's office at Rome, would be given to another commission; the police, perhaps, to another; the navy to another; and so on. Nothing would hinder these commissioners from being members of the great council, and nothing would hinder them, therefore, from electing themselves also to fill up vacancies in the council of elders: in fact, we are expressly told<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Livy, XXX. 16. "Sanctius consilium, maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis."

<sup>6</sup> Livy, XXXIII. 46.—What is

here said of the multiplication of offices in the hands of the same persons at Carthage, was also the case at Venice. Every member of

that the treasurer's or quæstor's office led regularly to a seat amongst the hundred; and thus the same men being often members at one and the same time of one or perhaps more of these administrative commissions, and of the great council, and also of the council of elders, we can understand what Aristotle means when he says that it was a favourite practice with the Carthaginians to invest the same person with several offices together.

All this was sufficiently aristocratical, or rather in the spirit of that worst form of aristocracy which the Greeks called oligarchy. And what was thus ordered by law, was to be maintained by feeling: the members of the aristocracy had their clubs<sup>7</sup>, where they habitually met at a common mess or public table, with the very object of binding them more closely to each other, and imbuing them entirely with the spirit of their order.

Under such a constitution the power of the suffetes had been reduced from its originally almost kingly prerogatives to the state of the doge under the later constitution of Venice. In earlier times they had been invested with the two great characters of ancient royalty, those of general and of priest<sup>8</sup>;

the supreme criminal tribunal of forty had a seat ex-officio in the senate; and the three presidents of the Forty sat also in the council of the doge. "L'autorité du législateur," says Daru, "celle du juge, l'influence de l'administration et le pouvoir discrétionnaire de la police, se trouvaient réunis dans les mêmes mains." *Histoire de Venise*, Livre XXXIX. Vol. VI. p. 78, and 146.

<sup>7</sup> Τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν. Aristotle, *Politic.* II. 11. It may be mentioned, as a mark of the aristocratical spirit of the Carthaginian government, that the senate and people had different baths.—*Valer. Max.* IX. 5. Ext. § 4.

<sup>8</sup> At least Hamilcar, who commanded the Carthaginians at the battle of Himera, and who was one of the suffetes, is described by Herodotus as sacrificing during the

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

The aristocratical clubs.

Diminution of the power of the suffetes.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

but now the first of these was commonly taken from him, and the office of general-in-chief is spoken of by Aristotle as distinct; nor was it even left in the suffetes' appointment. Still the two kings, as the Greek writers call them, were recognised as an essential branch of the government, and if they differed upon any proposed measure from the council of elders, then the question was referred to the assembly of the people<sup>9</sup>. It was thus, no doubt, that an opening was afforded for weakening the power of the aristocracy: for either of the suffetes was thus enabled to introduce the decision of the popular branch on points of government; and it is of the essence of a popular assembly, if called into activity, to become predominant: it may exist and yet be powerless, but only so long as few points are in practice submitted to its decision.

Judicial  
power.  
Court of the  
hundred  
and four.

But so long as the suffetes and council were agreed, the power of the Carthaginian people was exceedingly small. Nothing, it seems, could originate with the popular assembly; so that the exercise of its functions did not depend on its own will, but on the accidental disagreement of the other branches of the legislature. And as the mass of the people had so small a share practically in the legislation or in the administration of affairs, so they were destitute of judicial power: there were no juries as in

battle, and pouring libations with his own hand on the victims. VII. 167. And although the expression in Herodotus is *ἐθύετο*, and not *ἔθυεν*, yet the same expression is applied to the prophet Tisamenus, who was with the Greek army at Platæa; and unless Hamilcar had

been personally engaged in the sacrifice, we can scarcely suppose that he would have remained in the camp while it was going forward, instead of being present with his soldiers in the action.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Politic.* II. 11.



England, nor any large popular courts where hundreds or even thousands of the poorest citizens sat in judgment, as at Athens. All causes, civil and criminal, were tried by certain magistracies<sup>10</sup>: the highest matters, as we have seen, by the council of elders; but every magistracy seems to have had a judicial power attached to it, and only one court had a popular constitution. This was the court of the hundred and four<sup>11</sup>, the members of which were elected by the people at large; but public opinion required that

<sup>10</sup> Ἀριστοκρατικὸν, τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ἢ ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι. Aristot. Politic. II. 11. Πάσας ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας, III. 1. For the statement in the text these passages are a sufficient warrant; but the first offers, as is well known, much difficulty in itself; and Kluge's explanation is not satisfactory. In the latter passage Carthage and Lacedæmon are said to resemble each other in the aristocratical principle of vesting the judicial power in magistrates, and not in juries taken from the people at large. This is perfectly clear; but one does not see why it should be more aristocratical to give to all these magistrates an universal jurisdiction, rather than, as at Sparta, to assign civil causes to one court, and criminal to another. It is strange, too, that in one of these passages Sparta and Carthage should be said to manage their courts of justice on the same principle; that is, on one of an antipopular character, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα, if in the other passage they are meant to be contrasted with one another. Is it not possible therefore to refer

the words καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι, to the whole of the clause preceding it, rather than to the words καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ἢ ἄλλων, and to understand these last words not of the Lacedæmonian practice of submitting different causes to different magistrates, but of a more democratical system by which not all causes were tried by magistrates, as at Carthage, but some by magistrates, and others by juries; "some by one authority, and others by another?"

<sup>11</sup> The number of this court is supposed by Niebuhr (Vol. I. note 851) to have reference to the number of weeks in the solar year, as if there were two judges for each week. The numbers were elected, says Aristotle, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων ἀλλ' ἀριστίνδην. This can only mean that public opinion required for the office so high a qualification in point of character, that the appointment was in the truest sense of the word aristocratical; whereas, at Sparta, a lower standard being fixed for the characters of the Ephori, persons of very ordinary qualifications were often chosen, if party feelings recommended them.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

they should be men of irreproachable characters ; and therefore the election was conducted with care, and no one without merit was likely to be appointed. This court probably exercised jurisdiction especially in civil and mercantile causes ; such as would be exceedingly numerous in so great a commercial country as Carthage.

Regular system of colonization.

Thus excluded in the ordinary course of things from the government, the legislature, and the courts of justice, the Carthaginian commons were kept for centuries in a state of contented acquiescence with their country's constitution, because provision was happily and wisely made for their physical wants. Colonization, as a provision for the poorer citizens, was an habitual resource of the Carthaginian government. And not only did their numerous settlements along the coast of Africa enable them to make grants of land to whole bodies of their people, but individuals<sup>12</sup> were employed in various offices under the government, as clerks, or as custom-house officers, where opportunities of acquiring money would not be wanting. With such means of relief, largely offered by fortune and wisely used, the Carthaginian people were saved from that worst cause of revolutions, general distress ; and the mass of mankind are so constituted, that so long as their physical wants are satisfied, the cravings of their intellectual and moral nature are rarely vehement.

<sup>12</sup> Aristot. Politic. VI. 5. Ἄετι τινες ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιουκίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους. I have done : Heeren objects to this interpretation, and explains it of colonies sent out in the mass. Kluge understands this passage as

Every one who is accustomed to make history a reality must feel how unsatisfactory are these accounts of mere institutions, which, at the best, can offer us only a plan, and not a living picture. Was the Carthaginian aristocracy, with its merchant-nobles, its jealous tribunals, its power abroad and its weakness at home, an older sister of that Venetian republic, whose fall, less shameful than the long stagnation of its half existence, Nemesis has in our own days rejoiced in? Or did the common voice in France speak truly, when it is called England the modern Carthage? Or is Holland the truer parallel; and do the contests of the house of Nassau with the Dutch aristocracy represent the ambition of the house of Barca, and the triumph of the popular party over the old aristocratical constitution? We cannot answer these questions certainly, because Carthage on the stage of history is to us a dumb actor; no poet, orator, historian, or philosopher, has escaped the wreck of time, to show us how men thought and felt at Carthage. There were Carthaginian writers, we know. Sallust had heard translations of passages in their historical records<sup>13</sup>; and the Roman senate, when Carthage was destroyed, ordered Mago's work on agriculture to be translated into Latin<sup>14</sup>. Nor were geographical accounts of

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Meagreness  
of our ac-  
counts of  
Carthage  
from the  
total want  
of all Car-  
thaginian  
literature.

<sup>13</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. 20.

<sup>14</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natur.* XVIII. § 22. It appears from this passage that on the destruction of Carthage the Carthaginian libraries were given by the senate to "the princes of Africa," "regulis Africæ;" that is chiefly, no doubt, to

Masinissa. And thus the Carthaginian books from which Sallust quotes, were said, he tells us, to have belonged to king Hiempsal, Masinissa's grandson. And farther, Mago's work was committed for translation to persons who understood Carthaginian, of

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

their voyages of discovery wanting; imperfect translations of, or rather extracts from, two of which into Greek<sup>15</sup> and Latin, have descended to our own times. But of poets, orators, and philosophers we hear nothing; nor probably were the writers who were translated to Sallust deserving of the name of historians; at least all that he quotes from them relates to times beyond real historical memory, as if they had but recorded floating popular traditions, without attempting critical or contemporary history. It was a Greek who gave what may be looked upon as a Carthaginian account<sup>16</sup> of the first Punic war; and it was to two Greeks<sup>17</sup> that Hannibal committed the task of recording his own immortal expedition to Italy. Their language, indeed, shut the Carthaginians out from the prevailing civilization of the ancient world: it was easy for a Roman to learn Greek, which was but a sister language to his own; but neither Greek nor Latin have any near resemblance to Phœnician; nor were there any Carthaginian names or stories which poets and artists

whom the man who knew it best was a member of the Junian family, D. Silanus. Still a knowledge of Carthaginian must have been a rare accomplishment; which makes us wonder at the introduction of speeches in that language upon the Roman stage, as in the *Pœnulus* of Plautus. It seems to me by no means certain that all of what is there given is genuine Carthaginian. Was Plautus likely to have learnt the language, and for what object would pure Carthaginian have been introduced, when apparently the only

purpose answered by Hanno's speaking in a foreign language is to cause a laugh at Milphio's burlesque interpretation of it?

<sup>15</sup> Such as a Greek translation of a voyage of Hanno, published by Hudson in his *Geographi Minores*; and Festus Avienus' Latin version of certain parts of the voyage of Himilcon, which Heeren has given in the Appendix to his work on Carthage.

<sup>16</sup> Philinus of Agrigentum.

<sup>17</sup> Sosilus of Lacedæmon, and Silanus or Silenus. Vid. Cornel. Nepot. in Hannibal, 13.



had made famous amongst all civilized nations like those of Thebes and Troy. Thus, as I said before, Carthage, not having spoken of what was in her heart, it has passed along with herself into destruction; and we can now only know something of what she did, without understanding what she was.

Polybius<sup>18</sup> has said that during the wars with the Romans, the Carthaginian constitution became more democratical, and he ascribes the victory of the Romans in some measure to the superior wisdom of their aristocratical government, and the instability of popular counsels in Carthage. It is, indeed, evident, that the family of Barca rested on popular support, and were opposed by the party of the aristocracy; and that they could maintain their power so long in spite of such an opposition, shows undoubtedly, that the popular part of the constitution must have gained far more strength than it possessed in the days of Aristotle. Hamilcar and his family seem to have stood in the position of Pericles at Athens; both have often been taxed with having injured irreparably the constitution of their two countries; and both, perhaps, had the natural weakness of great men, that feeling themselves to be better than any institutions, they removed too boldly things which to them were hindrances, but to the mediocrity of ordinary men are supports or useful guides; so that when they died, and no single men arose able to fill their place, what they had undone found nothing

CITAP.  
XXXIX.

Growth of  
the popular  
party, head-  
ed by Ha-  
milcar Barca  
and his  
family.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

to succeed to it, and then the overthrow of the older system appeared an irreparable mischief. But the question is amongst the most difficult in political science; Venice shows that no democracy, no tyranny, can be so vile as the dregs of an aristocracy suffered to run out its full course; and with respect to the conduct of a war, the Roman senate is no fair specimen of aristocracies in general; the affairs of Athens and of Carthage were never conducted so ably as when the popular party was most predominant; nor have any governments ever shown in war greater feebleness and vacillation and ignorance than those of Sparta, and, but too often, of England.

Enterprising  
spirit of the  
Carthaginian govern-  
ment.

A great commercial state, where wealth was largely gained and highly valued, was always in danger, according to the opinion of the ancient philosophers, of losing its spirit of enterprise. But in this Carthage resembled the government of British India; necessity at first made her merchants soldiers; and when she became powerful, then the mere impulse of a great dominion kept up her energy; she had much to maintain, and what she already possessed gave her the power, and with it the temptation, of acquiring more. Besides, it is a very important point in the state of society in the ancient world, that the business of a soldier was no isolated profession, but mixed up essentially with the ordinary life of every citizen. Hence those who guided the counsels of a state were ready also to conduct its armies; and military glory was a natural object of ambition to many enterprising minds which,

in modern Europe, could only hope for distinction in the cabinet or in parliament. The great families of Carthage, holding amongst them a monopoly of all the highest offices, might safely calculate on obtaining for all their members some opportunity of distinguishing themselves: if the father fell in the service of his country, his son not unfrequently became his successor, and the glory of finishing what he had begun was not left to a stranger. Thus the house of Mago for three generations conducted the Carthaginian invasions of Sicily; and thus Hamilcar Barca, according to his own expression<sup>19</sup>, reared his three sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago, as lion's whelps to prey upon the Romans.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

History can produce no greater statesmen and generals than some of the members of the Carthaginian aristocracy. But the Carthaginian people were wholly unfit to contend with the people of Rome. No military excellence in arms or tactic is ever ascribed to them; nor does it appear that they were regularly trained to war like the citizens of Rome and Italy. The Carthaginian armies were composed of Africans and Numidians, of Gauls and Spaniards, but we scarcely hear of any Carthaginian citizens except as generals or officers. With this deficiency in native soldiers, there was also a remarkable want of fortresses; a point of no small importance at all periods, but especially so in ancient warfare. The walls exist in Italy to this day of many

Inferiority  
of the Car-  
thaginian  
people as  
soldiers.  
Want of for-  
tresses in  
the Cartha-  
ginian terri-  
tory.

<sup>19</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 3.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

towns whose very names have perished; but we know that, small as they were, they could have delayed the progress of an invader; and how inestimable were the services rendered to the Romans in their greatest danger by the fortifications of Nola and Casilinum! But in the Carthaginian territory an invader found nothing but a rich and defenceless spoil. Agathocles conquered 200 towns<sup>20</sup> with scarcely any opposition; and Hannibal himself, after one defeat in the field, had no resource but submission to the conqueror. Had a French army ever effected a landing in England during the last war, the same want of fortresses would have enabled the enemy to overrun the whole country, and have taught us by fatal experience to appreciate in this respect the improvidence of Carthage.

Carthage  
was unequal  
to Rome.

Thus with abler leaders and a richer treasury, but with a weaker people, an unguarded country, and with subjects far less united and attached to her government, Carthage was really unequal to the contest with Rome. And while observing this inequality in the course of our story, we shall have more reason to admire that extraordinary energy and genius of Hamilcar Barca and his family, which so long struggled against it, and even in spite of nature, almost made the weaker party victorious.

<sup>20</sup> Diodorus, XX. 17.

## CHAPTER XL.

FIRST PUNIC WAR—THE ROMANS INVADE SICILY—  
SUBMISSION OF HIERO—THE ROMANS CREATE A  
NAVY—NAVAL VICTORIES OF MYLÆ AND ECNOMUS  
—EXPEDITION OF M. REGULUS TO AFRICA; HIS SUC-  
CESSES, HIS ARROGANCE IN VICTORY, HIS DEFEAT  
AND CAPTIVITY—WAR IN SICILY—SIEGE OF LILY-  
BÆUM AND NAVAL ACTIONS CONNECTED WITH IT—  
HAMILCAR BARCA AT EIRCTE AND ERYX—NAVAL  
BATTLE OF THE ÆGATES—PEACE CONCLUDED—  
A.U.C. 490 TO 513—A.C. 264 TO 241.

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Μελετήσομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά, καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπι-  
στήμην ἐς τὸ ἴσον καταστήσωμεν, τῇ γε εὐψυχίᾳ δὴ πον περιεσόμεθα· ὁ  
γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν φύσει ἀγαθόν, ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο διδαχῇ· ὁ δ' ἐκείνοι  
ἐπιστήμη προύχουσι, καθαιρετέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μελέτη.—THUCYD. I 121.

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THE first Punic war lasted without intermission for more than two and twenty years<sup>1</sup>, a longer space of

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

<sup>1</sup> From the middle perhaps of the year 490 to the middle of the year 513; nearly twenty-three years if we reckon from the arrival of the first Mamertine embassy at Rome, to the conclusion of the definitive treaty. The whole pe-

riod of the Revolution wars, from April 1792 to July 1815, is but a very little longer, and it becomes very much shorter if the interval of peace be deducted, which extends from October 1801 to May 1803.

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.  
Introduction  
to the his-  
tory of the  
first Punic  
war.

time than the whole period occupied by the wars of the French revolution, if we omit to reckon the nineteen months of the peace or rather truce of Amiens. And we have now, for the first time, the guidance of a careful and well-informed historian, who having been born little more than thirty years after the end of the war<sup>2</sup>, had studied the written accounts given of its events by each of the contending parties, had learnt something, no doubt, concerning it, from the mouths both of Romans and Carthaginians, and who judged what he had heard and read with understanding, and for the most part impartially. The actions then of this war may be known, and some of them deserve to be described particularly; nor does it indeed seem possible to communicate any interest to history, if it must only record results and not paint actions. But in military matters especially, much that may and ought to be told at length by a contemporary historian, ought not to be repeated by one who writes after an interval of many centuries: and therefore I must of necessity pass over slightly many battles and sieges in order to relate others in full detail, and yet avoid the fault of too great prolixity.

The Mamer-  
tines of Mes-  
sana apply to  
Rome for  
aid against  
the Cartha-

It was the eleventh year after the defeat of Pyrrhus at Beneventum, and Appius Claudius Caudex and M. Fulvius Flaccus were consuls, when a depu-

<sup>2</sup> The exact year of Polybius' birth is uncertain. He was under 30 in 573, but as he was appointed ambassador to Egypt in that year,

he could not have been many years younger. See Fynes Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* Vol III. p. 75.



tation<sup>3</sup> arrived at Rome from the Mamertines of Messana, praying that the Romans, the sovereigns of Italy, would not suffer an Italian people to be destroyed by Greeks and Carthaginians. Hiero, king of Syracuse, was their open enemy; the Carthaginians, under pretence of saving them from his vengeance, were trying to get possession of their citadel; but the Mamertines, true to their Italian blood, sought to put themselves under the protection of their own countrymen, and it greatly concerned the Romans not to allow the Carthaginians to become masters of Messana, and to gain a station for their fleets within thirty stadia of the coast of Italy.

Six years had not elapsed since the Romans had extirpated the brethren and imitators of the Mamertines, who had done to Rhegium what the Mamertines had done to Messana; and Hiero, king of Syracuse, had zealously aided them in the work, and as it appears<sup>4</sup>, was actually at this time their ally. The Mamertines were a horde of adventurers and plunderers, who were the common enemies of mankind, and whose case the Romans had prejudged already by their exemplary punishment of the very same conduct in the Campanians of Rhegium, while Hiero and the Carthaginians were the friends and allies of Rome. The senate, therefore, we are assured<sup>5</sup>, after long debates, could not resolve to interfere in such a quarrel.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.  
ginians and  
Hiero.

The senate  
hesitates to  
grant it.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, I. 10. Zonaras, sius, Fragm. Vatican. LVII. VIII. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, I. 11.

<sup>4</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 8. Dion Cas-

CHAP.  
XL.A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

But the people in their tribes resolve to assist them.

But the consuls, who, if true to the hereditary character of their families, were both of them ambitious men and unscrupulous, brought the petition of the Mamertines before the assembly of the people. The ready topics of aiding an Italian people against foreigners, and of restraining the power of Carthage, whose establishments in Corsica, Sardinia, and the Liparæan islands, were already drawn, like a chain, round the Roman dominion, were, no doubt, urged plausibly; it might have been said too, that the Carthaginians had already undertaken to protect the Mamertines, so that they could not reproach the Romans for upholding the very same cause. Besides, the Roman people had a fresh remembrance of the assignations of land, the rich spoil, and the lucrative employments, which had followed from their late conquests in Italy; the fertility of Sicily was proverbial; and the well-known riches of Carthage made a war with her as tempting a prospect to the Romans as a war with Spain has been ere now to Englishmen. So the Roman people resolved to protect the Mamertine buccaneers, and to receive them as their friends and allies.

C. Claudius crosses over to Messina, and promises to the Mamertines the aid of Rome.

The vote of the comitia was, by the actual constitution of Rome, paramount to every other authority except the negative of the tribunes; and as the tribunes did not interpose, the hesitation of the senate availed nothing. Accordingly the senate now resolved to assist the Mamertines; and Appius Claudius was ordered to carry the resolution into effect. But before he could be ready to act with a consular

army, C. Claudius, with a small force, was sent to the spot with orders to communicate as quickly as possible with the Mamertines. In a small boat<sup>6</sup> he crossed the strait to Messina, and was introduced before the Mamertine assembly. With the language so invariably repeated afterwards whenever a Roman army appeared in a foreign country, C. Claudius assured the Mamertines that he was come to give them their freedom, and he called on the Carthaginians either to evacuate the city, for since the Mamertine embassy to Rome they had been put in possession of the citadel by their partisans in Messina, or to explain the grounds on which they occupied it. His address received no answer; upon which he said, "This silence proves that the Mamertine people are not their own masters, and that the Carthaginians have no just defence of their conduct to offer. For the sake of our common Italian blood, and because our aid has been implored, we will do the Mamertines justice."

But the strait of Messina, guarded by a Carthaginian fleet, was a barrier not easy to surmount. The Romans, since their conquest of Tarentum and their possession of all the coasts of Italy, seem to have given up their navy altogether, and we hear at this time of no duumviri or naval commanders as regular officers of the commonwealth. From the Greek cities in their alliance, Neapolis<sup>7</sup>, Velia, and Tarentum, they obtained a few triremes and pente-

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

The Roman fleet in attempting to cross the strait is repulsed by the Carthaginians.

<sup>6</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 8. Dion Cassius, *Fragm.* Vatican. LVIII.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, I. 20.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

conters; but they had not a single quinquereme, the class of ships which may be called the line of battle ships of that period. Their attempt to cross to Sicily was therefore easily baffled, and some of their triremes<sup>8</sup> with the soldiers whom they were transporting, fell into the hands of the Carthaginians.

Claudius again crosses to Messana, and invites the Carthaginian governor to a conference.

Hanno, the Carthaginian governor of Messana, sent back the ships and the prisoners to the Romans, calling upon them not to break the peace with Carthage, nor to venture again on the hopeless attempt of crossing the strait in defiance of his naval superiority<sup>9</sup>. C. Claudius rejected his overtures and repeated his determination to deliver Messana. Hanno exclaimed, that since they were so arrogant, he would not suffer the Romans to meddle with the sea so much as to wash their hands in it. Yet his vigilance did not justify this language, for Claudius with a few men effected his passage, apparently in a single ship, and finding the Mamertines assembled at the harbour to receive him, he again proceeded to address them, professed his wish to leave their choice of protectors to their own free decision, and urged that Hanno should be invited to come down from the citadel, that the Roman and Carthaginian commanders might each plead the claim of his own country to be received as the ally and defender of Messana.

The governor is treacherously seized,

With this proposal Hanno<sup>10</sup> was induced to com-

<sup>8</sup> Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Vatic.* LIX. Zonaras, VIII. 8.

<sup>9</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 9. Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Vatic.* LIX.

<sup>10</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 9. Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Vatic.* LX.

ply, as over-scrupulous, it seems, to remove every ground of suspicion against the good faith of Carthage as Claudius was unscrupulous in serving the ambition of Rome. When the Carthaginian governor appeared, the discussion began; neither party would yield, and at last Claudius ordered his soldiers to seize Hanno and detain him as a prisoner. The Mamertines applauded the act, and Hanno to procure his liberty, engaged to withdraw his garrison from the citadel, and to leave Messana in the hands of the Romans.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.  
and surrenders the citadel to purchase his freedom.

The Carthaginian council of elders<sup>11</sup>, always severe in its judgments upon military commanders, ordered Hanno forthwith to be crucified; and dispatched another officer of the same name with a fleet and army to Sicily. Hiero, provoked by the treachery of the Romans, concluded an alliance with Carthage against them, and the two allied powers jointly blockaded Messana. Hiero lay encamped on the south side of the town, Hanno stationed himself on the north, and his fleet lay close by, at the headland of Pelorus, where the strait is narrowest, to prevent the Romans from reinforcing their garrison.

Messana is besieged by the joint forces of Carthage and of Syracuse.

Things were in this state<sup>12</sup> when Appius Claudius with his consular army arrived at Rhegium. After some fruitless attempts at negotiation, he prepared to force his passage. We want here a consistent account of the details; but negligence there must

Appius Claudius crosses the strait with a consular army, and defeats the Syracusans.

<sup>11</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 9. Polybius, I. 11. Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXIII. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Polybius, I. 11. Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXIII. 2. 4. Zonaras, VIII. 9.



CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

have been on the part of the Carthaginians<sup>13</sup>, to allow an army of twenty thousand men to be embarked, conveyed over the strait, and landed on the coast of Sicily, without loss or serious interruption. The landing was effected at night, and on the south of Messana, near the camp of the Syracusans. Appius immediately led his soldiers to attack Hiero, who, confounded at the appearance of the Romans, and believing that the Carthaginians must have betrayed the passage, still marched out to meet the enemy. The Syracusan cavalry supported its old renown, and obtained some advantage, but the infantry were never much esteemed, and on this occasion they were probably inferior in numbers. Hiero was defeated and driven to his camp, and the very next night, suspecting his allies, and perceiving that he had ventured on an ill-advised contest, he raised the siege, and retreated to Syracuse.

He defeats  
the Cartha-  
ginians,  
raises the  
siege of Mes-  
sana, and  
pursues  
Hiero under  
the walls of  
Syracuse.

Thus delivered from one enemy, Appius next attacked the Carthaginians<sup>14</sup>. Their position was strong, and he was repulsed; but this success tempted them to meet him on equal ground, and they were then defeated with loss. Messana was

<sup>13</sup> Zonaras says of Appius, *ὡς εἶρε συχνοὺς αὐτῶν πολλαχῇ κατὰ πρόφασιν ἐμπορίας ἐλλιμενίζοντας, ἐξηπάτησε σφᾶς ὅπως διέλθῃ τὸν πορθμὸν ἀσφαλέςτατα*. It is not easy to ascertain the exact meaning of Zonaras' Greek, but I believe that *κατὰ πρόφασιν ἐμπορίας* does not mean "under pretence of trafficking," but when "they had an occasion of trafficking."

Compare in Thucydides, VII. 13. *ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει*. It would seem then that the Carthaginian sailors were trafficking in the port of Messana when they ought to have been at sea, watching the movements of the Romans.

<sup>14</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 9. Polybius, I. 12. Diodorus, *Fragm. Hoeschel*. XXIII. 4.

now completely relieved; the Carthaginian army retreated, and was divided into detachments to garrison the towns of the Carthaginian part of the island. Appius overran the open country in every direction, and the soldiers, no doubt, congratulated themselves on their decision in the comitia at Rome, which in so short a time had enriched them with the plunder of Sicily. But an attempt to take Egesta was repulsed with considerable slaughter, and when Appius advanced even to the very walls of Syracuse, and pretended to besiege the city, he found that he could not always be successful; his men suffered from the summer and autumn fevers of the marsh plain of the Anapus, and he retreated to Messana, with the Syracusan army pressing upon his rear. The Syracusans, however, long accustomed to regard the Carthaginians as their worst enemies, were unwilling to support the evils of war in their cause; the Syracusan advanced posts held frequent communications with the Romans, and although Hiero could not yet consent to make peace with the protectors of the Mamertines, yet the manifest disposition of his subjects was not to be resisted, and the Romans reached Messana in safety. Appius left a garrison there, and returned with the rest of his army to Rome; the strait was now clear of the enemy's ships, for in ancient warfare a fleet was dependent upon land co-operation<sup>15</sup>, and could not act without great diffi-

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

<sup>15</sup> The failure of Pompey's fleet in either preventing Cæsar from crossing the Ionian sea from Brundisium, or in effectually cutting off his communications with Italy afterwards, is one of the most strik-

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 490.  
A.C. 264.

Second cam-  
paign in  
Sicily. Hiero  
makes peace  
with Rome.  
A.U.C. 491.  
A.C. 263.

culty upon a coast which was wholly in possession of an enemy.

When Appius returned to Rome, he found that the war with Volsinii was at an end, for his colleague, M. Fulvius Flaccus, triumphed for his victories over the Volsinians on the first of November<sup>16</sup>.

The whole force of Rome was, therefore, now at liberty, and as the Carthaginians seem to have despaired of defending the straits of Messina, two consular armies<sup>17</sup>, amounting to about 35,000 men, crossed over into Sicily in the spring of 491. All opposition was overborne, and Hiero, after having lost sixty-seven towns<sup>18</sup>, was glad to obtain peace on condition of restoring all the Roman prisoners without ransom, of paying a large sum of money, and of becoming the ally of the Roman people. He had the wisdom to maintain this alliance unbroken to the hour of his death, having found that the friendship of Rome would secure him from all other enemies, whereas the allies of Carthage were exposed to suffer from her tyranny, but could not depend on

ing instances of the defects of the ancient naval service. But with respect to the invasion of Sicily from Italy, we must remember that not even the British naval force, while every point in Sicily was in our possession, could prevent the French from throwing across a division of about 3000 men, in September, 1810, whose defeat was effected by our land forces solely, after they had effected their landing in safety.

<sup>16</sup> Fasti Capitolini.

<sup>17</sup> Polybius, I. 16.

<sup>18</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIII. 5. The terms of the peace with Hiero are variously reported. Diodorus says that he obtained a peace for fifteen years on giving up his Roman prisoners without ransom, and on paying 150,000 drachmæ; Polybius makes the sum 100 talents, and says nothing of any term when the peace was to expire; Zonaras names no specific sum, and Orosius and Eutropius set it at 200 talents.

her protection. Hiero retained nearly the same extent of territory which had belonged to Syracuse in old times, before the tyranny of the first Dionysius; but all the rest of his dominion was ceded to the Romans.

Having now only one enemy to deal with<sup>19</sup>, and having the whole power of Syracuse transferred from the Carthaginian scale to their own, the Roman generals went on prosperously. Many towns were taken from the Carthaginians, and in the following year, 492, Agrigentum<sup>20</sup> was reduced after a long and obstinate siege, and all the inhabitants sold for slaves. The consuls of the year 493 were no less successful, but the Carthaginians had at last begun to exert their naval power effectually; many towns on the Sicilian coasts<sup>21</sup> which had yielded to the Roman armies were recovered by the Carthaginian fleets; the coasts of Italy were often ravaged, so that the Romans found it necessary to encounter their enemy on his own element: they resolved to dispute with the Carthaginians their dominion of the sea.

Immediately at the close of the year 493, they began to fell their timber. But no Italian shipwright knew how to build the line-of-battle ships of that period, called quinqueremes, and their build was so different from that of the triremes, that the one would not serve as a model for the other. Ship-

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 491.  
A.C. 263.

Third and fourth campaigns. Siege of Agrigentum. The Romans resolve to build a fleet.  
A.U.C.  
492-3.  
A.C. 262,  
261.

They find a model for their ships, and train their seamen.

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, I. 17—20.

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, I. 18, 19. Orosius, IV. 7. Zonaras, VIII. 10.

<sup>21</sup> Polybius, I. 20.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 493.  
A.C. 261.

wrights might have been procured from the king of Egypt, but to send thither would have caused too great a delay. It happened that a Carthaginian quinquereme<sup>22</sup> had run ashore on the Bruttian coast when Appius Claudius was first crossing over to Sicily, and it was noted as a curious circumstance, that the Roman soldiers had taken a ship of war. This quinquereme, which had probably been sent to Rome as a trophy, was now made the shipwright's model, and a hundred ships were built after her pattern, and launched in two months after the first felling of the timber<sup>23</sup>. The seamen, partly Roman proletarians, or citizens of the poorest class, partly Etruscans or Greeks from the maritime states of Italy, were all unaccustomed to row in quinqueremes, and the Romans had perhaps never handled an oar of any sort. While the ships were building therefore, to lose no time, the future crew of each quinquereme<sup>24</sup> were ranged upon benches ashore, in the same order, that to us undiscoverable problem, in which they were hereafter to sit on board; the keleustes, whose voice or call regulated the stroke in the ancient galleys, stood in the midst of them, and at his signal they went through their movements, and learned to keep time together, as if they had been actually afloat. With such ships and such

<sup>22</sup> Polybius, I. 20. Auctor de Viris Illustrib. in Appio Claud. Caudic. "quinqueremem hostium copiis pedestribus cepit." So in the invasion of Holland in 1795, the French triumphed greatly in the capture of some Dutch ships

of war by a party of their cavalry: the ships were locked up in the ice, and the French cavalry took them without any resistance.

<sup>23</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natur.* XVI. § 192. Florus, II. 2.

<sup>24</sup> Polybius, I. 21.



crews the Romans put to sea early in the spring, to seek an engagement with the fleet of the first naval power in the world.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 494.  
A.C. 260.

An English reader is tempted here either to suspect extreme exaggeration in the accounts of the Roman inexperience in naval matters, or to entertain great contempt for the fleets and sailors of the ancient world altogether. There are no braver men than the Austrians, but there would be something ludicrous in the idea of an Austrian fleet, manned chiefly by peasants from the inland provinces of the empire, and commanded by officers of the land service, venturing a general action with an English or American squadron. But the accounts of these events are trustworthy; and had the Romans encountered the Athenian navy in the days of its greatness instead of the Carthaginian, the result, in the first years of the war at least, would probably have been different. However, there is no doubt that the naval service of the ancient nations was out of all proportion inferior to their land-service; the seamen were altogether an inferior class, and the many improvements which had been made in the military art on shore seemed never to have reached naval warfare. Ships worked with oars were still exclusively used as ships of war; and although the use of engines, well-deserving the name of artillery, was familiar in sieges, yet it had never been adopted in sea-fights<sup>25</sup>, and the old method of at-

Defects in  
the ancient  
naval ser-  
vice.

<sup>25</sup> Vegetius, writing in the fourth century after the Christian æra, speaks of the use of artillery in sea-fights as a thing of common

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 494.  
A.C. 260.

tempting to sink or disable an enemy's vessel by piercing her just below the water with the brazen beak affixed to every ship's bows, was still universally practised. The system of fighting, therefore, necessarily brought the ships close to one another; and if the fighting men on one side were clearly superior to those on the other, boarding, if it could be effected, would ensure victory. The fighting men in the ancient ships, as is well-known, were quite distinct from their rowers or seamen, and their proportion to these varied, as boarding was more or less preferred to manœuvring. In the Ionian revolt, about 500 B.C., we find forty soldiers<sup>26</sup> employed on each of the Chian ships out of a crew of 200; the Corinthians and Coreyræans about seventy years afterwards had nearly as many<sup>27</sup>, but the Athenians, in the most flourishing state of their navy, had commonly no more than ten. In the quinqueremes now used, we find the Romans employing on one occasion 300 seamen and 120 soldiers; this, however, was perhaps something above their usual proportion; but there can be no doubt that the soldiers on board of each ship were numerous, and if they could board the enemy their victory over what Niebuhr justly calls the mere rabble of an African crew was perfectly certain.

practice: but I do not recollect any mention of it as early as the Punic wars.

<sup>26</sup> Herodotus, VI. 15.

<sup>27</sup> Thucydides, I. 49. He says that the ships had many heavy-armed soldiers on board, and many archers and dartmen, after the an-

cient fashion. That the number of fighting men on board the Athenian ships in the most flourishing state of their navy was no more than ten, appears from a comparison of several passages in Thucydides, II. 92. 102. III. 95. and IV. 76. 101.

The object of the Romans was therefore to enable their men in every case to decide the battle by boarding. For this purpose they contrived in each ship what may be called a long drawbridge, thirty-six feet long, by four wide, with a low parapet on each side of it. This bridge was attached by a hole at one end of it to a mast twenty-four feet high, erected on the ship's prow, and the hole was large and oblong, so that the bridge not only played freely all round the mast, but could be drawn up so as to lie close and almost parallel to it, the end of it being hoisted by a rope passing through a block at the mast-head, just as our cutters' booms are hoisted by what is called the topping lift. The bridge was attached to the mast at the height of about twelve feet from the deck, and it had a continuation of itself reaching down to the deck, moving, I suppose, on hinges<sup>28</sup>, and serving as a ladder by which it might

CHAP.  
XII.

A.U.C. 494.  
A.C. 260.  
Machine invented by the Romans, to enable them to board the enemy.

<sup>28</sup> This is the difficult part of Polybius' description, I. 22, which he by no means makes very intelligible. "The ladder or bridge was put round the mast after the first twelve feet of its own length:" the object being apparently to attach it to the mast at such a height above the deck, as to make it form an inclined plane down to the deck of the enemy. But unless the lower end of the ladder had been fixed to the deck, the men could not have ascended by it; and had it been all one piece with the upper part, the moment the bridge was lowered to fall on the enemy's deck, the lower part must immediately have gone up into the air. And of course it is absurd to sup-

pose that the men could have gone upon the bridge before it was fixed on the enemy's ship. I can only suppose then that what Polybius calls "the first twelve feet of the ladder" served as a permanent ascent from the deck to the end of the bridge, where it went round the mast, and that it was so far distinct from the bridge, that it remained in its own place when the bridge was lowered, although, when the bridge was hoisted up to lie close to the mast, both it and the bridge seemed to be a continuation of each other.

Folard's engraving and description of this machine are altogether erroneous: but he mentions a story which well illustrates the

CHAP.  
XL.A.U.C. 494.  
A.C. 260.

be ascended. Playing freely round the mast, and steered by the rope above-mentioned, the bridge was let fall upon an enemy's ship, on whatever quarter she approached; and as a ship's beak was commonly her only weapon, an enemy ventured without fear close to her broadside or her stem, as if she were there defenceless. When the bridge fell, a strong iron spike fixed at the bottom of it was driven home by the mere weight of the fall into the deck of the enemy's ship, and held it fast; and then the soldiers, in two files, rushed along it by an inclined plane down upon the deck of the enemy, their large shields and the parapet of the bridge together, completely sheltering their flanks from the enemy's missiles, while the two file-leaders held their shields in front of them, and so covered the bridge lengthways. So with these bridges drawn up to their masts, and exhibiting a strange appearance, as the regular masts were always lowered previously to going into action, the Roman fleet put to sea in quest of their enemy.

C. Duilius  
commands  
the Roman  
fleet. SEA  
FIGHT OF  
MYLÆ.

It was commanded by one of the consuls, Cn. Cornelius Scipio<sup>29</sup>, but as he allowed himself to be taken with seventeen ships, in an ill-advised attempt on the Liparæan islands, his colleague, C. Duilius,

object of attaching the bridge to the mast at a height of twelve feet above the deck. "The Maltese seamen," he says, "have been known to mount on the main-yard preparatory to boarding, and when the ship runs on board the enemy, one yard-arm is lowered, and the men are thus dropped one after

another on the enemy's deck." I will not answer for the truth of the story, but it evidently contains the same notion of boarding by an inclined plane, which appears to have suggested to the Romans the arrangement of their bridge.

<sup>29</sup> Polybius, I. 21.



the descendant probably of that upright and moderate tribune who took so great a part in the overthrow of the decemvirs' tyranny, was sent for from his army to conduct the fleet. He found the Carthaginian fleet, under the command of Hannibal, the same officer who had defended Agrigentum in the late siege, ravaging the coast of Mylæ, the modern Melazzo, on the north coast of Sicily, not far from the strait of Messina. The Carthaginians advanced in the full confidence of victory, and though surprised at the masts and tackle on the prows of the Roman ships, they yet commenced the action boldly. But the thirty ships which formed their advanced squadron, including that of Hannibal himself, were immediately grappled by the Roman bridges, boarded and taken. Hannibal escaped in his boat to his main battle, which was rapidly advancing; but the disaster of their first division startled them, and when they found, that even if they approached the Roman ships on their broadside or on their stern, still these formidable bridges were wheeled round and lowered upon them, they were seized with a panic and fled. Their whole loss, including that of the advanced squadron<sup>30</sup>, amounted to about fifty ships sunk or taken, and in men to three thousand killed and seven thousand prisoners.

The direct consequence of this victory was the raising of the siege of Egesta<sup>31</sup>, which the Carthaginians had well nigh reduced to extremity, and

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 494.  
A.C. 260.

Results of  
the battle,  
and honours  
allowed to  
Duilius.  
The Duilian  
column.

<sup>30</sup> Polybius, I. 23.

<sup>31</sup> Polybius, I. 24.



CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 494.  
A.C. 260.

the taking of Macella by assault. But its moral results were far greater, inasmuch as the Romans were now confident of success by sea as well as on shore, and formed designs of wresting from the Carthaginians all their island possessions, Sardinia and Corsica no less than Sicily. Duilius, as was to be expected, obtained a triumph, and he was allowed<sup>32</sup> for the rest of his life to be escorted home with torches borne before him, and music playing whenever he went out to supper, an honour which he enjoyed for many years afterwards. A pillar also was set up in the forum to commemorate his victory, with an inscription recording the amount of the spoil which he had taken; and an ancient copy of this inscription<sup>33</sup>, retaining the old forms of the words, is still preserved, though in part illegible.

Indecisive war in Sicily. Roman expedition to Corsica and Sardinia. Conspiracy at Rome.

The events of the three next years may be passed over briefly. Towns were taken and retaken in Sicily, much plunder was gained, enormous havoc made, and many brave actions<sup>34</sup> performed, but with

<sup>32</sup> Cicero, de Senectute, 13. It appears that this continuation of his triumph during his whole life was his own act, and that it was thought right and proper, as he had done such good service; "quæ sibi nullo exemplo privatus sumpserat: tantum licentiæ dabat gloria." This no doubt is more correct than those other statements which represent it as an honour specially conferred upon him by the senate or people.

<sup>33</sup> A temple of Janus, built by C. Duilius at this time, was restored in the early part of the

reign of the emperor Tiberius. (Tacitus, Annal. II. 49.) It is possible that the column and its inscription may have been restored in the reign of Augustus; for the restoration of the temple had been begun by him, and was only completed by his successor.

<sup>34</sup> Such as that noble act of a military tribune in the army of the consul A. Atilius Calatinus, in the year 496, who sacrificed himself and a cohort of 400 men to cover the retreat of the army out of a dangerous defile in which they had been surprised by the

CHAP.  
XL.A.U.C. 495-  
497.  
A.C. 259-  
257.

no decisive result. Hamilcar, one of the Carthaginian generals, destroyed the town of Eryx and removed its inhabitants to Drepanum, a place on the sea-side close beneath the mountain where they had lived before, and provided with an excellent harbour<sup>35</sup>. It was not far from Lilybæum, and these two posts both being strongly fortified were intended to be the strongholds of the Carthaginian power in Sicily. On the other hand, the Romans invaded Sardinia and Corsica<sup>36</sup> and carried off great numbers of prisoners. But as they extended their naval operation they unavoidably became acquainted with the violence of the Mediterranean storms; and the terrors of the sea were very dreadful to the inland people of Italy, who were forced to furnish seamen to man the Roman fleets, a service utterly foreign to the habits of their lives. Thus in the year 495<sup>37</sup>

enemy. Cato complained of the injustice of fortune which had given so scanty a share of fame to this tribune, while Leonidas for an act of no greater heroism had acquired such undying glory. In fact, the tribune's very name is uncertain, for we find the action ascribed to three different persons. See A. Gellius, III. 7, who quotes at length the passage of the *Origines* in which Cato described the action.

<sup>35</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIII. 9. Zonaras, VIII. 11.

<sup>36</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 11. Polybius, I. 24. The *Fasti Capitolini* record L. Scipio's triumph over the Sardinians and Corsicans in the year 494, that is, according to the common reckoning, 495; and they

record also a triumph of C. Sulpicius over the Sardinians in the year following. The Lucius Scipio who triumphed over the Corsicans was the son of the L. Scipio who was defeated by the Gauls in the third Samnite war. His epitaph has been preserved, as well as his father's, and it tells of him, how "he won Corsica and the city of Aleria." Aleria is the Alalia of Herodotus, an old Greek colony founded by the Phocæans when they fled from the generals of Cyrus.

<sup>37</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 11. Scipio on his return from Corsica in 495 had encountered a violent storm, and built a temple to the powers of the weather in gratitude for his escape from destruction. This is

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 495.  
A.C. 259.

some Samnites, who were waiting in Rome till the fleet should be ready for sea, entered into a conspiracy with some slaves who had been lately carried off as captives from Sardinia and Corsica, to make themselves masters of the city. The seamen, however, of the ancient world were always chosen from the poorest classes of freemen, and their making common cause with the slaves showed at once that their attempt had nothing of the character of a national revolt. In fact, their own Samnite commander informed the Roman government of their conspiracy, which was thus prevented and punished. The higher classes in the allied states, who served as soldiers, liked the war probably as much as the Romans did; and with one doubtful exception<sup>38</sup>, we read of no symptoms of disaffection to Rome during the whole course of the war.

Naval action  
off the Lipa-  
ræan islands.

Besides their expeditions to Sardinia and Corsica, and their naval co-operation with the consular armies engaged in Sicily, the Romans gained an advantage over the Carthaginian fleet in the year 497, off the Liparæan islands<sup>39</sup>, for which the consul C. Atilius obtained like Duilius a naval triumph.

Great arma-  
ment of the  
Romans.

This success, although in itself very indecisive, yet

noticed in his epitaph, "Dedit tempestatibus æde merito," and also by Ovid in his *Fasti*.

<sup>38</sup> Polybius says that in 495 or 496 the allies quarrelled with the Romans in Sicily, complaining that their services in the field were not sufficiently acknowledged, and that they consequently encamped apart from the Romans, and were

attacked in their separate position by the Carthaginian general, and cut to pieces, I. 24. But it does not appear that these were the Italian allies of Rome, and it is possible that they may have been the Mamertines.

<sup>39</sup> Polybius, I. 25. *Fasti Capitolini* Zonaras, VIII. 12.

encouraged the Romans to attempt operations on a far grander scale, and to carry the war into Africa. Great efforts were made during the winter, and a fleet of 330 ships was prepared<sup>40</sup>, manned by nearly 100,000 seamen, exclusive of the soldiers or fighting men. This vast number could scarcely have been furnished either by Rome itself or its Italian allies; but the thousands of captives carried off from Corsica and Sardinia, or from the cities of Sicily, no doubt were largely employed as galley-slaves; and if they worked in chains, as is most probable, the free rowers who were in the ships with them would be a sufficient guard to deter them from mutiny. The two consuls for the ensuing year were L. Manlius Vulso and Q. Cædicius; but Q. Cædicius died soon after he came into office, and was succeeded by M. Atilius Regulus. The two consular armies had apparently wintered in Sicily; for the fleet sailed through the strait of Messina, doubled cape Pachynus<sup>41</sup>, and took the legions on board at Ecnomus, a small place on the southern coast, between Gela and Agrigentum. Forty thousand men were here embarked, and the Carthaginians, who had assembled a still larger fleet of three hundred and fifty ships, had already crossed over to Lilybæum, and from thence, advancing eastward along the Sicilian coast, were arrived at Heraclea Minoa, and were ready to give the Romans battle. Both consuls were on board the Roman fleet; the Carthaginians were

CHAP.  
XI.  
A.U.C. 498.  
A.C. 256.  
They pre-  
pare to in-  
vade Africa.

<sup>40</sup> Polybius, I. 25. Each Roman ship had on board 300 rowers and 120 fighting men.  
<sup>41</sup> Polybius, I. 25.



CHAP.  
XL.A.U.C. 498.  
A.C. 256.BATTLE OF  
ECNOMUS.  
Defeat of  
the Cartha-  
ginian fleet  
off the south  
coast of  
Sicily.

commanded by Hanno, who had been defeated at Agrigentum during the siege of that town, and by Hamilcar, who had so lately founded Drepanum.

The Roman fleet at Ecnomus contained 140,000 men, while less than 20,000 British seamen were engaged at Trafalgar. Yet it is not only in our generation, when Trafalgar and its consequences are fresh in our memory, that its fame will surpass a hundred-fold the fame of the battle of Ecnomus. For the twenty-seven ships which Nelson commanded at Trafalgar, by crushing the naval force of France, changed the destiny of all Europe; whilst the three hundred and thirty ships which fought at Ecnomus produced only a brief result, which within five years was no more perceivable. A fleet that could be built in a few months was no irreparable loss if destroyed; and the poor slaves who worked at the oar might be replaced by the plunder of the next campaign. The battle of Ecnomus was obstinately contested, but at last the Romans were completely victorious. They lost twenty-four ships<sup>42</sup>, in which not more than 2880 soldiers could have perished, if we suppose, what rarely happened, that not a man was picked up by the other ships; but they destroyed thirty of the enemy's fleet, and took sixty-four with all their crews. The Carthaginians with the rest of their ships made all speed to reach Carthage, that they might be still in time to defend their country against the expected invasion.

<sup>42</sup> Polybius, I. 27, 28.



The way to Africa was now open, and the consuls<sup>43</sup>, after having victualled their ships with more than their usual supplies, as they knew not what port would next receive them, prepared to leave the coast of Sicily and to cross the open sea to an unknown world. The soldiers and even one of the military tribunes murmured<sup>44</sup>; they had been kept from home during one whole winter, and now they were to be carried to a strange country, into the very stronghold of their enemy's power, to a land of scorching heat, and infested with noisome beasts and monstrous serpents<sup>45</sup>, such as all stories of Africa had told them of. Regulus, it is said, threatened the tribune with death, and forced the men on board. The fleet did not keep together, and thirty ships reached the African shore unsupported<sup>46</sup>, and might have been destroyed before the arrival of the rest, had not the Carthaginians in their confusion

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 498.

A.C. 256.

The consuls cross over to Africa, occupy Clypea, and begin to lay waste the country.

<sup>43</sup> Polybius, I. 29.

<sup>44</sup> Florus, II. 2.

<sup>45</sup> "Libya to the west of the lake Tritonis," that is, the present pashalik of Tunis, the ancient territory of Carthage, "is very hilly," says Herodotus, "and overgrown with woods, and full of wild beasts. For here are *the monstrous serpents*, and the lions, and the elephants, and the bears, and the asps, and the asses with horns, and the dog-heads, and the creatures with no heads, whose eyes are in their breasts, at least as the Libyans say, and the wild men and the wild women, and a great many other creatures besides." IV. 191. This description

is very remarkable, following, as it does, a detailed and most exact account not only of all the African tribes on the coast from Egypt to the lesser Syrtis, but also of those in the interior. But the Carthaginian territory was rendered so inaccessible to foreigners, that all sorts of exaggerations and fables were circulated respecting it. Herodotus seems to have known nothing of its fertility, but only of its woods and its wild beasts, the terrors of which the Carthaginians no doubt purposely magnified.

<sup>46</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Vatican. XXIII. 3.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 498.  
A.C. 256.

neglected their opportunity. When the whole fleet was reassembled under the headland of Hermes, Cape Bon, they stood to the southward along the coast, and disembarked the legions near the place called Aspis or Clypea<sup>47</sup>, in English, shield; a fortress built by Agathocles about fifty years before, and deriving its name from its walls forming a circle upon the top of a conical hill. They immediately drew their ships up on the beach, after the ancient manner, and secured them with a ditch and rampart; and having taken Clypea, and despatched messengers to Rome with the news of their success, and to ask for farther instructions, they began to march into the country; and the ravages of forty thousand men were spread far and wide over that district which, for its richness and flourishing condition, was unmatched probably in the world.

Description  
of the coun-  
try south of  
Carthage.  
One consul  
returns  
home. Re-  
gulus is left  
in Africa.

From Cape Bon, the Hermean headland, the African coast runs nearly north and south for as much as three degrees of latitude as far as the bottom of the lesser Syrtis. This was the most highly-prized country of the Carthaginian dominion, filled with their towns, and covered with the villas of their wealthier citizens. In their old commercial treaties<sup>48</sup> with Rome no Roman vessel was allowed to approach this coast; they wished to keep it hidden from every foreigner, that its surpassing richness might not tempt the spoiler. Here grew those figs which Cato the censor showed in the Roman senate,

<sup>47</sup> Polybius, I. 29. Strabo, XVII.  
p. 834.

<sup>48</sup> See Polybius, III. 22, 23.

to prove how the fruits of Italy were outdone by those of Africa; and here grew those enormous harvests of corn which in later times<sup>49</sup> constantly fed the people of Rome. But now the aspect of the country resembled the approach to Genoa, or the neighbourhood of Geneva, or even the most ornamented parts of the valley of the Thames above London. Everywhere were to be seen single houses<sup>50</sup> standing in the midst of vineyards, and olive-grounds, and pastures; for as in Judea in its golden days, every drop of rain was carefully preserved in tanks or cisterns on the high grounds, and a plentiful irrigation spread life and freshness on every side, even under the burning sun of Africa. On such a land the hungry soldiers of the Roman army were now let loose without restraint. Villas were ransacked and burnt, cattle and horses were driven off in vast numbers, and twenty thousand persons, many of them doubtless of the highest condition, and bred up in all the enjoyments of domestic peace and affluence, were carried away as slaves. This havoc continued for several weeks, till the messengers sent from Rome returned with

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 498.  
A.C. 256.

<sup>49</sup> Horace's expressions are well known, "Frumenti quantum metit Africa," "quicquid de Libycis verritur areis," &c. See also Tacitus, *Annal.* XII. 43.

<sup>50</sup> See the description of this country as it appeared to the soldiers of Agathocles. *Diodorus* XX. 8. The irrigation is especially noticed, πολλῶν ὑδάτων διωχευμένων καὶ πάντα τόπον ἀρδευόντων. It is the neglect of this

which has so reduced the productiveness of Africa in modern times, but still the soil is described as extremely fertile. Sir G. Temple counted ninety-seven shoots or stalks on a single plant of barley, which was by no means one of the largest in the field; he was assured that plants were often seen with three hundred. Excursions in the Mediterranean, Vol. II. p. 108.

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 98.  
A.C. 256.

the senate's orders. One of the consuls<sup>51</sup>, with one consular army and forty ships, was to remain in Africa; the other was to return home with the second consular army, the fleet, and the plunder. L. Manlius accordingly embarked, and arrived safely at Rome with his division of the army, and with the spoil. M. Regulus, with 15,000 foot and 500 horse, was left in Africa.

He defeats  
the Cartha-  
ginians,  
and fixes  
his head-  
quarters at  
Tunes.

The defenceless state of the country, and the apparent helplessness of the Carthaginian government, seem to have encouraged the Roman senate to hope that a single consular army might at any rate be able to maintain its ground and harass the enemy, even if it could not force them to submission. And the example of Agathocles, who, during four years had set the power of Carthage at defiance, no doubt increased their confidence. The incapacity of the Carthaginian government and generals was enough indeed to embolden the Romans. Their army, strong in cavalry and elephants, kept on the hills<sup>52</sup> where neither could act, and were attacked and defeated, and their camp taken by the Romans. Regulus then overran the whole country without opposition; the Romans<sup>53</sup> boasted that he took and plundered more than three hundred walled villages or towns, but none of these deserved the name of a fortified place; and even Tunes<sup>54</sup> itself, within twenty miles of Carthage, fell into their hands with little resistance. Here Regulus established his head-

<sup>51</sup> Polybius, I. 29.

<sup>52</sup> Polybius, I. 30.

<sup>53</sup> Florus, II. 2.

<sup>54</sup> Polybius, I. 30.

quarters, and here he seems to have remained through the winter<sup>55</sup>.

Meanwhile, to increase the distress of the Carthaginians, the Numidians<sup>56</sup>, or the roving tribes of the interior, then as now always ready to attack and plunder the civilized settlers of the sea coast, joined the Romans, and, like the Cossacks, being most expert in such desultory and plundering warfare, they outdid the Romans in their devastations. From all quarters fugitives from the country crowded into Carthage, and it was feared that the city would be unable to feed so great a multitude as were now confined within its walls. Alarm and distress prevailed, and the council of elders sent three of its own members to the Roman consul to sue for peace.

Regulus, like Fabricius and Curius, was in his own country a poor man; it is a well known story<sup>57</sup> that he complained of the loss which his small portion of land must sustain from his absence, and that the senate promised to maintain his wife and children till his return. Such a man's head could not but be turned by his present position, when the plunder of Africa had given him the power of acquiring riches beyond all his conceptions, and when the noblest citizens of the wealthiest state in the world came as suppliants to his head-quarters. He treated them with the insolence shown by some of the French generals during the revolution to the ambassadors

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 498,  
499.

A.C. 256,  
257.

The Numidian  
tribes join  
him.

Distress at  
Carthage.

Regulus  
imposes in-  
tolerable  
terms on  
the Cartha-  
ginians who  
come to sue  
for peace.

<sup>55</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 13.

<sup>57</sup> Auctor de Viris Illustrib. in

<sup>56</sup> Polybius, I. 31. Diodorus, Regul. Valer. Maxim. IV. 4, § 6. Fragm. Vatican. XXIII. 4.



CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 498,  
499.  
A.C. 256,  
255.

of the old sovereigns of Europe. Carthage<sup>58</sup> must evacuate Sicily and Sardinia, ransom all her own prisoners, and give up without ransom all those whom she had taken from the Romans; must make good all the expenses of the war, and pay a yearly contribution besides; above all, she must follow wherever the Romans should lead, and make neither alliance nor war without their consent; she must not send to sea more than a single ship of war on her own account, but if the Romans required her aid she must send them a fleet of fifty ships. The Carthaginian ambassadors protested against terms so extravagant. "Men who are good for any thing," replied Regulus, "should either conquer, or submit to their betters<sup>59</sup>." And with threatening and insolent expressions to the ambassadors personally, he ordered them to be gone with all speed from the Roman camp.

His terms  
are rejected.

The council of elders called together the great council on this emergency<sup>60</sup>; and the whole body of the aristocracy of Carthage with one voice rejected conditions so intolerable. But great was the danger, and great the general alarm. The gods were to be propitiated by no common sacrifices, and those horrid offerings to Moloch, which had been made

<sup>58</sup> Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Ursin.* CXLVIII. Regulus was so elated by his successes, that he wrote home to the senate to say that "he had sealed up the gates of Carthage by the terror of his arms." Zonaras, VIII. 13.

<sup>59</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm. Vatican.* XXIII. 4.

<sup>60</sup> Polybius, I. 31. Diodorus, *Fragm. Vatican*, XXIII. 4. And for a particular description of the human sacrifices offered in such emergencies, see Diodorus, XX. 14.

when Agathocles was threatening Carthage with ruin, were now again repeated. The figure of the god stood with outstretched arms to receive his victims; young children of the noblest families were placed in the hands of the image, and from thence rolled off into a furnace which burnt before him. Nor were there wanting those who with something of a better spirit threw themselves into the fire, willing to pay with their own lives the atonement for their country.

In the midst of this distress, an officer returned<sup>61</sup> who had been sent to Greece to engage Greek soldiers of fortune in the Carthaginian service. Among others he brought with him a Spartan named Xanthippus, a man who had been trained in his country's discipline, and had added to it much of actual military experience. He might have fought with Acrotatus against Pyrrhus in that gallant defence of Sparta: and in all likelihood he had followed king Areus<sup>62</sup> to Athens to save the city from the dominion of Antigonos, when Sparta and Athens fought for the last time side by side in defence of the independence of Greece. Xanthippus<sup>63</sup> condemned the conduct of the Carthaginian generals in

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 498,  
499.  
A.C. 256,  
255.

Xanthippus, a Spartan soldier, arrives at Carthage, and directs the operations of the Carthaginians.

<sup>61</sup> Polybius, I. 32. Some years afterwards, when Ptolemy Euergetes overran the whole kingdom of Seleucus Callinicus, he committed his conquests beyond the Euphrates to the care of "*Xanthippus*, one of his two generals-in-chief." Jerome, in Daniel XI. 9. Could this Xantippus or Xan-

thippus be the conqueror of Regulus, whose glory in Africa recommended him to the notice of the king of Egypt after his return from Carthage, so that he became a general in the Egyptian armies?"

<sup>62</sup> See Justin, XXVI. 2. Pausanias, III. 6, § 3.

<sup>63</sup> Polybius, I. 32.

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 498,  
499.  
A.C. 256,  
255.

the strongest terms; his reputation gave weight to his words; the government sent for him, and he so justified his opinion and explained so clearly the causes of their defeats, that they entrusted him with the direction of their forces. Hope was already rekindled; but when he reviewed the soldiers without the walls, and made them go through the movements which were best fitted to meet the peculiar tactic of the Romans, loud shouts burst from the ranks, and there was an universal cry to be led out to battle. The generals of the commonwealth did not hesitate to comply, and although they had no more than 12,000 foot, yet relying on their cavalry, four thousand in number, and on their elephants amounting to no fewer than a hundred, they boldly marched out, and no longer keeping the high grounds, encamped in the open plain, and thus checked at once the devastation of the country.

He prepares  
to give bat-  
tle to the  
Romans.

Regulus was obliged to risk a battle<sup>64</sup>, for as soon as he ceased to be master of the field, his men would be destitute of provisions. He encamped within little more than a mile of the enemy, and the sight of the Roman legions, so long victorious, made the resolution of the Carthaginian generals waver. But the soldiers were clamorous for battle, and Xanthippus urged the generals not to lose the precious opportunity. They yielded, and requested him to form the army on his own plan. Accordingly, he placed his cavalry on the flanks, together with some

<sup>64</sup> Polybius, I. 33.

of the light-armed mercenaries, slingers perhaps from the Balearian islands, and archers from Crete. The heavy-armed mercenaries, we know not of what nation, whether Gauls, or Spaniards, or Greeks, or a mixed band of all, were on the right in the line of battle; the Africans, with some Carthaginian citizens, were on the left and centre; the whole line being covered by the elephants, which formed a single rank at some distance in advance. The Romans were in their usual order, their cavalry on the wings, and their velites or light-armed troops in advance of the heavy-armed soldiers; but their line was formed of a greater depth than usual, to resist the elephants' charge.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 498,  
499.  
A.C. 256,  
255.

When the signal was given, the Carthaginian cavalry and elephants immediately advanced, and the Romans, clashing their pila against the iron rims of their shields and cheering loudly, rushed on to meet them. The left wing passing by the right of the line of elephants attacked the Carthaginian mercenaries and routed them; Xanthippus rode up to rally them<sup>65</sup>, threw himself from his horse, and fought amongst them as a common soldier. Meantime, his cavalry had swept the Roman and Italian horse from the field, and then charged the legions on the rear; while the elephants, driving the velites before them into the intervals of the maniples, broke into the Roman main battle, and with irresistible weight and strength and fury trampled under foot

And totally  
defeats  
them. Re-  
gulus is  
taken pri-  
soner.

<sup>65</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm. Vatic.* XXIII. 5.

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 498,  
499.  
A.C. 256,  
255.

and beat down and dispersed the bravest. If any forced their way forwards through the elephants' line, they were received by the Carthaginian infantry, who being fresh and in unbroken order presently cut them to pieces. Two thousand men of the left of the Roman army escaped after they had driven the mercenaries to their camp, and found that all was lost behind them. Regulus himself, with 500 more, fled also from the rout, but was pursued, overtaken, and made prisoner. The rest of the Roman army was destroyed to a man on the field of battle.

Rejoicings  
at Carthage.

The few fugitives from the left wing made their escape to Clypea; Tunes it seems was lost immediately, and except Clypea, the Romans did not retain a foot of ground in Africa. We have no Carthaginian historian to describe the triumphant return of the victorious army to Carthage; how the Roman prisoners and Regulus, lately so insolent, were led through the streets bound and half-naked; how the bands of noble citizens met at their public tables, sworn companions and brethren to each other in peace and war, and remembered with joyful tears their comrades who had fallen; how the whole city was full of festivity<sup>66</sup>, and every temple was crowded by wives and mothers offering their thanksgivings for this great deliverance. The feasting, after the Carthaginian manner, continued deep into the night; but other sounds and other fires than those of revelry and rejoicing were to be seen and heard amid the

<sup>66</sup> Polybius, I. 36. For the human sacrifices after a victory, description of the Carthaginian see Diodorus, XX. 65.



darkness; the fires of Moloch again were blazing, and some of the bravest of the prisoners were burnt alive as a thank-offering. CHAP.  
XL.

Xanthippus, crowned with glory<sup>67</sup>, and no doubt richly rewarded, returned to Greece soon after his victory, before admiration and gratitude had time to be changed to envy. Clypea was besieged, but the Roman garrison held out desperately, and the senate no sooner learned the disaster of their army, than they sent a fleet to bring off the survivors. The Carthaginians, dreading a second invasion, raised a fleet to meet the enemy at sea, but the number of their ships was greatly inferior, and they were completely defeated. The Romans, however, had no intention of landing again in Africa; so total a destruction of their whole army impressed them with a dread of the enemy's elephants, which they could not for a long time shake off: they contented themselves with taking on board the garrison of Clypea, and sailed back to Sicily.

The Romans had now for five years sent fleets to sea, and had as yet had little experience of its ter- The fleet is wrecked on its return off the south coast of Sicily.

<sup>67</sup> Polybius, I. 36. Niebuhr supposes that Regulus was defeated towards the end of the consular year 499, so that the sea-fight off Clypea took place early in the consulship of Cn. Cornelius and A. Atilius, that is, in the consular year 500. He thinks that Ser. Fulvius and M. Æmilius were already proconsuls when they obtained their victory, because it appears from the Fasti Capitolini that they were proconsuls when they

obtained their triumph. But it is more probable that they were both employed as proconsuls in Sicily for a whole year after their consulship, and thus that their triumph was delayed. Zonaras says expressly that they were consuls when they were sent out to bring off the garrison of Clypea, and we can hardly extend the operations of Regulus in Africa to a period of a year and a half.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 499.  
A.C. 255.

rors. This increased their natural confidence, and they thought that Romans<sup>68</sup> might sail at any season, and that it was only cowardice which was restrained by pretended signs of bad weather. So, in the month of July, in spite of the warnings of their pilots, they persisted in coasting homewards along the southern coast of Sicily, at the very time when violent gales from the south and south-west make that coast especially perilous. The fleet was off Camarina when the storm came on, and taught the Romans that fair-weather seamen may mistake ignorant presumption for courage. Above 260 ships were wrecked, which must have had on board 78,000 seamen, without counting the soldiers, who were probably at least as many as 25,000, and the whole coast from Camarina to Pachynus was covered with wrecks and bodies. The men<sup>69</sup> who escaped to shore were most kindly relieved by Hiero, who fed and clothed them, and conveyed them to Messana.

War in Sicily. Agrigentum recovered by the Carthaginians. The Romans take Panormus.

This great disaster encouraged the Carthaginians to redouble their efforts in Sicily. Carthalo, an able and active officer<sup>70</sup>, immediately recovered Agrigentum, and Hasdrubal was sent over with 140 elephants, to take the chief command of all the Carthaginian forces in the island. But the Romans,

<sup>68</sup> Polybius, I. 37.

<sup>69</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIII. 14. The language of these fragments must surely be very modern, for in this passage the writer says that along the whole coast, τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ ἄλογα καὶ τὰ ναύαγια ἔκειντο. τὰ ἄλογα must here

mean "the horses," which is the common meaning of the word in modern Greek, but no writer of the Augustan age would have so used it.

<sup>70</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIII. 14. Polybius, I. 38.

with indomitable spirit, fitted out a new fleet of 220 ships in the space of three months; and the consuls of the following year, A. Atilius and Cn. Cornelius, crossing over to Messina, and there being joined by the remnant of the other fleet which had escaped the storm, sailed along the northern coast of Sicily, took Cephalædium, and although obliged by Carthalo to raise the siege of Drepanum, yet they besieged and took the important town of Panormus, obtained a sum of nearly 470 talents from those of the inhabitants who could afford to pay the stipulated ransom, and sold 13,000 of the poorer class as slaves. A garrison was left in Panormus, and several other smaller places revolted also to the Romans.

For this service Cn. Cornelius justly obtained a triumph<sup>71</sup>. But we are surprised to find the same honour bestowed on one of his successors, C. Sempronius Blæsus. For Sempronius and his colleague, Cn. Servilius Cæpio<sup>72</sup>, having carried their fleet over to the coast of Africa, made some descents and plundered the country near the sea, but were able to effect nothing of importance; and after having been obliged to throw all their plunder overboard to enable their ships to float over the shallows of the Lesser Syrtis, they were finally, when sailing across from Panormus to the Lucanian coast, overtaken by another storm, which wrecked more than 150 of their ships. Upon this, the Romans resolved to tempt the sea no more, and to keep only a fleet of sixty ships,

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 501.  
A.C. 254.

A.U.C. 501.  
A.C. 253.  
Another Roman fleet is wrecked between Panormus and the coast of Italy.

<sup>71</sup> Fasti Capitolini.

<sup>72</sup> Polybius, I. 39. Zonaras, VIII. 14. Orosius, IV. 9.

CHAP.  
XL.

to supply their armies with provisions, and to protect the coasts of Italy.

A.U.C. 502.

A.C. 252.

A.U.C. 503.

A.C. 251.

The Roman  
armies in

Sicily are in  
a bad state

of discipline.

The two following years were full of discouragement to the Romans. Their armies remained in Sicily, but did little to advance the conquest of the island; because the terror of the elephants was so great that their generals were afraid to risk a general action. Such a state of things is very injurious to the discipline of an army, and we find that the service was so unpopular that 400 of the Roman horsemen<sup>73</sup>, all of them men of birth and fortune, refused to obey the consul, C. Aurelius Cotta, when he ordered them to work at some fortifications, and were by him reported to the censors, who degraded them all from their rank, and deprived them of their franchise of voting. And on other occasions Cotta ordered two of his officers to be scourged publicly by his lictors for misconduct<sup>74</sup>; one of them a kinsman of his own, and the other a military tribune, and a patrician of the noble name and house of the Valerii. Yet with the aid of some ships which he procured from Hiero, he attacked and reduced the island of Lipara, the largest of the Liparæans<sup>75</sup>; and for this, and the capture of Therma, which had risen up on the site of the ancient Himera, he obtained after all a triumph.

A.U.C. 504.

A.C. 250.

In the spring of the third year, when C. Atilius

<sup>73</sup> Valerius Maximus, II. 9, § 7. <sup>75</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. Frontinus, Strategem. IV. 1. § 22. XXIII. 15. Zonaras, VIII. 14.

<sup>74</sup> Frontinus, Strategem. IV. 1. Polybius, I. 39. § 30, 31. Val. Max. II. 7, § 4.

Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso were chosen each for the second time consuls, the Romans resolved somewhat to extend their naval operations, and to build fifty new ships<sup>76</sup>. But before the consuls left Rome, the tidings came of a most complete victory in Sicily, and of the total destruction of the dreaded Carthaginian elephants. Resuming then all their former confidence, the Romans increased their fleet to two hundred ships<sup>77</sup>, and sent out both consuls with two consular armies to form at once the siege of Lilybæum, the strongest and almost the only place still held by the Carthaginians in Sicily.

This most brilliant and seasonable victory had been won by L. Cæcilius Metellus, who had been consul in the preceding year; and when his colleague, C. Furius, had gone home at the end of the campaign, Metellus<sup>78</sup> was left in Sicily with his own army as proconsul. It appears that Hasdrubal the Carthaginian general was taunted for his inactivity<sup>79</sup>; and relying besides too much on the terror of his elephants, he crossed the mountains from Selinus, and descended into the plain of Panormus. Metellus kept close within the walls of the town, till Hasdrubal, not content with having laid waste the open country, advanced towards Panormus, and drew out his army in order of battle as if in defiance. Then the proconsul<sup>80</sup>, keeping his regular infantry within one of the gates on the left of the enemy, so that by

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.  
The senate  
resolves to  
make greater  
efforts.

BATTLE OF  
PANORMUS.  
Great vic-  
tory obtain-  
ed by L.  
Metellus  
over Has-  
drubal. The  
Carthagi-  
nian ele-  
phants are  
taken.

<sup>76</sup> Polybius, I. 39.

<sup>77</sup> Polybius, I. 41.

<sup>78</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 14. Polyb. I. 40.

<sup>79</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel.  
XXII. 15.

<sup>80</sup> Polybius, I. 40.



CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.

a timely sally he could attack them in flank, scattered his light troops in great numbers over the ground immediately in front of them, with orders, if hard pressed, to leap down into the ditch for refuge. Meantime all the idle hands in the town were employed in throwing down fresh supplies of missile weapons at the foot of the wall within the ditch, that the light troops might not exhaust their weapons. The elephants charged, drove the enemy before them, and advanced to the edge of the counterscarp, or outer side of the ditch. Here they were overwhelmed with missiles of all sizes; some fell into the ditch, and were there despatched by thrusts of pikes, the rest turned about, and becoming ungovernable broke into the ranks of their own army which was advancing behind them, and threw it into great confusion. Philinus<sup>81</sup>, who favoured the Carthaginians, said that the Gauls in their army had indulged so freely in the wines which foreign traders sent to Sicily to tempt the soldiers to traffic with their plunder, as to be incapable of doing their duty. But there was no need of drunkenness to increase the disorder, when more than a hundred elephants, driven to fury by their wounds, were running wild amidst the Carthaginian ranks. Then Metellus sallied, attacked the enemy in flank, and completely defeated them. Ten elephants were taken with their drivers still mounted on them<sup>82</sup>; the rest had thrown off their drivers, and the Romans knew not how to

<sup>81</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIII. 15.

<sup>82</sup> Polybius, I. 40. Zonaras, VIII. 14.

take them alive, till Metellus made proclamation that any prisoner who should secure an elephant should be set at liberty. This induced the drivers to exert themselves, and in the end all the elephants were secured, and conveyed safely to Rome<sup>83</sup>, to be exhibited in the conqueror's triumph. And the device of an elephant, which is frequent on the coins of the Cæcilian family, shows the lasting sense entertained by the Metelli in after-times of the glory of their ancestor's victory.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.

The battle of Panormus was fought about midsummer, and Metellus returned to Rome with his army and his trophies, and triumphed on the 7th of September<sup>84</sup>. The captured elephants were exhibited in the circus maximus<sup>85</sup>, and hunted up and down it by men armed only with pointless spears, to teach the people not to be afraid of them; after which they were shot at with real weapons and destroyed. Metellus must have lived for nearly fifty years after his triumph<sup>86</sup>, full of honours and glory. He was a second time chosen consul, he was appointed once

Triumph  
and subse-  
quent ho-  
nours of  
Metellus.

<sup>83</sup> They were carried across the strait on rafts, composed of a number of casks lashed together, with a sort of flooring fastened together upon them. The flooring or deck was fenced in with high bulwarks, and covered over with earth, so that the elephants were not aware of their situation, and were conveyed over the sea quietly. Zonaras, VIII. 14. Frontinus, Strategem. I. 7, § 1. Pliny, Hist. Natur. VIII. § 16.

<sup>84</sup> Fasti Capitolini.

<sup>85</sup> Pliny, Hist. Natur. VIII. § 17.

<sup>86</sup> He lived to the age of an hundred years, (Pliny, Hist. Natur. VII, § 157.) and we can scarcely suppose him to have been much more than fifty when he obtained his first consulship. For his other honours see Pliny, Hist. Nat. VII. § 139. He was appointed dictator just after the Gaulish invasion of 529. See Fasti Capitolini.

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 504  
A.C. 250.

master of the horse, and once dictator, and he was also created pontifex maximus, in which last office he acquired a new glory, by rescuing the sacred palladium from the temple of Vesta when it was on fire, at the risk of his life, and to the actual loss of his sight. For this act of piety he was allowed ever after to be drawn to the senate in a chariot, an extraordinary honour, as the chariot was accounted one of the marks of kingly state, and therefore not to be used by the citizen of a commonwealth.

Embassy  
from Car-  
thage to pro-  
pose an ex-  
change of  
prisoners.  
Regulus ac-  
companies  
it. His mag-  
nanimous  
counsel, re-  
turn to Car-  
thage, and  
death.

Thirteen noble Carthaginians<sup>87</sup> had been taken at Panormus, and had been led in the triumphal procession of the conqueror. The Carthaginians, wishing to recover these and others of their citizens, sent an embassy to Rome to propose an exchange of prisoners, and M. Regulus was allowed to accompany the ambassadors, upon his promise given to return with them to Carthage if the negotiation failed. Pyrrhus had given a similar permission to his Roman prisoners, with the hope no doubt that in order to avoid returning to captivity they would use their influence to procure the acceptance of his terms. But Regulus, thinking that the proposed exchange would be to the advantage of the Carthaginians, nobly dissuaded the senate from consenting to it: he himself would be ill-exchanged, he said, for a Carthaginian general in full health and strength, for the Carthaginians, he believed, had given him a secret poison<sup>88</sup>, and he felt that he could not live

<sup>87</sup> Livy, Epitom. XIX. Zonaras, VIII. 15. Orosius, IV. 10.

<sup>88</sup> A. Gellius, VI. 4. Zonaras, VIII. 15.

long. The exchange was refused; Regulus returned to Carthage, and soon after died. His springs of life had been poisoned, not by the deliberate crime of the Carthaginians, but by mortification, shame, a pining after his country, and the common miseries of a prisoner's condition, at a period when the courtesies of war were unknown. Afterwards the story prevailed, that the Carthaginians in their disappointment had put him to a death of lingering torment; whilst the Carthaginians told a similar story of the cruel treatment of two noble Carthaginian prisoners<sup>89</sup> by the wife and sons of Regulus, into whose hands they had been given as hostages, and Regulus' natural death was made, according to the story, the pretext for wreaking their cruelty upon the unfortunate Carthaginians in their power. We may hope that these stories are both untrue; but even if the Carthaginians had exercised towards Regulus the full severity of the ancient laws of war, it ill became the Romans to complain of it, when their habitual treatment, even of generous and magnanimous enemies, was such as we have seen it exemplified in the execution of the Samnite C. Pontius.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.

Never had the prospects of the Romans been fairer than when, in the autumn of the fifteenth year of the war, the consuls C. Atilius and L. Manlius began the siege of Lilybæum. This place and Drepanum were the only two points in Sicily still retained by the Carthaginians; and here they concen-

The Romans  
form the  
SIEGE OF  
LILYBÆUM.

<sup>89</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm. de Virtut. et Vitiis*, XXIV. A. Gellius, II. 4.

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.

trated all their efforts, destroying even Selinus<sup>90</sup>, their earliest conquest from the Greeks, and removing to Lilybæum its inhabitants and its garrison. But from this time forward to the very end of the war the victories of the Romans ceased, and during a period of eight successive years the Fasti record not a single triumph, a blank not to be paralleled in any other part of the Roman annals. Lilybæum and Drepanum remained unconquered to the last, after the former had sustained a siege which for its length and the efforts made both by besiegers and besieged is not to be surpassed in history.

Situation of  
Lilybæum  
and its ports.  
Forces em-  
ployed on  
both sides in  
the siege.

The general difficulty of ascertaining precisely the position of the ancient towns and harbours is felt particularly when we attempt to fix the topography of Lilybæum. It seems that the ancient city, covering more ground than the modern town of Marsala, must have occupied the extreme point of Sicily, now called Cape Boeo; and to have had two sea fronts, one looking N.W. and the other S.W. while on the land side the wall ran across the point from sea to sea, facing eastwards, and forming the base of a triangle, of which the two sea fronts meeting at the point of Cape Boeo formed the sides. Polybius speaks of the harbours of Lilybæum, as if there were more than one; and as the ancient harbours were almost always basins closed by artificial moles, it is probable that there would be one at each sea front of the town. But the principal harbour looked

<sup>90</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm. Hoeschel*. XXIV. 1.



towards Africa, on the s.w. side of Lilybæum, and its entrance was very narrow, because at a little distance<sup>91</sup> from the shore there extends a line of shoals nearly rising in some places to the water's edge, and running parallel to the coast, and the passages through these shoals, or round their extremity, were exceedingly narrow and intricate. The land side was fortified by a wall with towers at intervals<sup>92</sup>, and covered by a ditch ninety feet wide and sixty deep. The garrison consisted at first of ten thousand regular soldiers, besides the inhabitants, and the governor Himilcon was an able and active officer, equal to the need. The Romans employed in the siege two consular armies, and the seamen of a fleet of two hundred ships of war, and a great multitude of small craft; so that as the seamen worked regularly at the trenches, the besieging force may well have amounted to 110,000 men<sup>93</sup>.

The Romans attacked the land front of the town in form<sup>94</sup>: they carried mounds across the ditch, and battered the towers in succession; whilst a formidable artillery covered their operations, and played upon the defenders of the walls. On the sea side they endeavoured to block up the harbour by sinking stone ships in the channels through the shoals, but a violent storm<sup>95</sup> raised such a sea that every thing

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.

Attempts of the Romans to stop up the entrances into the harbour.

<sup>91</sup> See Captain Smyth's Hydrographical Remarks on the coast of Sicily, p. xxvi. and his plan of the anchorages and shoals in the neighbourhood of Trapani, in his Sicilian Atlas.

<sup>92</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoesch.

XXIV. 1. Polybius, I. 42.

<sup>93</sup> The amount given by Diodorus, XXIV. 1.

<sup>94</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXIV. 1. Polybius, I. 42.

<sup>95</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXIV. 1, copying probably from

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.  
Able and  
successful  
attempts of  
the Cartha-  
ginian naval  
officers to  
throw suc-  
cours into  
the place.

was swept away, and the harbour still remained open.

But material fortifications, however strong, must yield at last to a persevering enemy. The real strength of Lilybæum lay in the courage and ability which the long war had at last enkindled among the Carthaginian officers; so that now all was energy and wisdom, in complete contrast to the weakness and timidity of former generals. Himilcon was defending Lilybæum with the utmost ability and vigour; Adherbal, a man no less brave and able, had the command at Drepanum, and had with him a worthy associate in Carthalo; while Hannibal, one of his intimate friends, was sent from Carthage to carry succours to Himilcon. And here, for the first time, the Carthaginians displayed the combined skill and coolness of true seamen. Hannibal sailed from Carthage<sup>96</sup> with fifty ships, and lay waiting his time

Philinus. Polybius ascribes the failure of the work to the depth of the sea and the force of the current in the narrow channels. But for more than a mile off the land the water is shallow, no where exceeding four fathoms, and it is inconceivable that in fair weather such a depth of water could have been a serious impediment to a people like the Romans, when they had at their command the labour of a hundred thousand men. According to Captain Smyth, some of the stones thrown in by the Romans in this siege have been weighed by an English wine merchant residing near Marsala, and have been used by him to build a very respectable mole opposite to his own establish-

ment, nearly at what must have been the south-east corner of the ancient town. One would be glad to know the exact spot at which these stones were weighed up; but Captain Smyth does not mention it. See his *Survey of Sicily*, p. 234.

<sup>96</sup> Polybius, I. 44. It is not easy to ascertain whether Hannibal ran into the harbour on the N.W. front of Lilybæum, or into that on the S.W. front. Probably it was the latter, so that he passed between Cape Boeo and the shoals which lie a little off the land, and so ran on in a direction parallel to the line of the coast till he came to the actual entrance between the moles into the harbour.

at the small Ægusan islands which lie to the north of Lilybæum. At length the wind blew fresh from the north, setting full into the harbour's mouth; Hannibal placed his soldiers on the decks ready for battle, hoisted every sail, and knowing the channels well, he ran down before the wind to the entrance between the shoals, dashed through the narrow passage, whilst the Romans in astonishment and awkwardness did not put out a single ship to stop him, and amidst the cheers and shouts of the whole garrison and people of Lilybæum, who had crowded to the walls to watch the event, he landed ten thousand men in safety within the harbour. Other officers of single ships passed several times backwards and forwards with equal success<sup>97</sup>, acquainting the Carthaginian government with every particular of the siege, and confounding the Romans by their absolute command as it seemed of the winds and waves.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.

But the courage of the Roman soldiers was as firm as ever. Immediately after Hannibal's arrival, Himilcon made a general sally<sup>98</sup> to destroy the works of the besiegers, but the Romans maintained

Sally of the  
garrison.  
They burn  
the Roman  
works.

<sup>97</sup> Polybius, I. 46, 47. There is a passage in this description which if we could discover the line of the ancient walls of Lilybæum might determine the position of the harbour. The way to enter the harbour, says Polybius, was "to approach it from the side towards Italy, and to bring the tower on the sea shore in a line with all the towers of the wall looking towards Africa, so as to cover them all." I. 47. The "tower on the sea shore" must mean the tower nearest to the extreme point of Cape

Boeo, but whether the line of towers looking towards Africa followed the line of the coast, so that to bring them into a line with the "tower on the sea side," a vessel must advance in a course nearly s.e. or whether they ran due eastward from Cape Boeo, in the direction of the modern Marsala, and therefore did not follow the line of the coast, can hardly be ascertained without a farther and more careful examination of the ground.

<sup>98</sup> Polybius, I. 45,

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 504.  
A.C. 250.

their ground and he was repulsed with loss. The land wall of the town was carried<sup>99</sup>, but Himilcon meanwhile had raised a second wall within, parallel to the first; so that when the first was taken the Romans had to begin all their approaches over again; and a second attempt<sup>100</sup> to burn the works, being favoured by a strong wind, was completely successful. All the Roman engines, their covered galleries, and towers, were burnt to ashes, and the consuls in despair turned the siege into a blockade.

Sufferings of  
the Romans  
during the  
winter.

During the winter the sufferings of the Romans were very great. Thousands of men had perished in the course of the siege<sup>101</sup>, and the loss of seamen had been so great, as they it seems were chiefly employed in the works, that the fleet was useless for want of hands to work it. Besides, the troops were ill-supplied with corn, and were obliged to subsist chiefly on meat<sup>102</sup>; a change of diet most unwellcome and hurtful to the Romans, who were accustomed then as now to live almost wholly on their polenta and on vegetables. Fevers broke out amongst them, and were very fatal; but Hiero again came to their assistance, and supplied them with corn. But no progress was made with the siege, when the following summer brought the new consul, P. Claudius, to Sicily to take the command.

<sup>99</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIV. 1.

<sup>100</sup> Polybius, I. 48.

<sup>101</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIV. 1. Polybius, I. 49.

<sup>102</sup> *κρεωβορουντες μονον εις την νοσον επιπτον.* Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIV. 1. We may

compare the distress of Cæsar's soldiers on the coast of Epirus, when although they had meat in plenty, yet they wanted corn, and nothing could make up to them for the loss of their bread. Cæsar, *Beil. Civil.* III. 40.



P. Claudius was the son of Appius Claudius the famous censor, and he inherited, even in over measure, the pride and overbearing temper of his family. He loudly reproached the former consuls for their inactivity<sup>103</sup>; and complaining that the discipline of the army was gone to ruin, he exercised the greatest severities on all under his command, whether Romans or Italians. He renewed with equal ill-success the attempt to block up the entrance to the harbour, and being impatient to distinguish himself, he no sooner received a reinforcement of 10,000 seamen from Rome than he resolved to put to sea and attack Adherbal, who was lying with the Carthaginian fleet in the harbour of Drepanum. It seems that his own officers<sup>104</sup> foreboded the failure of his attempt, but none could hope to move a Claudius from his purpose. The consul's pride disdained alike the warnings of gods and men; as he was going to sail it was reported to him that the omens were unfavourable, for the sacred chickens refused to eat. "Then they shall drink," was Claudius' answer, and he ordered them immediately to be thrown into the sea.

Adherbal did not expect the attack<sup>105</sup>; but so great was his promptitude, that on the first sight of the enemy he manned all his ships with his seamen and soldiers, and keeping close under the land, stood

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 505.  
A.C. 249.  
P. Claudius takes the command at Lilybæum. He sails to attack Adherbal at Drepanum. His obstinacy and profaneness.

BATTLE OF  
DREPANUM. Great victory of Adherbal over the Roman fleet under P. Claudius.

<sup>103</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm. de Virtut. et Vitiis*, XXIV. *Fragm. Hoeschel*. XXIV. 1. Polybius, I. 49.

<sup>104</sup> Cicero *de Nat. Deor.* II. 3.

Valer. Maxim. I. 4, § 3.

<sup>105</sup> Polybius, I. 49—51. Orosius, IV. 10. Diodorus, *Fragm. Hoeschel*. XXIV. 1.



CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 505.  
A.C. 249.

out of the harbour while the enemy were actually entering it. Claudius confounded at this, ordered his ships to put about and stand out to sea again. Some ran foul of each other in doing this, but at last he got clear of the harbour and formed his fleet under the land, with the ships' heads turned to the sea. Adherbal, who had brought his own fleet safely into the open sea, now formed his line of battle and attacked the Romans. We hear no more of Duilius' bridges for boarding; whether the Carthaginians had discovered some means of baffling them, or whether the practised soldiers now on board the Carthaginian ships rendered such a contrivance no longer formidable. Adherbal's victory was complete; Claudius escaped with only thirty ships, and the rest, amounting to ninety-three, were taken; with a loss in men, although some escaped to land, of not fewer than 8000 killed and 20,000 prisoners. The conquerors did not lose a single ship, and the number of their killed and wounded was very inconsiderable.

The Carthaginians follow up their success with vigour.

They followed up their victory with vigour<sup>106</sup>. Thirty ships sailed to Panormus and carried off from thence the Roman magazines of corn, which were sent to supply the garrison of Lilybæum. Carthalo arrived with seventy ships from Carthage, and being reinforced by Adherbal, attacked the remains of the Roman fleet which had been drawn up on shore at Lilybæum under the protection of the army, carried off five ships and destroyed others. Meanwhile the other

<sup>106</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm.* Hoeschel. XXIV. 1. Polybius, I. 52, 53.

consul, L. Junius Pullus, had sailed from Rome with a large fleet of ships laden with corn and other supplies for the army at Lilybæum, which he convoyed with an hundred and twenty ships of war. Being himself detained at Syracuse to wait for some of the ships of his convoy, and to collect corn from some of the districts in the interior of the island, he entrusted about four hundred of the corn-ships with some of his ships of war to his quæstors, and sent them on to Lilybæum, where the want of corn was severely felt. Carthalo was lying at Heraclea near Agrigentum, looking out for the Roman fleet; and when he heard of their approach he put out to sea to intercept them. The quæstors being in no condition to fight, fled to the small bay of Phintias, not far from Ecnomus, the scene of the great naval battle seven years before, and there mooring their ships at the bottom of the bay, and mounting the artillery of the town on the cliffs on each side of them, they waited for the enemy's attack. Carthalo was disappointed to find them so well prepared, and as their resistance was obstinate, he only carried off a few of the corn-ships and returned to Heraclea, watching for the time when they should venture to continue their voyage.

He had not waited long when his look-out ships<sup>107</sup> announced that the rear-division of the Roman fleet under the consul in person had doubled Cape Pachynus, and was advancing along the southern coast of Sicily. Wishing to meet these ships before they

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 505.  
A.C. 249.

Two Roman  
fleets are  
totally  
wrecked.

<sup>107</sup> Diodorus, Fragm. Hoeschel. XXIV. 1. Polybius, I. 53, 54.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 505.  
A.C. 249.

could join their other division in the bay of Phintias, he sailed in pursuit of them with all speed. The consul made for the shore near Camarina, dreading an open and rocky coast, and the danger of the south-west gales, less than an engagement with an enemy so superior. Carthalo, not choosing to attack him in this situation, stationed his fleet off a headland between Phintias and Camarina, and there lay, watching the movements of both the Roman divisions. Meanwhile it began to blow hard from the south, and there were signs of a coming storm which were not lost on the experienced Carthaginian pilots, who urged Carthalo to run in time for shelter. With great exertions he got round Cape Pachynus, and there lay safely in smooth water. But the storm burst with all its fury on the Romans, and overwhelmed both their fleets with such utter destruction, that all the corn-ships, amounting to nearly 800, and 105 ships of war, were dashed to pieces. With two ships of war only did the unfortunate consul arrive at Lilybæum.

P. Claudius  
is recalled,  
and a dicta-  
tor appoint-  
ed.

These accumulated disasters broke the resolution of the Romans. P. Claudius was recalled to Rome<sup>108</sup>, and required to name a dictator, that he might himself be brought to trial for misconduct. He named one of his own clerks, M. Claudius Glicia, as if he delighted to express his scorn of his country, when it no longer held him in honour. The senate obliged Glicia to resign his office immediately, and appointed by their own authority, as in ancient times,

<sup>108</sup> Livy, Epitom. XIX. Zonaras, VIII. 15.

A. Atilius Calatinus. Atilius named L. Metellus his master of the horse, and they both set out without delay to take the command in Sicily.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 505,  
506,  
A.C. 249,  
248.  
Trial of P.  
Claudius,

P. Claudius was tried before the people for his profane contempt of the auspices; but according to the most probable account<sup>109</sup>, the trial was broken off by a sudden storm, which, if noticed by any one present, obliged the comitia to separate. It was done in all likelihood on an understanding that the accused would by his own act satisfy the justice of the people; and the Romans of this period shrank from shedding noble blood by the hands of the executioner. We only know that three years afterwards P. Claudius was no longer alive; for his sister being pressed by the crowd of spectators as she was going home from the circus, said aloud that she wished her brother could come to life, and command another fleet, that he might make the streets less crowded. For this speech she was impeached<sup>110</sup> by the ædiles, and heavily fined: and this trial is recorded to have taken place three years after the defeat at Drepanum.

L. Junius<sup>111</sup> was not more fortunate than his colleague, although he had on shore endeavoured to make up for his disasters at sea, and had stormed and occupied the mountain and town of Eryx, immediately above Drepanum. He too was tried for having put to sea in defiance of the auspices, and finding his condemnation certain he killed himself.

and of his  
colleague,  
L. Junius.

<sup>109</sup> Valer. Maximus, VIII. 1, § 4.

<sup>111</sup> Polybius, I. 55. Cicero, de Natur. Deor. II. 3.

<sup>110</sup> A. Gellius, X. 6.

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 507.  
A.C. 247.  
Hamilcar  
Barca is  
appointed to  
the com-  
mand in  
Sicily. His  
system of  
warfare.

It was about this period of the contest that Hamilcar Barca<sup>112</sup>, the father of the great Hannibal, was appointed to command the Carthaginian forces in Sicily. The Romans had resigned the sea to their enemy, but their superiority by land was at present irresistible; the terror of the elephants had vanished, and Sicily in general is not a country peculiarly suited to the action of cavalry. It was Hamilcar's object, which he pursued steadily to the end of his life, to form an infantry which should be a match for the Roman legions; and this could only be done by avoiding for the present all pitched battles, and at the same time carrying on an incessant warfare of posts, in which his soldiers would be constantly trained, and learn to feel confidence in their general and in each other. This was the method by which alone Pompey could have resisted Cæsar's veterans; but Pompey, although he saw what was right, had not the firmness to persevere in it, and Pharsalia was the reward of his weakness. Hamilcar possessed patience equal to his ability, and his influence with the government enabled him to turn both to the best advantage.

His long  
occupation  
of the table  
mountain  
near Panormus, and of  
Eryx.

During six years, therefore, Hamilcar made Sicily a training school for the Carthaginian soldiers, as he afterwards made Spain. He first occupied the summit of a table-mountain near Panormus<sup>113</sup>, now called

<sup>112</sup> Polybius, I. 56. Hamilcar seems to have succeeded Carthalo. Zonaras, VIII. 16.

<sup>113</sup> Polybius, I. 56. Monte Pellegrino is famous in modern

times for the cave in which Sta. Rosolia's bones were said to have been found in 1624, and where a church has since been built in her honour.



Monte Pellegrino, rising immediately above the sea, with precipitous cliffs on every side, and with a level surface of considerable extent on the summit, and abundant springs of water. A steep descent led to a little cove where ships could be drawn up on the beach with safety<sup>114</sup>; and here he kept a light fleet always at hand, with which he made repeated plundering descents on the coasts of Italy, while by land he was continually breaking out and making inroads into the territory of the Roman allies, even as far as the eastern coast of the island<sup>115</sup>. Year after year the consuls were employed against him, but they never could gain any pretence for claiming a triumph. During the latter part of this remarkable warfare Hamilcar recovered, and fixed his head-quarters at, the town of Eryx<sup>116</sup>, although the summit of the mountain above him was occupied by the Romans, and a Roman army lay also below him, nominally engaged in blockading Drepanum. It appears that the Romans still continued also to blockade or rather to be encamped before Lilybæum; but as the sea was perfectly open, their presence produced no effect on the garrison.

We wish in vain to catch any glimpses of the internal state of Rome after twenty years of such destructive warfare. If the varying numbers of the MSS. of Livy's epitomes can be trusted, the Roman citizens at the end of the war were fewer by one-sixth

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 507  
—511.  
A.C. 247—  
243.

<sup>114</sup> Apparently the small bay of Mondello, between Capo di Gallo and Monte Pellegrino.

<sup>115</sup> A fragment of Diodorus speaks of Hamilcar as making war

in the neighbourhood of Catana. Fragn. Hoeschel. XXIV. 2.

<sup>116</sup> Polybius, I. 58. Diodorus, Fragn. Hoeschel. XXIV. 2.

Internal state of Rome. Depreciation of the copper coinage.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 507  
—511.  
A.C. 247—  
243.

part than they had been ten years before : the census sank from 297,797 to 251,222<sup>117</sup>, and the decrease amongst the Latins and Italian allies must have been at least equal. We find also that the As towards the end of the war was reduced five-eighths of its original weight ; from having weighed twelve ounces it was brought down to two<sup>118</sup> ; and although it is certain that this reduction was gradual, inasmuch as Asses of several intermediate weights are still in existence, yet Pliny may be so far correct that the As, having weighed a full pound or nearly so down to the beginning of the first Punic war, was reduced to two ounces before the end of it. No rise in the value of copper could possibly have justified such a reduction, which could only have been one of the ordinary tricks of distressed governments ; it is clear also that the silver denarii coined a few years before must have vanished out of circulation, as otherwise, if the general payments of the government were made in silver, they would have gained nothing by the depreciation of the copper coinage. Besides, the constant employment of such immense armaments in Sicily must have drained Italy of its silver, as even the Sicilian states, and much more the foreign merchants, who always gathered in numbers where war was going on on a large scale, would have been unwilling to take the Roman copper money. And this great scarcity of money would perhaps explain the very low reported prices of provisions at Rome<sup>119</sup>

<sup>117</sup> Livy, Epitom. XVIII. XIX.

<sup>119</sup> Pliny, Hist. Natur. XVIII.

<sup>118</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. XXXIII. § 44. § 17, quoting from Varro, says

on one or two occasions during the war, if those prices were indeed to be depended on; for if the government did not want to make purchases of corn for its armies, a plentiful harvest would create a great glut of it in the market: the actual war, and the general jealousy of the ancient world on that point, making it alike impossible to dispose of it by exportation.

CHAP.  
XI.  
A.U.C. 507  
—511.  
A.C. 247—  
243.

Twenty years before, the Roman people, we are told, had voted for engaging in the war with Carthage, while the senate sat hesitating; and the plunder of Sicily, in the first campaigns, made them doubtless rejoice in their decision. At a later period, something was occasionally gained by the soldiers in the same way, but from the beginning of the siege of Lilybæum it ceased altogether, and the warfare with Hamilcar was as unprofitable to the Roman armies as it was laborious and dangerous. Meanwhile the taxation must have been very heavy; for the building of such large fleets, though not to be measured by the cost of our ships of war, was still expensive, and armaments of an hundred thousand men, including soldiers and seamen together, such as were often sent out in the course of the war, must

Heavy taxation. Foundation of one or two colonies, and great assignation of lands.

that at the time of L. Metellus' triumph, the modius or peck of corn sold for a single As, and that the congius of wine, and twelve pounds of meat, were sold also at the same price. Some accident must have occasioned these prices, unless indeed we are to understand the As before its depreciation, or rather that the reckoning was made according to the old standard and not the later and reduced one. It

is very strange, however, that in the very winter after this season of plenty, the Romans should have been in such great distress for corn at Lilybæum. See p. 606. The low prices at the time of Metellus' triumph, were not probably market prices, but merely the rate at which he made distributions of corn and wine to the people in honour of his success.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 507  
—511.  
A.C. 247—  
243.

have greatly drained the treasury. To all this was to be added, since the disasters of the Roman fleets, the ravage of the coast of Italy by the enemy; for Hamilcar, from his stronghold near Panormus, more than once put to sea with his ships of war, and wasted not only the Bruttian and Lucanian coasts, but the shores of the gulf of Salernum, and even of the bay of Naples as far as Cumæ<sup>120</sup>. On the other hand, private citizens were allowed to fit out the government ships of war on their own account<sup>121</sup>, and some plunder was thus taken, but very insufficient to make up for the losses of the war. Two or three colonies were planted, such as Alsium and Fregenæ on the Etruscan coast near the mouth of the Tiber, and Brundisium; but these were more for public objects, the two in Etruria being founded probably as outposts to check the descents of the Carthaginian fleet, than for the relief of the poorer citizens. An accidental notice in Pliny<sup>122</sup> informs us that L. Metellus was in the course of his life appointed one of fifteen commissioners for granting out lands; a larger number of commissioners than we find on any other occasion named for that purpose. It would be important to fix the date of this appointment, but this can only be done by conjecture: it could scarcely however have been as early as the great assignation of lands made after the fourth Samnite war, for that was twenty years before Metellus obtained his first consulship, nor could it have been much later than the period of Hamilcar's

<sup>120</sup> Polybius, I. 56.

<sup>121</sup> Zonaras, VIII. 16.

<sup>122</sup> VII. § 139.

warfare in Sicily, for in the beginning of the last year<sup>123</sup> of the war he was already pontifex maximus, and in the year following he lost his sight in saving the palladium. The probability is, therefore, that an assignment of lands on the largest scale took place about the close of the war, either to the poorer citizens generally, or, as after the second Punic war, to the old soldiers who had undergone such hard and unprofitable service in Sicily.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 507  
—511.  
A.C. 247—  
243.

On the other side, Carthage maintained no large fleets since the Romans had laid aside theirs, purposely to avoid so great an expense. Hamilcar's army could not have been very large, and the agriculture and internal trade of Africa suffered little or nothing from the war. But the contest was tedious and wearing, and in Sicily it was almost wholly defensive, which in itself is apt to sicken a nation of continuing it; nor were ordinary minds likely to enter into the views of Hamilcar, and await patiently the result of his system of creating an effective army. Besides, the unsoundness of the Carthaginian power in Africa was always felt in seasons of pressure; and at this very time hostilities<sup>124</sup> were going on against some of the African people, which, however successful, were necessarily an expense and a distraction to the government. It seemed, therefore, that in spite of Hamilcar's ability, the possession of Lilybæum and Drepanum was held but by a thread, which a single unfortunate event might sever.

Effects of  
the war on  
Carthage.

<sup>123</sup> Valerius Maximus, I. 1, § 2.

<sup>124</sup> Diodorus, *Frags. de Virtut. et Vitiis*, XXIV. Polybius, I. 73.



CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 512.  
A.C. 242.  
The Romans resolve  
to send  
another  
fleet to sea.

The Roman government at last, in the twenty-fourth year of the war, roused itself for one more decisive effort. But so exhausted was the treasury, that a fleet could only be raised by a patriotic loan; that is to say, one, two, or three wealthy persons, according to their means, advanced money to build a quinquereme, which was to be repaid to them in better times<sup>125</sup>. In this way two hundred ships were constructed; and the Romans had an excellent model in one of the best sailing of the Carthaginian ships, which had been taken some years before off Lilybæum. The consuls of the year were C. Lutatius Catulus and A. Postumius Albinus. Lutatius was the founder of the nobility of his house, and a man worthy to have been the ancestor of that Q. Catulus, whose pure virtue bore the hardest of trials, the triumph of his own party. Postumius belonged to a family scarcely second to the Claudii in overbearing pride; and it was perhaps not without some suspicion of his following the example of P. Claudius at Drepanum, that the pontifex maximus<sup>126</sup>, Metellus, forbade him to take any foreign command, because, as he was flamen of Mars, his religious duties required his constant presence at Rome. The fleet therefore was entrusted to C. Lutatius.

Anxiety for  
its success.

The anxiety for the success of this enterprise was naturally great. On such occasions omens and prophecies were never wanting; and the consul him-

<sup>125</sup> Polybius, I. 59.

<sup>126</sup> Valerius Maxim. I. 1, § 4.

self longed to discover his future fate, and wished to consult the famous lots kept in the temple of Fortune at Præneste<sup>127</sup>. But the senate forbade him, resolving that the consul of the Roman people should go forth with no auspices but those vouchsafed to him by the gods of Rome.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 512.  
A.C. 242,  
241.

The fleet sailed at an unusual season; for if Eutropius' date of the battle be correct, the ships must have left the Tiber as early as the month of February. Lutatius, accordingly, found that the Carthaginian ships had all gone back to Carthage<sup>128</sup> for the winter, so that he occupied the harbour of Drepanum without opposition, and began vigorously to besiege the town. As Q. Valerius, the prætor, accompanied him to Sicily, it is probable that two consular armies were employed, and so large a force obliged Hamilcar to remain quiet in Eryx, and made it certain that Drepanum must fall, unless relieved by a fleet from Carthage.

C. Lutatius  
Catulus  
arrives with  
the fleet at  
Drepanum.

Lutatius, expecting to be attacked by sea<sup>129</sup>, was indefatigable in exercising his seamen both in rowing and in manœuvring, and he attended carefully to their food and manner of living, that they might be in the best possible condition. The Carthaginians, on their part, equipped a fleet with all haste, and appointed Hanno to command it, an officer who had acquired distinction by his services against the Africans. But they had lately so neglected their navy that their seamen and soldiers on board were alike,

A Carthagi-  
nian fleet is  
sent over  
from Africa  
to oppose  
him.

<sup>127</sup> Cicero, de Divinat. II. 41.

<sup>129</sup> Polybius, I. 59, 60.

<sup>128</sup> Polybius, I. 59.

CHAP.  
XL.

A.U.C. 512.

A.C. 242,  
241.Catulus is  
anxious to  
intercept  
them.

for the most part, without experience ; and the ships, besides, were heavily laden with provisions and other stores for the relief of Drepanum.

Hanno first put in at the small island of Hiera<sup>130</sup>, which lies some miles out to sea off the western point of Sicily. His hope was to dash over unperceived to the coast by Drepanum, to land his stores, and to take Hamilcar and his veterans on board from Eryx ; which being effected, he would not fear to encounter the Romans. This Catulus was above all things anxious to hinder, and he resolved to bring on the action, if possible, before the enemy could communicate with Hamilcar. He had himself been badly wounded a little before in some skirmish with the garrison of Drepanum, and was unable to leave his bed ; but Q. Valerius, the prætor, was ready to take the command, and kept earnestly watching for the enemy.

BATTLE OF  
ÆGUSA OR  
OF THE  
ÆGATES.  
Great vic-  
tory of the  
Romans.

It was the morning of the 10th of March<sup>131</sup> ; the Roman fleet having taken on board picked soldiers from the legions, had sailed on the preceding evening to the island of Ægusa, which lies between Hiera and the Sicilian coast, and had there spent the night. When day broke, the wind was blowing fresh from the west, and rolling a heavy sea in upon the land ; the Carthaginians took advantage of it, hoisted their sails, and ran down before the wind towards Drepanum. The Roman fleet, notwithstand-

<sup>130</sup> Polybius, I. 60. Zonaras, VIII. 17. Valer. Maxim. II. 8, § 2.

<sup>131</sup> Eutropius, II. Polybius, I. 60.

ing the heavy sea and the adverse wind, worked out to intercept them, and formed in line of battle with their heads to windward, cutting off the enemy's passage. Then the Carthaginians lowered their masts and sails, and prepared of necessity to fight. But their heavy ships and raw seamen and soldiers were too unequal to the contest, and the fortune of the day was soon decided. Fifty ships were sunk, and seventy taken; the rest fled, and the wind, happily for them, shifting just in time, they again hoisted their sails, and escaped to Hiera.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 512.  
A.C. 242,  
241.

To continue the war was now impossible, and orders were sent to Hamilcar to negotiate for peace<sup>132</sup>. Lutatius, whose consulship was on the point of expiring, readily received his overtures; but he required that Hamilcar's army should give up their arms, and all the Roman deserters who had fled to them, as the price for being allowed to return to Carthage. This demand was rejected by Hamilcar with indignation: "Never," he replied, "would he surrender to the Romans the arms which his country had given him to use against them;" and he declared that sooner than submit to such terms, he would defend Eryx to the last extremity. Lutatius thought of Regulus, and of the vengeance which had punished his abuse of victory, and he withdrew his demand. It was then agreed, "that the Carthaginians should evacuate Sicily, and make no war upon Hiero or his allies; that they should

The Carthaginians sue for peace. Terms of the treaty.

<sup>132</sup> Polybius, I. 62. Diodorus, Fragm. Vatican. XXIV. 4. Cornel. Nepos in Hamilcar, 1.

CHAP. XL.  
 A.U.C. 513.  
 A.C. 241.

release all Roman prisoners without ransom; and pay to the Romans in twenty years 2200 Euboic talents." These were the preliminaries, which were subject to the approval of the Roman government; the senate and people would not, however, ratify them, but sent over ten commissioners with full powers to conclude a treaty<sup>133</sup>. These plenipotentiaries required that the money to be paid should be increased to 3200 talents, and the term of years reduced to ten; and they insisted that the Carthaginians should also give up all the islands between Sicily and Italy. This clause was intended apparently to prevent their forming any establishments on the Liparæan Islands, which, although not at present in their power, they might after the peace have attempted to reoccupy, as some of them were uninhabited, and none possibly had been as yet formally occupied by the Romans.

Hamilcar  
 evacuates  
 Sicily.

Hamilcar would not break off the negotiation on such points as these. His views were now turned to Spain, a wide field of enterprise, which might amply compensate for the loss of Sicily. And he wished to see his country relieved from the burden of the war with Rome, and enabled to repair and consolidate its resources. The peace, therefore, was concluded: Hamilcar evacuated Eryx<sup>134</sup>, and his troops were embarked at Lilybæum for Carthage. But their unseasonable and bloody rebellion which immediately followed, and which for more than three

<sup>133</sup> Polybius, I. 63.

<sup>134</sup> Polybius, I. 66.



years involved the Carthaginians in a war far more destructive than that with the Romans, deranged all his plans, and delayed probably for many years the renewal of the contest between the two rival nations.

CHAP.  
XL.  
A.U.C. 513.  
A.C. 241.

Such was the end of the first Punic war, in which Conclusion. although the contest was long and wearisome, yet both parties fought as it were at arm's length, and if we except the short expedition of Regulus, neither struck a blow at any vital part of his enemy. But the next struggle was sure to be of a more deadly character, to be fought, not so much for dominion as for life and death. In this new contest, the genius of Hamilcar and of his son determined that in the mortal assault Carthage should anticipate her rival; and Italy for fifteen years was laid waste by a foreign invader. The state of the Roman supremacy in Italy, when it was exposed to this searching trial, the fate of the several Italian nations under the Roman dominion, and their dispositions, whether of attachment or of hatred, will form, therefore, the fit beginning of the third volume of this history, which will embrace the third period of the Roman commonwealth; the period of its foreign conquests, before Rome

“ —whom mighty kingdoms curtesied to,  
Like a forlorn and desperate castaway,  
Did shameful execution on herself.”

# CONSULS AND

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome: common reckoning.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
123	367	387	98-2	
124	368	386	98-3	
125	369	385	98-4	
126	370	384	99-1	
127	371	383	99-2	
128	372	382	99-3	

# MILITARY TRIBUNES.

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XIV. 110. Q. † Kæso † † Ænus † Sulpicius K. Fabius Q. Servilius P. Cornelius M. † Claudius †	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 4. T. Quintius Cincinnatus Q. Servilius Fidenas V. L. Julius Julus L. Aquillius Corvus L. Lucretius Tricipitinus Ser. Sulpicius Rufus		Capitolino & Corbo.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 2. M. Furius † Caius † † Æmilius †	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 5. L. Papirius C. Cornelius C. Sergius L. Æmilius II. L. Menenius L. Valerius Publicola III.		Cursore & Lano.
<i>Coss.</i> XV. 8. L. Lucretius Ser. Sulpicius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 6. M. Furius Camillus Ser. Cornelius Maluginensis Q. Servilius Fidenas VI. L. Quintius Cincinnatus L. Horatius Pulvillus P. Valerius		Maluginense & Cincinnato.
<i>Coss.</i> —XV. 14. L. Valerius A. Manlius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 11. A. Manlius P. Cornelius T. Quintius } Capitoli L. Quintius } L. Papirius Cursor II. C. Sergius II.		Capitolino & Cincinnato.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 15. L. Lucretius † Sentius † Sulpicius L. Æmilius L. Furius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 18. Ser. Cornelius Maluginensis III. P. Valerius Potitus II. M. Furius Camillus Ser. Sulpicius Rufus II. C. Papirius Crassus T. Quintius Cincinnatus II.		Rufo & Camillo.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 20. Q. Sulpicius C. Fabius † Servilius Cornelius P. † Ugo † Sex. † Anius † Caius † Marcus †	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 21. L. Valerius IV. A. Manlius III. Ser. Sulpicius III. L. Lucretius L. Æmilius III. M. Trebonius	Genucius & Curtius. Γαλάται καὶ Κεῤῥαί- τοι Ῥώμης ἐκρά- τησαν πλὴν τοῦ Καπετωλίου.	Publicola III. & Flacco III.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
129	373	381	99-4	
130	374	380	100-1	
131	375	379	100-2	
132	376	378	100-3	
133	377	377	100-4	
134	378	376	101-1	
135	379	375	101-2	

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 22. P. Cornelius L. Virginius L. Papirius M. Furius A. Valerius L. Manlius Q. Postumius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 22. Sp. Papirius L. Papirius Ser. Cornelius Maluginensis IV. Q. Servilius Ser. Sulpicius L. Æmilius IV.	Macrinus II. & Capitolinus IV.	Fidenas & Crasso.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 23. T. Quintius L. Servilius L. Julius Aquillius Decius Lucretius Ancus Ser. Sulpicius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 22. M. Furius Camillus VII. A. Postumius Regillensis L. Postumius Regillensis L. Furius L. Lucretius M. Fabius Ambustus	Vibulanus & Elva	Publicola IV. & Tricipitino.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 24. L. Papirius C. Cornelius L. Mallius C. Servilius A. Valerius Q. Fabius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 27. L. Valerius V. P. Valerius III. C. Sergius III. L. Menenius II. Sp. Papirius Ser. Cornelius Maluginensis	+ Pacelaus + & Crassus	Publicola V. & Mamertino VI.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 25. M. Cornelius Q. Servilius M. Furius L. Quintius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 30. P. Manlius C. Manlius L. Julius C. Sextilius M. Albinus L. Antistius	Macrinus III. & Lænas	Capitolino & Albino.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 28. L. Papirius M. + Publius + T. Cornelius L. Quintius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 31. Sp. Furius Q. Servilius II. C. Licinius P. Clælius M. Horatius L. Geganius	+ Manlius + & Capitolinus V.	Fidenas II. & Siculo.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 36. Ser. Sulpicius L. Papirius T. Cornelius M. Quintius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 32. L. Æmilius P. Valerius IV. C. Veturius Ser. Sulpicius L. Quintius } Cincinnati C. Quintius }	Macrinus IV. & Fidenas	Mamertino & Cincinnato.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 38. L. Valerius Crispus + Mallius Fabius + Ser. Sulpicius Lucretius	[Omitted in Livy, through some confusion in his reckoning.]	Malogennesius & Crassus	Lanato III. & Prætextato.



Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
136	380	374	101-3	
137	381	373	101-4	
138	382	372	102-1	... actus est ... t... dedicavit
139	383	371	102-2	... oplicola V. ... ext. III. ... luginensis VI. TR. MIL.
140	384	370	102-3	... .. Cossus ... .. uginensis. M. Fabius K.F.M.N. Ambustus II. TR. MIL.
141	385	369	102-4	... .. pitolin. ... .. luginensis VII. ... .. extat. IV. TR. MIL. Sp. Servilius C.F.C.N. Struetus L. Papirius Sp. F.C.N. Crassus. L. Veturius L.F. Sp. N. Crassus Cicurinus ... llus IV. Dict. ... amercinus Mag. eq. Rei Gerundæ Causa. ... um in Milites ex S.C. abdicarunt. In eorum locum facti sunt ... pitolinus. Dict. Seditionis sedandæ et R.G.C. ... mus e Plebe Mag. eq.

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 41. Q. Crassus + Servilius + Cornelius Sp. Papirius Fabius + Albus +	VI. 35. No curule Magistrates	Julius & Virginius	Bacho + Solo +
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 48. M. Furius L. Furius A. Postumius L. Lucretius M. Fabius L. Postumius	VI. 35. No curule Magistrates	Capitolinus VI. & Camerinus	Papirio & + Ni- nio +
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 50. L. Valerius P. + Ancus + C. Terentius L. Menenius C. Sulpicius T. Papirius L. Æmilius M. Fabius	VI. 35. No curule Magistrates	Pœnus & + Me- lito +	+ Scarabiense + & Celimontano.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 51. P. Manlius C. + Erenucius + C. + Sextus + Tib. Julius L. Albinus P. Trebonius C. Mallius L. Anthestius	VI. 35. No curule Magistrates	Crassus & Tullius	Prisco & Comi- nio.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 57. Q. Servilius L. Furius C. Licinius P. Clœlius	VI. 35. No curule Magistrates	Tricipitinus & Fi- denas II.	Mamertino & + Solo +.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 61. L. Æmilius C. Virginius Ser. Sulpicius L. Quintius C. Cornelius C. Valerius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 36. L. Furius A. Manlius Ser. Sulpicius Ser. Cornelius P. Valerius C. Valerius	Cossus & Pœ- nus II.	Medullino & Po- lito.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
142	386	368	103-1	<p> . . . . ssus II.  . . . . aluginensis II.  . . . . acerinus  L. Veturius L.F. Sp. N. Crassus Cicurinus II.  P. Valerius L.F.L.N. Potitus Poplicola VI.  P. Manlius A.F.A.N. Capitolinus II.  . . . amillus V. Dict.  . . . . . Mag. eq. Rei Gerund. Causa. </p>
143	387	367	103-2	<p> . . . EBE PRIMUM CREARI CŒPTI.  . . . mercinus  L. Sextius Sex. F.N.N. Sextin. Lateran.  Primus e plebe.  . . . . Regillensis Albinus  C. Sulpicius M.F.Q.N. Peticus. </p>
144	388	366	103-3	<p> . . . tinensis  Q. Servilius Q.F.Q.N. Ahala . . </p>
145	389	365	103-4	<p> . . . Peticus  C. Licinius C.F.P.N. Calvus </p>
146	390	364	104-1	<p> . . . ercinus II.  Cn. Genucius. M.F.M.N. Aventinensis.  . . . mperiossus. Dict.  . . . Natta. Mag. eq. Clavi Fig. Causa. </p>
147	391	363	104-2	<p> . . . Ahala II.  L. Genucius. M.F.M.N. Aventinensis II.  . . . Regillensis Dict.  Rei Gerundæ Causa.  . . . . Sci . . . . Mag. eq. </p>
148	392	362	104-3	<p> . . . . .  C. Sulpicius M.F.Q.N. Peticus II.  . . . Capitolinus Crispinus. Dict.  . . . M.N. Maluginensis. Mag. eq.  Rei Gerundæ Causa  . . alibus . . . o CCCXCII. </p>

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 71. L. Papirius L. Menenius Ser. Cornelius Ser. Sulpicius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 36. Q. Servilius C. Veturius A. Cornelius M. Cornelius Q. Quintius M. Fabius	† Achilles † & Mugillanus	Fidenas III. & Maluginense.
XV. 75. Anarchy	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 38. T. Quintius Ser. Cornelius Ser. Sulpicius Sp. Servilius L. Papirius L. Veturius	Atratinus & Vibulanus	Capitolino & Structo.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 76. L. Furius Paulus Mallius Ser. Sulpicius Ser. Cornelius	<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —VI. 42. A. Cornelius II. M. Cornelius II. M. Geganius P. Manlius L. Veturius P. Valerius VI.	Capitolinus VII. & Vibulanus II.	Cosso II. & Grasso.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 77. Q. Servilius C. Veturius A. Cornelius M. Cornelius M. Fabius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 1. L. Sextius L. Æmilius Mamercinus	Mugillanus II. & Rutilius	Mamercino & Laterano.
<i>Tribb. Milit.</i> —XV. 78. T. Quintius Ser. Cornelius Ser. Sulpicius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 1. L. Genucius Q. Servilius	Æmilius & Rusticus	Abentinense & Haala.
<i>Coss.</i> —XV. 82. L. Æmilius Mamercus L. Sextius Laterias	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 2. C. Sulpicius Peticus C. Licinius Stolo	† Cossus † Medullinus	Petico & Calbo.
<i>Coss.</i> —XV. 90. L. Genucius Q. Servilius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 3. Cn. Genucius L. Sextius Mamercinus II.	Flavus & Camerinus	Mamertino & Abentinense.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Era.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
149	393	361	104-4	<p>..... mbustus  C. Poetelius C.F.Q.N. Libo. Visolus.  ... Ahala, Dict.  Rei Gerund. Causa  ... Capitolin. Crispinus, Mag. eq.  ..... Cos. De Galleis et Tiburtibus.  ..... rt.  M. Fabius N.F.M.N. Ambustus. Cos.  Ovans, De Herniceis. Ann. CCCXCIII.  Non. Sept.</p>
150	394	360	105-1	<p>..... Lænas  Cn. Manlius L.F.A.N. Capitolin. Imperioss.</p>
151	395	359	105-2	<p>..... mbustus.  C. Plautius P.F.P.N. Proculus  C. Sulpicius M.F.Q.N. Peticus II.  Dict. De Galleis. Ann. CCCXCV.  Nonis Mai.  C. Plautius P.F.P.N. Proculus. Cos.  De Herniceis. Ann. CCCXCV. Idibus Mai.</p>
152	396	358	105-3	<p>....  .....  C. Marcius L.F.C.N. Rutilus.  Cos. De Privernatibus. Ann. CCCXCVI.  Kal. Jun.</p>
153	397	357	105-4	<p>....  .....  C. Marcius L.F.C.N. Rutilus.  Dict. De Tusceis. Ann. CCCXCVII.  Pridie Non. Mai.</p>
154	398	356	106-1	
155	399	355	106-2	<p>.....  .....  M. Fabius N.F.M.N. Ambustus II.  Cos. III. De Tiburtibus. Ann. CCCXCIX.  III. Non. Jun.</p>
156	400	354	106-3	



Diodorus.	Livy.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Coss.</i> —XV. 95. C. Sulpicius C. Licinius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 4. Q. Servilius Ahala L. Genucius	Potitus & Capito- linus	Haala II. & Abentinense.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 2. Cn. Genucius L. Æmilius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 9. C. Sulpicius C. Licinius Calvus	Genucius & † Cu- bius †	Stolo & Petico.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 4. Q. Servilius L. Genucius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 11. C. Pœtelius Balbus M. Fabius Ambustus	Mamertinus & La- teranus	Ambusto & Pro- culo.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 6. C. Licinius C. Sulpicius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 12. M. Popillius Lænas Cn. Manlius	Petitus & Galba	Rutilo & Capito- lino.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 9. M. Fabius C. Pœtelius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 12. C. Fabius C. Plautius	Mamertinus II. & † Sulla †	Ambusto & Læ- nas II.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 15. M. Popillius Lænas Cn. Manlius Imperiosus	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 16. C. Marcius Cn. Manlius	† Allus † & Genu- cius	Rutilo & Capito- lino.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 23. M. Fabius C. Plotius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 17. M. Fabius Ambustus II. M. Popillius Lænas II.	Stolo & Petinus	Ambusto II. & Lænas II.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 28. C. Marcius Cn. Manlius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 18. C. Sulpicius Peticus III. M. Valerius Publicola “Quadringentesimo anno quam urbs Roma con- dita erat, quinto trice- simo quam a Gallis reciperata.”	Libo & Lænas	Petico & Pub- licola.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
157	401	353	106-4	
158	402	352	107-1	
159	403	351	107-2	. . . lius M.C.F.N. Lænas Cos. III. . . . alleis. Ann. CDIII. Quirinalibus.
160	404	350	107-3	. . . . audius P.F. . . . Regil . . . . . . biit . . . Dict. Comit. Habend. Causa. . . . Mag. eq.
161	405	349	107-4	. . . . . . . . erius M.F.M.N. Corvus . . . Dict. Comit. Habend. Causa.
162	406	348	108-1	. . . . . . . . rioss. Torquat . .
163	407	347	108-2	. . . . . . . . . Visolus. . . . erius M.F.M.N. Corvus. Cos. II. . . . Antiatus Volseis Satricaneisque Ann. CDVII. K. Febr.
164	408	346	108-3	
165	409	345	108-4	
166	410	344	109-1	. . rius . M.F.M.N. Corvus. De Samnitibus Anno CDX. X. K. Oct. . . nelius P.F.A.N. Cossus Arvina . . os. De Sam- nitibus. Ann. CDX. VIII. K. Oct.
167	411	343	109-	
168	412	342	109-3	

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 32. M. Fabius M. Popillius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 18. M. Fabius Ambustus III. T. Quintius “in quibusdam annalibus pro T. Quintio M. Popi- lium consulem inve- nio.”	Ambustus & Proculus	Ambusto III. & Capitolino.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 37. C. Sulpicius M. Valerius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 19. C. Sulpicius Peticius IV. M. Valerius Publicola II.	Rusticius & Capi- tolinus	Petico IV. & Publicola II.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 40. M. Fabius T. Quintius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 21. P. Valerius Publicola C. Marcius Rutilus	Ambustus II. & Lænas	Publicola & Ru- tilo II.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 46. M. Valerius C. Sulpicius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 22. C. Sulpicius Peticius T. Quintius Pennus	† Potitus & Pub- licola †	Petico V. & Pen- no II.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 52. C. Marcius P. Valerius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 23. M. Popilius Lænas L. Cornelius Scipio	Rusticius II. & † Pœnus †	Lænas IV. & Sci- pione.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 53. C. Sulpicius C. Quintius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 24. L. Furius Camillus Ap. Claudius Crassus	Scipio & Lænas	Camilo & Crasso.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 56. C. Cornelius M. Popillius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 26. M. Valerius Corvus M. Popilius Lænas IV.	Camillus & Cras- sus	Lænas IV. & Corvino.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 59. M. Æmilius T. Quintius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 27. T. Manlius Torquatus C. Plautius	Corvinus & Lænas II.	Venno & Tor- quato.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 66. M. Fabius Ser. Sulpicius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 27. M. Valerius Corvus II. C. Poetelius	Venox & Tor- quatus.	Corvo & Visulo.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 69. M. Valerius M. Popillius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 28. M. Fabius Dorso Ser. Sulpicius Cameri- nus	Corvinus II. & Libo.	Dorsus & Rufa.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 70. C. Plautius T. Manlius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 28. C. Marcius Rutilus III. T. Manlius Torquatus II.	Vulso & Cameri- nus	Rutilo III. & Torquato.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 72. M. Valerius C. Poetelius	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 28. M. Valerius Corvus III. A. Cornelius Cossus	Rutilus & Tor- quatus	Corvo III. & Cosso III.

Year of the Commonwealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
169	413	341	109-4	. . . anlius L.F.A.N. Imperiossus Torquat. . . . os III. De Latineis Campaneis Si dicineis . . . urunceis. A : CDXIII. XV. K. Junias.
170	414	340	110-1	. . ublilius Q.F.Q.N. Philo Cos. De Latineis Ann. CDXIV. Idib. Januar.
171	415	339	110-2	L. Furius Sp. F.M.N. Camillus Cos. De Pedaneis et Tiburtibus. An. CDXV. IV. K. Oct. C. Mænius. P.F.P.N. Cos. De Antiatribus La- vineis Veliterneis. Ann. CDXV. Pridie K. Oct.
172	416	338	110-3	
173	417	337	110-4	
174	418	336	111-1	M. Valerius M.F.M.N. Corvus III. Cos. IV. De Caleneis. Ann. CDXIX. Idib. Mart.
175	419	335	111-2	
176	420	334	111-3	
177	421	333	111-4	
178	422	332	112-1	
179	423	331	112-2	
180	424	330	112-3	. . Aimilius L . . . N. Mamercin. Privernas. Cos. II. De Privernatibus. Ann. CDXXIV. K. Mart. C. Plautius P.F.P.N. Decianus Cos. De Priverna- tibus. Ann. CDXXIV. K. Mart.
181	425	329	112-4	

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 74. C. Marcius T. Manlius Torquatus	<i>Coss.</i> —VII. 38. C. Marcius Rutilus Q. Servilius	Corvinus III. & Cossus	Haala III. & Rutilo IIII.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 77. M. Valerius A. Cornelius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 1. C. Plautius II. L. Æmilius Mamercinus	+ Allus + & Ru- tilius	Venno II. & Mamerco.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 82. Q. Servilius Marcius Rutilus	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 3. T. Manlius Torquatus III. P. Decius Mus	Venox II. & + Mamertinus +	Torquato III. & Mure.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 84. L. Æmilius C. Plotius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 12. Ti. Æmilius Mamercinus Q. Publilius Philo	Torquatus III. & Muso	Mamercino & Philo.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 89. T. Manlius Torquatus P. Decius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 13. L. Furius Camillus C. Mænius	+ Mamertinus + & + Silo +	Camillo & + Ne- pote +.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVI. 99. Q. Publilius Ti. Æmilius Mamercus	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 15. C. Sulpicius Longus P. Ælius Pætus	Camillus & + Mi- nius +	Pæto & Longo.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 2. L. Furius C. Mænius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 16. L. Papirius Crassus K. Duilius	+ Phistus + & Longus	Crasso & + Hella +.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 17. C. Sulpicius L. Papirius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 16. M. Valerius Corvus IV. M. Atilius Regulus	Crassus & + Du- lius +	+ Caleno + & Corvo IV.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 29. K. Valerius L. Papirius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 16. T. Veturius Sp. Postumius	Regulus & Cor- vinus	Caudino and Cal- vino.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 40. M. Atilius M. Valerius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 17. A. Cornelius II. Cn. Domitius	+ Albinus + & Calvinus	+ Hoc anno Dic- tatores non fue- runt +.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 49. Sp. Postumius T. Veturius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 18. M. Claudius Marcellus C. Valerius	Albinus II. & Cossus	Calvino & Arvi- nus II.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 62. C. Domitius A. Cornelius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 19. L. Papirius Crassus II. L. Plautius Venno	Potitus & Mar- cellus	Petito & Mar- cello.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 74. C. Valerius M. Clodius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 20. L. Æmilius Mamercinus C. Plautius	+ Brassus + & Venox	Crasso II. & Venno.



Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
182	426	328	113-1	
183	427	327	113-2	Q. Publius Q.F.Q.N. Philo II. Primus Pro Cos. De Samnitibus Palæpolitaneis, Ann. CDXXVII. K. Mai.
184	428	326	113-3	
185	429	325	113-4	L. Papirius Sp. F.L.N. Cursor. Dict. De Samniti- bus. An. CDXXIX. III. Non. Mart.
186	430	324	114-1	
187	431	323	114-2	L. Fulvius L.F.L.N. Curvus Cos. De Samnitibus. Ann. CDXXXI. Quirinalibus. Q. Fabius M.F.N.N. Maximus Rullianus Cos. De Samnitibus et Apuleis Ann. CDXXXI. XII. K. Mart.
188	432	322	114-3	
189	433	321	114-4	C. Ma . . . M. Fos . . . L. Corn . . . L. Papiriu . . . T. Manli . . . L. Papiriu . . .
190	434	320	115-1	L. Papirius . . . L. Papirius Sp. F.L.N. Cursor II. Cos. III. De Samnitibus. Ann. CDXXXIV. X. K. Septem. Cens. . . . C. . . . cius . . .
191	435	319	115-2	M. Plautius L.F.L.N. Venno L. Foslius C.F. . . N. Flaccina . . . Cens. L. Papirius L. F. M. N. Crassus C. Mainius P.F.P.N. Lustrum Fecer. X. V.
192	436	318	115-3	Q. Aimilius Q.F.L.N. Barbula. C. Junius C.F.C.N. Bubulcus. Brutus.
193	437	317	115-4	Sp. Nautius Sp. F. Sp. N. Rutilus M. Popilius M.F.M.N. Lænas. L. Aimilius L.F.L.N. Mamerc. Privernas. Dict. L. Fulvius L.F.L.N. Curvus. Mag. eq. Rei Ge- rund. Causa.

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 82. L. Plotius L. Papirius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 22. P. Plautius Proculus P. Cornelius Scapula	Mamertinus II. & Decianus	+ Privernas + II. & Deciano.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 87. P. Cornelius A. Postumius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 22. L. Cornelius Lentulus Q. Publilius Philo II.	Venox & Scipio	Deciano II. & Barbato.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 110. L. Cornelius Q. Publilius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 23. C. Pœtelius L. Papirius	Lentulus & + Silo +	Lentulo & Philo.
.....	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 29. L. Furius Camillus II. Junius Brutus Scæva	Libo & Cursor	Libone III. & Cursore II.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVII. 113. C. Pœtelius Papirius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 37. C. Sulpicius Q. Æmilius or Aulius	Camillus & Bru- tus.	Camillo II. & Bruto.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVIII. 2. L. Furius Dec. Junius	<i>Coss.</i> —VIII. 38. Q. Fabius L. Fulvius	Longus & Cera- tanus	+ Hoc anno Dicta- tatores non fue- runt +.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVIII. 26. C. Sulpicius C. Ælius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 1. T. Veturius Calvinus Sp. Postumius	Cursor II. & + Sullus +	Longo II. & Cere- tano.
....	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 7. Q. Publilius Philo L. Papirius Cursor	Calvinus & + Balbinus +	+ Corvo + & Rul- liano.
....	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 15. Q. Aulius Cerretanus II. L. Papirius	Cursor III. & + Silo +	Calvino II. & Albino.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVIII. 44. Q. Publilius Q. + Publius +	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 20. M. Fostius Flaccinator L. Plautius Venno	+ Papinius + & Ceratanus	Cursore II. & Philo III.
<i>Coss.</i> —XVIII. 58. Q. Ælius L. Papirius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 20. C. Junius Bubulcus Q. Æmilius Barbula	Venox & Flaccus	+ Murillano + & Ceretano.
<i>Coss.</i> —XIX. 2. L. Plotius M'. Fulvius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 21. Sp. Nautius M. Popillius	Barbula & Bu- bulcus	Venno & Flacci- natore.

Year of the Common-wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
194	438	316	116-1	L. Papirius Sp. F.L.N. Cursor IV. ... obliilius . . F.Q.N. Philo IV. . . Fabius M.F.N.N. Maximus Rullianus. Diet. . . Aulius . . F. Ai. N. Cerretan. In Prælio occisus est. In ejus L. F. est Mag. eq. R.G.C. . . Fabius M.F.N.N. Ambustus. Mag. eq.
195	439	315	116-2	M. Poetelius M.F.M.N. Libo. C. Sulpicius Ser. F.Q.N. Longus . . . C. Mainius P.F.P.N. Diet. Rei Gerund. Causa. M. Foslius C.F.M.N. Flaccinator. Mag. eq. C. Sulpicius Ser. F.Q.N. Longus Cos III. De Samnitibus. Ann. CDXXXIX. K. Quint.
196	440	314	116-3	L. Papirius Sp. F.L.N. Cursor. . . C. Junius C.F.C.N. Bubulcus. Brutus . . C. Poetelius C.F.C.N. Libo. Visolus. Diet. M. . . . . M.F.M.N. Libo. Mag. eq. Rei Gerund. Causa.
197	441	313	116-4	M. Valerius M.F.M.N. Maximus. P. Decius P.F.Q.N. Mus. C. Sulpicius Ser. F.Q.N. Longus. Diet. R.G.C. C. Junius C.F.C.N. Bubulcus. Brutus Mag. eq. Cens. Ap. Claudius C.F. Ap. N. Cæcus. C. Plautius C.F.C.N. Qui in hoc honore Venox appellatus est. L.F. XXVI. M. Valerius M.F.M.N. Maximus. Cos. De Samnitibus Soraneisq. Ann. CDXXXI. Idib. Sext.
198	442	312	117-1	C. Junius. C.F.C.N. Bubulcus. Brutus III. Q. Aimilius Q.F.L.N. Barbula II. C. Junius. C.F.C.N. Bubulcus. Brutus. Cos. III. De Samnitibus. An. CDXLII. Nonis Sext. Q. Aimilius Q.F.L.N. Barbula Cos. II. De Etrusceis. An. CDXLII. Idib. Sext.
199	443	311	117-2	Q. Fabius M.F.N.N. Maxim. Rullian. C. Marcius C.F.L.N. Rutilus. Qui postea Censorinus appellatus est.
200	444	310	117-3	L. Papirius Sp. F.L.N. Cursor. Diet. C. Junius C.F.C.N. Bubulcus Brutus. Mag. eq. Rei Gerund. Causa. Hoc anno Dictator et Magist : Eq. sine Cos. fuerunt L. Papirius Sp. F.L.N. Cursor III. Diet. II. De Samnitibus. An. CDXLIV. Idibus Oct. Q. Fabius M.F.N.N. Maximus Rullian. II. Pro Cos. De Etrusceis. An. CDXLIV. Idib: Nov.

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Coss.</i> —XIX. 17. C. Junius Q. Æmilius	[Names omitted.]	Rutilus & Lænas.	Barbula & Bruto.
<i>Coss.</i> —XIX. 55. Sp. Nautius M. Popilius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 24. M. Pætelius C. Sulpicius	Cursor IV. & Lænas II.	Lucillo & Lænas.
<i>Coss.</i> —XIX. 66. L. Papirius IV. Q. Publius II.	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 28. L. Papirius V. C. Junius Bubuleus	Cursor V. & Bubuleus II.	Cursore IV. & Philo IIII.
<i>Coss.</i> —XIX. 73 M. Pætelius C. Sulpicius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 28. M. Valerius P. Decius	. . .	Libone & Longo III.
<i>Coss.</i> —XIX. 77. L. Papirius V. C. Junius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 30. C. Junius Bubuleus III. Q. Æmilius Barbula II.	Maximus & Muso.	Cursore V. & Bruto II.
<i>Coss.</i> —XIX. 105. M. Valerius P. Decius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 33. Q. Fabius C. Marcius Rutilus	Bubuleus IV. & Barbula.	Maximo & Mure.
<i>Coss.</i> —XX. 3. C. Junius Q. Æmilius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 41. Q. Fabius P. Decius	Rullus & Rutilius.	Bruto III. & Barbula II.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
201	445	309	117-4	P. Decius P.F.Q.N. Mus. Q. Fabius M.F.N.N. Maximus Rullian. III.
202	446	308	118-1	Ap. Claudius C.F. Ap. N. Cæcus. L. Volumnius C.F.C.N. Flamma Violens. Cens. M. Valerius M.F.M.N. Maximus. C. Junius C.F.C.N. Bubuleus Brutus. L. F. XXVII.
203	447	307	118-2	..... Tr . . . ulus P. Corn ..... Q. Marcius Q.F.Q.N. Tremulus Cos. De Anagnineis Herniceisq. Ann. CDXLVII. Prid. K. Quint. ... N. Scipio Barbatus. ..... Mus.
204	448	306	118-3	..... Megellus. Ti. Mi ..... M. .... M. Fulvius L.F.L.N. Curvus. Pætinus Cos. De Samnitibus. Ann. CDXLIIX. III. Non. Oct.
205	449	305	118-4	..... C. N. Sophus. P. S ..... ..... N. N. Maximus Rullianu . P. Sempronius P.F.C.N. Scphus Cos. de Æqueis Ann. CDXLIX. VII. K. Oct. P. Sulpicius Ser. F.P.N. Saverrio. Cos. De Samniti- bus. Ann. CDXLIX. IIII. K. Nov.
206	450	304	119-1	..... n. F. Cn. N. Lentulus. .....
207	451	303	119-2	..... C. N. Den . . . ..... ..... N. Bubuleus B ..... C. Janius C.F.C.N. Bubuleus Brutus II. Dict. De Æqueis Ann. CDLI. III. K. Sext.
208	452	302	119-3	..... M.F.N.N. Max ..... ..... ilius L.F.L.N. .... ..... no Dictat ..... ..... M.F.M.N. .... ..... onius .... M. Valer ..... IV. Dict. II. .... X. K. De . .



DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
<i>Coss.</i> —XX. 27. Q. Fabius II. C. Marcius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 42. Ap. Claudius L. Volumnus	Muso II. & Rullus II.	Rulliano II. & Rutilo II.
+ <i>Coss.</i> +—XX. 36. + Ap. Claudius + + L. Plautius +	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 42. P. Cornelius Arvina Q. Marcius Tremulus	Appius & Violens.	+ Hoc anno Dictatores non fuerunt +
<i>Coss.</i> —XX. 45. Ap. Claudius L. Volumnus	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 44. L. Postumius Ti. Minucius	+ Remulus + & + Albinus +	+ Mure II. & Rulliano III. +
<i>Coss.</i> —XX. 73. Q. Marcius P. Cornelius	<i>Coss.</i> —IX. 45. P. Sulpicius Saverrio P. Sempronius Sophus	+ Metellus + & Minucius	Cæco & Violense.
<i>Coss.</i> —XX. 81. L. Postumius Ti. Minucius	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 1. L. Genucius Ser. Cornelius	Sempronius & + Faverius +	Tremulo & Arvina.
<i>Coss.</i> —XX. 91. P. Sempronius P. Sulpicius	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 1. M. Livius Dentor M. Æmilius	Lentulus & + Aventesius +	Megello & Augurino.
<i>Coss.</i> —XX. 102. Ser. Cornelius L. Genucius	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 6. M. Valerius V. Q. Appuleius	Dentonius & Æmilius	Sofo & Saberio.
<i>Coss.</i> —XX. 106. M. Livius M. Æmilius	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 9. M. Fulvius Pætinus T. Manlius Torquatus. Huic suffectus M. Valerius.	Corvinus & Pansa	Rufus & Adventinense.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
209	453	301	119-4	. . . . . F.C.N . . . . . . .
210	454	300	120-1	. . . . . . . . . . M. Fulvius Cn. F. Cn. N. Pætinus Cos. De Samnitibus Nequinatibusque. Ann. CD . VII. K. Oct.
211	455	299	120-2	. . . . . . . . . . Cn. Fulvius Cn. F. Cn. N. Max. Centumalus. Cos. De Samnitibus Etrusceisque. Ann. CDLV. Idi- bus Nov.
212	456	298	120-3	. . .
213	457	297	120-4	. . . . . . . . . . ens
214	458	296	121-1	. . . . . M. Rull. . . . . . e devovit. Q. Fabius M.F.N.N. Maximus Rullianus III. Cos. V. De Samnitibus et Etrusceis Galleis. Ann. CDLIX. Prid. Non. Sept.
215	459	295	121-2	. . . . N. Megellu . . . . . . . . lus. . . . . . . Cornelius A.F.P.N. Arvin . . . . . . . l. est . . . . XX. L. Postumius L.F. Sp. N. Megell. Cos. II. De Samnitib. et Etrusceis VI. K. April. CDLIX. M. Atilius M.F.M.N. Regulus Cos. De Volsonibus et Samnitib. A. CDLIX. V. K. Apr.
216	460	294	121-3	L. Papirius L.F. Sp. N. Cursor S . . . . . mus. Sp. Carvilius C.F.C.N. Maximus Cos. De Samnitibus. Ann. CDLX. Idibus Jan. . . . . L.F. Sp. N. Cursor . . . . itibus . . Ann. CDLX. Idibus Febr.
217	461	293	121-4	. . . . .
218	462	292	122-1	. . . . . . . . . . . . . ximus . . . Ann. D. CDLXII. K. Sext.

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
[The regular history of Diodorus ends with the 20th book, at the third year of the 119th Olympiad, and his lists of consuls here terminate.]	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 11. L. Cornelius Scipio Cn. Fulvius	Petitus & Torquatus	† Dextro † & Paulo.
	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 14. Q. Fabius Maximus IV. P. Decius III.	Scipio & Maximus	† Corvo II. & Rulliano II. †
	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 16. L. Volumnius Ap. Claudius	† Rullus III. Muso III. †	Corvo V. & Pansa.
	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 22. Q. Fabius Maximus V. P. Decius IV.	† Claudius & Violens †	Petino & Torquato.
	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 32. L. Postumius Megellus M. Atilius Regulus	Rullus IV. & Muso IV.	Scipione & Centumalo.
	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 38, 39. L. Papirius Cursor Sp. Carvilius	Claudius & Violens II.	Rulliano IV. & Mure III.
	<i>Coss.</i> —X. 47. Q. Fabius Gurges D. Junius Brutus	Rullus V. & Muso V.	Cæco & Violense.
	[Here the 10th book of Livy ends; and the ten following books being lost, his lists of consuls are wanting till the period of the second Punic war.]	† Metellus † & Regulus	Rulliano V. & Mure IV.
		† Cursor & Maximus.	Megello II. & Regulo.
		Maximus & Gracchus	Gurgis & Scævola.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
219	463	291	122-2	
220	464	290	122-3	
221	465	289	122-4	
222	466	288	123-1	
223	467	287	123-2	
224	468	286	123-3	
225	469	285	123-4	
226	470	284	124-1	
227	471	283	124-2	. . . . . eisque . . . III. Non. Mart.
228	472	282	124-3	. . . cius Q.F.Q.N. Philippus . . . Etrusceis. Ann. CDLXXII. K. Apr.
229	473	281	124-4	. . . uncanius Ti. F. Ti. N. Cos. . e Vulsiensibus et Vulcentib. Ann. CDLXXIII. K. Febr. . . . milius Q.F.Q.N. Barbula Pro Cos. De Tarentineis Samnitibus et Sallentineis. Ann. DCLXXIII. VI. Idus Quint.
230	474	280	125-1	
231	475	279	125-2	C. Fabricius C.F.C.N. Luscinus II. Cos. II. De Lucaneis Bruttieis Tarentin. Samnitibus. Ann. CDLXXV. Idibus Decembr.
232	476	278	125-3	C. Junius C.F.C.N. Brutus Bubule. Cos. II. De Lucaneis et Bruttieis. Ann. CDLXXVI. Non. Jan.
233	477	277	125-4	Q. Fabius Q.F.M.N. Maximus. Gurges II. Cos. II. De Samnitibus Lucaneis Bruttieis. Ann. CDLXXVII. Quirinalib.
234	478	276	126-1	M' Curius M'F.M'N. Dentat. IV. . . . . nitib. et Rege Pyrrho. A. CDLXXXIX . . . . ebr. . . . Ti. F. Ser. N. Lentul. . . os. De Samnitibus et . . . Ann. CDLXXXIX. K. Mart.
235	479	-275	126-2	
236	480	274	126-3	. . . C. N. Canina . . . . . neis Samnitibus . Ann. CDXXC. Quirinalibus.

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
		Metellus II. & Bulbus	Megello III. & Bruto
		Maximus II. & Muso VI.	Dentato & Rufino
		+ Cremolus + & + Albinus +	Corvino II. & Noctua
		Marcellus & Rutilius	Tremulo II. & Arvina.
		Potitus & + Petitus +	Marcellino & Rutilo.
		Lepidus & + Cincinnus +	Maximo & Pæto.
		+ Tacitus + & + Dento +	Canina & Lepido.
		Dolabella & Maximus	Tucca & Metello.
		+ Lucius + & Pappus	Calvo & Maximo.
		Barbula & Philippus	Luscinius & Labo.
		Levinus & Cornucanius	Barbula & Filippo.
		Severio & Muro	Levino & Cornucanio.
		Luscinius & Pappus	Saberio & + Prorico +.
		Rufinus & Bulbus	Luscino II. & Pæto.
		Gorges & Clepsinus	Rufino II. & Bruto II.
		+ Benacus + & Lentulus	Gurgis II. & Clepsina.
		+ Benacus + & Merenda	Dentato II. & Lentulo.
		Licinius & + Cambius +	Dentato III. & Merenda.



Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Era.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
237	481	273	126-4	. . . ximus II. . . . . Tarenti . . . . An. CD . . . . L. Papirius L. . . . Cos. II. De Ta . . . . Brut- ticiis
238	482	272	127-1	
239	483	271	127-2	. . . . Corne . . . . . assi . . . . .
240	484	270	127-3	
241	485	269	127-4	. . . . . onius P.F. . . . . De Peicentibus . . Ap. Claudius Ap. F . . . . Cos. De Peicen . . .
242	486	268	128-1	M. Atilius M.F.L.N. . . . . Cos. De Sallentineis . . . . . VIII L. Julius L.F.L.N. Libo. Cos. De Sallentineis. An. C . . . . VII . . Febr.
243	487	267	128-2	D. Junius D.F.D.N. Pera Cos. De Sassinatibus An. CDXXCVII. V. K. Octobr. N. Fabius C.F.M.N. Pictor II. Cos. De Sassina- tibus. An. CDXXCVII. III. Non. Oct. N. Fabius C.F.M.N. Pictor II. Cos. De Salentineis Messapieisque. An. CDXXCVII. K. Febr. D. Junius D.F.D.N. Pera II. Cos. De Sallen- tineis Messapieisque An. CDXXCVII. Non. Febr.
244	488	266	128 3	Cens. Cn. Cornelius L. F. N. Blasio C. Marcius C.F.L.N. Rutilus Qui L.F. XXXV. in hoc honore Censorin. appel. e.
245	489	265	128-4	BELLUM PUNICUM PRIMUM. Ap. Claudius C.F. Ap. N. Caudex. M. Fulvius Q.F.M.N. Flaccus. M. Fulvius Q.F.M.N. Flaccus Cos. De Vulsi- niensibus. An. CDXXCIX. K. Nov.
246	490	264	129-1	M <sup>r</sup> Valerius M.F.M.N. Maximus. Qui in hoc honore Messal. appel. e. M <sup>r</sup> Otacilius C.F.M <sup>r</sup> N. Crassus. Cn. Fulvius Cn.F.Cn.Maxim. Centumalus. Dict. Q. Marcius Q.F.Q.N. Philip- Clavi figend. causa. pus Mag. eq. M <sup>r</sup> Valerius M.F.M.N. Maxim. Messalla Cos. De Pœneis et Rege Siculor. Hierone. An. CDXC. XVI. K. April.
247	491	263	129-2	L. Postumius L.F.L.N. Megellus Q. Mamilius Q.F.M.N. Vitulus.

Diodorus.	Livy.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
		Cursor & Maximus	† Lucino † & † Cinna †
		Claudius & Clepsi- nas	Cursore II. & Maximo
		Gallus & Pictor	† Claudio † & Clepsina.
		Sempronius & Rufus	Clepsina II. & † Laesio †.
		Regulus & Libo	Gallo & Pictore.
		Fabius Pictor & † Peta †	Sofo & † Ruffio †.
		Maximus & Vitu- lus	Regulo & Libone.
		† Thaugatus † & Flaccus	Pera & Pictore.
		Maximus II. & Crassus	Maximo & Vitulo.
		Albinus & Vitulus	Caudex & Flacco.
		Flaccus II. & Crassus II.	Maximo & Grasso.

Year of the Common-wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
248	492	262	129-3	L. Valerius M.F.L.N. Flaccus T. Otacilius C.F.M'N. Crassus.
249	493	261	129-4	Cn. Cornelius L.F.Cn.N. Scipio Asina. C. Duilius M.F.M.N. C. Duilius M.F.M.N. Cos. Primus Navalem De Sicul. et classe Pœnica egit An. CDXCIII. K. Interkalar.
250	494	260	130-1	L. Cornelius L.F.Cn.N. Scipio C. Aquillius M.F.C.N. Florus L. Cornelius L.F.Cn.N. Scipio Cos. De Pœneis et Sardin. Corsica An. CDXCIV. V. Id. Mart.
251	495	259	130-2	A. Atilius A.F.C.N. Calatinus C. Sulpicius Q.F.Q.N. Paterculus C. Aquillius M.F.C.N. Florus Pro Cos. De Pœneis An. CDXCV. IIII. Non. Octob. C. Sulpicius Q.F.Q.N. Paterculus Cos. De Pœneis et Sardeis An. CDXC . . . . III . . . . Cens. C. Duilius M.F.M. . . . . cipi . . . .
252	496	258	130-3	C. Atilius M.F.M.N. Regulus Cn. . . . . Q. Ogulnius L.F.A.N. Gallus Dict. M. Lætorius M.F.M.N. Plan- Latinar. Fer. Causa. cianus Mag. eq. A. Atilius A.F.C.N. Calatinus Pr. ex Sicilia De Pœnis. An. . . . XIIII. K. F . . . . C. Atilius M.F.M.N. Regulus Cos. De Pœnis Nava- lem egit VIII. . . .
253	497	257	130-4	L. Manlius A.F.P.N. Vulso Longus. Q. Cædicius Q.F.Q.N. In Mag. mort. e. in ejus locum factus est M. Atilius M.F.L.N. Regulus. L. Manlius A.F.P.N. Vulso Long. Cos. De Pœnis Navalem egit VII . . . An. . .
254	498	256	131-1	Ser. Fulvius M.F.M.N. Pætin. Nobilior M. Aimilius M.F.L.N. Paullus.
255	499	255	131-2	Cn. Cornelius L.F. Cn. N. Scipio Asina A. Atilius A.F.C.N. Calatinus. Ser. Fulvius M.F.M.N. Pætinus Nobilior Pro Cos. De Cossurensibus et Pœneis Navalem egit XIII. K. Febr. A. CDXCIX. M. Aimilius M.F.L.N. Paullus Pro Cos. De Cos- surensibus et Pœnis Navalem egit XII. K. Febr. An. CDXCIX.

Diodorus.	Livy.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
		Scipio & Duilius	Megello & Vitulo.
		Scipio II. & Florus	Flacco & Grasso.
		† Catacinus † & Paterculus	Asina & Duillio.
		Regulus & Blesus	Scipione & Floro.
		Vulso & † Decius †	Calatino & Paterculus.
		Petinus & Paullus	Regulo & Blesio.
		Scipio & † Catacin †	Longo & Regulo.
		Capito & Blesus II.	Nobiliore & Paulo.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
256	500	254	131-3	Cn. Servilius Cn. F. Cn. N. Cæpio C. Sempronius Ti. F. Ti. N. Blæsus Cens. D. Junius D.F.D.N. Pera. Abd. L. Postumius L.F.L.N. Megell. Idem qui Pr. erat. In mag. m. est. Cn. Cornelius L.F. Cn. N. Scipio Asina Pro Cos. De Pœnis X. K. April. An. D. C. Sempronius Ti. F. Ti. N. Blæsus Cos. De Pœnis K. April. An. D.
257	501	253	131-4	C. Aurelius L.F.C.N. Cotta. P. Servilius Q.F.Cn.N. Geminus Cens. M' Valerius M.F.M.N. Maxim. Messal. P. Sempronius P.F.P.N. Sophus L.F. XXXVII. C. Aurelius L.F.C.N. Cotta Cos. De Pœneis et Sicu- leis. Idibus April. An. DI.
258	502	252	132-1	L. Cæcilius L.F.C.N. Metellus C. Furius C.F.C.N. Pacilus
259	503	251	132-2	C. Atilius M.F.M.N. Regulus II. L. Manlius A.F.P.N. Vulso II. L. Cæcilius L.F.C.N. Metellus Pro Cos. De Pœnis VII. Idus Septemb. A. DII.
260	504	250	132-3	P. Claudius Ap. F.C.N. Pulcher. L. Junius C.F.L.N. Pullus. M. Claudius C.F. Glicia. qui scriba fuerat. Dictator. coact. abdic. Sine Mag. eq. In ejus locum factus est A. Atilius A.F.C.N. Calatinus Dict. L. Cæcilius L.F.C.N. Metellus Rei Gerund. Causa. Mag. eq.
261	505	249	132-4	C. Aurelius L.F.C.N. Cotta II. P. Servilius Q.F.Cn.N. Geminus II.
262	506	248	133-1	L. Cæcilius L.F.C.N. Metellus II. N. Fabius M.F.M.N. Buteo. Cens. A. Atilius. A.F.C.N. Calatinus A. Manlius T.F.T.N. Torquat. Attic. L.F. XXXVIII.
263	507	247	133-2	M' Otacilius C.F.M.N. Crassus II. M. Fabius M.F.M.N. Licinus. Ti. Coruncanus Ti. F. Ti. Nepos. Dict. M. Fulvius Q.F.M.N. Comit. Habend. Causa. Flaccus Mag. eq.



DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
		Cotta & Geminus	Asina II. & Calatino II.
		Metellus & † Pap- pus †	Cepio & Blesio.
		Regulus II. & Vulso	Cotta & Geminio.
		Pulcher & † Pul- cher †	Metello & Pacilo.
		Cotta II. & Gemi- nus II.	Regulo II. & Vulso.
		Metellus II. & Bu- teo	Pulero & Pullo.
		Crassus & Licin- nius	Cotta II. & Gemi- no II.
		Buteo II. & Bul- bus	Metello & † Ru- tilo †.

Year of the Common- wealth.	Year of Rome.	Year before the Christian Æra.	Olympiad.	Fasti Capitolini.
264	508	246	133-3	M. Fabius M.F.M.N. Buteo. C. Atilius A.F.A.N. Bulbus.
265	509	245	133-4	A. Manlius T.F.T.N. Torquat. Attic. C. Sempronius Ti. F. Ti. N. Blæsus II.
266	510	244	134-1	C. Fundanius C.F.Q.N. Fundulus C. Sulpicius C.F. Ser. N. Gallus
267	511	243	134-2	C. Lutatius C.F.C.N. Catulus A. Postumius A.F.L.N. Albinus.
268	512	242	134-3	A. Manlius T.F.T.N. To . . . Attic. II. Q. Lutatius . . . C.N. Ce . . . Cens. C. Aurelius L . . . . . C. Lutatius C.F.C.N. Catulus Pro Cos. De Pœnis ex Sicil . . . e . . . egit. IIII. Non. Oct. A. DXII. Q. Valerius Q.F.P.N. Falto Pro Pr. ex Sicilia Navalem egit Prid. Non. Octob. An. DXII. Q. Lutatius C.F.C.N. Cerco Cos. De Falisceis K. Mart. An. DXII. A. Manlius T.F.T.N. Torquatus Atticus. Cos. II. De Falisceis IV Non. M . . . Ann. DXII.
269	513	241	134-4	C. Claudius. Ap. F.C.N. Centho. M. Sempronius C.F.M.N. Tuditanus.

DIODORUS.	LIVY.	Fasti Siculi.	Fasti Cuspiniani sive Norisiani.
		Torquatus & Ble- sus	Grasso II. & Lici- no II.
		Fundulus & Gal- lus	Buteo & Pullo.
		Catulus & Albinus	Attico & Blæso.
		Torquatus & † Cato †	Fundulo & Gallo.
		Cento & † Tudina- tus †	Catulo & Albino.
		† Toncinus † & Falco	Attico II. & Cerco.

## EXPLANATION OF THE TABLES.

I HAVE continued the tables of military tribunes and consuls from the point at which they ended in the last volume, to the end of the first Punic war. I have given, as before, the lists of consuls, from Livy and Diodorus, so far as their remaining works contain them ; and I have now given all the fragments of the Fasti Capitolini which relate to the period contained in this volume without any omission, and at the same time without adding to the words or even letters which exist on the fragments of the marble hitherto discovered.

The Fasti of Diodorus end with the year 452, and those of Livy with the year 459 ; and the Fasti Capitolini are wanting for several years here and there both before and after that period. I have therefore given two other sets of Fasti ; one of which goes by the name of the Sicilian Fasti, because Onufrio Panvini found the MS. containing it in Sicily. Casaubon copied the MS. and gave his copy to Scaliger, who published it in his edition of Eusebius, pp. 227—299, under the title of *ἐπιτομή χρόνων*.

The other Fasti were first made known by John Cuspiniani, who published extracts from them in his commentary on Cassiodorus in the sixteenth century. They have been since published entirely by Noris towards the end of the seventeenth century, and they may be found, with his dissertation on them, in the eleventh volume of Grævius' Collection of Roman Antiquities. The MS. containing them is in the

imperial library at Vienna, and, according to Noris, they were compiled about the year 354 of the Christian æra.

These last *Fasti* are no doubt older and more correct than the Sicilian, which are full of errors; but both are useless for the period of the military tribuneships; because, representing all the years of the commonwealth as marked by consulships, they never give to any year the names of more than two magistrates. But the author of the Sicilian *Fasti* seems to have copied his lists from some writer who, like Cassiodorus, gave only the consulships, and purposely omitted the years of military tribuneships; and not being aware of this, and supposing that the lists of consuls were continuous in point of time, he has marked the years immediately preceding the first plebeian consulship with the names of the consuls who preceded the Gaulish invasion; insomuch that placing that invasion in the third year of the 99th Olympiad, he notwithstanding makes it fall in the consulship of M. Genucius and C. Curtius, who were consuls only five years after the expulsion of the decemvirs. Both the Sicilian *Fasti* and those of Noris give merely the cognomen, or last name, of each consul: it seems as if they had looked hastily up some *Fasti* where all the names were given at length, and had, to save trouble, merely copied down the name which came last. Sometimes the recurrence of the same names near to each other has misled them; as, for instance, in the third Samnite war, the Sicilian *Fasti* give three consulships of Q. Fabius and P. Decius instead of two, and two of Ap. Claudius and Volumnius instead of one. The corruptions of the Roman names are as bad as those in the *Fasti* of Diodorus: Calatinus is corrupted into "Catacion," Dentatus into "Benacus," Cædicus into "Decius," Caudex into "Thaugatus," Canina, a rather uncommon cognomen of one branch of the Claudian house, becomes "Cambius" in the Sicilian *Fasti*, and "Cinna" in those of Noris; and many others recur which it is in general easy to correct from the corresponding years in the *Fasti*



Capitolini, or from any correct list of the consuls. Some corruptions, however, cannot easily be restored, nor is it always easy to ascertain how much must be ascribed to mere errors of the copyist, and where the authors really meant to give different consuls from those named in the other *Fasti*.

With regard to Livy's Chronology, the fixed point from which we must set out is the year of Rome 400, which, according to his express statement, VII. 18, was the thirty-fifth year after the expulsion of the Gauls, and was marked by the consulship of C. Sulpicius Peticus, and M. Valerius Publicola. Reckoning the years from this point, according to Livy's own statement of events, the consulship of Q. Fabius Gurges and D. Junius Brutus, the last-mentioned in his tenth book, would fall in the year 459. But Sigonius places it one year later, and makes the year 422 to have been wholly taken up by interregna, and so to have been marked by no consuls' names. This he does, in order to reconcile Livy with himself; because his reckonings elsewhere require, as he thinks, the insertion of a year more than he has actually accounted for. That is to say, Livy, in the beginning of the 31st book, says that the sixty-three years which passed between the beginning of the first Punic war and the end of the second, had furnished him with matter for as many books as the four hundred and seventy-eight years which had elapsed from the foundation of Rome to the consulship of Ap. Claudius, when the first Punic war began. Such are the numbers in almost all the MSS. But as the number four hundred and seventy-eight would agree with no system of chronology, it has been long since corrected in the printed editions to "four hundred and eighty-eight." Sigonius, however, argued that the true reading was four hundred and eighty-six, the Roman numerals CDLXXVIII having, as he thinks, been corrupted from CDLXXXVI, the third X having been altered to V, and the V separated into II. He therefore

places the beginning of the first Punic war in 486, having, as I have above-mentioned, inserted a whole year of interregna, not noticed by Livy, which he makes out to be the year 422. Now, without this additional year, the first Punic war does actually, as I think, according to Livy, begin in 487; for Sigonius omits two consulships between the retreat of Pyrrhus and the consulship of Ap. Claudius and M. Fulvius, namely those of Q. Ogulnius and C. Fabius in 485, and of Q. Fabius Gurges and L. Mamilius in 489. The first of these is mentioned expressly by Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* XXXIII. § 44, as well as by Zonaras, VIII. 7, and by the Sicilian *Fasti* and those of Noris, and is admitted by Sigonius himself in his commentary on the *Fasti Capitolini*. The consulship of Q. Fabius and L. Mamilius is mentioned by the Sicilian *Fasti* and by those of Noris, and is required by the dates of the *Fasti Capitolini*, which place the consulship of D. Junius Pera and N. Fabius in 487, and that of Ap. Claudius and M. Fulvius in 489, manifestly making an interval of a year between them, although the names of the intermediate consuls are lost. Zonaras speaks of Fabius as being sent against the Volsinians, and expressly says that he was consul in that year with “Æmilius,” according to the present text of Zonaras in the edition of Du Cange, Venice, 1729. But in the 2nd chapter of the same 8th book of Zonaras, L. Æmilius the colleague of Q. Marcius Philippus in 473, is in one MS. called *Μαμίλιον*, which shows how readily the names *Αἰμίλιος* and *Μαμίλιος* may be confounded with each other. And, farther, Sigonius acknowledges this consulship of Q. Fabius and L. Mamilius in his commentary on the *Fasti Capitolini*. Thus, according to Livy, there would be in fact the events of 486 years related in his fifteen first books, and the sixteenth book began with the year 487, that is with the consulship of Ap. Claudius and M. Fulvius; and the fifteen next books did contain also the events of sixty-three years; from the year 487 to the year 550, the consulship of Cn. Cornelius and

P. Ælius Pætus, before the expiration of which the war with Carthage was concluded; as the first Punic war had begun about the middle of 487. And thus the correctness of Sigonius' alteration of Livy's date from CDLXXVIII to CDLXXXVI is indeed established, although, as I think, his way of justifying it is erroneous, and so also is his interpretation of it: for Livy does not say that App. Claudius was consul in 486, but that his own fifteen first books, which stopped at the beginning of App. Claudius' consulship, had contained the events of 486 years. And therefore, according to Livy, the first year of the war with Pyrrhus would fall in 471, the first year of the first Punic war in 487, and the end of the second Punic war in 550.

Meantime, I have continued to follow the common chronology of the years of Rome, because it is hopeless now to endeavour to supersede it by any other system, and it would be a mere perplexity to my readers, if they were to find every action recorded in this history fixed to a different year from that with which they had been accustomed to connect it. Nor does there seem any adequate object to be gained by the attempt. The æra of the foundation of Rome is itself a point impossible to fix accurately; nor can we determine the chronology of the fourth and fifth centuries of Rome either in itself, or as compared with the chronology of Greece. Our existing authorities are too uncertain and too conflicting to allow of this; and as I have said already in another place, the uncertainty of the history and chronology act mutually on each other, and a sure standing place is not to be found. The five years of anarchy during the discussions on the Licinian laws are indeed utterly improbable; and we may safely assume that they could not have happened exactly as they are represented. But Cn. Flavius, in the middle of the fifth century, recorded on his Temple of Concord<sup>1</sup> that it was dedicated 204 years after the dedica-

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* XXXIII. § 19. Ed. Sillig.

tion of the Capitol ; and this agrees exactly with the Fasti Capitolini, which place the ædileship of Flavius and the censorship of Fabius and Decius in the year of Rome 449. It is, indeed, probable that the Gaulish invasion should be placed later than its common date ; and the five years of the anarchy may well be inserted in the early part of the commonwealth ; a period, for which we have neither a history nor a chronology that will bear any inquiry. Yet Polybius followed the common date of the Gaulish invasion, and his chronology of the subsequent Gaulish wars is all based on the assumption that Rome was taken in the 98th Olympiad, and not later. Polybius doubtless may have been misled, and Cn. Fulvius may have had no sufficient authority for fixing the interval between the dedication of his Temple of Concord and that of the Capitol : but if they were both mistaken, where are we to find surer guides ? and if the records on which they relied were uncertain, as indeed they very possibly were, what evidence or what probability can we find now, so as to be enabled to arrive at a more certain conclusion ?

I follow then the common chronology of Rome ; not indeed as thinking with the authors of "*L'Art de vérifier les Dates*," that it is possible to fix the very year, and even the day of the month, on which the several consuls of the fifth century entered upon their office ; but because it is a convenient standard of reference, and, if not correct, which in all probability it is not, yet is quite as much so as any other system which could be set up in its room. And this has determined me not to adopt Niebuhr's dates, even on his authority ; because I cannot persuade myself that the certainty of his amended chronology is so clear as to compensate for the manifest inconvenience of departing from a system which is fixed in the memories of all the readers of Roman history throughout Europe.



## APPENDIX I.

### NOTE ON THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF MANLIUS.

ZONARAS, whose history is taken generally from Dion Cassius, relates that Manlius was holding the Capitol against the government, and that a slave having offered to betray him, went up to the Capitol as a deserter, and begged to speak with Manlius. He professed to be come to him on the part of the slaves of Rome, who were ready to rise and join him, and whilst Manlius was speaking to him apart on the edge of the cliff, the slave suddenly pushed him down it, and he was then seized by some men who had been previously placed there in ambush, and was by them carried off as a prisoner. Then he was tried in the Campus Martius; and as the people could not condemn him in sight of the Capitol, the trial was adjourned, and the people met again in another place out of sight of the Capitol, and then condemned him. The scene of the second trial is said by Livy to have been the Peteline Grove. Now we find that on two other occasions after a secession, assemblies were held in groves without the city walls, and not in the Campus Martius; once after the revolt of the soldiers and secession of the commons in 413, in this very Peteline Grove (Livy, VII. 41), and once after the last secession to the Janiculum, in the Oak Grove, "in Esculeto." (Pliny, Hist. Nat. XVI. § 37.) Now as there is little reason to doubt that there was a secession also in the disturbance caused by Manlius, it is likely that when peace was restored the terms would



have been settled in an assembly held in some sacred grove, and that there a general amnesty would be passed, and any exceptions to the amnesty discussed and determined. And if Manlius had fallen into the power of his enemies in the manner described by Zonaras, his partisans having thus lost their leader, would have been ready to submit, and could not have opposed his execution, if it were insisted upon by the government as a necessary sacrifice to public justice. The story of his trial before the centuries in the Campus Martius is every way suspicious, and may possibly have been invented to account for the fact of his death having been decreed in an assembly held in the Peteline Grove. It was obvious that trials before the centuries, the only tribunal which could legally try a Roman citizen capitally, were held in the Campus Martius ; and as the fact of the secession was more and more glossed over, so the real nature of the assembly in the Peteline Grove would be less understood ; and then it was attempted to be explained as a mere adjourned meeting of the centuries, held in an unusual place, because the deliverer of the Capitol could not be condemned in the Campus Martius, where his judges had the Capitol directly before their eyes.

I may observe that the law which forbade any patrician's residing from henceforth in the Capitol, strongly confirms the fact of an actual secession. Manlius had occupied the citadel as a fortified position, and had held it with an armed force against the government ; and this pointed out the danger of allowing any one to reside within its precincts.

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## APPENDIX II.

### ON THE LATER CONSTITUTION OF THE CENTURIES.

THE constitution of the comitia of the centuries, as it originally existed, is perfectly familiar to every reader, and

has been described in the first volume of this history. But it is remarkable that this well-known form of it never existed during those times of which we have a real history ; and the form which had succeeded to it is a complete mystery. It is strange, but true, that we know how the centuries were constituted in the times of the later kings, but that we do not know what was their constitution in the time of Cicero and Cæsar.

It is quite clear that the old constitution of the centuries gave a decided ascendancy to wealth. The first class, together with the centuries of the knights, formed a majority of the whole comitia. Thus every election would have been in the hands of the rich, and such a state of things as existed in the last years of the commonwealth, when the aristocracy had no other decided influence than what they could gain by bribery, is altogether inconceivable.

Again, the division of the people into tribes had nothing to do with the earlier constitution of the centuries ; the votes were taken by classes, and a man's class depended on the amount of his property. But in the later constitution the votes were taken by tribes, and a man's tribe, except in the case of the four city tribes, implied nothing as to his rank or fortune. The agents employed to purchase votes were called *divisores tribuum* ; such and such tribes are mentioned as interested in behalf of particular candidates (Cicero *pro Plancio*) ; and some one tribe was determined by lot to exercise the privilege of voting before the rest. In short the tribes are mentioned as commonly at the comitia in the Campus Martius, whether held for trials or for elections, as at the comitia held in the forum.

On the other hand, the division by classes continued to exist in the later constitution. Cicero speaks of the comitia of centuries differing from the comitia of tribes, inasmuch as in the former, he says, " the people are arranged according to property, rank, and age, whilst in the latter no such distinctions are observed." *De Legibus*, III. 19. The centu-

ries of the first class are spoken of both in trials (Livy, XLIII. 16), and in elections (Cicero, Philippic. II. 33), and in the second oration of the pseudo-Sallust to Cæsar, *de Republicâ Ordinanda*, the author notices, as a desirable change in the actual constitution, that a law formerly proposed by C. Gracchus should be again brought forward and enacted, that the centuries should be called by lot from all the five classes indiscriminately. This proves not only that the division into classes existed to the end of the commonwealth, but also that the first class continued to enjoy certain advantages above the others. The problem therefore is to determine how the system of classes was blended with that of tribes, and in what degree the centuries of the historical period of the commonwealth retained or had forfeited the strong aristocratical character impressed on them by their original constitution.

Various solutions of this problem have been offered at different times by scholars of great ability. Octavius Panthagathus in the 16th century supposed that each of the five classes had two centuries belonging to it in each of the tribes, and that the Equites had one century in each tribe, making the whole number of centuries to amount to 385, out of which those of the Equites and the first class together would amount to 105, whilst those of the other classes were 280; so that the two former, instead of being a majority of the whole comitia, stood to the other centuries only in the proportion of 3 to 8. This notion of seventy centuries in each class, or ten centuries in each tribe, has been maintained also by Savigny, according to Zumpt; and by Walther, in his *History of the Roman Law*, Vol. I. p. 136. This also is the opinion of another living authority of the highest order, who has expressed to me his full acquiescence in it.

Niebuhr, on the contrary, held that the whole division into five classes was done away with; that each tribe contained two centuries only, one of older men, the other of

younger ; that the thirty-one country tribes constituted the first class under this altered system, and the four city tribes the second class ; and that besides these two classes there were no more. He held the aristocratical character of the comitia of centuries, as compared with the assembly of the tribes, to consist in the following points : that the plebeian knights voted distinctly from the rest of the commons, and that the patricians also had their separate votes in the *sex suffragia*, or six old centuries of knights ; 2nd, that the centuries of each tribe were divided according to their age, one of older men, and the other of younger ; 3rd, that the proletarians, or those who possessed property under four thousand asses, were altogether excluded ; and 4th, that the auspices were necessarily taken at the comitia of centuries, and that they were thus subjected to the influence of the augurs. Niebuhr held also, that the prerogative century could only be chosen out of the tribes of the first class, and never out of the four city tribes.

Zumpt, in a recent essay on the constitution of the comitia of centuries, read before the Prussian academy in 1836, maintains that the old centuries of *Ser. Tullius* subsisted to the end of the commonwealth without any material alteration, except that those of the first class were reduced from eighty to seventy. He then supposes that two of these centuries were allotted to each of the thirty-five tribes, together with three centuries from the four remaining classes ; and of these three, one he thinks was taken from the fifth class, and two-thirds of a century from the second, third, and fourth classes. Thus the richer citizens still retained an influence in the comitia more than in proportion to their numbers, although much less than it had been in the original constitution of *Ser. Tullius*.

Lastly, Professor Huschke of Breslau, in his work on the constitution of *Ser. Tullius*, published in 1838, agrees with Niebuhr in supposing that the whole number of centuries was reduced to seventy, each tribe containing two, one of

older men and the other of younger ; but these seventy centuries were divided, he thinks, into five classes ; so that about ten tribes or twenty centuries would contain the citizens of the first class, a certain number of tribes would in like manner contain all the citizens of the second class, and so on to the end : some tribes, according to this hypothesis, consisting only of richer citizens, and others only of poorer.

But I confess that all these solutions, including even that of Niebuhr himself, are to me unsatisfactory. If the first class had contained thirty-one out of the thirty-five tribes, while each tribe contained only two centuries, we should hear rather of the tribes of the first class, than of the centuries ; whilst on the other hand the positive testimony of the pseudo-Sallust, who, according to Niebuhr himself, could not have lived later than the second century after the Christian æra, to the existence of five classes down to the time of the civil war, seems to be on that point an irresistible authority.

It appears to me to be impossible to ascertain with certainty either the number of the centuries in the later constitution, or their connexion with the five classes. To guess at points of mere detail seems hopeless, and positive information on the subject there is none. But we know that the comitia of centuries differed from those of the tribes expressly in this, that whereas all the members of a tribe voted in the comitia tributa without any farther distinction between them, and, as far as appears, without any subdivisions within the tribe itself, so in the comitia of centuries the members of the same tribe were distinguished from each other ; the older men certainly voted distinctly from the younger men, and probably the richer men also voted distinctly from the poorer : so that the centuries were a less democratical body than the tribes.

In the account given by Polybius of the composition of the Roman army, we find traces at once of the existence of



something like the old system of classes, and of the changes which it must have undergone. All citizens whose property exceeded four thousand asses, were now enlisted into the legions, whereas in old times none had been required to provide themselves with arms whose property fell short of twelve thousand five hundred asses. But one hundred thousand asses still appear to have been the qualification for the first class ; and it is remarkable that the peculiar distinction of this class, the coat of mail, was the same as it had been in the oldest known system of the classes. All distinctions of arms, offensive or defensive, between the second, third, and fourth classes, seem to have been abolished ; but the fifth class still, as in old times, supplied the light-armed soldiers of the legions, or the velites.

But, however much of the old system of the classes was preserved in the later constitution of the centuries, the difference in the political spirit of the tribes and centuries is scarcely, I think, perceivable. We do not find the votes of the centuries ever relied upon by the aristocracy to counterbalance the popular feeling of the tribes. It might have been conceived that a popular assembly, where wealth conferred any ascendancy, would have been decidedly opposed to one of a character purely democratical ; that the centuries in short, like our own House of Commons, during more than one period of our history, should have sympathized more and more with the senate, and have counteracted to the utmost of their power on the Campus Martius the policy embraced by the tribes in the forum. But this is not the case ; the spirit of the Roman people, as distinguished from the senate and the equestrian order, appears to have been much the same whether they were assembled in one sort of comitia or another ; the centuries elected Flaminius and Varro to the consulship in the second Punic war, although their opposition to the aristocracy seems to have been one of their chief recommendations ; and in later times the

centuries elected many consuls who advocated the popular cause not less violently than the most violent of the tribunes elected by the tribes.

The cause of this is to be found in the great wealth of the equestrian order and of the senate, which drew a broad line of separation between them and the richest of the plebeians, and thus drove the members of the first class to sympathize with those below them rather than with those above them. While the possession of the judicial power was disputed by the senate and the equestrian order, it was only after many years that any share of it was communicated to the richest of the plebeians. Thus it is probable that the middle classes at Rome, as elsewhere, repelled by the pride of the highest classes, were forced back as it were into the mass of the lower ; and entered as bitterly into all measures galling to the aristocracy, as the poorest citizens of the tribes.

If this be so, the question as to the exact form of the comitia of centuries in later times, however curious in itself, is of no great importance to our right understanding of the subsequent history. For whether the influence of the first class as compared with that of the lower classes was greater or less, it does not appear that the character of the comitia was altered from what it would have been otherwise ; the first class was as little attached to the aristocracy as the fourth or fifth. After the unsuccessful attempts of so many men of ability and learning, I have no confidence that I could approach more nearly to the true solution of the problem ; and, in fact, there seem difficulties in the way of every theory, which our present knowledge can hardly enable us to remove. If hereafter any solution should occur to me which may be free from palpable objections, and may seem to meet all the circumstances of the case, I shall hope to mention it in a subsequent volume ; in the mean time, I must at present express my belief that the exact arrangement of the classes in the later comitia of

centuries is a problem no less inexplicable than that of the disposition of the rowers in the ancient ships of war.

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### APPENDIX III.

#### OF THE ROMAN LEGION IN THE FIFTH CENTURY OF ROME.

THE accounts of the Roman legion in the fourth and fifth centuries of Rome are full of perplexity. Nor is this to be wondered at, for as there were no contemporary historians, and as the military system afterwards underwent considerable changes, the older state of things could be known only from accidental notices of it in the stories of the early wars, or from uncertain memory. How little help in these inquiries is to be expected from Livy, may be understood from this single fact ; that although he himself in two several places (I. 43 and VIII. 8) has expressly stated that the ancient Roman tactic was that of the phalanx, yet in no one of his descriptions of battles are any traces to be found of such a system ; but the sword and not the pike is spoken of as the most efficient weapon, just as it was in the tactic of the second Punic war, or of the age of Marius and of Cæsar.

Livy, however, has preserved in one place a detailed account of the earlier legion, as it existed in the great Latin war in the beginning of the fifth century. And Polybius, as is well known, has described at length the arms and organization of the legion of his time, that is, of the latter part of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh century of Rome. I shall notice the similar and dissimilar points in these two accounts, and then see how far we can explain the changes implied in them : and, finally, notice some statements in other writers which relate to the same subject.

Both accounts acknowledge the existence of four divisions

of fighting men in the legion ; the light-armed, (*γροσφό-μαχοι* Polyb. *rorarii*, Livy,) the *hastati*, the *principes*, and the *triarii*. But to these there was in the older legion a fifth added, the *accensi*, or supernumeraries ; who in ordinary cases were not armed, but went to the field to be ready to take the arms and supply the places of those who fell.

In both accounts the *hastati*, when the legion is drawn up in order of battle, are placed in front of the *principes*, and the *principes* in front of the *triarii*. But in the old legion the greater part of the light-armed soldiers are described as stationed with the *triarii* in the third line, and only about a fourth part of them are with the *hastati* in the front. Whereas, in the later legion, the light troops are divided equally among the three lines.

Again, in the older legion the *triarii* were equal in numbers to the *hastati* and *principes*, respectively, each division consisting of somewhat more than nine hundred men. Whereas, in the later legion, the *triarii* were never more than six hundred men ; while the *hastati* and *principes* were regularly twelve hundred each, and sometimes exceeded this number.

In the older legion the light-armed troops carried each man a pike, "*hasta*," and two or more javelins, "*gæsa*." These were the arms of the fourth class in the Servian constitution, "*nihil præter hastam et verutum datum*:" *verutum* and *gæsa* alike signifying missile weapons or javelins as opposed to the *hasta* or pike. But in the later legion, the light-armed soldier carried no pike, but had a round shield, *πάρην*, and a dirk or cutlass, *μάχαιρα*, together with his javelins.

In the older legion again the *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*, all bore the arms of the second and third classes in the Servian constitution ; that is to say, the large oblong shield, "*scutum*," the pike, and the sword, "*gladius*." But in the later legion, the *hastati* and *principes* had both

dropped the pike, and were armed instead of it with two large javelins, of about six feet in length, which Polybius calls *ύσσολί*, and which were no other than the formidable *pila*.

Farther, we have a remarkable notice, that there was a time when the *triarii* alone carried *pila*, and were called *pilani*, while the *hastati* and *principes* still carried pikes<sup>2</sup>.

Again, the older legion was divided into forty-five maniples or ordines; fifteen of *hastati*, fifteen of *principes*, and fifteen of *triarii*; but as the *triarii* were in fact a triple division, so their maniples contained one hundred and eighty-six, or possibly one hundred and eighty-nine men each, while those of the *hastati* and *principes* contained only sixty-three men each.

In the later legion, the *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii* contained ten maniples each; and those of the two former divisions consisted of one hundred and twenty men each, while those of the *triarii* contained only sixty. The light troops were divided into thirty divisions, one of which was added to each maniple of the heavy-armed troops, in just proportion to its respective strength; that is, that twenty-four light-armed men were added to each maniple of the *triarii*, and forty-eight to each maniple of the *hastati* and *principes*. It may be, however, that the divisions of the light-armed troops were all equal: in which case they would have raised each maniple of the *triarii* to one hundred men, and each maniple of the *hastati* and *principes* to one hundred and sixty.

In the older legion, each maniple contained two centuries; that is, it consisted of two centuries. Therefore the century of the old legion consisted of thirty men.

In the later legion each maniple also had two centuries; but the maniples being of unequal numbers, the centuries

<sup>2</sup> Livy says that the *hastati* and *principes* were called *antepilani*; VIII. 8. Varro, (Ling. Lat. V. § 39. Ed. Müller,) and Ovid (Fasti, III. 129), call the *triarii* expressly *pilani*.



were unequal also : the centuries of the triarii contained thirty men each, as in the older legion, but those of the hastati and principes had each sixty.

On comparing these two forms of the legion, it is manifest that in the older there is retained one of the characteristic points of the system of the phalanx, or of fighting in columns, the keeping the light-armed or worst-armed men mostly in the rear. The old legion consisted of a first division of about nineteen hundred men, of whom only three hundred and fifteen had inferior arms ; and of a second division of nearly twenty-eight hundred men, of whom only nine hundred and thirty were well armed ; nine hundred and thirty were light-armed, and the remaining nine hundred and thirty, the *accensi*, were not armed at all. Nay, it appears doubtful whether even the triarii, properly so called, were quite equal to the hastati and principes ; for in the Latin war it seems to be a mistake of Livy's to suppose that they carried pikes ; they appear at that time to have borne only pila and swords, and were therefore less fitted than the hastati and principes for the peculiar manner of fighting then in use in the Roman army.

But even in this earlier form of the legion there seems to have been some change introduced from a form still earlier. The mixture of light-armed soldiers in the front ranks of the phalanx, unless we are to suppose that they were always thrown forward as mere skirmishers, and had no place in the line, seems to show that a modification of the tactic of the phalanx had already been found necessary, and that the use of the javelin instead of the pike was already rising in estimation.

This alteration seems to derive its origin from the Gaulish wars. The Gauls used javelins themselves, and the weight of their charge was such that the full-armed soldiers of the Roman legions were not numerous enough to withstand them ; it became of importance, therefore, to improve the efficiency of the light-armed soldiers, and at the

same time to enable the Roman line to reply to the Gaulish missiles, if the enemy preferred a distant combat to fighting hand to hand.

That something of this sort was done is directly stated ; but as usual the accounts are conflicting and inconsistent with themselves. Dionysius makes Camillus say to his soldiers, that whereas "the Gauls had only javelins, they had arrows, a weapon of deadly effect." Ἀντὶ λόγχης ὀϊστός, ἄφυκτον βέλος. *Fragm. Vatic. XXX.* Plutarch says that Camillus instructed his soldiers "to use their long javelins as weapons for close fight," τοῖς ὕσσοις μακροῖς διὰ χειρὸς χρῆσθαι, *Camill. 40*, and in the next chapter he describes the Gauls as grappling with the Romans and trying to push aside their javelins, which evidently supposes them to have been used as pikes. And yet in the very sentence before, he talks of the Gaulish shields as being weighed down by the Roman javelins, which had run through them, and hung upon them, τοὺς δὲ θυρεοὺς συμπεπάρθαι καὶ βαρύνεσθαι τῶν ὕσσῶν ἐφελκομένων, (*Camill. 41.*) a description applicable only to weapons thrown at the enemy and not used as pikes.

A passage in Livy seems to offer the solution of this difficulty. When the Gauls attacked the Roman camp in their invasion of the Roman territory in the year 405, only ten years before the Latin war, the triarii were engaged in throwing up works, and the hastati and principes covered them. Then, as the Gauls advanced up hill to attack the Roman position, "all the pila and spears," "pila omnia hastæque," "took effect," says Livy, "from their own weight ; and the Gauls had either their bodies run through, or their shields weighed down by the darts that were sticking in them." *VII. 23.* It appears then, that both the pilum and hasta could be used as missiles ; but both also could be used as pikes, for the pilum was six feet in length : and therefore it is very possible that Camillus may have shortened the spear of the hastati, to render it available as

a missile, and also strengthened and lengthened the pilum to make it serve on occasion the purposes of a pike.

Thus the hastati and principes were armed with swords, with large oblong shields, *scuta*, and with spears, *hastæ*; but the large shield already fitted them for a more independent and personal mode of fighting than that of the phalanx, and the spear might be used as a javelin, no less than as a pike. The Samnite wars, following so soon afterwards, decided the Romans to give up the tactic of the phalanx still more entirely; the spear which might be used as a javelin, but was more fitted for close fight, was now given only to the soldiers of the third line; while the pilum, which might be used as a pike, but was properly a missile, was taken from the third line, and given to the soldiers of the first and second lines. At the same time those citizens whose properties were rated between four thousand asses and twelve thousand five hundred, and who were not formerly required to provide themselves with arms, were now called upon to do so, and therefore the *accensi* are no more heard of; while the *rorarii*, who seem to have belonged to the fifth class of the old Servian division, and to have gone to battle with no other weapons than slings, were now called upon to provide themselves with light-arms of a better description, and became the *velites* of the new legion. Why the *triarii* should have been also reduced in number does not certainly appear; except that as the whole Roman tactic was now become a very active system of personal combats along the whole line, it was necessary to have as many men as possible available for the two first divisions, and that the mere reserve, which was not to form any part of the fighting force, except on emergency, should be kept low, and confined to the older soldiers who had no longer sufficient activity to be employed in the constantly moving battle of the regular line.

Niebuhr has attempted to explain the number of centuries in the legion, and of men in each century, by a

reference to the varying number of tribes, and to the centuries in the classes of the Servian constitution. But his explanation does not seem to me satisfactory; and the question is not essential to our understanding of the military character of the legion. It may be observed, however, that the germ of the division of the legion into ten cohorts, may be traced already in the legion of the time of Polybius, as a tenfold division existed in it in each of the three lines of the hastati, principes, and triarii. A cohort then would be merely one manipule of each of these three lines; a miniature legion, presenting the same variety of force on a small scale, which the legion itself did on a large scale. And thus the cohorts of the legion of four thousand two hundred men would consist of four hundred and twenty men each, as afterwards in the imperial legion they consisted properly of six hundred men each.

Sallust, it is well known, makes Cæsar say that the Romans had borrowed their arms, offensive and defensive, from the Samnites. (Bell. Catilinar. 51.) And although the Samnites are not named, yet the order of time seems to show that they must, partly at least, be intended, where Diodorus says, Fragm. Vatic. XXIII. 1, that the Romans, having first adopted the tactic of the phalanx in their wars with the Etruscans, afterwards exchanged it for the system of fighting in cohorts, ( $\sigma\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha\iota\varsigma$  being a certain correction for  $\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha\iota\varsigma$ , which has no meaning at all,) and with the large oblong shield,  $\theta\upsilon\rho\epsilon\iota\omicron\iota\varsigma$ , because the nations whom they subsequently encountered used this tactic. And it probably is true, that the peculiar form of the Roman legion was owing to the wars with the Gauls and Samnites, which led to the total disuse of the phalanx, and to the perfecting of those weapons, such as the sword and the javelins, which, in the system of the phalanx, are of the least importance.


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